Shawn McHale: My name is Shawn McHale and I’m the director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and it is my pleasure to introduce another, in this case, a roundtable on Taiwan.

As many of you know, we have been offering events and conferences on Taiwan for numerous years. In fact, the title of this particular event, Taiwan’s Quest for International Space, reminds us of an action event we gave about three years ago. We addressed similar issues of how in a sense Taiwan negotiates international space. That is a story I have often been in a sense puzzled by the way which contemporary individuals often approach the world in a sense that we often think in terms of how countries can or cannot in a sense fit within the modern framework of a nation state.

For those of us with a much longer perspective, perhaps in other words like a thousand-year perspective or more, what is intriguing in a sense is over time how numerous political entities have experimented with numerous different forms, political forms, and their relation to actually international space. In a sense, when we look at today, if we sort of do not
restrain ourselves in the context of simply looking in terms of
the modern nation state and whether nations fail in a sense at
achieving in a sense their rightful place within that space, we
can easily come to realize that what Taiwan is doing today, in
a sense compelled to do today, is to force to experiment, to
try in other words to come up with newer alternative or ways in
which to assert itself within the international framework. And
this is not simply a however Taiwan issue; it is one which
numerous nation states today, numerous political entities today
are engaged in. So in a sense, this experimentation in an
international space is one of course where Taiwan is operating
today but it is also one the European Union and ASEAN and
numerous other entities are experimenting as well.

To enlighten us on Taiwan’s quest for international space,
we have three individuals who are going to speak this afternoon
and give some provocative comments. I am going to turn the
podium over to Ed McCord who will now introduce the individual
speakers. Thank you very much.

Edward McCord: Okay, thank you very much. I was just
thinking. Actually, I was going to start off like you often do
in a conference and say, well, we are dealing today with a very
timely issue and then I thought, well, this is not one of those
issues that is timely because it is always timely and that is
so true with so many of the issues dealing with Taiwan, that
the issues are somewhat constant and yet they evolve, they keep changing in different ways. So I hope we have a lot of insights on the whole problem of Taiwan’s quest for international space today.

Bonnie Glaser has a lot to say so I’m going to keep it really short. I’m just going to introduce the panel, let them talk and then when they are done talking, we will open the floor to questions. So I’m just going to introduce everybody first and then we will just head right in.

So first of all, we have David Dean who is advisor with the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation and former director of AIT. We have Jacques deLisle who is a professor of law and director of Asian Studies at University of Pennsylvania. And Bonnie Glaser who is the Freeman Chair of Chinese Studies, senior fellow and-Bonnie Glaser: [Inaudible]Edward McCord: Okay, sorry, senior fellow in the Chinese Studies Program at the Center for Strategic International Studies. So without further ado, I’ll turn the floor over to David.

David Dean: [Audio glitch] -- regime. From the start of the Korean War, in 1950 until 1971, most countries supported Taiwan and its claim to be China’s legitimate government largely because of the Korean War where Chinese and North Koreans were fighting the U.N. forces because of the Cold War,
because of Beijing’s internal turmoil resulting from the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution and U.S. support for Taiwan. But by 1971, there was mounting pressure to recognize reality. In October of ’71, the General Assembly of the United Nations, in the General Assembly, the PRC won the China Sea and Taiwan was ousted. It is worth noting that Henry Kissinger was in Beijing at the time of the vote. His visit was well publicized and members of the U.N. could not overlook the symbolic significance of his presence there during the vote.

Shortly thereafter, President Nixon signed the Shanghai Communiqué in February of 1972. Seven years later, the United States exchanged formal diplomatic relations with Beijing on January 1st, 1979, leaving the Republic of China and Taiwan more alone than ever before to defend its claim to sovereignty, its identity and its international persona.

It is amazing that Taiwan was resilient enough to survive and to prosper under these circumstances. It had at that time a stable government. Then, of course, the U.S. had passed the Taiwan Relations Act. Taiwan’s economy was growing at a rate of 10 percent a year for its gross domestic product, then it was one of the little dragons along with South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong and plowing ahead economically. Then, of course, Tiananmen occurred on the Mainland, making the Chinese image in
the international -- setting back the Chinese image in the international community.

Today, Taiwan still clings to the 1946 constitution as amended but modifies its territorial claim to a statement that its government exercises control of the territory of Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, Kinmen and Matsu. For the purposes of entering the World Trade Organization, Taiwan called itself the customs territory of Taiwan, the Penghu islands, Kinmen and Matsu. Since 1949, Beijing has always insisted it was the legal government of China, including the province of Taiwan. Lately, however, China says there is only one China and that the Mainland and Taiwan are parts of the One China.

The U.S. position on the status of Taiwan is complex. In the Cairo and Potsdam Conferences, World War II leaders declared that Taiwan was to be returned to China. This was done in 1945. With the fall of the generalism and the KMT on the Mainland in 1948 and 1949, the U.S. withdrew its support from them. But with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the U.S. decided to support once again and to defend the Republic of China on Taiwan. The Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1954. There were many disagreements and misunderstandings but by the late 1960s, when I was in Taipei, we had a mutually beneficial relationship.
The sky darkened, however, in the ‘70s with the developments I have already mentioned. With the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, the U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintains there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The U.S. government does not challenge that position. When the U.S. broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan on January 1st, 1979 in the Joint Communiqué establishing relations with China, the U.S. recognized the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China but added in this context that the people of the U.S. will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

Early in ‘79, the American Institute in Taiwan was established as a private nonprofit corporation in Washington, D.C. and Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act four months later. I was the founding chairman, director and trustee of AIT from 1979 to 1995. AIT acting under the State Department’s policy instructions tried to stabilize the relationship with Taiwan. From 1979, Taiwan was hard-pressed to maintain its international presence. In 1983, the U.S. supported Taiwan’s membership in the Asian Development Bank against PRC objections. A compromise was reached to give both the PRC and Taiwan membership but Taiwan had to change its name to Taipei, China.
Taiwan engaged the dollar diplomacy, giving large sums to countries to maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei and buying a switch in diplomatic relations from countries that recognized the PRC. President Lee Teng-hui, yielding to domestic pressure, mounted an unsuccessful campaign for a seat in the General Assembly at the United Nations. He did this partially to raise Taiwan’s visibility in the international community. For similar reasons, he began a pragmatic diplomacy campaign playing golf with heads of state primarily in Southeast Asia.

In 1995, President Lee pressed for a visit to the U.S. Finally, under a threat from Congress that it would amend the Taiwan Relations Act, President Clinton reluctantly agreed to have President Lee visit Cornell University, his alma mater. The visit caused a serious breach between Beijing and Washington and between Washington and Taipei. The Chinese government recalled their ambassador in Washington. They cancelled the Koo-Wang talks, which were scheduled to begin shortly thereafter. They instituted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait and then renewed these military exercises just before the March presidential elections the following year.

In 1999, President Lee introduced the two-state concept by telling a reporter that relations between China and Taiwan should be on a special state-to-state basis, thereby
infuriating Beijing and the U.S. even more. Taipei’s relationships with Washington and Beijing deteriorated further during the presidency of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008. Chen, seeking international space and progress towards independence, pressed the envelope focusing exclusively on Taiwan’s interests and ignoring urgent advice from Washington and mounting threats from Beijing. Other countries witnessing this dangerous behavior were increasingly reluctant to support Taiwan even in an informal manner. As a result, Chen’s strenuous efforts to raise Taiwan’s international status backfired.

Now I have described some of the ups and downs in the U.S. policy towards Taiwan. One important factor was that from 1950 on until the Shanghai Communiqué, the U.S. maintained that the status of Taiwan was unresolved. This claim infuriated generalism on Chiang Kai-shek who insisted that Taiwan was part of China. Beijing, for obvious reasons, agreed with him. Recently, I read just two weeks ago a news article saying that the Japanese representative in Taipei said inter alia that the status of Taiwan was unresolved to suggest that the Japanese government still may hold this position.

In the 1979 recognition communiqué, the U.S. acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. President Ma Ying-jeou elected in 2008 said -
last year in 2008 - his most solemn duty was to safeguard the constitution. He also said that Taiwan has to be a respectable member of the global village and that dignity, autonomy, pragmatism and flexibility should be Taiwan’s guiding principles when developing foreign relations. Ma said that under the principles of no unification, no independence and no use of force, he hoped to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Based on the consensus of One China respective interpretations, he called for the resumption of negotiations with Beijing.

As of this date, one year later, there have been several successful negotiations in travel, trade, tourism and other practical fields. In addition, there seems to be at least a temporary truce in the diplomatic field. Rumors suggest that Beijing has asked El Salvador, Paraguay and possibly Panama to delay switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. At the present time, Taipei has diplomatic relations with 23 countries. It also has unofficial representatives in the U.S., Japan, most European countries, Southeast Asia and in many other countries. Taiwan also has membership in several hundred international governmental organizations. It is able to make its views known in most parts of the world but in many countries, it still does not have access to the top leadership.
Nancy Tucker concludes her excellent book, *Strait Talk*, by urging the U.S. to engage in top-level talks with Taiwan leaders to reassure them of U.S. support and to dispel decades of mistrust. By urging U.S. engagement, Nancy Tucker does not mean that the U.S. should be central to Taipei-Beijing talks but must commit to assist Taiwan if its relative weaknesses threaten equity. She states that only U.S. Strait Talk with Taiwan can make Taipei less likely to be overwhelmed by China, accommodating too much or gearing towards independence and war.

In my view, and is likely that with tensions in the Taiwan Strait at a new low, the upper reaches of the U.S. administration will pay less and less attention to Taiwan. But for strategic, economic and other compelling reasons, they will have to pay more and more attention to China. Most policymakers here will be encouraged by Ma Ying-jeou’s engagement with the Mainland and will hope that he succeeds in prolonging the status quo for several years allowing interaction between China and Taiwan to progress without harming Taiwan’s democracy and freedom. Others, because they consider China a long-term threat to U.S. national security, are concerned about too much progress in the Taipei-Beijing talks. They believe President Ma’s policies could be dangerous. They still think of Taiwan in General MacArthur’s terms as an unsinkable aircraft carrier, valuable in protecting
the sea lanes of communication and a potential conflict with China. Some members of the Democratic Progressive Party and a few supporters in the U.S. are opposed to President Ma’s policies towards China because they favor independence for Taiwan.

To sum up, Taiwan is trying to regain traction as an international actor by reversing Chen Shui-bian’s policies towards the Mainland from confrontation to cooperation. Taiwan still faces a very rocky road in dealing with China and with countries influenced by China. The U.S. will have to tread cautiously to help Taiwan with arms sales and other support without upsetting the progress of the delicate negotiations between Taipei and Beijing.

Now, depending on the degree of progress in these relations, it is not impossible to imagine a time when Taiwan, with Beijing support, can be admitted to the U.N. General Assembly in a two-seat for China deal similar to that of the former Soviet Union’s three seats, including Belarus and the Ukraine. But Taiwan’s main challenge in the months and years ahead is to make progress without surrendering its autonomy. Thank you.

Jacques deLisle: [Inaudible] -- it has been a central feature of Taiwan’s recent quest, the quest particularly in the last year or so under the Ma administration for international
space. As you all know, Taiwan was able to participate in the WHA Assembly, the meeting this year under observer status, under the name of Chinese Taipei and the question of what are we to make of that accomplishment and the background to it. As I said, I think it is very much part of Taiwan’s current quest to keep and perhaps expand its international space and, of course, that agenda as we just heard has changed in its details from the Chen years but we still have clearly an homage with the three notes and One China interpretations and the commitment to uphold the constitution of the RSC, a commitment to maintaining and expanding space in more concrete policy measures as well.

And so what I want to do is address the WHA issue in the context of these larger questions of Taiwan’s quest to keep, hold and expand its international space. And here, I think if we look at how Taiwan has approached this problem for many years now and again changing some under Ma, we see several strands that are still evident in the WHA case itself and in the recent discussion of the human rights covenants as well.

The first strand has really been that Taiwan has pursued a very traditional, a very venerable strategy for claiming as much as it can of the status of a state or an international system, very conventional nation state structure. Here, we have seen in years gone by quite explicit emphasis on Taiwan’s
satisfaction of the principal legal and underlying legal political criteria for being a state in the international system, so the fact that Taiwan has a coherent and long separately governed territory that has a stable population that identifies itself as a people of Taiwanese although with all the ambiguities of being Taiwanese and/or Chinese, that it has a government which provides effective governance at home and conducts external relations. And related to that the Taiwan has enjoyed -- the Republic of China has enjoyed the capacity to undertake international relations, relations with other states.

So to the four classic criteria, we heard a lot about them under Lee Teng-hui, we heard a lot about them under Chen Shui-bian and they have received less specific emphasis under Ma. That is partly an attempt to pursue a more moderate style but does not provoke a stronger response from the Mainland but I think it is also because this strand has become a hardy perennial that does not require the kind of repetition that it once did. And I will not say much more about that strand.

The second strand, a related one, has been to maintain as much in the way of diplomatic relations as Taiwan can to keep it up to that level that many states enjoy in terms of conducting international relations. Ideally, this is done formally. That is the 23 governments with which Taiwan, with
which the RSC maintains formal diplomatic relations and where that sort of formal relationship is not possible, do the best one can, so hence the tech relay IP type arrangement, the framework created by the TRA and the many parallel arrangements that Taiwan enjoys around the world.

The third strand has been to participate in international organizations - just like states do or just does other states did, depending on how you choose to put it - ideally, as a full member and where that is not possible and of course where it is least possible is in the presumptively states member-only organizations such as the United Nations and its affiliates. But that is not possible to get some kind of status, observer status or some other form of meaningful participation. Obviously, the biggest prize in recent years in terms of full membership has been the WTO. The first step forward in observer status with the U.N. affiliate of course is the WHA session this year.

A fourth and final strand is the quest to participate in multilateral international treaty regimes where possible by formal accession to the treaty - again, the WTO agreement being an example - and where that is not possible - again, as in these other strands taking the second best - which is to act as if or to take as many steps as possible toward looking a lot like a member and assuming the obligations of membership. And
here, the human rights covenants are the most striking recent example although there is a piece of it in the WHA story as well.

Last to the strand of maintaining formal diplomatic relations and were not possible of something functionally approaching it, that has obviously been part of recent developments. This is the so-called diplomatic truce Ambassador Dean has mentioned, the perceived diplomatic truce, at least the almost openly declared diplomatic truce and the view from Beijing that it is not wise to put pressure on any of the remaining 23 to switch and indeed to pressure them not to switch. Again, we have all just been through the 30th anniversary of the TRA so I will not repeat that. You all know the story of those kinds of not quite formal diplomatic relations but quite robust international engagements. So that is that strand.

The two I want to focus on are primarily the last two. First, participation and where possible membership in international organizations. Again, the WTO, the accomplishment of several years back. APEC is another example of participating in what is primarily a state grouping but a somewhat less formal international organizational structure. It is a little easier to get into. And here, Taiwan of course has recently enjoyed at least a minor upgrade in its status by
Lien Chan being the representative, the former vice president and party chairman. So these are, as I said, upgrading status. Ambassador Dean mentioned the Asian Development Bank which is a case for Taiwan was in a sense able to get itself grandfathered in because Beijing was not at that point seeking to engage in these institutions and so there was some inertia behind it.

As WTO, APEC and ADB all suggest, of course, Taiwan’s strong suit in this area has been an economic organization rather than political and strategic ones for quite obvious reasons having to do with Taiwan’s importance globally and regionally on the economic side and the somewhat less neuralgic from Beijing’s perspective, the character of economic as opposed to security or political issues.

In terms of state-member only organizations as they are often referred to the U.N. affiliates, here of course we have seen a switch from the Chen Shui-bian years which is where the strategy reached its apogee or its nadir depending on your viewpoint with the referendum on the March ballot seeking entry of the U.N. under the name Taiwan. Obviously, it has been a big climb-down from that and the emphasis shifted back to something that had been present before, which is some kind of participation in the U.N.-affiliated specialized organizations with WHA-WHO being front and center among that.
What Taiwan achieved in May of 2009 is somewhat ambiguous. Part of it is quite clear, of course. The Chinese-Taipei’s Department of Health participated as an observer in the 2009 meeting. This is the first time that Taiwan has participated in a U.N.-affiliated agency since its departure from the U.N. in 1971. And of course, it follows many developments over the last year preceding that, including the emergence of the diplomatic truce, the establishment of the three links, the recommencement of the SEF-ARATS process of progress on a number of concrete economic issues having to do with trade investment and even beyond economic criminal enforcement cooperation and, of course, talk of ECFA as the replacement for CECA. One can swim in the alphabet soup of acronyms in this area. The progress toward a free trade like or at least comprehensive framework outside agreement for trade.

So that is sort of the background and the formal label but what does it in fact mean? Well, Taiwan clearly got some access to one of these long-withheld state member-only affiliate, U.N.-affiliate organizations. What exactly does it mean? Well, there was talk before the deal was struck about whether Taiwan would have observer status or would have meaningful participation. I’m still not quite clear which of those is preferable and why. Observer status has the benefit of being a status but it does not tell you how meaningful your
participation should be. Participation means you get to do something but it does not have the concreteness of status. We can have angels dancing on the head of this particular pin for some quite time and the fact that people argue about that suggests just how in some ways silly and in some ways deadly serious this discussion is for trying to claim status.

Clearly, what Taiwan got is something less than full membership as Ma and his supporters and the regime, the government or the administration stressed, Taiwan got status that, again, on this robust reading included everything but voting rights. It had to endure a name it does not like, Chinese Taipei, but that is the name Taiwan has endured in many other contexts. And it got a status that is in some ways was similar to what the Knights of Malta and East Germany and other entities that have a fair amount of state-like status have enjoyed before the WHA-WHO and it is a status which on this interpretation is pretty automatically or presumptively renewable. The point made by the Ma administration was that every member is technically invited each year. It is just understood that that will happen and the hope and expectation was that this would be the case for Taiwan as well.

The more critical view pressed by the DPP among others of course has stressed not the half-full glass but the half-empty glass. That is that Taiwan’s status at the WHA remains tenuous
and reversible. It was fatally dependent on Beijing’s goodwill in creating it at the first place and will remain so dependent going forward that there was insufficient resolution of the status of the much discussed but never seen 2005 MOU between the WHO and China about how Taiwan would be handled. And clearly, Taiwan got something that, at least from critical eyes, was less than other not full members got within the WHA-WHO system. It did not get the Holy See’s status as a nonmember state and it did not get admitted via a general assembly resolution of support as happened with the Palestinian Authority, the PLO at the time.

So that is sort of where we are. Now, what does it mean? Well, the interesting question here is the question we touched upon already which is will it be renewed going forward? At this point, probably pretty good reasons to expect that absent something that disrupts cross-strait relations, it will. The more interesting question in many ways is, is this replicable? Is it a precedent that will extend to other U.N.-affiliated agencies and other items on the international -- other institutions on the international landscape? Much of this of course depends simply on the will, preferences and ability to reach agreement between the two parties.

Here, Beijing has moved a good long ways from its most intransigent points. One can look to Hu Jintao’s turn of the
year six-points proposal where he promised to support reasonable participation in international organizations, including the WHO as the possible fruit of improving cross-strait relations. China obviously had to drop, Beijing had to drop the claim that Taiwan has no rights or credentials for participating in any way in any U.N.-affiliated organization and particularly had to back off from the statement with respect to the WHO in the wake of SARS that Taiwan’s attempt to participate was an inglorious sparse — one of the nicer bits of rhetoric that turned up in this whole thing.

Also, of course moving into the WHO realm meant moving a little bit beyond the purely economic and down that spectrum a little bit toward the more political in this strategy of “economics first, politics later,” easy first, hard later. That said, there are still signs of limitation. There was much in Beijing’s discussion of the WHA accord that it was conditional, it was dependent on Taiwan’s continuing good performance and Beijing’s continuing good wealth and the TAO in particular stressed that there was no automatic replicable precedent and anyone talks in Beijing in this network says pretty much the same kinds of things. There are still, of course, signs of disagreement within China’s Taiwan policy circles about how capacious and how rapidly one should -- patience one should be in and how rapidly one should move
beyond the WHA model or move beyond the WHA case to a broader model. And there is still a fair amount of nervousness about the one-way ratchet problem, that is, you give Ma something and Ma either pushes for more or worse yet, the DPP wins, they take that and run with it. That concern still has a great deal of resonance.

On the Taiwan side, the strategy seems to be to take things very much one step at a time. WHA - check. Now let’s move on to the next thing. There is obviously much virtue and success to that. The most critical view of course is that it is part of a gradual sellout. The somewhat more moderately critical view has been that there is such a long list that by the time one works one’s way through it, we will all be dead. There are many, many international organizations out there.

But in terms of whether the WHA case provides an interesting precedent, I think it is important to look at in context and to realize what type of issues the WHA case raised. And here, I think it is clear the WHA was a relatively easy case. It does not tell us much because you start with the easy and move to the hard, you can build confidence, we may build upon this but one may not. So it is important to realize just in some ways that it was the easy case.

First, the politics were uniquely favorable. China botched SARS and botched it badly as an international
relations, international PR type thing. It created a great deal of sympathy for Taiwan; it had the U.S., Japan and others coming out in favor of Taiwan’s participation, and it was very hard to back-pedal from that even if one wanted to. Secondly, the subject matter of the WHA is one in which Taiwan had a relatively strong hand to play and one can see this in Taiwan’s international quest for space in years gone by. That is, it had two relevant characteristics.

First, the case could be made that Taiwan’s participation was important to safeguarding vital interest of Taiwan. Taiwan is on the pathway of SARS, on the pathway of H1N1, even on the pathway of dangerous exports which are also partly covered by pieces of the WHO-related regime so Taiwan’s vital interests were at stake. This was not just symbolic about statehood status.

Secondly, the international regime at issue could not be complete or effective without Taiwan’s participation again because Taiwan is on the pathway of many of these things to go out in effect to the wider world. Those are the same types of arguments one saw about the WTO and they were pretty effective and pretty compelling in a way that a lot of other cases will not be. If you look beyond the WHA case, things start to get a bit harder. Yes, we have moved beyond the economic and into other sets of issues but even the health regime is not fully
settled; Taiwan is still trying to seek access to various networks for dealing with things like food safety and medical products and global outbreaks of disease that do not come bundled with Taiwan’s current participation.

The next obvious steps along the U.N.-affiliated agencies path – things like the International Maritime Organization or the International Civil Aviation Organization are similar in many ways. You can make the same kinds of arguments that were made about health that I just described, but it is a little tougher because Maritime and Civil Aviation needs to start to talk about territory and sovereignty. Who controls that airspace? Who controls that sea space? It gets a little more political.

Institutional structure may matter as well. In some ways, the WHA-WHO has a felicitous division between the assembly and the organization. Many of the U.N. organizations have this structure but the vocabulary different and, therefore, the ability to draw at least a notional line between assembly participation and organization participation or membership makes it a little less of a concession; that is, Beijing can still say Taiwan cannot join organizations but it can participate in the assembly. Now, obviously, these kinds of deals have been struck. For many organizations, there are observers in other U.N.-affiliate organizations; there are
observers in the U.N. General Assembly itself. And as Ambassador Dean has pointed out, there were the old three Soviet seats, the two German seats and so on, which at least indicate some flex. So it is an uphill hike but it obviously starts with that first step and I think it is just too early to tell what goes on. We will go on.

Finally, this question of Taiwan’s pursuit of membership in international multilateral treaty regimes. Here, in the public health field, Taiwan already made some progress indeed before the accord was reached from the WHA. Taiwan was allowed to join the international health regulation system in January of ‘09 - was a step toward that. But the big ticket item here really is the recent discussion of the international human rights covenant that were just ratified in Taiwan and where the instruments of ratification were given to Kofi Annan, who according to news reports anyway, took them but did not really accept them, reject them, logged them in. So they are in this ambiguous limbo land, but this is part of this strategy that Taiwan has pursued again of where possible joining agreements, but since it cannot - it looks like still - fully get membership in these multilateral especially U.N.-centric treaty regimes, Taiwan’s strategy instead has been to do everything it can to get up to that line - the old Zeno’s paradox, right? Closer and closer but not quite in.
And this is something to understand repeatedly in other contexts. Think of the Montreal Protocol on the environment, the Nonproliferation Treaty which the ROC had acceded to back in the old days; the U.N. Chemical Weapons Convention, some of the substantive rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency, various U.N. Security Council resolutions, which of course are not treaties but have a certain international legal status on Iraq, Yugoslavia on counterterrorism; the Warsaw Convention on civil aviation and liability limits. These were all areas where Taiwan has not been fully able to join because it cannot get into these things which are often U.N. linked and at the very least multilateral. But it says, “We are going to behave as if we were. We are going to deposit the ratification instruments even.” And this is a great tactic, right? Because it means it walks and talks very much like a state, and these are all areas where Taiwan can unilaterally act to conform. It does not require any action or concessions from anybody else so it can behave fully as if it were a member. And that I think is some of what is going on with the WHO-centric health regime. It is clearly what is going on with the human rights regime.

Now, the other final piece of this part of the story is that of course the human rights covenants play to another issue. It plays Taiwan’s values card, the idea that this is a human rights regarding democracy, and, oh, by the way that
place across the strait does not quite measure up so well on this. And this is playing to the modern term in international law and international relations that your domestic regime mattered. And so, as the Ma administration has done, it says, “We are not only joining this, we are doing this to recognize and advance further the human rights accomplishments of Taiwan.” It becomes on that view something of a virtuous circle and President Ma has even said it would not be such a bad thing. Indeed, it would be a good thing for the world if there were a cross-straits competition in human rights. And so we see that being undertaken as well. And with that, I will stop and pass the podium to Bonnie.

Bonnie Glaser: Thank you very much. I am going to divide my talk into two parts. First, I’m going to talk about the Mainland’s policy towards Taiwan’s international space and then talk a little bit about Taiwan’s strategy to expand its international space going forward and then maybe a little bit of overlap with what Jacques talked about.

Today’s People’s Daily has a very big article on the cover. Hu Jintao spoke to the Chinese ambassadors. Once every five years, they hold this ambassadorial meeting. The entire standing committee in the Politburo attended and Hu Jintao laid out four priorities for China’s diplomats, and one of them is to maintain the One China principle. And I found that
interesting because I think it underscores that Beijing remains ambivalent about allowing Taiwan to participate in the international community. On the one hand, China wants to respond positively to the needs, the demands of the Taiwan people including international space as part of its broader strategy to win the hearts and minds of the people of Taiwan. The Chinese also recognize that international space is an important political issue on the island and one that will have an impact and has had an impact on President Ma Ying-jeou’s support rate.

On the other hand, concerns persist about Taipei’s intentions in seeking to join international organizations especially U.N.-specialized agencies and about the ramifications of allowing Taiwan to play a role as an entity that is separate from China. Many Chinese say that if not aimed at actually promoting independence, such efforts by Taiwan are least intended to consolidate Taiwan’s de facto independence status. Some opponents even argue that permitting Taiwan greater international space is contrary to the cause of reunification of the motherland. But Hu Jintao, of course, has spoken clearly on this issue, really beginning in 2005 with the joint statement that was signed with Lien Chan. And he spoke even more clearly last December in the six points that Jacques
referred to which really paved the way for Taiwan’s achievement of observer status in the World Health Assembly this past May.

I will quote here just a portion of Hu Jintao’s point on international space in which he said, “We are aware of how the compatriots in Taiwan feel about the issue of participation in international activities and we attach importance to the settlement of related issues. Regarding the issue of Taiwan’s participating in the activities of international organizations, fair and reasonable arrangements can be made through pragmatic consultation between the two sides, provided that this does not give rise to two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan.”

I think, importantly, Hu also signaled that Beijing understands the risks associated with Taiwan’s exclusion from the overall regional economic integration process. And I think he signaled somewhat obliquely that the mainland may be willing to consider Taipei’s desire to negotiate free trade agreements with other countries which would follow the signing of ECFA between Taipei and Beijing. And I think that is important for Taiwan and for Ma Ying-jeou’s agenda going forward.

But despite these positive signals, China really has not let up on efforts to hamper Taiwan’s participation in both international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. There are continuing instances of Beijing trying to downgrade Taiwan’s status, for example, by seeking to
change its name to something that is obviously consistent with the One China principle like Taipei, China or sometimes even Taipei or Taiwan Province of China.

Moreover, it is evident that China really does not want the WHA compromise to be followed by a flood or even a trickle of bids by Taiwan to join international governmental organizations. And Jacques referred to some of the statements that have been made in Beijing about how this is sort of a unique case. There was a senior Chinese official recently visiting here who said it is only an individual case and it cannot be copied everywhere. And so, I do think that there are a lot of issues, a lot of ambivalence going forward in terms of how China is going to treat the ongoing efforts by Taiwan to expand its participation in the international community.

Now I’m going to turn to the bulk of my presentation which is really on Taiwan’s strategy going forward and what Taiwan is likely to do. First, I want to start with a bit of a description about Ma Ying-jeou’s approach to this issue which I think is important and obviously, as Ambassador Dean mentioned, it is really quite different from his predecessor, President Chen Shui-bian.

In keeping with what President Ma calls his modus vivendi strategy or flexible diplomacy, President Ma seeks to increase Taiwan’s participation in the international community while not
asserting Taiwan’s claim to sovereign state status and therefore not directly challenging Beijing’s One China principle.

Under Ma’s leadership, Taiwan has taken a very low-key approach to expanding Taiwan’s international space. For example, in 2008, Taiwan did not bid for membership in the United Nations as it had for the prior 15 years. Instead, it asked the United Nations to consider allowing Taiwan to have meaningful participation in U.N.-affiliated agencies. Rather than bid for membership in the World Health Organization this year, as Jacques pointed out, Taipei adopted an approach that relied mainly on goodwill from Beijing.

Female Voice: Specific adaptation work in Vietnam.

Bonnie Glaser: I’m not talking about Vietnam [cross-talking].

The WHA outcome was negotiated again as Jacques said between health authorities from Taiwan and the Mainland. Now, although President Ma has issued a confrontational approach, he has nevertheless attached very high priority to expand in Taiwan’s international space. For example, in an interview that he gave last February, Ma was emphatic that Taiwan’s international space be protected. He said, “There is a clear length between cross-strait relations and our international
space. We are not asking for recognition. We only want room to breathe.”

President Ma attributes the success of his policy to his low-key approach and to support from the international community and of course also goodwill from Beijing. I think he appreciates Beijing’s sensitivity on the issue of Taiwan’s international space. This is evidenced by the fact that in the wake of achieving observer status in the WHA, Taiwan has not yet announced which international organization or organizations will be the next objective. I think President Ma is patient. He wants to build mutual trust in the belief that greater mutual trust between Beijing and Taipei will create more space for Taiwan.

In a statement that was delivered by President Ma on the receipt of the invitation to attend the WHA, he said his administration is not pursuing participation for the sake of participation or breakthroughs purely to achieve breakthroughs. “Much less,” he said, “As the government engaging in needlessly combative behavior in pursuit of an ideological agenda. Participating in international organizations,” Ma said, “is for the sake of the people and therefore,” he said, “we must focus on the function of specific international organizations, seek to address the kitchen table concerns of the people of Taiwan and enable Taiwan to make a substantial contribution to the
international community.” And then he closed by saying, “This way of thinking will be used to prioritize which organizations Taiwan seeks to participate in and the strategies to achieve it.”

So what steps will Taiwan take going forward to further increase its voice and its role in the international community? Well, I think first we can certainly expect that President Ma will continue to adhere to the modus vivendi strategy which has achieved some success so far. I believe he will not press Beijing immediately but after the passage of a reasonable period of time, I think it is possible that President Ma may announce a new target organization that Taiwan aspires to participating. And informal discussions may be held with Beijing prior to deciding which international organization Taiwan will seek to enhance its role.

I will present what I see as seven objectives for Taiwan’s international space strategy going forward, and I view these goals as goals that Taiwan hopes to achieve over a period of years, not in a very short period of time. All of them will require sustained improvement in cross-strait relations and a higher level of confidence between Beijing and Taipei. These are not necessarily in a particular order of priority though the first one, I believe, is the highest priority, and that is to keep the diplomatic truce in place. If Beijing establishes
diplomatic ties with any of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, I think this would disprove Ma Ying-jeou’s contention that the development of cross-strait relations will expand rather than get stripped of Taiwan’s international space, and obviously this would be very harmful to Ma politically. And this is I think probably his highest priority.

Second is to expand opportunities for Taiwan to participate in international organizations in which it is already a member. One example that comes to mind, and perhaps the most important, is APEC. Taiwan has been a full member of APEC for 18 years. It is able to attend almost all APEC activities, hold bilateral dialogues. Taiwan’s economic minister will be at the meeting that is taking in place in Thailand this week, having a bilateral with China’s commerce minister. But Taiwan nevertheless has never hosted any ministerial meeting or sectoral meeting like transportation or education, for example. I think all APEC members, except perhaps Hong Kong and I think Papua New Guinea have hosted the ministers’ meeting. So Taiwan is permitted, of course, to send its economics minister, its finance minister but not its foreign minister. In fact, all those participation is limited to director general level or below. Beijing claims that sending the foreign or vice foreign minister even would imply that Taiwan is a sovereign country. The next three APEC
meetings are chaired this year by Singapore; next year by Japan and the year after that by the United States, which really provides an unprecedented opportunity for Taiwan to enhance its participation.

The third goal is to expand participation in international governmental organizations in which Taiwan has a status but that status is short of full membership. And I would cite as an example here the World Health Organization. Although participating as an observer, as Jacques has talked about in great length at the 62nd WHA last May, was a very significant achievement in Taiwan’s quest for a great international space. It was after all only a one-time event. The invitation must be reissued on an annual basis. I would certainly hazard to guess that unless there are major setbacks on cross-strait relations that there is every reason to expect that Taiwan will receive an invitation in 2010.

However, observer status in the WHA does not provide Taiwan full access to the World Health Organization. Taiwan is not invited to, nor notified of planned technical meetings; sometimes Taiwan finds out through third parties that a meeting is taking place and applies to participate, but admission is not guaranteed. If it is granted, it is on a case by case basis, and experts are permitted to attend but never an official delegation.
Taiwan also seeks to participate in various WHO mechanisms from which it is still excluded such as the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and the International Food Safety Authorities Network. Progress was achieved, again as Jacques mentioned, last January when Taiwan was brought into the International Health Regulations mechanism but certainly more from the perspective of Taiwan needs to be done to meet the health needs of its 23 million citizens so this will be I think an area of importance.

The fourth goal is to promote meaningful participation for Taiwan in other U.N.-specialized agencies with a focus on those that can enhance the well being of the Taiwanese people and also those to which Taiwan can make a contribution through its own experience and its own expertise. I’ll mention two of these and they were the same two I think that Jacques mentioned - the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization. There is a total of 17 U.N.-specialized agencies. There are many others I think that Taiwan could participate in, contribute to and also benefit from participating, but I think these two in particular are important for Taiwan but are sensitive for the reasons that Jacques explained, because they bring into the discussion issues like airspace and sea and these are necessarily related to sovereignty.
On the International Civil Aviation Organization, Taiwan is a major international transportation hub. It links Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and North America. There are over one and a half million flights that pass through the Taipei Flight Information Region each year. In order to make a good argument, the passenger safety would benefit from Taiwan’s participation and currently, Taiwan only obtains information indirectly through the U.S. Federal Aviation Organization. So it is sort of similar with the WHO; they have to go through different parties to obtain information. And therefore, the receipt of information is not only not comprehensive but it is also not as timely as it might be. And this negatively affects Taiwan’s ability to smoothly implement its own aviation safety programs.

As far as the International Maritime Organization goes, Taiwan has the world’s 10th largest maritime shipping industry but it is prevented from obtaining first-hand information again from the IMO concerning its meetings, certificates of survey, certification of seamen issued by Taiwan’s government have often been rejected or questioned and this has led to increase in cost and it has also negatively affected the growth of Taiwan’s maritime transportation. And the number of vessels registered in Taiwan has steadily declined as a result. When international maritime disputes concerning Taiwan registered
vessels arise, their owners are often treated unfairly in negotiations and arbitration and request for compensation.

Taiwan provides assistance to ships in distress in its area of responsibility and it engages in maritime rescues, but Taiwan-registered vessels are not accorded equitable and reciprocal treatment in the world community. And whether in cases of emergency or disputes, Taiwan’s government is prevented from extending direct assistance to its nationals and other governments; and therefore, it has to commission NGOs to help them instead.

Moving on to the fifth goal, the fifth is to promote meaningful participation in other international government organizations, those that are not affiliated with the U.N. And there is a set of priority issues here for the Taiwan government that they are interested in. This include climate change, the environment, combating crime, sea or air transportation safety and financial and aid issues. The one organization that I would mention here that has been raised in the Taiwan press is Interpol, which is the world’s largest international police organization; it has 187 member countries and it facilitates international police cooperation even where diplomatic ties do not exist between countries. Membership is currently restricted to member states, which makes it very difficult. Organizations that have status other than
membership or have a charter that provides for other possible statuses other than membership as a sovereign country, obviously Taiwan has a better opportunity to find the mechanism to participate.

The sixth goal is to join or participate in newly forming international organizations and I want to emphasize this even though it sort of overlaps with some of the other categories. But specifically, Taiwan hopes to play a role at the United Nation’s Climate Change Conference taking place in Copenhagen this December. Taiwan was excluded from the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and from the Kyoto Protocol, but it does adopt a policy, a voluntary compliance with international environmental agreements, just as it has tried to become, as Jacques has talked about, members of international treaties. And even though it cannot join, it has been compliant with their provision.

I think Taiwan seeks to contribute efforts to combat global warming today primarily through NGO efforts but it has a lot of experience and expertise to share with other countries. In fact, Taiwan ranked third in Asia and 32nd in the world ranking of 2009 climate change performance index, which was for 2008 but it was released in 2009 and it plays ahead of Singapore which was 38; South Korea was 41, Japan was 43, and
China was 49. India plays ahead of Taiwan at number seven, and Indonesia of 27. These were the global rankings.

Finally, number seven is to seek to join and expand Taiwan’s participation in NGOs and there are over I think 40,000 internationally operating NGOs. Taiwan participates in I believe more than 2,000. But NGOs are increasingly playing a role in setting the agenda in world affairs and so Taiwan hopes to do more in this regard. I’ll mention two here that I think Taiwan sees as particularly important. One is the Shangri-La Dialogue which was inaugurated in 2002 and it has become widely recognized as a key event annually for defense and security policy in the region. More and more countries are sending their defense ministers or highly ranked civilians or military officers, and it is organized by the IISS so this is an independent think tank in Great Britain. There are 27 countries that are represented. Taiwan is only committed to send a couple of scholars who have no governmental affiliation. So I think expanding and upgrading its participation in the Shangri-La would enable Taiwan to interact with more counterparts in the region and to join in the dialogue on regional security issues that affect Taiwan’s interest.

CSCAP, you probably all know a great deal about, it is a track-two mechanism that enables scholars, officials and others in a private capacity to discuss political and security issues
and challenges that face the region. It also provides policy recommendations to intergovernmental bodies and establishes a lot of linkages with institutions and organizations and other parts of the world. Again, as with Shangri-La, Taiwan’s scholars participate in CSCAP, study groups in their private capacities. I hear from my colleague at in Pacific Forum, Ralph Cossa, that there is a very lengthy vetting process and it is very painful. He is always advocating on Taiwan’s behalf. I should underscore here that the CSCAP charter allows membership to institutes and member committees from countries and territories in the Asia Pacific Region and this charter was actually written with Taiwan in mind but still has not enabled Taiwan to enhance its participation. One option would be to permit Taiwan to become an associate member.

So let me close by saying that some progress has been made in increasing Taiwan’s participation in the international community in the past year, which I believe is largely due to President Ma’s pragmatic approach. And a positive response from the mainland and a few key instances such as the WHA and in respecting the diplomatic truce. Beijing has come to understand that the issue of international space is important to Ma’s domestic support and that failure to make headway could put at risk his moderate approach to cross-strait relations. Stated more positively, continued progress on Taiwan’s
international space may help sustain momentum in cross-strait relation as well as extend Ma’s tenure and power. Hopefully, that recognition by the Mainland will supersede fears that giving Taiwan greater international space will strengthen its de facto independence status and set back the attainment of the longer term goal of unification. Thank you very much.

Edward McCord: Well, I think we had a very not only comprehensive but actually very in-depth analysis of the whole issue of Taiwan’s quest for international space. We would open the floor up now to questions, discussion, please, I’ll recognize people, please identify yourself and if you are directing a question to a particular panelist, say who it is. Yes?

Norman Fu: My name is Norman Fu [phonetic]. I’m a writer of the China Times of Taipei. My question is directed to Mr. Dean. I wish you could clarify two points that you discussed in your remarks.

Number one, first, you cited Nancy Tucker about her book in which she said the U.S. should pay more attention, high level attention given better access, high level access to Taiwan’s leadership so that Taiwan can deal with China in confidence, whereas, in your view, you seemed to be saying - if I heard you right - that the U.S. will pay less attention to Taiwan’s leadership’s need for this kind of high-level access
because of the U.S. interest in having better strategic whatever, economic relations with China. This is my first point. I wonder if you can elaborate on that particular point.

The second point, you mentioned in passing that there may be in the future a two-seat formula for China along the lines of the former USSR which had three seats in the U.N. I wonder how this can be done because if you take a look at China’s insistence on One China principle, I would like to get some more of your wisdom on this particular point.

David Dean: Thank you, Mr. Fu. When I was making those comments about Nancy Tucker’s book, I saw myself the division between what she has said in her book and my own comments. I was only speaking in terms of my own comments, from my personal experience of what types of issues attract high-level attention in the U.S. administration, not just this administration but all of the administrations. The issues that attract attention are burning issues - Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and things of that type.

As I mentioned, the situation in the Taiwan Strait is probably calmer today than it has been in the past many, many years. Therefore, it is not going to grab their attention. Probably the administration policymakers are going to be working on other issues, and although I would like Nancy Tucker’s comments about what we should do, I was merely trying
to say what it is likely that the administration will do, that they will focus their attention on putting out the fires. So this is a problem in how the U.S. government goes without conducting its foreign policy. It does not give equal time to every place.

Now, for your second point, would you -- two seats for China. Well, that was my own personal point of view. I have always felt that it might be possible to foresee some form of a Chinese Republic in which various parts like Hong Kong and Taiwan might be part of it along with the Mainland. In that case, if any such entity might develop in years and years and years ahead, it would not be too far from my imagination anyway to think that some of those parts at least will get representation in the General Assembly, but I said with China’s concurrence. I did not say an opposition to China’s views. It would have to be an agreement that they agreed upon and then try to persuade members of the United Nations to accept. Whether we will ever see something like that, I do not know, there are too many uncertainties between here and then, but it would be a reasonable solution. We have been talking today about all of the various U.N. agencies that Taiwan might join at some point in the future that might be mutually advantageous to everybody. I can think that this solution of two seats for
China would be a solution of Taiwan’s future and China’s problem with [inaudible].

Carrie Damba: I’ll stand up since I’m back here. Carrie Damba [phonetic] from the Congressional Research Service. I have a question for both Jacques and Bonnie on ICAO and the International Maritime Organization as I have talked to people in Taiwan about this and about their interests. It certainly seems like the kind of participation that would benefit the international community given the amount of air and sea traffic goes to Taiwan’s area, really two questions.

One is how -- can you elaborate a little bit - Bonnie mentioned it a little bit - on how Taiwan gets its information now? How do you conduct air and sea operations without participation in these organizations? And question two, from a policy standpoint, maybe a practical standpoint, is progress toward this kind of participation likely to benefit from or be harmed by maybe U.S. government action or congressional action seeking this kind of participation? Thank you.

Jacques deLisle: Bonnie will probably have a better answer to the first question than I do. My information on that is largely through from what I have heard from Taiwanese sources; it is to, of course, complain [sounds like] literally about the impediments involved. In many of these cases, as
with WHO as well, it goes through third parties and the U.S. has been, as I understand, a principal third party.

Now there is a very robust debate about how much in today’s world you really need that direct participation to get the necessary information. There are clearly instances where communication have not been good and there are however clearly fairly high levels of functionality. We do not have ships colliding and planes falling out of the sky and things like that in the region, but it is at the margin that it matters. And it clearly is costly and risky not to have it and have it go through third channels, particularly in the SARS context for instance, they went through the US-CBC. And there are downside risks to that but it is a debate that each statement you get a pushback from the other side. So Taiwan has plausible functional claims but not quite as plausible as the most ardent proponents would say, and the Mainland’s answer, “Well, if you want direct communication, it is easy. Just come in under our umbrella and so you are really making a symbolic point by not coming in this way and we are happy to run it through Beijing’s CBC.” I do not have a whole lot of specifics but the sense is that the information flow is not as bad as one might fear but it still does have costs.

As to the U.S. role in all of this, I think first of all, I think the cause and effect problem of the U.S. role in any
form of cross-strait relations is always a little messy. On the one hand, we tend to get involved when things are going particularly badly, for example, the closing days of the Chan years of [indiscernible]. So that is clear. But the question is does our getting in the middle of it really muck it up sometimes? It of course has and it occurred delightfully on the sideline but I think the U.S. has a facilitator role to play certainly, partly because much of Taiwan’s ability to make any headway in any of these organizations, again the WHA-WHO examples are the most recent one. Taiwan’s opportunities benefit significantly depend crucially as in so many things on a degree of U.S. support but being too front and center, with all due respect to the folks up on the Hill, would be a somewhat blunt instrument that is sometimes wielded by Congress on these types of issues. You could imagine a pretty nasty backlash.

So I think subtle working through the channels, U.S. engagement with the international organization side probably does help and certainly signaling of support for greater participation does help, but getting too far in the middle, too upfront to the public, I think risks a reaction not just from Beijing per se but also given what Bonnie has talked about as well on the panel here that there are divisions of opinion within China about how accommodating to be. And not
surprisingly, you know, this very well, the folks who are most skeptical and most worried about giving an inch and having the mile taken are certainly going to see anything that has the U.S. back in the middle of putting in a tone with the most public statement [indiscernible] some edge of mucking around it in internal affairs, whether it is risky.

But again, that said, I would stress that the functional sort of day-to-day nudging it forward issue, we probably do have a positive role to play and an indispensable role in terms of making clear that we do support greater participation. And again, it is most effective when praised in terms of Dean and Bonnie and I are both talking about, that is saying this is not about Taiwan status; it is about the interest of Taiwanese people and others who use Taiwan adjacent air and sea space. And it is about making the regime functional for everybody globally.

Bonnie has given you the data on how high Taiwan ranks in those two things. I would add only that one of the interesting fruits of the [indiscernible] in cross-strait relations in the establishment of the full three links and such is that there is more of that kind of traffic going on. It is the argument that to have a safe global regime in these areas require greater participation and greater inclusion and so on has actually become stronger, thanks to those developments.
Bonnie Glaser: I’ll be brief. I cannot add anything more in the first question. I gave all the information I have, but I think the second question is very important because I think we have to really strike the right balance here because if there is no voice from the United States and other members of the international community encouraging the inclusion of Taiwan whether meaningful participation or whatever status in various organizations, I think the odds of it happening, of Taiwan making any progress will be slim. It would be tougher for Taiwan and I think President Ma continues to appreciate the role that is played by the international community.

At the same time, if too much pressure is put on Beijing, the Chinese will say we are not going to do X, whatever it is, under pressure. We are going to decide that it is in our interest when we do it and how we do it. And this was very clear with the WHA process where when it got to a certain sort of sensitive moment, the Chinese really signaled that any statement by the United States publicly is going to undercut efforts by the two sides to make progress. So I think timing is very important in that regard. And I guess ultimately, the bottom line is that we need to be in very close consultation with President Ma and with Taiwan and that we should be playing the role that they want us to play.
If they see it as helpful, for example, when the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang Yi, was here, I think there were things that were said by senior U.S. officials to try and encourage Beijing to be more open to Taiwan’s participation in the international community. But as far as Congress doing things, called in hearings, that might be a little bit in the direction perhaps of being seen as putting too much pressure on Beijing. But I think we really need to listen to Taiwan’s needs on this and pursue those.

[End of CD 1]

[Start of CD 2]

Male Voice: I get the impression that this progress being made on the so-called international space but that is not really happening within the region that perhaps that is a legacy from the tail end of Lee Teng-hui and certainly from Chen Shui-bian that Beijing knows the U.S. put much more pressure on the Southeast Asians and others to lessen the kind of links they had with Taiwan.

[End of CD 2]

[Start of CD 3]

Male Voice: -- for Taiwan and that really with the Koumintang administration there have been a very difficult relationship that has developed with Japan and I wonder if any of the speakers would like to comment on this.
David Dean: Well, if I may offer just a word or two, I think what you say about Japan is quite correct that Japan does have a very good relationship. The reason that I mention Japan’s position on the status of Taiwan is because if that represents the government’s position and the head of the Japanese Interchange Association made this is the speech and there was an instant uproar in Taiwan. Some people in the legislature realm were calling for the PNG [phonetic] but President Ma’s office calmed the situation.

I think that in saying that, they do not want to say officially that Taiwan is part of China but they also know they have very little options. So it seems to me that China’s efforts in Asia are influenced by opinions like that in Japan but also were influenced by -- I think if they are going to try to get more Asian countries, for instance, to agree that Taiwan becomes part of the Ten plus One that is an economic organization for trade. I think that it is likely this whole procedure takes a lot of time and we are not expecting anything to turn this year or next year. I’m thinking in terms of 10 or 20 years of gradual progress, maybe some setbacks and gradual progress. That will influence at that time how much pressure China puts on countries in the region or, indeed, internationally.
Jacques deLisle: Just very quickly on that. There is a lot going on there and I will not try to plumb some of the details of it but instead a very simple level. Of course, China is much more a regional power than it is a global power; its leverage is much greater with its near neighbors. That is one aspect. The other is that Taiwan remains for reasons that may be shifting under our feet, too early to tell, but Taiwan has remained excluded from what has become an increasingly robust and important intergovernmental order in Southeast Asia, East Asia, the various ASEAN Plus arrangements as the ASEAN-China free trade area, that whole package of things, which in what is in a sense the momentum and perhaps still the clung-to notion that the way to [indiscernible] Taiwan in some ways is not included. So I think that is going to be a lagging rather than a leading variable; it is just too hard to fathom that one.

Bonnie Glaser: I think economics remains Taiwan’s priority and I think that the Taiwan government is optimistic that after the signing of an eco agreement, the target for which is now next year, that there will be countries particularly in Southeast Asia, probably Singapore being among the first since they were already negotiating a free trade agreement with Taiwan in 2001. That did not go forward because of the name that Taiwan insisted on when President Chen Shui-
bian was in power for them to use for that FTA. But I think that the government has received some signals from other governments including Singapore that as long as China does not object -- China is going to have to give the nod in one way or another that these governments are not going to suffer some punitive retaliation for moving forward with Taiwan. And I think that the quote that I read from what Hu Jin-tao said in his Six Points signals that the Mainland understands that having Taiwan be marginalized economically is not in its interest. So I’m fairly optimistic.

Edward McCord: There were a number of hands up and we are actually out of time, so what I’m going to do is suggest that we let the people who have questions, ask them in sequence and then let the panel make final answers. We have one here, one here, one here, so we will start there -- oh, many more -- actually we are going to take three.

Male Voice: I have a simple question. Actually, I’m a medical doctor but I represent Chinese-American Professional Association particularly Taiwan project advocate group and I practice here, sports medicine actually.

My question is very political. In the issue, we can use the existing example, European Common Market, so many small countries. If Taiwan can develop a greater China market combined with Singapore, Hong Kong, Mainland and Taiwan, is...
that possible to create a more international space? I need every speaker’s input for this.

Mutaya: Mutaya [phonetic] from the East-West Center. It is really a comment more than a question.

It seems to me there have been two strategies from Taiwan to increase its international space. One that is Lee Teng-hui’s and Chen Shui-bian’s and now under Ma and we clearly see which has been more successful than the other. But at the same time, I think it is important to recognize that there are clear limits to what this new strategy can achieve as well. And I think three very good presentations all highlight in fact the limitations more than the possibilities of how much international space can be achieved. And so, one looks at what is the cause and effect here. The cause really is political developments in Taiwan, political developments in China and how they in fact impact upon. So one really has to see in terms of any dramatic movement forward or whether in fact the political developments in Taiwan are sustainable and in fact status quo or inter-regimes are going to be the norm or is it going to be an alternation back to Chen Shui-bian and independence and so forth and whether in fact in China, Hu Jin-tao and his successors are better able in fact to have such political capital that they can in fact allow much more space and room to realize what you call as a two-seat formula for representation.
So I think one has to be so very realistic and really look at very incremental, very slow pace rather than look at very dramatic increase in international space.

Scott Tanner: Scott Tanner [phonetic], CNA, following on Carrie’s question on proper U.S. role in encouraging more space and Bonnie’s response about striking the appropriate balance, I wanted to follow on about U.S. promotion of third countries, particularly in the region, help promoting space for Taiwan particularly on functional issues. You mentioned maritime, crime, health and others where Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand, all of these countries would have a very strong stake in at least having better working relations with Taiwan.

Edward McCord: Answer whatever you think you can or want to.

Jacques deLisle: David Dean wants to have the last words, so I guess we are starting at this end.

The European Common Market model and its possibilities for international space is a very benign model for Taiwan. You can get deep economic integration without significant loss of political space. That is why if you look at the debates within Taiwan, although partisan-based, in Taiwan over the last decade or more, everybody has got their model. The confederation or the commonwealth of the two Germanys and the model does not surprisingly appeal to those who most want that outcome. In
that sense, sure, if that is the relevant paradigm then there is a lot of hope. Of course, the critical comeback to that is the model is not the European Union; it is more like Germany-Austria in Hirschman’s book where you got an asymmetric interdependence and a political agenda on the part of the larger party and, yes, it is ultimately a Rorschach - yes.

A well-functioning version I think is quite positive and as that suggests and this gets into in some sense the comment of really which of those becomes more plausible as a matter of political will and political preference in both Taipei and Beijing. I fully embrace the point that there is a big domestic politics component to this that is too often slighted in the name of these discussions. I think it is actually, from a political science perspective, a fascinating case of interactive effect between the international environment and domestic politics. I can go on for hours on that but I will not.

As to the U.S. promoting third party approaches, I think there is much to be said for that in terms of avoiding some of the downfalls that Bonnie and Carrie have mentioned. It certainly is in these other third countries’ interests within the region, but I think we are still in a dynamic whether they - the folks out in Beijing - as we were talking about before are not going to be taking the lead in this. It is going to be
a matter of signalling to Beijing and then the degree of support by the U.S. But, again, keeping it functional, talking about how it is important to not just Taiwan but to the functionality of these regimes and therefore serving the interests of these countries I think helps take -- I do not think it will change anybody’s mind but it takes the political temperature and symbolism down off in way that is certainly hopeful and helpful.

Bonnie Glaser: I’ll just add to that question that you asked, Scott.

I think that there are plenty of countries in the region that see the value in having Taiwan’s participation but I do not think us talking to them about it is the way to make progress as they recognize their stake and they look at their huge neighbor and they see much bigger stakes with China. So I think the real strategy has to be to persuade Beijing that really it should be more tolerant, more magnanimous, more willing to allow Taiwan to participate in these organizations. If Beijing is willing to go along with it, then I think that would open up a lot more opportunities, but I’m not really very optimistic that there will be some major recognition in Beijing of the advantages that flow on having Taiwan a member. This is really a very sensitive sovereignty related question in Beijing
that I think they are having a lot of difficulty grappling with them.

In fact, I think that if Taiwan had not been so successful in convincing Beijing that Ma Ying-jeou’s poll ratings would plummet, if they did not get observer status in WHO, I’m not so sure Beijing would have gone along with it. They were already very concerned about the extraordinary drop in his poll ratings from the time that he was elected due primarily to the economic situation. Beijing not being a democracy did not predict this would happen but they were very, very worried and they were quite concerned about a DPP comeback, so they do want to help keep him in power. I think that is largely why they came to the decision they did on WHO.

Can they be convinced again that there is yet another organization or set of organizations that will help Ma? I do not know, but I think it is going to be very, very tough slogging because I could just think Beijing remains extremely sensitive and sees that the risks are just so much greater than the benefits.

David Dean: Do I have the last word?

Edward McCord: You have the last word.

Bonnie Glaser: You do.

David Dean: Well, I agree with Jacques and Bonnie very much particularly on the issue that Beijing, for some reason
that we cannot fathom at the present time, were to change its mind about Taiwan’s participation in these international organizations or even in its negotiation with Beijing itself for more progress between them then the domestic repercussions, I agree, will be very severe and they would be against Beijing’s own interest. So it seems to me that their own interests dictate that they selectively and slowly explore the area of the relationship across the strait and also explore the area of Taiwan’s gradual entry into different organizations if it can be done in such a way that it does not affect the sovereignty too much. That is my final word. Thank you.

Edward McCord: Obviously, we could have gone on for a bit longer but we really are out of time. I think we had a very interesting session today and I want to thank our panelists for their participation.

[End of CD 3]

[End of transcript]