Amy Paige Snyder

In centuries past, travelers used the stars for navigation. Now, in the early 21st century, people are once again looking to the sky for navigation- not to the stars, but to artificial constellations of satellites. The US Global Positioning System (GPS) has its basis in a 1963 study by the Aerospace Corporation on the use of a space-based system as the foundation of a global radio-navigation satellite system (RNSS). Over the next several years, the US Department of Defense (DoD) developed this concept into the network of Earth-orbiting satellites now known as GPS. Originally intended as a system to enhance the navigation, positioning, and timing capabilities of US and allied military forces, GPS not only continues to be a vital military asset, but now also has numerous civilian functions worldwide. GPS is the basis for a global multi-billion-dollar industry in GPS-based services and equipment. The growth in civilian applications and GPS-based commerce around the world was enabled by the Clinton Administration's 1996 policy, which states that the United States will "provide the GPS...for peaceful civil, commercial, and scientific use on a continuous, worldwide basis, free of direct user fees." 1 The US decision to offer GPS worldwide was done with the hope of, at once, preserving GPS's military and commercial benefits to the United States, and garnering significant diplomatic benefits for the United States.
While the US decision to allow worldwide availability of GPS is likely to be a net benefit, the national security, economic, and political ramifications remain uncertain. Currently, nations both friendly and hostile to the United States may access GPS and develop applications based upon it. At the same time, many nations are developing systems to improve the GPS signal in their regions, while still others contemplate developing their own navigation, positioning, and timing systems. Given the increasing international use of GPS, in crafting its policies the United States must take the GPS-related activities of other nations into consideration.
This chapter examines some of the policy issues the United States must consider regarding international use of, and involvement with, RNSS. This chapters explores the use of RNSS in the five Pacific Rim countries of Japan, China, Taiwan, North Korea, and South Korea, a region that represents both a mix of traditional US allies and adversaries, and a range of RNSS-related capabilities and uses. An evaluation of US policies regarding GPS necessitates both an overview of GPS, and an examination of each country's current and likely near-future involvement with RNSS. Such involvement could include GPS applications, indigenous commercial GPS-based services and equipment, development of GPS augmentation systems or independent space-based navigation systems, and the use of other nations' space-based navigation systems. The United States confronts diverse policy issues in the Asia-Pacific, both in dealing with allies and with adversaries. While some of the issues raised have long been concerns for the United States, other issues are newer, arising from the implications of widespread GPS availability.

The GPS system, which was built by the US DoD, cost more than $10 billion to construct. It consists of three primary components: the space, control, and user segments. The space segment consists of 24 satellites in six inclined, low earth orbits, 20,200 kilometers above Earth. The control segment consists of ground monitoring stations around the globe operated by DoD. The user segment is any receiver that can acquire GPS signals from the satellites. GPS satellites carry atomic clocks that continuously transmit precise time signals. The system can determine a receiver's position anywhere on Earth and low Earth orbit by recording the length of time taken by the satellites' coded radio signals to reach the receiver, which itself generates a set of codes identical to those of the satellites. The travel time is multiplied by the speed of light to determine the receiver's distance from the satellites. At least four satellites, whose positions are always known, must be overhead in order for GPS to determine the three-dimensional position of a receiver relatively accurately.
GPS satellites transmit two types of signals. The first is the precision (P)-code, which provides the Precise Positioning Service (PPS), and requires a decryption key to access. Primarily confined to US military use, this signal will allow a receiver to determine position with an accuracy of about 21 meters. The second signal GPS produces is the coarse acquisition (CA)-code. First available for civilian use in 1984, this signal provides what is known as the Standard Positioning Service (SPS) for worldwide access via a standard, commercial GPS receiver. Historically, DoD deliberately degraded this signal by a technique called selective availability (SA). When SA is operating, DoD deliberately introduces random errors into the signal, resulting in positioning errors, and a CA-code accuracy of 50 to 100 meters. The military employed SA for fear that adversaries could use a more accurate signal to the detriment of the United States. Clinton's 1996 GPS policy called for SA to be shut off permanently by 2006 at the latest. On May 1, 2000 President Clinton announced that the government would stop degrading the civilian signal with SA in order to enhance the signal's everyday usefulness. 2 Thus, at midnight on May 1, 2000, SA was turned off, and GPS's accuracy dramatically increased. With SA off, the accuracy of a commercial GPS receiver is now between 6 and 15 meters. 3 The military retains the ability to deny GPS signals regionally if deemed critical to national security. The United States plans to add two additional signals to future GPS satellites to enhance the system for civilian aviation and maritime navigation and scientific use, although Congress did not approve GPS civilian signal upgrades for 2000. 4 Despite difficulties in obtaining Congressional funding for GPS, some funds have been allocated to GPS improvements through FAA and Department of Transportation appropriations. 5
Augmentation systems can improve the real-time accuracy and availability provided by SPS. One method, known as differential GPS, or DGPS, can provide augmentation of the basic GPS signal on both local and regional scales. DGPS improves positioning accuracy of a user's receiver by using additional receivers in precisely known locations that receive GPS signals and transmit a correction signal to the user's receiver at a different frequency. DGPS thus corrects for the effects of SA and other system errors, making GPS more accurate and reliable. Many countries and private companies operate DGPS correction networks. In areas in which differential GPS systems operate, commercial GPS receivers are now accurate to 1 meter or better. 6 Private service providers operate their own, fee-based DGPS networks to serve high-precision applications such as mining, forestry, transportation, and surveying. The government, via the Coast Guard and the National Geodetic Survey, maintains two DGPS networks for maritime and geodetic purposes. The FAA is also developing a Wide-Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and Local-Area Augmentation Systems (LAAS) to support air traffic management. 7 While the existing networks are based on the ground, WAAS will be a space-borne system providing DGPS corrections over large areas of North American airspace.
GPS has multiple beneficiaries. The US military, its creator and primary intended user, has integrated GPS into almost every facet of its operations, ranging from the positioning of troops to navigation over air, sea, and land to precision timing and targeting of guided weapons. The civil sector worldwide is increasingly using GPS for public services including emergency response, search and rescue, weather forecasting, highway construction, land management, and air navigation. GPS is also useful to surveyors, motorists, farmers, hikers, and geology and environmental researchers. GPS is not only a powerful technology, but also a profitable one: in 1998, the sale of GPS-based goods and services grossed $4 billion in worldwide revenues, and this market is projected to grow annually by 25 percent through 2003. The United States is a world leader in the GPS equipment and service industry, and currently holds one-third of the market. US companies are projected to maintain this dominance for the next several years. 8 Now part of the emerging Global Information Infrastructure, GPS use reduces the costs of a variety of civilian and military navigation and positioning activities by improving efficiency and accuracy for no more than the cost of a receiver.
GPS is not the only existing RNSS. The Russians operate a counterpart system known as GLONASS, which stands for the Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System. While 24 satellites are required to provide precise navigation information worldwide, only ten GLONASS satellites are currently functioning. These ten satellites provide good coverage in Russia, and parts of Europe and Asia, but not worldwide. GLONASS's deterioration is a result of Russia's poor financial situation. When fully functional, GLONASS provides better positioning accuracy than GPS's CA-code with SA turned on. GLONASS, which possesses no SA feature, operates at different frequencies and uses different position algorithms than GPS. Thus, the two systems require different operating equipment. GLONASS, like GPS, is owned and operated by the Russian military, and has its own version of GPS's P code. Because GLONASS supports the Russian military, the nation has a strong incentive to keep the system operating. In order to attract funding for GLONASS, Russia has offered to let the system be the basis of an international navigation system and has also negotiated funding and use arrangements with various countries. 9 Russia launched two GLONASS satellites in October 2000. At least 15 more satellites need to be launched in the next few years to keep the system operational.
Europe is in the process of developing an independent, global satellite navigation system, which will, if completed, be called Galileo. 10 The European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Union (EU) are working together to build this system. Europe's increasing dependence on foreign-owned RNSS systems led to the desire to develop Galileo, "an independent system under civilian control which will be guaranteed to operate at all times." 11 The Galileo system will be made up of 30 satellites (27 active satellites, and three spares), and will be interoperable with GPS and WAAS in Europe, Japan, and the United States, as well as with Russia's GLONASS. Unlike GPS and GLONASS, Galileo will be civilian owned and operated. Galileo will ensure European access to RNSS, enable improved aircraft guidance and positioning, provide better coverage in northern Europe, bolster Europe's RNSS-related industries and create new jobs in the aerospace and information industries. 12 Currently in development, European officials expect Galileo to be fully operational by 2008, with some limited operability by 2006. In April 2001 Galileo moved closer to becoming an operational reality when EU transport ministers agreed to "an initial 100 million euros ($87 million) in funding for the 30-satellite Galileo constellation." 13 The EU and ESA are providing initial funding for Galileo but are trying to attract private investment in the system. The system's basic service will be available worldwide free of charge, although the EU may impose a tax on GPS receivers, or provide enhanced, fee-based services in order to earn revenue.

The use of RNSS varies widely within the countries under examination in this paper. The following sections summarize the uses of RNSS in each country. Table 1 provides an additional overview.

    Of the five Pacific Rim nations examined here, Japan is most involved in RNSS commerce, applications, and infrastructure. Although Japan uses GLONASS to some extent, the majority of the nation's RNSS activity centers on GPS. GPS commerce is big business in Japan: the country is Asia's leading GPS equipment manufacturer and had the highest world market share in 1998 with 47 percent. 14 Japan is particularly renowned for having the world's largest portable and automobile GPS receiver industry. 15 These products are widely used domestically and abroad, both within and beyond Asia. Thus, the Japanese economy reaps large benefits from commercial enterprise based on GPS. The Japan GPS Council, the counterpart of the US GPS Industry Council, helps promote the Japanese GPS industry, with both government and private support.
    Japan relies heavily on GPS applications for military and civilian applications. The nation is one of the world's largest users of GPS military equipment; military-grade GPS receivers and encryption devices are extensively used by Japan's Maritime Defense Forces. 16 In addition, the Japanese Defense Agency has an agreement with DoD to access military-level GPS signals. 17 GPS receivers are also used in Japan for maritime navigation in coastal areas, aircraft navigation, surveying, and monitoring crustal motion and volcanic activity. 18,19,X20
    Japan also makes extensive use of DGPS correction networks. The Japanese Maritime Safety Agency operates a maritime beacon DGPS network for safety in coastal navigation. A private DGPS service provider uses a network of 34 ground stations to cover nearly the entire island nation. 21 Two civilian agencies in the Japanese government are also making efforts to build a wide-area DGPS network for international aviation safety. 22 Called the Multifunctional Transport Satellite (MTSAT), this space-based augmentation system is intended to supply DGPS correction data to improve the accuracy of GPS-based navigation data for Japan's flight information region. The system will also have some meteorological applications, but will not have any signal encryption for military uses. Japan attempted to launch an MTSAT in November 1999, but the H-2 rocket carrying it was destroyed when it deviated from its flight path. As safe air traffic management is critical over the increasingly crowded skies of the Asia-Pacific region, Japan is likely to persist in its attempt to orbit an MTSAT.
    While Japan has undertaken significant efforts to create national DGPS networks, and possesses a strong GPS-based industry, and myriad GPS applications, the nation has no independent RNSS and is unlikely to develop one in the near future. In March 1997, Japan's Science and Technology Agency looked at five ways the nation could proceed in satellite navigation, ranging from developing an independent RNSS for the region, to continuing to rely on GPS and GLONASS, to cooperating with Europe on an RNSS. The agency decided to continue research into satellite navigation technologies that could, if desired in the distant future, lead to the development of a Japanese RNSS. The Japanese decision not to pursue an independent RNSS project resulted from the high costs of such an endeavor, a focus on capturing the ground-equipment markets, and to US concerns that such an undertaking would undermine GPS. 23 Thus, Japan has focused its primary efforts on creating GPS augmentation systems, and cooperating on the development and funding of an RNSS with Europe. Japan has also considered paying for part of upgrades to GPS or a next-generation system led by the United States as long as Japan could contribute hardware. 24 In 1998, the Japanese government signed a cooperative statement with the United States declaring its commitment to work with the United States to promote GPS as a worldwide standard for navigation, positioning, and timing. 25

    China has been increasingly involved with, and interested in, RNSS. GPS and GLONASS are both used for a variety of applications. Civilian uses of the systems include dam construction, coastal navigation, police dispatch, cargo monitoring, surveying of oil and gas reserves, and air traffic management. 26 China also uses GPS and GLONASS for military applications. 27 The Chinese aerospace industry is currently integrating GPS into its new fighter aircraft, while the military has used GPS technologies to support unmanned aerial vehicle programs and field training exercises. 28 China has also expressed interest in using GPS and GLONASS to increase the accuracy of ballistic missiles through mid-course guidance corrections. 29 Currently, China has some domestic GPS and GLONASS receiver production capabilities, but is not a major developer or manufacturer of RNSS user technology. There are reports, however, that the Chinese military-industrial complex has entered into joint ventures with foreign firms to produce GPS receivers for possible incorporation into weapons. Such weapons could be used by China or sold to third parties- including "nations of concern." 30 China's military uses of GPS are a concern for the United States and its allies. Nevertheless, the Chinese are unlikely to rely heavily on RNSS and RNSS applications for military purposes until they have their own RNSS system and/or guaranteed access to RNSS.
    China currently has limited indigenous RNSS capabilities, and operates several DGPS ground stations for activities such as air traffic management. China has stated an interest in developing a space-based navigation capability, and has engaged in navigation satellite research for at least 20 years. It recently launched a two-satellite regional positioning satellite system called Beidou ("Northern Dipper"). The two geostationary satellites, launched in October and December 2001, are less capable than GPS or GLONASS, but give China its first autonomous satellite navigation capability. 31,32 Chinese officials have stated that China is working on a more complex, global navigation system using a larger number of satellites in various orbital planes. 33,34 Most recently, the Chinese have expressed interest in helping Russia fund GLONASS. 35 China can be expected to seek to depend on RNSS systems other than GPS, although the Chinese are also likely to continue using the US system. China finds RNSS an increasingly useful and necessary tool, but is reluctant to increase its dependence on foreign owned systems, especially if such systems are owned and operated by non-Chinese military services.

    Taiwan has only recently become involved in space activities. In 1990, Taiwan established a National Space Program Office to develop basic space technologies and satellites for purposes such as communications, environmental monitoring, and scientific research. Taiwan also hopes to create an indigenous space industry for national security and economic growth; however, its use of RNSS is currently minimal, especially compared to Japan and China. Taiwan has begun limited use of GPS technologies to support missile, fighter aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicle programs. 36 On the civilian side, research institutes and universities use GPS technology for mapping, surveying, and geodesy. In 1989, Taiwan established a GPS receiver network to monitor ground movement, which, in this earthquake prone island, remains the chief GPS application. Taiwanese commercial investors have begun to finance the development of autonomous vehicle navigation systems as well as computer software based on GPS. In the near future Taiwan's main involvement with RNSS will be in GPS augmentation, civilian and military GPS applications, and development of commercial GPS products. Taiwan does not have the resources to develop its own satellite navigation system.

    North Korea's most widely known and worrisome use of RNSS is for military applications. The DPRK has reportedly used GPS receivers imported from Japan on its submarines. Reports have also indicated that North Korea leased a Thai communications satellite equipped with GPS to plot the path of a missile it planned to test in August 1999. 37 Some analysts worry that North Korea may soon integrate GPS receivers into its indigenous or imported medium- or long-range ballistic missiles to improve their accuracy. 38 North Korea has declared its intentions to use space capabilities for peaceful purposes, but has also stated that it would use these assets for military ends if confronted with foreign hostility. Despite its intention to be an independent space-faring nation, without dependence on China or any other nation for access to space, the primitiveness of North Korea's space technology and the poor condition of its economy make it highly unlikely that North Korea will develop its own RNSS. 39 The US policy considerations regarding North Korea and RNSS should include possible North Korean hostile use of GPS and other available RNSS, including procurement of RNSS receivers and RNSS-responsive weapons from other countries, incorporation of GPS technology into its own missiles, and development of GPS spoofing or jamming capabilities for use in regional conflicts involving North Korea.

    South Korea makes fairly extensive use of GPS for a variety of civilian applications, including maritime and aviation navigation, land surveying, bridge construction, precise synchronization of telecommunications networks, and intelligent transportation. 40 The size of the domestic market for GPS equipment and services is unknown; however, private firms in South Korea manufacture GPS receivers for handheld and automobile navigation uses and also offer GPS-based services. 41 As of 1997, the nation planned to build a DGPS correction network. 42 While various government ministries and agencies oversee the use of GPS, the Korea Astronomy Observatory monitors the local quality of, and any interference in, GPS signals. South Korea is seeking to develop both an indigenous space launch capability and a satellite-manufacturing industry. 43 Given its alliance with the United States, and the expense and difficulty of building an indigenous RNSS system, South Korea is likely to forgo developing its own system, and continue to use GPS. South Korea may develop a regional DGPS network to augment the GPS signal, sustain GPS-based applications and commercial activity, and possibly use other countries' RNSS. 44

GPS-related policy issues and dilemmas add complexity to the many foreign policy issues the United States faces in dealing with the Pacific Rim countries. The diverse and growing utility of RNSS in Japan, China, Taiwan, North Korea, and South Korea indicates that all of these countries have stakes in RNSS and in the US GPS in particular. Current national policy on GPS states that the United States will seek to protect US national security, civil, and economic interests relating to GPS, while making the system available for international use, promoting cooperation with foreign governments, and addressing the civil, commercial, and security interests of other nations. 45 Balancing US interests and needs with international interests, however, can prove formidable. The 1996 GPS policy states the US intention to achieve this national-international balance, but does not address the specific regional challenges that face the United States throughout the world. The United States must balance military-civil tensions, both domestically and abroad. The proliferation of GPS technologies adds new complexities to US interactions in the Asia-Pacific.
Clinton's 1996 GPS policy specifically calls for cooperation with foreign governments and international organizations in order to balance international and domestic interests in GPS. The question is, how will the United States cooperate with Pacific Rim nations when both US security and US economic competitiveness are potentially at stake? Yielding to some interests of US allies in the region could weaken US control of, and benefits from, GPS. The United States must consider the needs and interests of nations who rely upon GPS, and work with these nations to develop policies and agreements that satisfy their needs, along with the needs of the United States. The United States is working to establish GPS, rather than Galileo or GLONASS, as the world's standard RNSS system. Ignoring international concerns about GPS will impede US attempts to promote GPS as such a standard.
Just as the United States has built up civilian and military applications and commercial enterprises around the availability of GPS, so have many of the United States' Pacific Rim allies. US policy does not clarify to what extent, or how, the US government and US firms should work with foreign organizations to promote GPS civilian applications throughout their countries. Agreements like that made between Japan and the United States on cooperation using GPS, and international relationships between GPS-specific business councils can provide an institutional framework to facilitate GPS use and commerce in the Pacific Rim. This, in turn, will encourage these countries to support GPS as a global navigation standard. 46 Another US priority is to maintain the market share of its GPS equipment and services in the Pacific Rim countries. Continued GPS dominance depends on friendly trade relations between the United States and its Asian allies, low import tariffs on GPS goods, and simplified international sales clearances and equipment certifications.
Export control, however, must still be a major policy concern of the United States, as well as its Pacific Rim allies. Reports that traditionally hostile nations like North Korea and China may be integrating GPS receivers into guided weapons increase the importance of export controls. While the United States maintains export controls on military-grade GPS equipment, the nation has few controls on civilian GPS receivers. If it becomes clear that "hostile" nations are using GPS to the detriment of the United States, the United States may want to consider working with its allies to develop stricter export controls on civilian GPS technologies. Ultimately, however the US ability to restrict the flow of technology to North Korea, China, and other potentially aggressive nations depends on the willingness of other nations to coordinate their efforts with those of the United States. The United States thus needs to reach agreements with allied nations regarding what GPS technologies should be exportable to potential regional adversaries. Overly stringent export controls should be avoided, however, as they may limit the economic potential of GPS equipment and service sales. A balance between commercial interests and national security is essential- and difficult to achieve.
In addition, the United States must determine its stance on those Pacific Rim allies who use GPS for military purposes. By sharing military assets or information with any other nation, the United States risks lessening its military advantage connected with GPS. On the other hand, US allies benefit from such interactions, and as a result, are likely to remain committed to the use of GPS. The US government should consider the military needs of its Pacific Rim allies, and craft policies regarding allied access to P-code signals and trade of military-grade GPS equipment for specific uses that fit with US interests in the Pacific Rim. 47
One of the central US policy goals regarding GPS is maintaining the system as a global standard. As noted in the 1996 GPS policy, GPS allows the United States to reap significant civil, military, economic, and political benefits. Today, the preservation of GPS spectrum is uncertain, the development of a new European RNSS is imminent, GLONASS renewal is possible, and international hesitance to rely on a system controlled by the US DoD is growing. It is now more than ever in the US interest to formulate policies that rally foreign countries around GPS. Perhaps agreements like the US-Japan joint statement on GPS cooperation, serve as the clearest means by which the United States can assure the dedication of foreign nations to GPS. The Japanese agreement has been valuable because Japan is a world leader in GPS use and commerce. Such agreements with other Pacific Rim nations may not have quite the same impact and may or may not be feasible- but should still be explored. US promotion of GPS as a global standard will be facilitated by official assurances of the extreme unlikelihood of a US denial of GPS access. Confidence in GPS will also be increased by a US commitment to stable funding for GPS. Cooperation between the United States and its Pacific Rim allies to develop applications and civilian augmentation signal that maximize GPS's benefits will also help increase loyalty to GPS.
The United States must consider the implications of global GPS availability as it pertains to US military superiority. This is especially relevant in the case of a conflict in the Pacific Rim because GPS is essential to several US military systems. If foreign militaries are also making extensive use of the system, does this dilute US military strength? Commercial GPS receivers are accurate enough to allow hostile militaries to improve their navigation and positioning activities. Even if SA was turned back on, militaries can still use the CA-code to position military units and improve weapons delivery accuracy, especially given the broad availability of DGPS systems which improve GPS's accuracy. For example, it is estimated that North Korea could improve the accuracy of its No Dong 1 missile by 25 percent through use of GPS, even with SA on. 48 Considering the reported intentions of nations like North Korea and China to develop GPS-enhanced weapons, the United States and allies must work to minimize this threat by agreeing upon appropriate uses of GPS and deterring and combating the "misuse" of GPS.
Assuring US (and allied) access to the GPS signal is another defense-relevant policy concern. On a technical level, the United States must determine how to overcome attempts by hostile nations to interfere with US military use of the GPS signal, as well as unintentional interference. Protection of the GPS signal is essential, given US DoD estimates that China may be able to completely interdict the GPS signal in ten years. 49 The United States must undertake research on overcoming selective jamming and spoofing of GPS and DGPS to preserve its military advantage in a conflict.50 At the same time, the United States must determine how to deny GPS to adversaries in the case of conflict. Not only is the United States faced with deciding which nations should have access to the P-code, but also with the possibility of denying access to the CA-code during a conflict. This is both a technical and political issue. If the United States interferes with the GPS signal in a regional conflict, this may harm US allies, many of whom are dependent on GPS for both military and civilian functions - including public safety. The United States may also be faced with situations where denying GPS to an adversary could endanger civilians within that nation.
Although the United States recently turned off SA, the military can still decide through 2006 to employ SA to degrade GPS signals in a region if US national security is threatened. Before the May 1, 2000 decision to turn off SA, those who advocated keeping SA on argued that SA provided a defensive edge for the United States, and deterred foreign military investment in GPS technologies.51 Such assumptions are key arguments for turning SA on again in the case of a conflict in the Pacific Rim. Other experts maintain that SA offers minimal advantage to the US military, as foreign militaries have a local ability to improve signal accuracy using DGPS networks. Future enhancements, including development of independent RNSS, would further undermine the military advantage represented by GPS's SA.52 SA opponents also note that a foreign military's ability to benefit from the absence of SA depends on that military's technical sophistication, and pre-supposes its investment in GPS-based technologies in the first place. Civil and commercial users also advocate keeping SA off, in order to enhance GPS's utility for civil uses and commercial applications, reduce costs and complexity associated with using GPS with SA on, increase global confidence in GPS's capabilities, and spur growth of commercial GPS industries. A DoD evaluation of what circumstances would necessitate a return to the use of SA must include an evaluation of the effects of such a switch on civilian and commercial users of GPS. US decision-making vis--vis SA is additionally constrained by the fact that frequent policy changes could undermine international confidence in GPS.
Essentially, the United States must determine how to balance its national security interests with those of US and foreign commercial interests in GPS in the event of a Pacific Rim conflict. The 1996 GPS policy states that the government can interfere with domestic GPS commerce for national security reasons. The policy does not specify what criteria will be uses in limiting sales to foreign nations, with which nations the United States would restrict GPS-related trade, or how the United States will respond to sales of GPS equipment and services to hostile nations. US export control policy for GPS technologies must consider the likely efficacy of restrictions, that is, will US "adversaries" be able to purchase GPS technology from third parties even with US export controls? US export control policies must, at once, advance national security and avoid stunting US industrial growth. CONCLUSION
Pacific Rim involvement in GPS has the potential both to advance and undermine US national security, economic, and diplomatic benefits from GPS. As a result, the United States must work to develop policies independently, as well as with nations in the region, to promote positive uses and growth of GPS while deterring potential misuses of the system by aggressors. As well, the success of US GPS polices in the Pacific Rim will be affected by US actions and policies elsewhere. US GPS policies that affect European nations may also indirectly influence the attitudes toward GPS held by the Pacific Rim nations- both US allies, and potential adversaries. Only by crafting policies that appeal to international interests will the United States succeed in maintaining GPS as a global navigation and positioning system standard and continue to reap national security, financial, and political benefits from its brainchild.

Table 1. RNSS Capabilities and Uses in the Pacific Rim, Current and Near-Future
RNSS used now RNSS used in 5-10 years Indigenous RSS now? RNSS in 5-10 years? Indigenous RNSS Augmentations RNSS use for national security? RNSS use for civillian functions? Indigenous RNSS industry?
JAPAN GPS; GLONASS GPS; GLONASS; maybe Galileo No No, but capable DGPS; MTSAT Yes Yes Yes, high
CHINA GPS; GLONASS GPS; GLONASS; maybe Galileo No Maybe DGPS Yes Yes Yes, some
TAIWAN GPS GPS; GLONASS; maybe Galileo No No, incapable Some Yes Yes Yes, some
NORTH KOREA GPS GPS; GLONASS; maybe Galileo No No, incapable ? Yes Maybe ?
SOUTH KOREA GPS GPS; GLONASS; maybe Galileo No No, incapable Some DGPS Maybe Yes Yes, some


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