Panel II: Domestic Sources of Taiwan's Cross-Strait Policies

Edward McCord: I'm director of the Taiwan Education and Research Program at the Sigur Center. I'm very pleased to start this afternoon's session up now turning from external frameworks to domestic perspective on cross-strait relations. I'm particularly excited about this panel we have such [inaudible] disciplines here. We have anthropology [indiscernible] science. In the other school, we claim interdisciplinary but it's often [indiscernible] rather than what we actually do and so I think it's very nice that we actually are able to do an interdisciplinary panel today. I'm just going to introduce the three people in the order which they'll be appearing and then just leave it to them to give their presentation.

First of all, we have Sara Friedman who's up here on the border, on the back [indiscernible] she has been an associate professor at the Indiana University. She's also the author of the book *Intimate Politics: Marriage, the Market and State Power in Southeastern China*.

Following her will be Megan Greene from the University of Kansas. She's an author and she's a historian. We have an anthropologist and a historian with Megan Greene. Her book is the *Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan*.

And then, finally, an old friend, Shelley Rigger, political scientist, professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College. She has several books; *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for...*
Sara L. Friedman: Thank you all very much for coming. I'm going to do my best to stick to my 20 minutes here. I'd like to shift our topic a little bit to talk about the human face of cross-strait relations, specifically by looking at cross-strait marriages, marriages between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, most of which involve Chinese women and Taiwanese men.

And I want to talk about a dominant perception of the state of cross-strait marriages which is that under Chen Shui-bian's presidency, under the DPP role from 2000 to 2008, the government was fundamentally unfriendly to Chinese spouses in Taiwan largely because of DPP opposition to post- or cross-strait ties. So here the assumption is that although Chen's presidency coincided with the largest increase in the absolute number of cross-strait marriages and their percentage as a proportion of all marriages in Taiwan, that period did not simultaneously witness improved status or greater rights for these spouses. And you can see this in an increased awareness and sensitivity to immigration in general in Taiwan during this first decade of the 21st century, particularly in the early period. This is a magazine cover from 2003, modeled on a *Time Magazine* cover in the U.S. from the year prior to that but what the new face of Taiwan is and can he handle it.

So from a big picture perspective, this portrayal of hostile attitudes in part of the government toward Chinese spouses during Chen's presidency is reasonably accurate. And it's of course the argument that presidential support is critical to significant changes in policies that regard the Mainland.

For today, I want to complicate this picture a little bit. That’s another magazine cover about children born from these marriages and marriages with foreign spouses as well from...
Southeast Asia. So I'm going to complicate the picture by drawing on my research with Chinese spouses and their families, with NGO actors in Taiwan, both those that provide services and those that agitate for immigrant rights, as well as bureaucrats and officials in relevant government agencies such as the Mainland Affairs Council, the National Immigration Agency and the Ministry of Interior.

It's certainly true today that Chinese spouses enjoy more rights and a shorter timeline to citizenship under Ma Ying-jeou's presidency than it did before. But I want to argue that these gains cannot be explained exclusively by a shift from DPP to Kuomintang rule. Instead, I'm going to show how he considered how attitudes and policies towards immigration in general changed in Taiwan.

And the first decade of the 21st century saw unprecedented immigration-related NGO activism in Taiwan. These activities were directed primarily at foreign spouses, again, most of the women from Southeast Asia and migrant workers in Taiwan. But they created precedents that incurred subsequent attention to the rights of Mainland Chinese spouses specifically and that set in motion reform efforts that culminated in some on the major policy revisions that happened early on in Ma Ying-jeou's presidency.

So just to give you a sense of the kinds of numbers we're talking about here, since cross-strait ties opened in 1987 through the end of February of this year, there've been a total of roughly 287,000 Chinese spouses who applied for entry to Taiwan. Again, as of the end of February, a little over 70,000 have received Taiwanese citizenship. The yearly figures fluctuate a bit over the decade but with the exception of 2004, cross-strait marriages have accounted for over 50 percent of all unions of non-Taiwanese in any given year. And over the last decade, they made up anywhere from 18 to 20 percent of all registered marriages in Taiwan so that means at
the height, one in five marriages in Taiwan had a Mainland Chinese spouse. That was in 2003. Those numbers declined pretty dramatically in 2004 due to the implementation of a border interview system but they’ve held steady in past years at roughly one in 10 marriages in Taiwan.

So let me talk a little bit about who these major NGO actors have been and what their activities were during Chen Shui-bian's presidency that set precedents for these subsequent reforms.

The major group I'm going to talk about is the Alliance for Human Rights Legislation for Immigrants and Migrants. This is an umbrella organization that includes groups that focus more narrowly on women's rights, labor rights, human rights, as well as immigrant and migrant issues. The group came together at the end of 2003 under an initiative put forward by the Awakening Foundation, which is one of the major feminist organizations in Taiwan, in response to the government's efforts to finally move forward with establishing a National Immigration Agency. This had been on the books, been long debated for about a decade but it had been held up by debates over allocation of personnel resources, et cetera.

These groups were mostly concerned about the high percentage of police personnel in the proposed agency - 75 percent of positions allocated to police - as well as its overall emphasis on investigative policing and control functions as opposed to protecting immigrant and migrant rights. So, in December of 2003, the alliance formally came together and they worked very hard to influence the shape of the NIA as much as they could, with some success, although not as much as they had hoped for.

The second major issue that the alliance took on was revising the immigration law, the [foreign language]. And this is the law that is directed specifically to foreigners [indiscernible] did not fall under it. It was first implemented in 1999. It came up for a major revision, that
process of which lasted for several years. Alliance members met regularly over the course of about a year to pour over the existing law and debating revisions to each article. With assistance from legal scholars, they then drafted their own version of the law that they submitted to the Legislative Yuan in March of 2005 under Kuomintang legislator [indiscernible].

Although not all of their proposed amendments were included in the final version that passed in November of 2007, key elements of the alliance's agenda did make it in; exceptions for domestic violence from married immigrants, antidiscrimination regulations, and also the right of assembly and public demonstration for foreign spouses.

So in its initial years, the alliance focused primarily on the needs of so-called foreign spouses and foreign migrant workers in Taiwan. And it's important to point out that just prior to the benefit which the alliance was formed at the end of 2003, there have been a series of protests held around proposed revisions to the Act Governing Relations Between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. This is the major legal apparatus that governs Mainland Chinese [background noise].

Proposed revisions put out in 2002 wanted to extend the timeframe for citizenship for Mainland spouses from eight years to 11 years. That’s in comparison to the four-year timeframe for foreign spouses. This proposed revision provoked a series of protests on the parliament organization called the Cross-Strait Marriage Promotion Association, which is an organization primarily of Taiwanese husbands of Chinese women, many of whom are elderly veterans who came to Taiwan [indiscernible] as part of this organization specifically.

So they organized a series of public protests that went on through the fall of 2002 and 2003. The last one in September of 2003 was in there three months before the alliance was formed. None of the groups that eventually comprised the alliance took part in these protests,
and so we can see a very clear division at this point between groups that advocate for Chinese spouses and groups that are advocating to help foreign spouses and migrant workers. And when the alliance was formed, the Cross-Strait Promotion Association was not part of this initial membership. They joined a few years later for a variety of reasons that I'm happy to talk about more.

So in addition to these kinds of organizational obstacles and issue obstacles, there was also significant resistance within Taiwan's rather activist community to vesting discrimination against immigrants and migrants in general and Mainland spouses specifically. This reluctance was enhanced especially in the case of Mainland spouses who for many still raise the specter of national security concerns. And by contrast, foreign spouses could be more easily depicted as sympathetic targets, they tend to be young, to bear children, interphase discriminatory barriers due to minimalistic racial and cultural differences.

So given this reluctance, it's not surprising that the first major alliance initiative that included both the Cross-Strait Marriage Promotion Association and mainland spouses was a campaign in 2007 to abolish a financial requirement that affected both groups. This was a requirement that at point of naturalization both foreign and Mainland spouses show proof of financial resources sufficient for support. It's a requirement that first was introduced for Mainland spouses in 2004 and a few years later, foreign spouses as part of a revision of the nationality law.

The financial requirement created significant obstacles for foreign spouses especially because they often tended to work in informal sectors of the economy as with their husbands and they had trouble accumulating the resource and accumulating the formal kinds of proof that were
needed to attest to this financial status. Mainland spouses also complained about the requirement but they seemed better able to mobilize the resources when the time came to show proof.

So this sub-organization of the alliance called the Coalition Against Financial Requirements for Immigrants (CAFRI) organized a major protest on September 9th, 2007. That was the first public protest to bring together foreign and Mainland spouses in Taiwan and they came from across the island. The day began with a protest in front of the Executive Yuan and moved over the afternoon to the National Immigration Agency. Although foreign spouses greatly outnumbered Mainland spouses at this event, both groups performed and spoke publicly, although the Mainland spouses did so and [indiscernible] arrest. And the overall message of the event was that financial requirement did not protect the livelihood of immigrant spouses as the government claimed but instead violated immigrants' human rights by discriminating as before.

The protest and coalition demands in general met with a chilly response from the Ministry of the Interior and from the Immigration Agency. And it was only in November of 2008 after Ma Ying-jeou came to power that the regulations were significantly revised.

Now as part of this September protest, a group of men representing the Cross-Strait Marriage Promotion Association put out a skit that's out to broaden the scope of demands by raising issues that were specific to Mainland spouses. And here, they featured a Mainland bride dressed in traditional red whose hands are bound and who becomes increasingly burdened over the course of the skit by the various requirements; not only the financial requirement but also an interview system where the interview system and [indiscernible] at the initial residency stage and at naturalization. And these are things that foreign spouses did not encounter in the same way.

They continued this message at a protest a few months later that commemorated the 20th anniversary of the resumption of cross-strait ties, again, at the Immigration Agency and, again,
where they enacted a similar kind of skit that burdened or shackled a Mainland wife with restrictions on birth rights, financial requirement, et cetera. So, very powerful visual images.

What was striking at this event was the absence of any other members of the coalition or of the alliance. So it specifically was the Cross-Strait Marriage Promotion Association and their representatives who participated in this that was directed more narrowly to the interest of Mainland spouses, and an afternoon press conference that was focused on the financial requirement ironically drew from this larger group of activist organizations. So there's still a divide that we're seeing.

So by the end of 2007, we see the alliance begin to include representatives of organizations that are devoted to the interest of Mainland spouses alone although most of the public events are just to share concern with two constituencies. Beginning in the winter of 2008, however, the alliance began to turn its attention specifically to the Act, the act that governs mainland Chinese in Taiwan. And from January to June, they met on a regular basis to go over each article, to compare it to the revised immigration law, debate its political and gender content and to examine its consequences for Mainland Chinese spouses.

This was also in several guiding principles that they presented to the newly appointed Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan in July of 2008, and that continued to be debated in alliance meetings through the fall of 2008. And like the immigration law, this then resulted in an alliance draft that was submitted to the Executive Yuan at the end of 2008, again, under Kuomintang legislator [indiscernible] and 30 others supporting legislators.

So this alliance step [sounds like] was the most detailed of the seven submissions and it proposed changes to 14 articles of the Act. Obviously, not all of the changes made it in but the final version that was passed on June 9th, 2009 contains several of the key alliance requests. It
reduced the time to citizenship from eight to six years, still not for four years faced by foreign spouses concerned. It granted residency and work rights immediately upon arrival; this was a big point of contention. It eliminated the financial requirement altogether for Mainland spouses and it also eliminated some of the restrictions and their ability to inherit and to own property.

There were some things that remained unchanged. They did not gain the right to assembly or public demonstration prior to citizenship. They also continued to face restrictions on their ability to assume civil service positions even after [inaudible] assistance. Legislators were not going to [indiscernible] nor were they willing to overturn an article that made it impossible for Taiwanese who already had birth or adopted children of their own to adopt a Mainland Chinese child. And this became an issue specifically because of the growing number of Mainland spouses who had children from previous relationship on the Mainland, young children who they, at this point, were still unable to bring to Taiwan resulting in separations.

And I have to say that the legislators recognized the humanitarian issue here and added a supplementary resolution at the final consultation, urging the Executive Yuan to act on that issue through other means within two months' time, which they then did do. And I'm happy to talk about that more in the question and answer.

So by the time these revisions took effect in August of 2009, the alliance had fully taken on the task of promoting the rights of Mainland spouses in Taiwan. This is a significant shift from the early 2000s. That transition was made possible by the efforts of a few key individuals by the somewhat mainstreaming of the Cross-Strait Marriage Promotion Association, and by the establishment of a new member organization that was specifically devoted to the interest of Mainland Chinese spouses.
And this group followed in the footsteps of the major foreign spouses group by cultivating a group of Mainland women who would speak publicly and be a face for their own interests, as opposed to having Taiwanese activists represent them. And here, one of the issues in which they were most successful, the sympathetic issue of sponsoring children left behind in China. And this is a modern day press conference in May of last year sponsored by the alliance that featured four women who had children that they were unable to bring here.

So in the phase of persistent, bureaucratic and legislative reluctance to equalizing treatment of Mainland and foreign spouses and to reform a sense of the sensitive articles in the Act, the alliance's achievements within the first year or so of Ma Ying-jeou's presidency are quite straight. They clearly built on previous efforts to improve the status and rights of foreign marital immigrants and migrant workers and to utilize experience that was a part of over several years of legislative and legal reform, of lobbying, public protest and mobilizing the media.

Now we should add that key leadership changes at the Mainland Affairs Council and the National Immigration Agency also contributed to this effort because Ma was able to put in place individuals who were more inclined to pressure bureaucrats in those organizations to respond more positively to reform initiatives. But those changes came very much at the end, you might even say the tail-end of a process that had been set in motion quite early on in Chen Shui-bian's presidency. Thank you very much.

Megan Greene: So Sara has given you one sort of unconventional take on cross-strait relations, and I'm going for a second unconventional take on it. I guess I've titled my thoughts something like Taiwan's Past Is China's Future although maybe a more accurate thing to say would be China's present. And what I want to talk about here is how Taiwan has provided a development model for China over the past couple of decades, a model that China has taken far
beyond anything that Taiwan was able to accomplish largely because of the scope of its economy and that it hasn’t folded in a wholly, rigorous way but one that nonetheless has clearly influenced patterns of development in China.

The model that I’m talking about here is a model of using science and technology to promote development, so a developmental state model that is shaped around science and technology. It’s a model which the ROC government began to develop in fact when it was in China but there were too many logistical obstacles for it to work, for it to succeed. In Taiwan, it had a great deal more success, but it is important to note that this was not until the late 1970s. And prior to that period, it was really quite a bumpy path to sort of create or establish what then became a model.

Now, the main features of this model, let me just list them briefly. Technocracy or I'll say technocracy institutions and academy, that’s sort of how to talk about -- so technocracy, the important role that is played by technocrats in guiding development. It is important to realize that within this model that Taiwan has, technocrats are acting not independently entirely. They are working in concert with academic, business and international business partners to device good plans for Taiwan and then they are using that knowledge that they acquired in -- or the plans of their development to persuade political actors to go along with them.

They also created a number of important institutions over the course of the 1970s and into the 1980s, and I'll just mention three. One is the Science and Technology Advisory Group (STAG) which was a venue in which technocrats solicited advice that then helped them to work out a sense of direction for state planning. ITRI, the Industrial Technology Research Institute, a state-run R&D unit that responded to the needs of local industry, the higher and mostly foreign trade research interest. And then science parks, like the Hsinchu Science Park which was built
around ITRI and was also located in Hsinchu because of the proximity of some universities that had science and technology events.

As far as planning goes, there were several foci of the plans that were central to this model. One was then held -- and this is particularly in terms of developing the educational system to a point that people did not have to leave Taiwan for specialized higher education. But then also, in terms of trying to figure out strategies for reversing brain drain. That's harder to outline. How do you develop the economy to a point that you have jobs that people actually want to come back or stay in Taiwan to participate in?

Strategic plans for development of particular industries that aim to make up effective use of existing resources to build upon existing strengths were another important to [indiscernible] planning. And to make that work, industry had to have incentives to participate. And the institutions that I've already mentioned are to provide some of these incentives, but it's also the case that within the small -- technocracy really has to have a way of the political leadership behind it so as to push industry in certain directions.

Now, how and when did China get interested in this? The PRC is really better known for its - at least among historians which I think [indiscernible] - Maoist emphasis on redness and its rejection of expertise during big mass movements such as The Great Leap Forward then its construction of institutions that foster scientific and technological development. But it did create such a situation, this was in the 1950s, and in a limited way they sort of struggled along and went along, even through The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, sometimes meeting with great success as in the field of global technology in the 1960s.

But beginning in 1977, first Hua Guofeng then later Deng Xiaoping oversaw as part of the Four Modernizations that pushed for plan that’s strategic, scientific and technical
development. The PRC began to hold national science conferences to construct or rebuild state-run research institutions and to develop centralized plans for economic development to begin to account and plan for necessary developments in science and technology. The main early agents of these changes were, unlike Taiwan, political leaders rather than technocrats are helping the missions.

Now clearly, a centralized approach to state planning that recognizes the importance of science and technology is consistent. This isn’t something that originated in Taiwan, right? It's consistent with the Five-Year Plans of the Soviet Union and then the Soviet-influenced era in the PRC and of course it also was consistent with the Leninist background of the KMT. Although it would be overstating the case to suggest that Taiwan has served that as China's only development model in the post-Mao era and I certainly am not going there, there is no question that Chinese intellectuals and the Chinese government have sought to learn from the Taiwan experience since at least 1986 when Nankai University in Tianjin established an Institute of Taiwan in Economics, which was the earliest of several such institutes that Chinese universities are dedicated to the study in Taiwan.

This one emphasized research on Taiwan's economy, cross-strait trade relations and comparisons of economies across the straits and was set up to train graduate students in these areas of study. In other words, it's purview was to research and learn from Taiwan's development experience as well as to learn more about Taiwan.

By the early 1980s, architects of Taiwan's scientific and technical development process such as Wu Dayou and K.T. Li were themselves having increasing contact with PRC. Li had been interactive with Chinese science and technology leaders since at least as early as 1990 when
the then vice minister of science and technology of PRC praised his work in promoting Taiwanese development and introducing him as a keynote speaker at a conference in Seoul.

In '92, Wu, who was then president of Academia Sinica, also visited China and subsequently invited a number of PRC scientists to Taiwan in an effort to encourage intellectual exchange. These are just beginning steps but by the mid-1990s, the Chinese had grown honed in on K.T. Li who's a leading figure in Taiwan's economic development and high-level Chinese leaders were seeking his advice. He was invited, for instance in 1993 to attend the World Bank-sponsored conference on China's economic reforms in Dalian.

And following this conference at which he presented a paper on "Taiwan's Economic Development Successes and Problems," Li then met with both Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji in Beijing. In other words, his advice was being sought and he was asked to be talking about Taiwan's experiences.

Following this trip, Li remained in touch with some of the people he had met and continuing to correspond with them on topics related to Chinese economic reform. And at the same time, many of his written works have been published in simplified character editions in China.

Now, how did China -- so I think I've established a connection here. How has China implemented this model? And I'd like to quickly point to several features of China's current system of science and technology planning and development that bear a great deal of resemblance to the Taiwan model although of course there are some differences as well. And one is technocratization. Though some of Chinese early CCP cadres were highly educated by and large from CCP leadership during Mao's period, [indiscernible] in favor or practical knowledge.
But in the post-Mao era, I think, we all know that leaders of both provincial and central levels have increasingly been selected at least in part for their educational attainment and their managerial technocratic skills. Since the Deng era of [indiscernible] is becoming increasingly technocratized so that by 2002, for example, 22 of the 25 members of the Politburo had university educations, and 18 of them were engineers or other kinds of scientists. None of the members of the 1982 Politburo had been pursuing [inaudible].

This emphasis on technocracy shows perhaps more than anything else that during the past two decades, the CCP in all levels has fully adopted the belief that KMT plans had and even KMT planners prior to Taiwan. The economic development can be planned through scientific management and that it is the job of the government to plan and oversee development. And the first prerequisite for this is to staff government with skilled planners and managers.

Now, another dimension or another way in which China has sort of developed this model is through centralized state-run science and technology planning. In recent years, China's science and technology plans have focused on investment and research and development instruction and science and technology parks and improvement of science education.

By the mid-1990s, the PRC government was beginning to push comprehensive S&T development plans linked to five-year Lenin plans in much the same way that the KMT had done in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1995, the Chinese government devised a strategic plan that outlined China's S&T goals, among which was the plan to increase Chinese R&D spending of public and private to 1.5 percent of the GDP by 2000. Jiang Zemin said of this plan that China needed to work harder to improve its capacities to innovate and undertake its own R&D projects.

By 2003, it was clear that China needed to develop a new plan and Wen Jiabao, himself, an engineer, took a leading role in formulating. The resulting plan focused on developing the
areas of high-tech energy, life sciences and environment through increasing investment in R&D, offering tax breaks to companies performing their own [indiscernible] and setting up policies to protect the intellectual property of Chinese researchers.

Another aspect of this model that we see [indiscernible] of China is an emphasis on scientific and technological education and manpower development. Like Taiwan, the educational policies promulgated by the CCP's Central Committee in the 1980s calling for the training and economically and developmentally relevant manpower did not yield in any results. And Taiwan went through the same process through the '60s and the '70s and the '80s for that matter. Instead, there was a disjunction between therapy-down policy and the actual capacity of schools at all levels to respond to the policy.

Since the mid-1980s, observers have noted problems in China's S&T education such as a lack of qualified teachers, particularly at the university level, low pay for most but not all teachers' examinations that stress memorization over innovation, inadequate government financing is probably the goal of the nine-year compulsory education system were barriers and the difficulty directly in developing good curriculum and textbooks. And again, these were all issues that came up in Taiwan during the '60s, '70s and the '80s as well.

And the last thing I wanted to mention in this sort of [indiscernible] this model being moved over to China, the model adopted by China is the emphasis on science works. One area in which the Chinese government has rapidly surpassed Taiwan is in the construction of technology parks or science parks design at least in part along the lines of the existing model. These parks have followed two broad patterns.

The earliest ones were set up by universities in an effort to promote coordination research between universities and enterprises. But more recently, China has set up hundreds of
technology parks located in industrial regions. These parks served primarily as vehicles for attracting fund, direct investments to support economic development in general and R&D in particular. And they've had considerable success in this area. However, a major difference with Taiwan is that few of these parks were built around state-run R&D institutions in a way that Hsinchu will run them much later [indiscernible]. And most of the R&D in China's parks was being undertaken by multinationals who demanded rights to the patents.

So by 2006, as part of the new S&T plan, the PRC government was pushing indigenous R&D to become -- fostering indigenous R&D by long-term increases in government R&D, especially if it's their own [indiscernible] to look back, you know, what's going on with this implementation of this model.

Now what are the implications of all these? The Taiwan model of this developmental state model is only dependent upon a strong staying power. Now I don't mean to say that the state means to be in control of economic development but rather, it needs to have the capacity to coerce or the credibility to persuade certain economic sectors to participate in the development activities that the state is trying to encourage.

Now in Taiwan, the need for strong state power has presented problems for the developmental states since 2000 when the coalition of government and technocracy began to fall apart as democratization went to [indiscernible] change at the top. The DPP government lacked the coercive authority that the KMT had even after the martial law. And the DPP took an explicitly anti-technocratic approach and stopping ministerial level positions so that unlike the KMT government of the '80s and '90s, the DPP cabinet was no longer filled with PhDs and the DPP alienated and caused the retirement of many of the technocrats who rose through the ranks under the KMT.
In other words, the model doesn’t work so well with democracy but that could be good news for China, which, though undertaking some minor level of reform such as [indiscernible] elections [indiscernible] which one [indiscernible]. It doesn’t seem like [indiscernible] radical political change at the top any time soon. In other words, the PRC is likely to retain precisely the sort of coercive authority that needs to make this sort of developmental stage model work for some time. And as it oversees and constructs institutions to foster this development, it will build credibility as a state that fosters state economic development and builds the institutions that such development requires in much the same way as the KMT did over the course of the '70s and '80s.

Does this mean anything at all for cross-strait relations? Well, yes and no. Perhaps the most important implication for cross-strait relations is that of growing institutional similarity between Taiwan and China not in terms of the structure of the central government but in terms of institutions of higher education, state-sponsored research and development of science and industry works. The more closely these institutions resemble each other and interact across the strait, the more linkages will develop between them, and to my understanding whether or not between the PRC and Taiwan. Thank you.

Shelley Rigger: All right, well, thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here as always. This is a difficult time of year to get scholars to gather and I in particular was a high-maintenance participant. I confess so, I want to thank Deepa [phonetic] and Aaron for their understanding of flexibility and getting me here. I realize I was part of the work [indiscernible].

I guess I'm the conventional voice of this panel. We already had the other two panels labeled as unconventional but I think that I will try to keep the conventional part as brief as possible because I really think that by bringing these unconventional speakers, the organizers have done us all a huge service. In my line of work in political science, we tend to look very
closely at waves bouncing around on the surface of the water. And this is actually really important. I mean waves can overturn your boat, but the deeper currents that are analyzed in these two papers are ultimately extremely important for setting the direction your boat will travel.

So I'm used to looking at waves but I think it's really important and useful to kind of dive down below that turbulence on the surface to look at some of these longer-term forces. So I think the ways that our frequent [sounds like] paper really complicates our kind of facile discourse about Taiwan's democratization, the sort of green side good, pro-liberalization, pro-freedom, pro-human rights, blue side bad, enemy of liberty and political change. This story of Mainland brides and foreign brides in general really complicates the sort of easy division of the sides according to some kind of liberal notion of virtue.

And I think Megan Greene's paper gets back to a question that was asked this morning about leverage. What leverage must Taiwan have? What really ultimately does Taiwan bring to the table in cross-strait relations? Well, the answer is quite a lot. Things without which the Chinese, you know, the so-called Chinese economic miracle or the rise of China would not be possible. So I really appreciate the organizers for sort of directing our attention at these deeper forces and will really try not to filibuster for too long so that everyone has a chance to dig into those papers more deeply.

But what I wanted to do was to actually just read this. It's something that I said in this very room two years ago in the wake of Ma Ying-jeou's election. It was between the election and the inauguration, if I remember it correctly. And what I said was that Taiwan was embarking on an experiment that Chen Shui-bian's approach to cross-strait relations was a kind
of plan A and that Chen's approach had been unsuccessful and had not accomplished the goals
Chen had set for himself, and for many reasons which don't need to be recapitulated today.

But at any rate, plan A had not accomplished what it was designed to accomplish. And
my argument then was that Ma Ying-jeou's approach to cross-strait relations was plan B and its
success or failure was a matter of great importance to Taiwan, to the People's Republic of China
and to the whole world and it was of great importance. The stakes were very high, in part
because the stakes are high in the Taiwan Strait, but also because there was no plan C. No one
had articulated an alternative to either Chen Shui-bian plan or the Ma Ying-jeou plan. And so
what I thought I would do today is give you a little status report on where I think plan B is going
and I would say it’s pretty interesting.

Obviously, Taiwan’s economy is recovering from the economic recession that gripped
the world the last time I was here and that certainly had knocked Taiwan sharply back mainly in
2008. Taiwan’s recovery is stronger than that of many other countries, in part as Doug Paal, as
Vice President Paal said [indiscernible] because its close ties to China have allowed it to be
buoyed up by China’s own recovery. And much of China’s own recovery is being powered by
the investment of Chinese resources enforcing a recovery. It’s not us buying more junk from
China because the Chinese government is stimulating its own economy, its own resources. Well,
Taiwan has benefited as a sort of auxiliary to that economy from that stimulus package.

Also, at this moment, in the unfolding of plan B, cross-strait relations are going really
well. They are going -- if, I should say, by going well, you mean there are lots of conversations
going on between Taiwan and China, the level of tension is very low and there are new
agreements being concluded. So that’s how I’m defining going well. However, plan B is not the
homerun. It’s not the huge breakthrough that I think the most optimistic expectations for what a Ma Ying-jeou presidency might be able to accomplish would have anticipated two years ago.

And this is where it gets interesting because what we see is despite the fact that the two things that ought to be or that polling data suggest are very important to Taiwan people. Economic performance of the Taiwanese area and non-confrontational or non-threatening relationship with Mainland China on both of these fronts, the Taiwanese government seems to be performing remarkably well but I think Taiwanese people are not sure they want to define going well in that way anymore.

Ma Ying-jeou’s approval ratings as everyone knows are quite low and while there is support for his policies, the polling data still indicates a certain amount of enthusiasm for the general direction of his economic policies and also his cross-strait policies. There’s a great deal of controversy and a great deal of opposition to those policies as well. And I think the reason is that Taiwanese citizens are nervous about moving too fast. They’re not sure that in the process of implementing plan B, Ma Ying-jeou is going to protect Taiwan’s interests, either its economic interests or its political interests adequately. And I am at this point saying exactly the same things that Doug Paal said at lunch, so those of you who heard his speech are probably drifting off now so let me move on.

I think what this shows, this sort of limited success of plan B not as a way of either correcting Taiwan’s economic challenges or imbalances or as a way of improving the atmosphere of cross-strait relations but that the limits of plan B as a strategy for gathering the approval of Taiwanese people is revealing because it shows us once again how limited the range of options open to Ma or any other Taiwanese leader really are.
I don’t think there’s any appetite for going back to the Chen Shui-bian approach and I think plan A is going to be revived but plan B also is uncomfortable and anxiety producing because the passage through which Taiwan needs to steer its ship is a very narrow passage and the walls seemed too close all the time and so the passengers on the ship are pretty nervous. And I think what we’re learning now is any president, whether he’s implementing plan A or plan B, whether he is Chen Shui-bian or Ma Ying-jeou, is going to feel the heat from both sides as public and other political leaders try to press on that ship and keep its steerage break through this very narrow passage.

One last question that I thought might be interesting to think about briefly, if there’s so little freedom of action then why is there so much focus on the cross-strait issue? Obviously, one reason there’s so much focus on the cross-strait issue in Taiwan domestic politics is that it is an important issue. It is an issue that cannot be ignored because it cannot be resolved and it will not go away and it will determine the future of Taiwan. How it unfolds is a critical factor in Taiwan’s future.

But it’s also a kind of relentless presence in domestic politics because it’s necessary for the partisan divide to function in Taiwan. The Taiwanese political parties are still differentiated primarily according to this issue even though the actual implementation of different policies is increasingly unlikely constrained even impossible. So they are arguing about differences of nuances, narcissism of small differences is what’s motivating this kind of endless cycle of conversation that seems increasingly to lead to very little.

And I think this is another point that Doug Paal tried to make in his talk that the political parties and I would limit it just to the DPP. I think the KMT also could usefully come up with some other issues on which to differentiate themselves and some other aspects of Taiwan’s
predicament that could be debated and could be mobilized for political creativity and innovation rather than simply debating the cross-strait issue again and again. Megan [indiscernible] talked about canned economic policy be accomplished effectively under democracy. This is one of the issues that they could -- and perhaps to some extent are debating.

I have a student writing about ITRI now and it seemed I'm a little more optimistic about the future, maybe not developmental state writ [sounds like] large but at least of Taiwan’s continued ability to be smart enough to put money into things like ITRI where in this country we’ve been unable to subsidize that kind of innovations since the birth of the internet and space exploration in the internet, the great successes of that model in the U.S. we see incapacitated in the face of the next challenge. So I don’t know if it’s democracy or what.

So in conclusion, the question of -- and this is related to that point. Another question that was asked this morning, how can Taiwan prevent democratic politics from undermining its international position? And I think the answer is that democratic politics should be an international asset for Taiwan. Of course, this is the foundation of Taiwan’s soft power, Taiwan’s influence in the world, Taiwan’s claim on the attention of other nations is precisely its democratic politics. And it is unfortunate that this kind of fruitless internal combat over a narrow range of issues which are, I think, argued primarily as devices to create political turnover and something to fight about because when there’s an election, you have to fight about something. It’s the focusing on politics for the sake of politics instead of the opportunities that democracy and democratic politics open up for Taiwan that has made Taiwan’s democratic politics appear to be a liability instead of the asset that it should be. And I'm going to leave it there.
Edward McCord: Okay, we'll now open the floor for questions. Please give your name and try to make a question rather than a statement.

Deepa: Deepa [indiscernible] with the Civic Center. Thank you very much for the very unconventional and very interesting talks. Sara, my question is for you. Could you give us a little bit more picture about the demographics of these men who are marrying the women from Mainland? Are they young or older? Is there a political ideological position that they share? What more can you tell us about them?

Sara L. Friedman: Thank you Deepa. Yes, unfortunately I didn’t have time to go into that in greater detail so I’m glad you asked the question. It’s quite a diverse group and although I mentioned in my talk that mainly the leadership positions in that cross-strait marriage promotion association were held by older men, many of whom are veterans, that’s in fact a very small portion. Roughly 10 percent are good statistics available of the total number of cross-strait marriages.

There’s certainly a temporal shift over time in who are the partners with these marriages. In the earliest period, after ‘87, many were veterans who in part because of military policies in Taiwan, in part because of their social marginalization had never married in Taiwan or whose marriages for various reasons had ended and who when they day returned home looked for women, oftentimes middle-aged women who were themselves divorced or widowed and who would come back to Taiwan with them and help care for them in old age.

But those kinds of marriages have rapidly been overshadowed by other groups, working class and middle class men of both Taiwanese and Mainlander backgrounds who for a variety of different reasons might be disadvantaged, so to speak, on the Taiwan marriage market and look for wives from the Mainland. These might be men who are older and never married; they might
be poor; they might be disabled. They might be divorced or widowed and have young children where they need help taking care of or other family members who they need help caring for and have a hard time finding local women who are willing to marry them and either through a range of methods meet Chinese women that they ultimately marry.

That group also is increasingly being superseded by another group which are couples who are closer in age and educational and employment background now that roughly a million Taiwanese live and work in China, they meet through the work place, they meet through educational institutions or through introductions from friends and coworkers. And these, again, closer in age tend to be middle class, better educated and these couples do not always reside in Taiwan. In fact, the better educated couples are more likely to live in China.

Sydney: Hi, my name is Sydney and I’m a senior year at the Elliott School and I have a question for Sara as well. I like to say that I feel sympathetic for the four brides that you talked about in your presentation but actually, I have a different take on Chen’s policies which is that his restrictions on the spouses that are from Mainland are actually a national security precaution because it is rampant in Taiwan that transnational criminal nexus that are based in Taiwan and China and Southeast Asia are exploiting the potential of using these marriages for human trafficking, for prostitution and illegal immigration. And you mentioned that Ma is relaxing these restrictions so I was wondering if you know what the new government is now doing to prevent potential crimes. Thanks.

Sara L. Friedman: Thank you very much. I think certainly, we can’t over look the role of criminal gangs. Whether they’re engaged in human trafficking is another question. I think that depends on how you define trafficking which is a sort of a different issue. And whether it’s
a national security concern or whether it’s a crime and social welfare concern there, I see those as different questions, different kinds of concerns.

A national security concern would frame Mainland Chinese spouses as a potential political infiltration, and you see this discourse certainly that could have an impact on the direction of Taiwanese domestic politics once greater numbers attain citizenship and therefore voting rights, right? I think the notion of spies masquerading as marriage partners, you might have heard that discourse early on; you don’t hear that anymore.

So what are the differences in the policies? I think that’s a critical question that you’re asking. So under Chen Shui-bian, there’s the longer timeframe to citizenship. That doesn’t really do much to stop bringing in individuals for purposes other than marriage, using marriage as a cover for something else. The delay in legal work rights of two to six years under DPP rule, there’s an argument there that prevents the use of marriage simply for other activities. But what the Chen Shui-bian government did that really affected that process is implementing a border interview system. It began in 2003 and it was officially implemented in 2004.

Prior to that time, as long as a couple had legally registered their marriage in China, there was nothing that Taiwan officials could do to stop the Chinese spouse from coming into Taiwan. As long as the paperwork was in order, there was no face-to-face interaction. And I did a lot of interviews with officials and bureaucrats in the National Immigration Agency who are part of setting up that system and I also observed interviews that take place at the airport now.

So I think certainly there were gangs that were using marriage to bring in women for purposes of sex work, whether that was trafficking is I think not so well established. It appears that most of these women are doing this willingly so that would not fit a narrow U.S.-based definition of trafficking. And that interview system remains in place today.
So as you saw in my little graph there, the number of marriages dropped precipitously from 2003 to 2004 and that can be attributed significantly to that border interview system. Now, does that mean that people don’t still get through? Sure. Anybody who has seen the Hollywood movie Green Card knows that you can crack for these types of interviews but it’s certainly not as widespread as it was during that period.

Now, under Ma’s reforms, that border interview is still in place, and one could argue that there’s increasing pressure on the interviewers to weed out people they feel are not authentically committed to marriage as their purpose of entry. I’m just coming out with an article that talks about how difficult it is to use an interview at the airport to determine marital intention. So I think that’s a problem of the system itself, not that Taiwan has any other good options right now but that’s a problem of the system itself.

And there has -- just last week, actually, the Control Yuan issued a report identifying key features of policies against Mainland Chinese spouses as violating Taiwan’s commitment to human rights and the international conventions that it has signed on human rights. And one of the issues that points out are the interviews precisely because the interviews are not directed at all categories of foreign spouses but only some. So only Mainland Chinese are interviewed at the border; Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian spouses are interviewed at Taiwanese consular offices in their home country. Now clearly that immigration agency would prefer to do the interviews in Mainland China but that in the current political situation is impossible.

Male Voice: [Indiscernible] Taiwan community. I have a question for Megan. You seemed to imply in your presentation that in fact those technology and economic policy followed in Taiwan will depend on the coercive power of the central government and that it would not work in a democracy. In my previous life, I worked for the Dutch government on technology
policy and the last time I looked, Netherlands was still a very democratic country so it does work as far as I know. Can you elaborate on that point?

Megan Greene: Well, I certainly didn’t mean to suggest that no -- the science and technology policy could function in a democratic system but it appears pretty clear to me that the kind of developmental state that Taiwan created for itself through trial and error over several decades was really dependent upon a certain amount of state power. And as that state power has declined, the degree to which the state has been able to manage and govern and shape and direct economic development has declined.

And so it maybe, as Shelley was pointing out, that the institutions are still in place and they’re still doing things but if -- you have to have both a kind of -- the institutions have to be aiming at the needs of -- they have to be more respondent to the market place I guess - maybe that’s a better way of putting it - in a more democratic system. Whereas, if it’s less democratic, the market place can be made to shape itself to what the institutions can provide or want to provide.

And so you can have more effective and one coherent strategic plan that say we will develop in the semiconductor area, for instance, and suddenly because the state is providing the research and development resources and tax incentives and so on in order to facilitate this and has a certain amount of coercive authority as well then people come and people participate, whereas it’s more diffused now, I think.

Chao Chen: I'm Chao Chen [phonetic], I'm a freelance correspondent. Professor Rigger you talked about plan A and you talked about plan B. And could you explain what’s plan A and plan B and if plan A is not working, plan B is uncomfortable and should they have another plan, then what would it be? Thank you.
Shelley Rigger: Well, how I would characterize Chen Shui-bian’s approach to cross-strait relations is not to say Chen Shui-bian was trying to bring about the formal legal independence of Taiwan during his presidency. I don’t think that that was ever -- I think that has a kind of aspirational significance for China and for many other people in the DPP that’s why it’s hard to take out the DPP platform but I don’t think that that was a policy objective.

I think the policy objective was to minimize Taiwan’s vulnerability to the Mainland by restricting both political and economic interactions where it was possible and also and perhaps more a stronger focus of the policy was to fortify people in Taiwan against the inducements and enticements and attractions of the Mainland by reinforcing a sense of difference between Taiwan and the Mainland.

I think the latter keeps the kind of Taiwan identity piece. It was very successful and actually -- however, actually, I would say, it was in some ways successful in spite of the degree to which the administration pushed it. I think there’s some evidence that especially during Chen’s second term a certain amount of backlash against the kind of constant drumbeat of Taiwan identity talk, but overall the ideas that that talk was propagating have been absorbed. So you can find -- I remember watching him during the red shirt army when Shih Ming-teh was mobilizing tons of people outside the Taipei train station to call for the resignation of President Chen.

They made a video that they put on YouTube about their movement and the whole video was about Taiwan. And at the end of the video, the picture resolved itself from lots and lots of people into all these red-shirt people standing in the shape of the island of Taiwan. It was exactly the kind of rhetoric and symbolism that the Greens have all always used. I have a friend who’s a DPP activist whose father is a deep, deep, deep Green old soldier guy who came from
So I think that by the end of Chen’s term, this kind of Taiwan identity had become very mainstream and quite normalized in the society. And that may partially explain why as if it was politicized in some of the policies like regarding education and textbooks and naming things that there was a certain amount of backlash because people said this is silly, we're already there. What are you doing? Why are you still pushing all this stuff?

And so that aspect of plan A I think worked, but the other aspect of plan A which was to minimize the interactions with the PRC did not succeed because the DPP was unable to engage the PRC in ways that would have allowed it to manage the actual behavior of Taiwanese entrepreneurs and others in the Mainland. So that by not managing effectively - by active opening, effective management - Taiwanese individuals were left vulnerable on the Mainland where they had no protection and Taiwan as a unit was made more vulnerable because more of its economic activity were swept away without the institutions to allow that to be more of a two-way street.

Plan B, I think, is to try to manage the relationship and create the two-way street but in creating the two-way street, a lot of people are coming this way toward us on Taiwan and that’s where the anxiety comes in. I'm not going to talk about plan C because I don't know if there is one.

Jacob Chang: Jacob Chang from TECRO. That's already been a big feast on the mind as well as on the body. I think I have to say something just to repay my creditors. First, I want to commend Professor Friedman for her in-depth knowledge of Taiwan’s women movement and
especially the new immigrants' movement. You know much better than I do. I’m really glad to say that.

Second, I want to say something to Professor Greene. I’m reading your bio saying you have a book called *The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization*. Actually, President Ma Ying-jeou's speech in Harvard 15 days ago, the title was "The Quest for Modernity." I’m going to say is that probably he probably read yours and he cannot use these same words so he has to say -- I was totally -- who use modernity? Nobody uses that word anymore.

So, anyway, but in his speech, he says that Taiwan's success on Taiwan’s story not only in search of wealth and the power [foreign language] but because he did his speech, videotaped at Harvard to follow Benjamin Schwartz' famous [foreign language].

The third length [sounds like] of Taiwan story is democracy and freedom. This is what Professor Rigger was talking about. This is our second point of Taiwan. Then as what I was raising to what Professor Friedman, I will ask a question to Professor Rigger. More than 20 years ago just before Taiwan was [indiscernible] I read an article. This thing says that [indiscernible] Ma Ying-jeou should win. Here's one sentence or one word which struck me until now. You said, you wrote Taiwan's [indiscernible] will gather together to support Ma because as Ma gets elected, there will be some -- you used a very nice word, I forgot the word. There would some payback. However, we’ll see after he [indiscernible]. It seems to be she doesn’t get enough support. I don’t know whether this is because Ma Ying-jeou does not [indiscernible] or because of the natural powers democracy. Thank you.

Shelley Rigger: I don’t remember that article, but I will tell you that those KMT politicians are not going to get their dessert until they behave themselves better, right? I mean,
the huge legislative majority that Ma Ying-jeou inherited when he became is a terrible curse. There’s no pressure on the KMT legislators to be disciplined because they have the huge majority, they can’t be defeated so they defeat themselves.

And I think that has been, in some ways, I think a bigger impediment to President Ma rather than anything else. It has been the need to constantly try and organize members of his own party, and a lot of people have been really interested to see how the DPP has been coming back in this by-elections, these elections for people that there -- like they have to go to prison, they got elected to something else. Anyway, they left their seats and they have to have a new election to fill those empty seats and DPP has won most of them.

And I think part of the reason for that is that it’s the DPP’s virtue but part of the reason for that is that Ma Ying-jeou doesn’t care as much about winning those seats as about getting the right people into those seats if they win. So, again, Doug Paal already said this, people don’t pass a strategy which is really Ma Ying-jeou strategy from way back of promoting excellent rather than payback-oriented politicians. And even though they've lost some seats, they have continued to push that forward. The real test will be whether or not they can carry that into an election that really matters which is the one that happens at the end of this year. But, you know, I think that the payback if it has not been delivered, it’s because it has not been earned and not because the president was unwilling to reward honest and virtuous support.

Edward McCord: I think we have time for one more question.

Male Voice: I have a question for Sara and then for that story. Can you help me understand, are Taiwan's loose regulation on foreign spouses actually onerous compared to everybody else in the region? I don’t know that they’re that.
And then for the story, there’s a narrative of Taiwan’s history for better or worse that says economic development laid the base for political change and democratization. How does that get discussed in the Mainland or you just kind of dropped that part of it while they’re taking these aspects of Taiwan’s developmental model? Thank you.

Sara L. Friedman: Good question. Are they onerous in comparison to other countries in the region? I would say here that the major comparisons would be South Korea, Japan and for the Mainland Chinese, we might say Hong Kong.

Let me talk a little bit about the South Korea case because I know about that the most. South Korea in some ways looks comparable to Taiwan in that it also has a significant number of Mainland Chinese spouses, many of whom are of ethnic Korean descent and it increasingly has a growing number of Southeast Asian spouses. And as I was talking earlier, because of Taiwan’s recent economic woes, women from Southeast Asian countries who in the past had married Taiwanese men, those types of women are now increasingly marrying South Korean men instead.

The timeframe in South Korea is much shorter. South Korea we might argue has more problems in terms of integration because it prides itself on ethnic homogeneity. But no other country in the region distinguishes among categories of immigrant spouses based on their country of origin. Taiwan is the only one that does that and that’s because it has a completely separate legal apparatus for Mainland Chinese as it does for foreign spouses.

And prior to 2007, when the immigration agency was established, it had a separate bureaucratic apparatus as well that dealt with Mainland Chinese in a separate bureaucratic apparatus, sometimes within similar organizations but are completely separate for foreign spouses. Recently, the immigration agency has also moved in that direction, I might add, and
has separated out within sections and groups. It was too overwhelming for bureaucrats to have to handle both sets of laws basically in a country and so Taiwan is the only one that distinguishes it in that way.

Now, just a brief comment about the Hong Kong case because in some ways, Hong Kong is similar, although its political situation, obviously, is very different. Mainland Chinese who married in Hong Kong faced considerable wait times before they are granted permission to go to Hong Kong to get what’s called a one-way permit upwards of 10 years. And most permits are not issued by the Hong Kong government; they are issued by the PRC [indiscernible] and the wait time is different depending on the original’s province of origin. So for Guangdong, longer wait times for people. But once they get to Hong Kong, they face the same timeframe to becoming a Hong Kong permanent resident which is seven years of residence as any other foreigner.

Megan Greene: So your question was this whole idea that people have said a lot about Taiwan and economic development laying the foundation for democratization. Is that something that people say for China? And I can’t tell you what the Chinese are saying. That I don’t know. I have to look into it. But I can tell you that there are scholars -- and actually, as I think about it, I was sitting here thinking about this and most of the scholars that I can think of that I’ve heard saying things like this are people who work on Taiwan. So they just sort of want to take that whole sort of idea and apply it to China but there are certainly scholars and then other people outside of China who look at China and say economic development will lay the foundation for modernization because it did it in Taiwan and it has elsewhere and of course it will in China.

So I think it’s a very common way of looking at China from the outside, but I’m not in fact sure whether this is something that people in China have been talking about or within the
Chinese government. And of course, I’m also not entirely sure that as this economic
development would occur in Taiwan, all members of the government were necessarily thinking,
yes, this will lay the foundation for democratization.

Edward McCord: Well, I’m sorry we ran out of time. This has been a really interesting
thing and I just want to thank all our panelists for their time.