U.S.-India Relations: Ties That Bind?

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A wide-ranging conference on “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” was hosted by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University on April 1-2, 2004. I would like to thank the Asia Foundation for sponsoring the conference, as well as acknowledge the critical inputs of my colleague, Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth. The assumption of the conference was that sufficient time had elapsed since bilateral relations between India and the U.S. turned a corner in 2000, to assess how far relations had progressed and what kinds of impediments were still apparent.

This paper will consider relations between the two countries, bringing out the most salient aspects from the conference, but also going well beyond it, especially on the Indian side. This more extensive analysis is based on research conducted by the author in India between July and November 2004. In this connection, the author would like to express her sincere appreciation to a number of current and former senior officials from the Ministry of External Affairs, Defense Research and Development Organization, Indian Space Research Organization, the Prime Minister’s Office, and former colleagues from the National Institute of Advanced Studies for offering their candid views and time so generously in background interviews.

The conference convened a distinguished group of American and Indian policymakers and experts, who looked at both strategic and economic realms. (See Appendix for the conference program.) There were also more focused roundtables on two critical issues in U.S.-India relations: cooperation in high technology/dual use technology and counter-terrorism. The conditions of April 2004 have dramatically changed with a new government in New Delhi since May, and a high visibility easing of export controls by the U.S. for India in September. The Indian elections that swept the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee out of office and brought in the United Progressive Alliance, led by the Congress Party, caught nearly everyone by surprise. On the American side, there is greater continuity with the re-election of George W. Bush, but it is not yet clear whether the administration’s first term priorities will remain constant or change in the second term.

A dominant theme at the conference was the continuing need for building stronger “trust” between the countries despite improved ties. The differing perspectives aired by many of the American and Indian participants and interviewees simply underlined this sentiment. The direction and robustness of Indo-U.S. ties are considered in this paper by focusing on how India and the U.S. have dealt with two critical, but rather difficult spheres of cooperation: “terrorism” and dual use technology.
It took more than a decade after the end of the Cold War for the U.S. and India to break out of their previous mode of interaction despite having no direct conflict of interest. The rhetoric of shared democracy did not prove strong enough to elevate their relations immediately, and it has taken an enormous amount of diplomatic and non-governmental effort to realign their viewpoints. By 2004, ties between India and the U.S. had grown remarkably, especially in the defense area, and there was little fear that their relations would backslide significantly. The context of a stronger relationship does not, however, mean a problem-free relationship. Part of the strain has to do with the way the two countries invariably look at themselves and at each other.

Traditionally, Indian elites have tended to view India’s weight in international politics partly in civilizational power, which is formidable. Americans take a more material approach to power, and thus in relative terms, always saw India as a minor global player. India’s rise as an economic and strategic force since the mid 1990s, epitomized by the success of its information technology sector at the global level, has had a resounding effect on the U.S. Although India’s nuclearization undoubtedly contributed to serious attention by the U.S., it is unlikely that the nuclear tests alone would have led to the same level of engagement.¹ What the tests unmistakably did was to force the two countries into a series of dialogues for the first time, providing an opportunity to go beyond existing biases and toward better mutual understanding. The chief negotiator on the American side, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, has described these fourteen-odd meetings with his Indian counterpart, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh over a period of two and half years, as “civilizational dialogues,” revealing greater comprehension of the Indian psyche and the depth of their interactions. Although the U.S.’ objective of the dialogue was to press India on non-proliferation and narrow the gap between them, the results turned out quite differently. As Talbott puts it, for India, the nuclear tests were geared “to simultaneously stand up to the United States and sit down with the United States.”²

While President Bill Clinton’s March 2000 trip to India paved the way for jettisoning the past, the meetings between his successor George W. Bush and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee were crucial in defining the future path, with Bush calling relations a “strategic partnership,” and Vajpayee suggesting that India and the U.S. were “natural allies.” By 2004, summit diplomacy had set the foreign and defense establishments on a course that led to significant progress, particularly in military-to-military relations. Indeed, the progress was particularly remarkable given that informed opinion held, as of summer 2000, that
“there was no defense relationship to speak of.”

Still, there have been periodic reminders of the constraints and limits to their partnership, leading to some deflation of expectations on both sides. India’s decision in July 2003 not to send troops as part of the U.S. coalition in Iraq was a setback for the American side; the designation of Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) eight months later without any prior notice created a deep sense of disappointment for the Indians.

On Iraq, the Pentagon in particular had put a great deal of stock in securing Indian participation, and was apparently confident of India’s acquiescence. Indeed, if one were to go by the opinions of key mainstream Indian security analysts and some officials in New Delhi, there seemed to be a surprising amount of support for sending the troops, as long it was under United Nations command, though there seemed to be some leeway even for that requirement. India’s refusal was interpreted by some American policymakers as evidence that India could not be counted upon. In the case of the MNNA, India’s resentment had to do with both substance and style. As former Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Lalit Mansingh saw it, “In a strategic partnership, there should be an element of trust. I am afraid that there was a perception that this was breached when after talks in India, within 48 hours, we were surprised by the announcement of Pakistan becoming a major non-NATO ally...So this has left a certain bitterness in the mouth.”

II. Common Vision Versus Common Practice: Defining the Partnership

Between 2001 and 2003, defense ties outstripped progress made in other spheres of Indo-U.S. relations, although conventional wisdom would have defense flowing from a well-articulated and well-understood common vision on security. According to one expert with high-level experience in the Pentagon, “You cannot have any kind of defense relationship unless you understand how it works within an overall national security relationship, or if you will, a strategic relationship. The critical factor is—defense cannot lead, it can be a very important part of the relationship. But if you find defense leading, then you are actually out of sync.” While there seems to be a coincidence of interests at the broadest level regarding potential threats in the global arena, differences clearly persist between India and the U.S. on how to deal with them.

America’s present overriding threat perceptions center on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Another unstated medium term concern relates to the rise of China and the inevitable changes it will produce in the Asian balance of power. India’s top security concerns encompass all three similar threats, but on terrorism and WMD, there is no real convergence of thinking yet. There are many leading Indians in and out of government who are averse to being too closely identified with the so-called “war on terrorism,” on both ideological and substantive grounds. Although Islamist extremist violence is clearly viewed as a particularly important challenge for India, it is difficult to find any reputable observer agreeing with American methods to fight it. This view has only become stronger in light of the American experience in Iraq. India’s stand also reflects a deeper dissatisfaction with the current global order based on unchallenged American supremacy. This view is more muted in India that it would have been in earlier times, but as one keen observer noted, “In Asia, the U.S. is underestimating China’s and India’s unhappiness with the current global order.”

At the regional level too, India remains to be convinced that cooperation with the U.S. will produce concrete benefits. Lalit Mansingh has noted that, despite claims that the hyphenated Indo-
Pakistan relationship has been consigned to history, “it keeps re-emerging as a distraction” and casts a shadow not just on U.S.-India relations, but also on Indo-Pakistan relations. Likewise, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Kramer, after laying out the potential for Indo-U.S. defense cooperation, concluded that “the reality is, it is much more limited,” and in addition suggested that “the relationship [U.S.-India-Pakistan] is too hyphenated.” Whatever India’s expectations were about its ability to influence the U.S. on Pakistan, it was clear that even under the Clinton administration (without the 9/11 compulsions), India’s impact would not be great. For example, policy recommendations of American analysts who understand and accept the value of India on its own terms, invariably include such caveats as “The U.S. should have an India-first policy, but not an India-only policy;” or “India should not be allowed to exercise a veto on U.S. policy toward Pakistan.” While clearly legitimate from the U.S. perspective, the conclusion could be drawn that while the hyphen may go, it will be replaced in U.S. policy toward India with caveats. On America’s central foreign policy concerns of terrorism and WMD, the differences between the U.S. and India have not been put to rest, especially as they relate to Pakistan. But independent of Pakistan, there is still a level of discomfiture between the U.S. and India on these same issues as discussed below.

III. Critical Bilateral Issues: Combating Terrorism

After September 11th, the feeling that the two democracies are targets of “terrorism” seemed to draw India and the U.S. closer together with a new bond. This was particularly so given that the Taliban-sponsored al Qaeda provided impetus for the spotlight on South Asia-based violent extremism and terrorism, a phenomenon that India—for its own reasons—wanted to highlight internationally. With Pakistan’s induction into America’s “war on terrorism,” India’s expectations have had to be revamped. Moreover, the U.S. attack on Iraq and its aftermath have given pause to those in India who might have been predisposed to a strong connection with the U.S. in fighting terrorism. In India, the phrase “war on terrorism” is not commonly used, rather, the terms “campaign” or “fight against terrorism” are frequently heard. This is partly a result of India’s own understanding of how to combat terrorism, but it is also a due to a reluctance to fully embrace a term that has become inextricably linked to American foreign policy, and the political connotations thereof.

Indian hesitation to join the U.S. in its Iraq venture has indeed exposed the underlying differences in the way the two nations define terrorism, and the most effective means to combat it. So far, India had tried to argue about perceived double standards in the U.S. approach to terrorism and the need for “comprehensive” versus “selective” definitions, alluding to the distinct impression that the U.S. views militants in Kashmir differently than the extremists in the Middle East or Afghanistan. Conversely, the U.S. could argue that India is misguided in its own position on “terrorists” in Iraq. According to one former senior U.S. defense official, both India and the U.S. have a strategic interest in the Middle East, particularly given India’s rapidly growing demand for energy. As he put it, “Upon further examination, with regard to the Middle East, India should rethink its participation with regard to peacekeeping in Iraq.” This was not suggested “as a favor to the U.S., but because it is in India’s interest for the pursuit of stability in the region.”

The refusal to send Indian troops was publicly attributed to a number of factors: the lack of a United Nations mandate; domestic political opposition; and finally, the need for Indian...
troops in Kashmir. The United States had apparently wanted India to deploy a division—15,000 to 20,000 soldiers—but in July 2003, India turned down Washington’s request citing the absence of a U.N. mandate. Another reason cited later was the clear domestic opposition to such a move. It was not lost on observers that national elections were at the time slated to be held by October 2004, and that the ruling party would pay a high political cost if any Indian soldier died in Iraq. In September 2003, it was reported that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca raised the issue of troops again in New Delhi. This time around, India apparently argued that its troops were too tied up fighting militancy in Kashmir. It was the first time officials in New Delhi linked India’s ability to help in Iraq with violence in Kashmir. This was most likely an attempt by India to push the United States to step up pressure as part of its larger “war on terrorism,” on Pakistan to stop “cross-border terrorism” directed at India. A spike in militant attacks, as well as the historic standoff with Pakistan, even as President George W. Bush met with Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf in a highly symbolic Camp David meeting in June 2003, highlighted India’s dilemma.

There was another less publicized sentiment at work as well. Soon after India’s decision against sending troops, a high level Indian official indicated in a candid statement that while India fully agrees with the need to fight terrorism, the dominant belief among Indian policymakers is that America’s current strategy in Iraq is likely to produce more—not fewer—terrorists. Interestingly, when the arguments that Indian proponents made for joining the U.S. coalition in Iraq are examined closely, it would appear that they had little to do with the terrorism issue itself. It is difficult to find anyone making the case, initially at least, that terrorists were at work in Iraq, and that waging war in the cities of Iraq would curb international terrorism or extremism. Rather, the case for India’s involvement was made in other terms: staking a claim in post-war Iraqi reconstruction; presenting India as tough and trustworthy enough to go out on a limb for the isolated U.S.; not wanting to miss out an opportunity to play a role in the Persian Gulf/Middle East and thus expand India’s influence in a critical region; and gaining recognition as a major player at the global level.

The Indian hostage crisis in Iraq spanning July through September 2004 and its favorable resolution was interpreted by many analysts in India, including some of the earlier advocates of troop support, as by and large a vindication of the decision not to send troops. The release of three Indian hostages working for a Kuwaiti transport company in Iraq without harm after nearly six weeks of captivity reflected India’s extensive ties in the Middle East, and served to demonstrate India’s ability to set itself apart from the U.S.-led agenda in the Middle East in general, and Iraq in particular, despite India’s increasing ties with the U.S. on regional counter-terrorism.

The “Muslim” Factor in Indian Foreign Policy

So far, India has been viewed as a sympathetic state by Arabs and Iranians, a result of policies that Indian leaders have followed in pursuit of both their foreign and domestic interests. For reasons not directly related to India’s large Muslim minority, the country has historically pursued a foreign policy that has been decidedly supportive of the Palestinians. For example, India was the first non-Arab state to recognize and financially support the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1975. India treated PLO leader Yasser Arafat essentially as someone with the stature of a head of state, and only established low-key diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992. Not too surprisingly, Indo-Israel relations were elevated considerably under the Bharatiya Janata Party government
since 1998, in a departure from Congress’s pro-Arab stand. Still, even as relations with Israel have picked up, India has been careful to couch them in terms of technical and narrow defense equipment cooperation, rather than as a broad strategic relationship that Israel clearly would prefer. India’s interests in the Middle East are tempered in part by the presence of nearly 3.5 million Indians working in the area who could become vulnerable to unpopular regional policies.11

Domestic opposition in India to the war in Iraq has come from different quarters. In March 2004, thousands of people including political leaders, activists, school children, film stars, and labor unionists marched to the American embassy in New Delhi in protest. Three hundred thousand people marched through the streets of Calcutta in the same month condemning America’s occupation of Iraq.12 Again in June 2004, Shia clerics and prominent Sunnis led a large rally in New Delhi, along with key Hindu religious leaders like Dwaraka Sankaracharya, Swami Swarupananda Saraswati and Swami Agnivesh. Muslim and Hindu speakers shared the platform and condemned the U.S.-led coalition for “crimes against humanity.”13 At the leadership and popular levels in India, Iraq tends to be viewed not as a “Muslim” issue, but rather as an example of America’s aggressive unilateralism.14

Despite having the second largest Muslim population in the world, India has not been a base for any al Qaeda recruitment, a situation that has drawn attention from some well-known American commentators.15 According to one high-level former counter-terrorism official in the Indian government, the major reason that al Qaeda has not been active in India is due to the lack of local support. He notes that in the report of the 9/11 Commission, there are references to al Qaeda cells in a variety of places such as Hamburg and Madrid. There have been subsequent reports of such cells in Casablanca and Kuala Lumpur, but none in India. In this expert’s view, “It is a very privileged situation which India has,” and adds, “So when we want to cooperate with the United States, we have to do it in such a way that we preserve this.”16 Many influential Indian opinion makers and officials believe that it could be domestically disastrous for India to follow or be seen to follow U.S. anti-terrorism efforts too closely, especially in Iraq. According to a senior official in the current Indian government, there is still no satisfactory answer to the question, “What is in it for India?”17

There is, however, growing concern that American action in Iraq has been a boost to Islamic radicalism and that Iraq is in danger of becoming a weak, ungovernable state that invites militant activity on its soil. The fear is that Islamic militancy will not only affect the U.S., but that India too could suffer. In the words of a leading Indian journalist, “We will pay for U.S. mistakes in Iraq.”18 To that extent at least, the Indian government appears increasingly prepared to play a background role in supporting America’s attempt to “stabilize” Iraq without committing any military support or highly visible assistance.

The U.S. and India are also out of step over Iran, and hold significantly different threat perceptions about the dangers of WMD and terrorism from Tehran. These differences will only widen if Iran features more seriously in the second Bush administration as a threat, which cannot be ruled out.19 It will be extremely difficult for India to support punitive action against Iran in light of special Indo-Iranian ties in the nuclear and energy sectors, India’s traditional aversion to intrusions into a developing country’s sovereignty, and differences with the U.S. on how to approach nuclear proliferation, let alone fight it.20 Following the reelection of George W. Bush, leading Indian strategic analysts have increasingly warned against hard-line options as unworkable and misdirected.21 There is no sign that India is
willing to downgrade its relationship with Iran to suit American preferences.\textsuperscript{22}

\textit{Limits to Formal Cooperation}

Despite these divergences, the U.S. and India have set up mechanisms to cooperate on counter-terrorism, beginning as far back as the late 1990s. In November 1999, the U.S.-India Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group (JWG) was established and has met a number of times, alternating between New Delhi and Washington.\textsuperscript{23} After September 11, the JWG’s work has taken on an added urgency, but according to a former member of the Group, the most promising areas of cooperation are still those that the two countries could tackle at the tactical, as opposed to the strategic level.\textsuperscript{24}

Major areas of cooperation include: strengthened intelligence sharing; upgraded and expanded anti-terrorism training programs for Indian law enforcement officials; the launching of a Cyber Security Forum to focus on cyber-terrorism and information security; improving border monitoring, including equipment sales; enhancing measures against narcotics trafficking and financing of terrorism; and the ratification and implementation of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance.\textsuperscript{25} (The United States and Pakistan agreed to institutionalize counter-terrorism exchanges as a component of a wide-ranging Law Enforcement Working Group in February 2002.) Cooperation would seem to be constrained within these mechanisms as well. For example, a former director of India’s Central Bureau of Investigation pointed out that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has not even provided the transcripts of the interrogation of Afghan suspects in the December 2001 Indian Airlines IC-814 hijacking case to Indian authorities.\textsuperscript{26}

Ironically, one factor that seems to limit opportunities for a more strategic Indo-U.S. cooperation in this area is that India is a target for extremist violence and terrorism, rather than a base for terrorism against the U.S. Cooperation with India then is less of a compulsion for the U.S. From the Indian side, there are limits as well, particularly activities that might impinge on Indian sovereignty or long standing sensibilities. A reminder of this arose when opposition parties and others reacted sharply to the offer of FBI expertise made by U.S. Ambassador David Mulford directly to the state government of Assam to probe the serial bomb blasts in Assam and Nagaland in October 2004. Some in the Indian security establishment took strong exception to the gesture, with one official noting that, “If in the name of a crackdown on the al Qaeda, the U.S. can do something in Pakistan, it should not think it can do the same in India.”\textsuperscript{27}

There was also some suspicion expressed by Indian analysts that the U.S. gesture was an attempt to gain a foothold in India’s sensitive Northeast region, bordering Myanmar and China.

\section*{IV. Critical Bilateral Issues: Dual Use Technology}

High technology—specifically dual use technology transactions—take place within the larger politico-strategic framework, thus setting it apart from other commercial relations. Although Indo-U.S. trade in this sector is small in proportion to overall trade, it impacts the areas traditionally identified as vital to India’s national development. As such, dual use technology trade occupies an elevated position in India’s national discourse, and relations between the two countries are often disproportionately measured by progress or failure in this area. In the Indian context in particular, it will be hard to break this habit of thinking despite gains during 2004. Some of the sensitivity in dual use trade is, however, being softened by the surge in other trade and investment between the two countries.
The Sigur Center Asia Papers

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The Economic Boost

On the general economic front, Indian policymakers have unequivocally accepted the need for cooperation with the U.S. given India’s aspiration to reach the status of a developed country. That the U.S. is India’s single largest market makes it critical for India’s plans. Similarly, American policymakers and business leaders have begun to seriously speak of India in the same breath as China. Referring to India and China, a report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council submitted to Congress in early 2005 states that: “The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th Century and United States in the 20th Century—will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries.”

Recent American investment in India has been described by business leaders as part of a “second wave.” It is pointed out that shortly after India’s liberalization in 1991, there was a huge burst of American interest, only to be replaced by disappointment at discovering the obstacles to doing business in India, illustrated best by the litigation over the Dabhol power plant. There seems to be a consensus that this “second wave” is based on stronger interest and understanding, and thus much more sustainable.

Comparisons to China in terms of actual American investment still find India playing a hard game of catch-up, but India has made significant progress in improving its investment climate, and is rated among the top ten reformers of the world. Direct investment in India has been relatively weak in part because the high growth areas like software, technology, and financial support services do not require it. The Indian economy has become considerably more open, with the ratio of total trade to GDP reaching thirty percent in 2004 (up from fourteen percent in 1990), though lagging behind China’s, at 50 percent. One area in which India leads China is the opening of portfolio investment to outsiders. There are some economists who believe that with deeper reforms, India could easily attain an eight or nine percent long term growth rate; if it is the latter, the country will be able to double its per capita income in just a decade. Even those who are impatient or disappointed with the pace of India’s reforms and performance, especially in infrastructure, concede that “the buzz on India is fantastic.” This optimism is illustrated, for example, by the reaction of Sergey Brin and Larry Page, the celebrated young founders of Google, after their first visit to India in October 2004: “We expanded into India too late. We should have done it sooner.”

The idea of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S. appears to have support of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government, a move that is seen in many quarters as benefiting both sides (despite some immediate costs of competition). Backers of a services FTA in India point out that while it would open up some sectors which are now closed to the U.S., it would in turn provide huge opportunities for high-end Indian service providers such as doctors, accountants, architects and software engineers.

Divergences on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership

The upbeat mood of analysts in economic relations stands in some contrast to the situation regarding critical technologies, despite the new high profile Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) between India and the U.S. In general, many Indian officials and analysts seem to focus on the obstacles posed by the existing non-proliferation regime, in contrast to their American counterparts who tend to underplay them.

In the past, India tended to see U.S. technology embargos as being directly targeted against the Indian nuclear program, given the stepped up...
international sanctions put into place after India’s 1974 nuclear explosion. As such, technology controls have been particularly grating to India. The post-Pokhran II sanctions against India have now all been lifted, but the remaining sanctions are either mandated by U.S. legislation or imposed due to America’s membership in non-proliferation regimes such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NSSP announced by President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee in January 2004 (previously referred to as the Glide Path) is supposed to be the vehicle through which progress would be made in the most difficult areas of technology cooperation. In September 2004, India and the U.S. signed an agreement inaugurating the implementation of the NSSP with a good deal of fanfare. However, in a development that seemed to surprise the U.S., Indian opinion proved to be split on the actual benefits of the NSSP.

Indian Viewpoints

Only a small group inside the Indian government and a narrow section of the strategic community have been enthusiastic about the NSSP. There are many more skeptics, drawn from various government ministries, large sections of the strategic affairs community, senior defense technologists in and out of the government, and left coalition partners in the government. Even as the agreement was being finalized, officials in the Ministry of External Affairs were apparently hesitant, prompting Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to personally weigh in with strong support because of his belief that India had to send a “political message” that it would be business as usual under the new UPA government. For the Prime Minister and his close advisors, “the NSSP became a test of this government’s commitment to Indo-U.S. relations.” The main difference between the supporters and the skeptics is that for the former, the NSSP holds enormous symbolic value, while the latter dismisses it as just that.

For supporters, the very fact that the U.S. is willing to formally commit to cooperating with India (a non-NPT nuclear capable and non-MTCR missile capable country) on civilian nuclear energy and space technology, speaks volumes. As they see it, the reality is that the U.S. will provide or withhold technologies according to its own interests, with or without reference to nonproliferation regimes. America’s technology and equipment sales to China, and the manner in which the A.Q. Khan affair was handled with Pakistan, are cited as evidence for their argument. Thus, according to this group, India “should not miss the forest for the trees;” instead it should see American steps as important indicators of movement toward a fundamentally different relationship.

An important segment of the government that seems to share this view, taking a long-term approach, is the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). The ISRO’s interest extends well beyond immediate cooperation with the U.S. to what is termed the “next generation of space exploration” in which India could offer both cost and technology advantages, something the Americans are now believed to understand. India has already captured approximately fifteen to twenty percent of the global market for remote sensing data for civilian applications. For space technology cooperation, the ultimate “test” from the Indian side is whether an Indian launch vehicle would be allowed to carry an American-built satellite. The optimists say that nothing can be ruled out in the future, especially if market forces determine American policy.

In contrast, the skeptics have a long list of concerns and an even longer memory. The major criticism of the NSSP is that it provides no substantive movement forward, and that expectations of increased flow of dual use goods into India’s
civilian space and nuclear activities, are highly misplaced. In fact, Anil Kakodkar, Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, does not see the NSSP as being particularly useful for developing India’s civilian nuclear power technology, unlike the NSSP’s proponents. The modifications to U.S. export licensing policies are dismissed by many as cosmetic, pointing out they are to be reciprocal for India’s “implementation of measures to address proliferation concerns and to ensure compliance with U.S. export controls.” Moreover, the relaxation amounts to a presumption of approval only for dual use items not controlled for proliferation reasons. On the most important issue for space cooperation—i.e., the export of U.S. satellites, subsystems and components—critics note that there seems to be a blank. Given that U.S.-made systems dominate the satellite market, India is prevented from entering the launch service market despite lower costs since a launch from India would require a license for reexport by the customer, which is usually denied.

The bottom line from the skeptics is that “you cannot expect trust from someone you are still targeting.” Many hark back to the U.S. decision to discontinue supplies of low-enriched uranium for India’s Tarapore atomic power plant after 1974, despite the existence of an Indo-U.S. agreement that had the force of an international treaty. Some are also deeply concerned that the U.S. will now target Indian scientists, thus “moving up the value chain.” Their belief is that technology denial can only work up to a point in the new knowledge economy, hence innovative sanctions against intangibles are likely to be developed, adding yet another layer of distrust between India and the U.S. As far as this group is concerned, the fundamental American goal of ensuring asymmetry in technology, including full spectrum dominance, will continue to dictate U.S. policies. This goal will lead the U.S. to try and put a ceiling on scientific development elsewhere.

The defense technologists and scientists at least, believe that as in the earlier period, the U.S. will only be able to slow down India, but not stop it in new arenas.

Many Indian analysts and policymakers are incredulous at what is seen as continuing American double standards in the region on protecting sensitive nuclear technology. (This is a view shared by both skeptics and supporters.) The American sanctions on two Indian scientists for allegedly assisting Iran is a case in point. The U.S. appears to believe that Indian scientists are valuable to would-be proliferators because they represent the only pool of talent outside the nuclear weapon states familiar with “the start up stage” of nuclear weapons and missile programs. As far as India is concerned, its track record on not passing sensitive technology and information over the past decades is above reproach. In the words of a former Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission

The recent U.S. sanctions against two Indian engineers who held senior positions in the Nuclear Power Corporation of India is ludicrous in the extreme. One of them was involved in reviewing the safety aspects of a Russian nuclear power unit being built in Iran and which is under IAEA safeguards, the other person has not even visited Iran. Contrast this reaction of the U.S. to its pussyfooting on the well organized and longstanding proliferation of nuclear weapons-related technologies by Pakistan to North Korea, Libya and Iran…

**American Perspectives**

In comparison to Indian positions, American viewpoints on the NSSP have been fairly uniform, both in and out of the government. A leading American analyst has termed the NSSP “truly revolutionary,” and suggests that what is really important is “a change in the U.S. strategic ori-
entation towards India that in time will be more consequential than any of the minutiae encoded in the current agreement. U.S. officials have described the NSSP as specifically trying to find ways to cooperate more closely in civilian nuclear energy, civilian space programs, high technology trade, and missile defense as India moves to improve its export controls and nonproliferation policies. The U.S. Department of Commerce has argued that the impediments to high technology trade with India have as much to do with misperceptions as export controls or government restrictions, and points to the irony that while the U.S. actually has more restrictive trade regulations vis-à-vis China, the U.S. has a more robust high tech trade and investment relationship with China than with India.

The new response to India’s apprehensions about American reliability given past experience is: “Buy American and you will see how reliable we are.” But during the long absence of the U.S. from the Indian market, India has either indigenized or found other suppliers; thus it may think twice before disrupting existing arrangements. In addition, cost is often an issue because American technologies and defense equipment tend to be more expensive than those from Russia, Israel, or Europe. As one Indian proponent of stronger ties with the U.S. noted, “Although we might want to buy Boeing aircraft, the fact is that Airbus is cheaper.”

American policymakers also note that part of the problem is that the Indian government wants access to some of the most sensitive technology and items that relate to civil space and civil nuclear activities; on the other hand, this only affects a very small portion of the overall high technology relationship. According to the Department of Commerce, less than one percent of U.S.-India trade requires licenses. The formation of the U.S.-India High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) in November 2002 was to allow a close examination of not only the very sensitive items that might be affected by export controls, but also to look more broadly at the range of Indian tariff and non-tariff barriers that the U.S. believes inhibits American companies from being able to export as much to India as it does to other countries like China.

Apart from the nuclear and space sectors, defense-related high technology trade between India and the U.S. is gaining ground, despite cost and reliability concerns. One reason is the strong push given by the Pentagon, especially its Defense Policy Group. The Pentagon enthusiasts see bilateral agreements such as the General Security of Military Information Agreement and the Master Information Exchange Agreement with India as the foundation for greater defense cooperation. But the defense transfer relationship is still described as “embryonic.” All major defense technology transfer deals continue to be stymied by existing restrictions that affect this area as well: the dual use technology controls in the Department of Commerce and the Department of State’s licensing of Munitions List items directed at defense commodity trade. It has been pointed out that high tech trade with even long time U.S. allies like Britain and Australia is not always easy since the process is a deliberative one, encompassing many agencies and organizations.

Both in American official circles and the private defense sector, concern is sometimes expressed about “risk management,” or issues of intellectual property rights and contracts. This is captured in the question that a corporate leader dealing with technologies of national security significance asked: “When I go to talk to companies [in India], I ask a simple question—If I give you my crown jewel to work on, and you polish it to give it back to me, what if someone steals the jewel? How do you feel my pain?” Even defense officials favorably inclined to increasing high tech defense trade with India concede that “High tech
defense trade with countries that do not have an established ‘track record’ with the U.S. of protecting technology is extremely difficult and often a lengthy process. India is such a country.  

India’s Strategic Autonomy Question

One broad area that seems to be a stumbling block relates to the way that India and the U.S. tend to view the role of export controls in general. American analysts tend to describe export controls as the foundation for technology transfers and necessary for safeguarding national security. Some U.S. officials suggest that many Indians believe that export controls acceptable to the U.S. would erode India’s sovereignty if they were adopted. Such sentiment is found particularly among leading defense technologists and some policy makers in India who are steeped in a “do it rather than buy it” culture when it comes to dual use technology. Protecting India’s perceived strategic autonomy has been a central driving motivation of Indian foreign policy, and high technology achievements are still seen as a critical tool in this regard.

The aim of protecting India’s freedom in critical sectors continues to be balanced against the implications of potentially more intrusive external oversight under cooperative agreements offered by the U.S. For instance, one of the Bush administration’s latest anti-proliferation measures, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) unveiled in May 2003 to interdict WMD material including searches of suspected air, sea, and land cargos, has elicited only a cautious welcome from India. The PSI is a U.S.-led effort without involvement of the United Nations or international legal sanction. During then-Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit to New Delhi in March 2004, he expressed hope that India would become a core member of the group, which currently has a membership of 15 countries. India is, however, reluctant to join on several grounds: first, the PSI requires its members to leave themselves open to spot checks of their own ships and aircraft; secondly, there is a question of being consistent with international law; and thirdly, there is a risk of escalation of conflict. There is no guarantee that members will not become targets of PSI; India might have special reason to worry given the U.S. suspicions about India’s cooperation with Iran. Also, hypothetically speaking, if India were to try to interdict Chinese ships or aircraft heading for Pakistan, the risk of conflict with China would be high, without a clear idea of what the U.S. would do to avert or settle any such crisis.

V. Prospects: Ties in a Bind

It is increasingly clear that the euphoria that became prevalent after U.S.-India relations turned a corner in 2000 has noticeably diminished. On some of their most critical foreign policy concerns, neither India nor the U.S. are likely to come through fully for each other, and a reduction of expectations would seem to be in order. Two areas that have illustrated this are cooperation in dual use technology and counterterrorism as discussed above.

Although cooperation in defense and strategic affairs “led” the India-U.S. relationship to its current level, it has not culminated in a discernible strategic understanding. Even the highly publicized NSSP will go only so far given the reality of the international non-proliferation regime and U.S. legislation. As Kenneth Juster, an architect of the measure admitted, “…in the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, we have a framework to make even further changes, but in areas that are really not going to have a huge impact on technology trade that can take place between our two countries.” The strongest American advocates of stepping up high tech and dual use technology trade with India acknowledge that they
are already hitting up against the limits allowed by the nonproliferation controls. In any event, a large section of India’s policy community does not seem convinced that the change in American attitude itself will translate into substantive gains on the ground. What they see lacking is an American strategic commitment to India.58

One skeptic on the prospects of dual use technology cooperation on the American side is Strobe Talbott, who in a blunt assessment noted that “There is still a global nonproliferation regime in this world, and India has assertively, defiantly, put itself outside that regime. And that poses a problem, for the regime, for India and for the United States.”59 Simply adding India, and by extension Pakistan, into a “Club of Seven” is not viewed as viable because of “the precedent it would create for others to blast their way into the club.” Talbott believes that what is needed is “a halfway house.” A possible approach that has been discussed in this connection is the so-called 5+2 arrangement in which India and Pakistan would be treated more leniently, in exchange for yielding to international arms control measures and nonproliferation safeguards.

India is likely to resist any arrangement that does not recognize the differences between the two countries in dealing with sensitive nuclear technology. In meeting India’s concerns, it has been suggested that the U.S. may entertain inducting each one according to specific policies the countries took, without a presumption that both India and Pakistan would enter into the arrangement together or at the same time.60 However, the 5+2 proposition will not be an easy matter because both the non-proliferation proponents as well as the “realists” are likely to find fault. For the former, the arrangement will be condemned as rewarding proliferators, and sanctioning an unraveling of the NPT that still remains the nonproliferation centerpiece despite all its flaws. As for the realists, the objections would be more pragmatic, that the 5+2 concept will create a messier world, with different kinds of standards for proliferation, a world in which the P-5 countries will be increasingly forced to choose the lesser of two evils.61

On counterterrorism, bilateral cooperation is likely to be confined to the tactical realm. For example, despite India’s relatively successful and widely dispersed development projects in nearly every province of Afghanistan, the U.S. is apparently not willing to engage India seriously on Afghan policy, citing Pakistan’s sensitivities.62 Without the development of a comfortable working relationship with the U.S. on Afghanistan, India will be skeptical on combating extremism in the region. Kashmir remains the real “test” for gauging relations with the U.S., but some Indian analysts have argued that America has not made its own views clear, despite the enormous attention the issue has received.63 On the other hand, India’s decision not to send troops to Iraq clearly jolted American policymakers, especially in the Pentagon. Although the U.S. did not allow it to become a public bone of contention, it did not win India any friends either. For India, a key dilemma is how to contribute to stabilizing Iraq without getting implicated in the unpopular American “war on terrorism” there.

There is a vocal Indian minority led by some in the strategic affairs community that argues that the current U.S. administration’s foreign policy represents a strategic opportunity for India.64 The new Indian government appears to be listening to this group, without necessarily accepting its arguments. Significantly, the pre-election rhetoric of the Congress Party has not had a noticeable impact on its foreign policy positions—including nothing, for example, that would put it substantially at odds with the positions of its predecessor. Yet even among the most ardent supporters of the Bush administration’s controversial international agenda, there seems to be a pragmatic
consensus that what India desires is leverage that only the U.S. can offer. There is little evidence that these Indian officials or policy analysts share the worldview of the Bush administration. The proponents of an unabashedly pro-American policy are likely to remain a minority, though exerting a certain amount of influence. According to one official who subscribes to this view, “We are still swimming upstream.” The question that some of the more skeptical Indian commentators are asking is not what India gains from cooperating with the U.S., but what India would have to give up in the process, whether it is in the context of PSI or Iraq.

VI. Conclusion

The greatest scope for U.S.-India cooperation seems to be reverting to the realm where it was originally envisioned—economic relations. Above all else, India seeks to become a developed country, a goal that cuts across the leadership of the Congress Party and its rival Bharatiya Janata Party. With the election issue of outsourcing receding in the U.S., and a new Indian Prime Minister who tends to see economics as the driving force in internal and external relations, there is every reason for optimism on the economic policy front.

Besides, Prime Minister Singh’s own preference is to avoid letting U.S. relations with Pakistan affect India on other issues. In an interview during his visit to the U.S., the Prime Minister stated, “We recognize the circumstances in which the United States had to strengthen its relationship with Pakistan because of the events in Afghanistan. But we do not feel that that should be a barrier to or a bar to our own relationship with the U.S. which are manifold.”

As relations expand in the economic realm, American businesses may be expected to keep an eye not only on the bottom line, but also on the barometer registering regional tensions. For example, top corporate managers from G.E. (the largest and one of the most experienced foreign employers in India with a workforce of 20,000), have noted their concerns about “war and peace issues,” such as the standoff between India and Pakistan during 2002. They have also called for more leadership in the “second generation of reforms” in fiscal responsibility, anti-corruption, and privatization. But in the end, the corporate community’s strong conclusion appears to be that while India will have to struggle with these multiple challenges, the country has clearly demonstrated the ability to deal with them. This newfound realism on both sides should ensure that U.S.-India relations will improve steadily, but not as swiftly as earlier expectations might have suggested.

Endnotes

1 As early as 1993, India was being singled out for its economic growth. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Big Emerging Markets Initiative, a program cited by President Bill Clinton as among the U.S. government’s most important foreign policy priorities, was geared to enhancing relationships with ten of the fastest growing markets in the world. India was among the top on this list, along with China.


Franklin Kramer, “Toward a Mature Defense Relationship: Limits, Possibilities and Lessons,” remarks presented at “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” a conference hosted by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. April 1-2, 2004. It may be noted parenthetically that, under the Bush administration, the Pentagon has been uncharacteristically at the forefront of formulating strategic doctrine. To some extent, this tendency is being reflected in relations with India.

Interview with a senior scientist and former member of India’s National Security Advisory Board, Bangalore, India, November 22, 2004.

There seems to be a consensus among Indian decision-makers that given the disastrous experience with Indian peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka, no troops would be sent anywhere without a clear exit strategy and strong domestic support.


Discussion with a senior Indian official at an interaction in July 2003, Washington, D.C.


Ibid.


For example, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government put on record in Parliament its concern at the violation of international norms by some members of the U.S. security forces “in dealing with Iraqi people.” The Hindu, July 8, 2004.

Well-known correspondent Thomas Friedman of The New York Times was among the first to point out this anomaly.

B. Raman, “Managing the War on Terrorism in South Asia,” remarks presented at “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” a conference hosted by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. April 1-2, 2004. In response to a question about how the U.S. might learn from India in this connection, Raman, the former Head, Counter-terrorism Division of India’s Research & Analysis Wing, cited the democratic institutions and culture of India: “There are a lot of [Muslim] grievances. There is a lot of anger. We had the riots in Gujarat [March 2002] and a lot of Muslims were killed. But whenever anything happens to an Indian Muslim, whenever he feels like going and crying on the shoulders of someone, he goes and cries on the shoulders of our judiciary, he goes and cries on the shoulders of our Human Rights Commission, he goes and cries on the shoulders of our Parliament…It doesn’t occur to him to go and cry on the shoulders of Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda…You have to do an introspection as to why it is that when Muslims feel anger toward the United States, they feel like going and crying on the shoulders of Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda.”

Interview with a senior government official, New Delhi, October 27, 2004.


President George Bush in his 2005 State of the Union Address singled out Iran as the “world’s primary state sponsor of terrorism—pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve.” www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/02/02/sotu.transcript.5/index.htm. Leading neo-conservative Charles Krauthammer has already proclaimed the multilateral effort to restrain Iran “an abject failure.” His alternatives are stark: “There are only two things that will stop the Iranian nuclear program—revolution from below or an attack on its nuclear facilities.” Charles Krauthammer, “Axis of Evil: Part Two,” The New York Times, July 23, 2004. See also Brenda Shaffer, “If Iran Is Not Checked, Nuclear Terror is Next,” International Herald Tribune, August 9, 2004.

In the past, top Indian policymakers such as former external affairs minister Jaswant Singh have referred to Indian-Iranian ties as a “natural partnership.” See C. Raja Mohan, “India, Iran Look for Bigger Role in Kabul,” The Hindu, May 23, 2000.


For example, the late Indian National Security Advisor J.N. Dixit paid a high profile visit to Iran in October 2004. According to an External Affairs Ministry statement, India and Iran had agreed to focus on tie-ups in the fields of energy, trade and transit. The Hindu, October 20, 2004. As one Indian official put it to the author, “We are prepared to consider walking away from Iran one month after the U.S. walks away from Pakistan,” thus underlining the depth of India’s firmness. Interview with a senior official, New Delhi, October 28, 2004.

One of the reasons that India became more open to
working with the U.S. on counter-terrorism was that it recognized the importance of the U.S. over the Russians well before 9/11 in getting Indian concerns addressed, thus altering a historical preference.

24 Discussion with a former member of the Joint Working Group, New Delhi, October 31, 2004.

25 The latest two meetings (fifth and sixth) of the Working Group were held on July 12, 2002 and September 1, 2004. For accounts of their activities, see Joint Statement of the India-US. Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism, Press Release, Embassy of India, July 12, 2002; and Joint Statement, Sixth Meeting of The India-U.S. Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism, Delhi, August 31-September 1, 2004, Press Release, U.S. Consulate, Mumbai, India.

26 The Hindu, October 7, 2004. The hijacking refers to the sensational December 1999 incident in which an Indian Airlines airbus was hijacked from Nepal to Afghanistan.

27 Quoted in The Hindu, October 7, 2004. The left parties in particular attacked the U.S. for “gross violation of norms and a direct interference in the internal affairs of the country.”

28 For example, Michael Gadbow, Senior Vice President, General Electric, related how in a high level meeting of Chief Financial Officers on China held in New York, the conversation kept veering toward India. Gadbow, “A Global Corporate Perspective on U.S.-India Economic Ties,” remarks presented at “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” a conference hosted by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. April 1-2, 2004.


32 Arvind Panagariya, “Emerging India: A Threat or Opportunity?” paper presented at “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” a conference hosted by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. April 1-2, 2004. Panagariya believes that the upper limit of growth in India with greater reforms, especially in the labor market, is 11-12 percent. With a more gradualist pace of reforms, growth is expected to be around 6-7 percent.

33 Zainulbhai, “Taking Stock of U.S.-India Economic Cooperation.”

34 Segen Brin, quoted in Times of India, October 14, 2004.

35 The Times of India, August 7, 2004. While the FTA may make economic sense, there are serious political hurdles to be overcome. For an excellent discussion on the political economy of a U.S.-India FTA, see Robert Lawrence and Rajesh Chadha, “Should a U.S.-India FTA be Part of India’s Trade Strategy?” India Policy Forum, Volume 1, 2004.

36 The term “Glide Path” was not seen as appropriate since it suggested a landing, rather than a takeoff.

37 Interview with a senior government official, New Delhi, October 27, 2004.

38 Interview with a top official at ISRO headquarters, Bangalore, India, November 27, 2004.


41 Ramachandran, “India, U.S. and Trade in Technology.”

42 Interview with a high level former Defense Research and Development Organization official, now a consultant to the government of India, New Delhi, October 29, 2004.

43 Chari, “Indo-U.S. Tech Transfer Deal.”

44 Interview with a senior defense scientist in the Indian government after the U.S. placed sanctions on two leading Indian scientists, New Delhi, October 29, 2004.

45 The Hindu, October 18, 2004.


48 Peter Dougerty, “High Technology, Dual Use Technology and Critical Economic Issues,” roundtable at “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation: Taking Stock
and Moving Forward,” a conference hosted by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. April 1-2, 2004.


50 Conversation with a top Indian government official, New Delhi, October 28, 2004.


54 Dougherty, “High Technology.”

55 Conversations with a former official of India’s Nuclear Power Corporation; and a former member of India’s National Security Advisory Board, Bangalore, India, October-November 2004.


57 Sanjay Baru notes that “When there is no stated position, when there is a blurred, evolving position, and the position itself is read in different ways at different points in time by different elements of the Administration…, you cannot really come to grips with it…I still do not know what the thinking of the United States is on Kashmir.” Sanjay Baru, “Common Vision versus Common Practice: Defining the Partnership,” remarks presented at “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” a conference hosted by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. April 1-2, 2004. These comments were made before Baru became the Press Advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and should not be equated with the views of the present government. On Kashmir and the U.S., The Clinton administration’s preferred position was spelled out by Strobe Talbott (possibly for the first time publicly) when he said that “…the solution is obvious and ought to be much easier than it is. It is to make the Line of Control an international boundary, and to have a great deal of cross-border interaction, sort of an open border” at “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation.”

58 One leading expert has suggested that “in dual-use and military technology, US licensing policy and practice should treat India as being mid-way between Israel and China.” Interview, New Delhi, October 29, 2004.

59 Talbott, remarks presented at “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation.”

60 Talbott stated that “I am not suggesting that India and Pakistan would come in together, automatically, joined at the hip, hyphenated into a 5+2 arrangement” at “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation.”

61 This dilemma has hamstrung all attempts to reform the NPT, with little sign of any breakthroughs, as discussions indicated at “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” a conference hosted by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. April 1-2, 2004.


64 Interview with a high level government official, New Delhi, October 28, 2004.

65 Interview with a senior scientist and former member of India’s National Security Advisory Board, Bangalore, India, November 22, 2004.

66 For example, Prime Minister Singh’s attempt to calm the turbulent Assam region in 2004 was focused heavily on economic development, including unprecedented thinking about integrating the economies bordering Assam: Bangladesh and China. The left parties on whose support the ruling party relies, have not been particularly obstructionist on economic reforms as might have been anticipated.

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Dr. Ollapally’s areas of research and teaching focus on South Asian security; Indo-U.S. relations; nuclear nonproliferation; identity politics and the international system; and gender and international security. She is the author of the book, Confronting Conflict: Domestic Factors and U.S. Policymaking in the Third World and is the editor of Nuclear Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects. Her articles and chapters have appeared in numerous journals and books, and some of the most recent publications include: “America’s War on Terrorism in Southern Asia: Political and Military Dilemmas,” in John Davis ed., The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response; “Rethinking Gender and International Security: Balancing Global and Regional Perspectives,” Indian Journal of Gender Studies;“Indo-Russian Strategic Relations: New Choices and Constraints,” The Journal of Strategic Studies; and “Mixed Motives in India’s Search for Nuclear Status,” Asian Survey. Her articles have also appeared in Foreign Affairs; Political Science Quarterly; Nationalism and Ethnic Politics; and Asian Affairs among others. She is currently working on a book entitled Militants, Moderates and the Geopolitics of Extremism in South Asia.

She is on the Executive Board of Women in International Security in Washington, D.C. and is a member of the Advisory Council, Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace, New Delhi. Dr. Ollapally is the recipient of numerous awards and grants from the American Institute of Indian Studies, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and The Asia Foundation. She is a frequent commentator in the media. Dr. Ollapally received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.
U.S.-INDIA BILATERAL COOPERATION:
TAking STOCK AND MOVING FORWARD
April 1, 2004

Sigur Center for Asian Studies
The Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University
Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
1957 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Support for this conference from The Asia Foundation is gratefully acknowledged

CONFERENCE AGENDA

9:30-9:45 WELCOME
Deepa Ollapally, Senior Fellow, Sigur Center
Harry Harding, Dean, Elliott School of International Affairs

9:45-10:30 KEYNOTE
“Accomplishments and Challenges in the New Era of Cooperation,” Lalit Mansingh, Ambassador to the U.S. from India

10:30-12:00 TAKING STOCK OF U.S.-INDIA POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC COOPERATION
Chair: Karl F. Inderfurth, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs, and former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs

“Common Vision versus Common Practice: Defining the Partnership,” Sanjaya Baru, Chief Editor, The Financial Express and former member of National Security Advisory Board of India

“Managing the War on Terrorism in South Asia,” B. Raman, Director, Institute for Topical Studies and former Head, Counter-terrorism Division of the Research & Analysis Wing, India

“Defense Cooperation: Where Are We Today?” Claudio Lilienfeld, Visiting Scholar, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

“Toward a Mature Defense Relationship: Limits, Possibilities and Lessons,” Franklin Kramer, Counsel, Shea & Gardner, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

12:15-1:30 LUNCHEON ADDRESS

1:45-3:15 TAKING STOCK OF U.S.-INDIA ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Chair: Adil Zainulbhai, Director, McKinsey & Company, and Board Member, Indian American Policy Institute


“Emerging India: A Threat or Opportunity?” Arvind Panagariya, Jagdish Bhagwati Professor of Indian Political Economy, and Professor of Economics, Columbia University

“A Global Corporate Perspective on U.S.-India Economic Ties,” Michael Gadbaw, Vice President & Senior Counsel, General Electric Co.
ROUNDTABLES ON CRITICAL ISSUES
IN U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS
April 2, 2004

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George Washington University
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Washington, D.C.

THE “WAR ON TERRORISM” AND U.S.-INDIA COOPERATION

10:00-11:00 AM  Chair:
Deepa Ollapally, Senior Fellow, Sigur Center

Discussion Leaders:
B. Raman, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, and former Chief of Counter-terrorism Division, Research & Analysis Wing, India

Daniel Benjamin, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies; and author of the book The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House)

11:00-11:15 Coffee/Tea Break

HIGH TECHNOLOGY, DUAL USE TECHNOLOGY AND CRITICAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

11:15-12:15  Chair:
Deepa Ollapally, Senior Fellow, Sigur Center

Discussion Leaders:
Sanjaya Baru, Chief Editor, Financial Express, New Delhi

Peter Dougherty, Defense Technology Security Administration Policy Directorate, U.S. Department of Defense

Kaushik Vyas, Corporate Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation.