On September 6, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush accepted an invitation from China’s President Hu Jintao to attend the 2008 summer Olympics in Beijing. China is both the world’s leading manufacturing nation and an authoritarian state ruled by the Communist Party. Thus Bush’s trip symbolizes far more than just a sports-minded president attending his final Olympics as president. As tourism is an export, Bush effectively is trading with China.

Some watchdog groups and scholars, pointing to China’s jailing of human rights activists; denial of religious freedom; undermining of civil, political, and labor rights of its own people; and support of other repressive regimes, want Bush to boycott the Olympics or to use that opportunity to press China’s leaders to change their behavior. They note that the United States boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, despite mounting pressure on Bush to make his Olympic travel contingent on China’s human rights performance, the president has not budged. He believes that China’s human rights performance is not a “trade” issue.

Yet Bush’s visit to China raises questions about when and how Washington should link its trade policies and human rights objectives. Those questions go far beyond just the Beijing Olympics, and to the heart of how U.S. trade policy is—or should be—made. With the U.S. presidential campaign well underway, those questions ought to be something that all the candidates are considering in a coherent fashion, yet to date that is not the case.

President Bush is not the only president, nor even the first one, to favor trade expansion over human rights protection. His administration, however, shifted trade rhetoric and trade strategy in important ways. Bush has both elevated and simplified the trade-human rights relationship, arguing that trade inherently promotes human rights. The president has stressed that “free trade brings greater political and personal freedom,” so when the United States ships goods, it is functionally “exporting freedom.” That view, however, has not stopped him from using, and expanding, trade sanctions against Cuba, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe, as well as the nations in his “Axis of Evil.”

Bush’s trade representative, Robert Zoellick (now president of the World Bank), negotiated trade agreements with many developing countries where the demand for human rights was often nascent and the protection of human rights was in short supply. Due to pressure from a Democratic Congress, the Bush administration’s bilateral trade agreements included more provisions promoting human rights—in the areas of labor rights, political participation, the right to information, and due process—than even before. But Bush did not have a consistent strategy for linking trade and human rights; or for using incentives or sanctions, or other disincentives. Moreover, by not focusing on...
global trade liberalization under the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Bush administration made it harder to ensure that trade advanced access to jobs and opportunities for the bulk of the world’s people, rather than just for those living in the specific countries with whom he chose to negotiate.

As the United States approaches a presidential transition, neither trade nor human rights has become a leading campaign issue. But both are important for the U.S. government and the American people to consider. Under international law, we all have a collective responsibility to uphold human rights. Moreover, when policymakers fail to coordinate trade and human rights, it can undermine both. Alas, not one candidate has put forth a coherent strategy for using trade to advance human rights.

The Republican candidates have said little about trade beyond the platitude that it is good for economic growth, while the Democrats have done little but criticize the Bush administration’s use of bilateral trade agreements. A coherent strategy would require a major rethinking of trade and its role as a foreign-policy tool.

The Trade-Human Rights Relationship

U.S. officials long have used the incentive of a trade agreement to prod policymakers abroad to protect the human rights of their own citizens. But the United States does not always rely on incentives. It also frequently uses the stick of trade sanctions, denying access to its huge market in order to change the behavior of recalcitrant states. Moreover, the U.S. government does not always behave as though human rights are indivisible, as defined by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The declaration defines more than 30 human rights (including the right to form a trade union, the right to privacy, and the right to education) that governments have a duty to protect. However, there has been no agreement on an effective mechanism for enforcement. Thus, policymakers have few tools short of force to influence the domestic behavior of another nation—but trade is one such tool.

The relationship between trade and rights is complex, and policymakers still do not know how to link the two. Trade simultaneously can enhance and undermine human rights, depending on a variety of factors, including a country’s level of development, governmental expertise, and political culture. Moreover, scholars know little about causality. Does increased trade induce states to advance human rights, or are governments that protect human rights better able to trade, and thus trade more?

Scholars do know that it takes considerable governance expertise to promote human rights. In some instances, governments must intervene (e.g., to protect the rights of minorities); in others, they must refrain from intervening (e.g., to protect the right to free speech). Many policymakers in the developing world lack the skill, the will, or the funds to protect human rights. Even the most advanced industrialized nations struggle to promote, respect, and protect human rights. As such, policymakers cannot use trade to advance human rights in the developing world successfully unless they develop strategies that reflect and respect each government’s expertise and constraints.

The World George W. Bush Created

Polling data indicate that Americans are deeply concerned about the nation’s economic status and future. Voters want candidates to demonstrate that they can create jobs; stave off a recession; make health care and higher education affordable; stabilize the U.S. stock and housing markets; and slow the ascent of oil prices. Many voters also are frustrated about U.S. immigration and trade policy, and blame those policies for manufacturing job losses in the South and the Midwest.

Few Americans see new trade agreements as the solution to any of these problems. Instead, polling data indicate Americans are more likely to see trade agreements
as causing or exacerbating their problems. Yet expanding global markets can be a key element of a successful plan for economic growth. More exports generally mean firms can reap economies of scale and scope, which in turn can lead to higher profits, higher stock prices (for publicly-traded firms), and new jobs for more workers. More imports, in turn, generally mean cheaper—and a wider variety of—goods for consumers. Trade also can help keep U.S. producers competitive, innovative, and focused on their consumers.

Proponents of trade often argue that trade agreements free trade. But these agreements do not free trade; they facilitate it. Trade agreements essentially re-regulate trade relations between countries, setting common rules regarding how and when nations can apply regulations that distort trade and global markets. Freer trade is thus, a side effect of trade agreements. They allow U.S. interests to participate and influence foreign decision-making in areas related to trade, such as labor conditions in China or environmental conditions in Guatemala.

In countries that have a history of opacity and lack democratic institutions, such as Saudi Arabia (which recently joined the WTO) and China (a member since 2001), trade agreements can promote the rule of law and create new norms of good governance. For example, to comply with WTO rules, the organization’s 151 members must regulate any area of the economy related to trade from food safety to procurement rules to tax policy in a transparent and accountable manner. WTO rules also require member states to provide citizens and traders (both foreign and domestic) with the opportunity to influence and participate in certain aspects of trade policymaking.

Finally, trade agreements require that policymakers at the national and international level make their trade-related decisions openly, and allow the public to see the process of decision-making. In this way, over time, WTO membership may indirectly promote a citizen’s right to information, due process, and political participation. Thus, trade agreements can be far more than simply agreements governing commerce; at best, they can dramatically alter the interaction between publics and policymakers.

Multilateral vs. Bilateral
Proponents of multilateral liberalization have done a poor job of explaining how trade agreements affect Americans and why they are needed. While advocates may explain the economic benefits of trade to Americans (more jobs, lower prices for goods, higher stock prices), they rarely explain how trade policy can help achieve other important foreign-policy goals, such as reducing the supply of illegal drugs or helping to stabilize other countries. Opening up the U.S. market to Colombian coffee, for example, may encourage Colombian farmers to plant more coffee as an alternative to growing coca leaves for cocaine.

This lack of understanding is part of the reason trade agreements have become increasingly contentious. The American public is generally pro-trade, but wary of trade agreements. Most Americans have little understanding of what trade agreements do, why the United States negotiates so many of them, or how they affect average citizens. Among the 47 countries studied in the the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, the United States showed the biggest rise in opposition to globalization. In fact, the German Marshall Fund found that while 60 percent of those polled favor freer trade, some 57 percent (up from 51 percent in 2005) think trade costs more U.S. jobs than it creates.

In general, however, the Bush-era trade agreements could not do much to encourage employers to hire new workers or to stimulate economic growth. Unlike every president since Truman, Bush eschewed trade liberalization efforts at the multilateral level, where they could have had a substantial impact on economic growth and job
creation. Instead, his negotiators have concentrated on bilateral and regional trade agreements.

The Bush administration justified this change as a central element of the war on terror. Eleven days after September 11, 2001, U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick wrote an op-ed in the *Washington Post*, titled “Countering Terrorism with Trade.” In it, he argued, “America’s trade leadership can build a coalition of countries that cherish liberty in all its aspects. Open markets are vital for developing nations, many of them fragile democracies that rely on the international economy to overcome poverty and create opportunity; we need answers for those who ask for economic hope to counter internal threats to our common values.” But these spirited words linking human rights, trade, and the threat of terrorism did not spur multilateral action. Instead the Bush administration focused on trade talks with such relatively small countries as Bahrain, Colombia, Morocco, Peru, and Oman. These are not major trade recipients for U.S. exports.

The Bush administration’s bilateral strategy has had other negative ramifications. America’s shift to bilateral agreements encouraged other industrialized nations—including Canada, Australia, and Japan—to shift their focus to bilaterals, too. This shift has undermined the WTO. It also has alienated trade policymakers in the developing world who have had to devote their scarce resources to focus on bilaterals, rather than on multinational negotiations with larger economic payoffs.

Specifically, negotiators did not focus sufficiently on the Doha Round of trade talks, which began in 2001. This round was supposed to be devoted to the needs of developing countries, many of which have not reaped the benefits of globalization. Developing country producers confront relatively high trade barriers in the industrialized world for their exports, often commodities such as sugar, cotton, rice, and textiles. If the industrialized world were to open markets to these goods, more people in the developing world would be able to feed their families, and gain greater access to credit, education, and services. But seven years later, the Doha Round remains stalemated, and Bush administration officials argue that the stalemate justifies their focus on bilaterals. As a result, in the coming months Congress will review bilateral trade agreements with Colombia, Korea and Panama, rather than a multilateral trade agreement under the aegis of the WTO.

Finally, under President Bush, Washington has become less credible as a role model. Although the United States remains the world’s most competitive economy, according to the World Economic Forum, growth has slowed. Global markets have been shaken by fears of an American recession, and by huge U.S. budget and trade deficits. America’s financial troubles make it harder for policymakers to justify new investments in education, research and development, and infrastructure—the very public goods that advance human rights and competitiveness.

At the same time, the United States now is perceived widely as having a poor human rights record at home and abroad. This loss of economic credibility and moral authority makes it harder for the United States to use peaceful means such as trade to induce behavioral changes in other nations, such as Cuba, Iran, or Myanmar.

**The Interplay of Trade and Human Rights**

Americans generally do not see trade as a tool to enhance human rights abroad. They see trade as a tool for economic growth. U.S. policymakers make trade policy on behalf of commercial interests, and in turn weigh the interests of their producers and consumers. Officials may consider national security or political concerns, but they rarely introduce human rights interests of the global community into deliberations.

Consider the right to food. Trade liberalization may ensure that more people have
access to safe and affordable food, but in poor developing nations it also may make it harder for small farmers to sell their commodities at home or abroad. Unable to support their families, many such farmers often move to cities looking for work, crowding an already packed labor market with a dearth of stable, high-paying jobs. Thus the human impact of trade liberalization can be simultaneously positive and negative. But policymakers rarely have the luxury to consider such issues.

Policymakers develop trade positions based on the interests of their own domestic agricultural producers and consumers—the people who vote for them and fund their campaigns. Despite international human rights obligations, I can find no country tasked by its citizens to develop trade promises that promote the universal right to food. In the United States, for example, this would require policymakers to weigh not only the market distortions caused by America’s extensive use of commodities subsidies, but also to consider the impact of such subsidies on the supply, demand, and cost of food in the developing world. Such an approach would ensure that food security at the national level was a priority. Until trade policymakers receive such a mandate, they likely will not weigh the human rights impact of trade policies either on their own citizens or abroad.

big problems, little vision: candidates’ views

Americans understand that their security is tied to the security and well-being of others overseas—and thus to human rights. But so far, there has been little talk in the presidential campaign about how to craft policies to address this problem.

Both Republicans and Democrats mention human rights only occasionally. Senator John McCain has stated that he will not countenance the use of torture as a tool of U.S. foreign policy. Senator Hillary Clinton has maintained that trade should enhance women’s rights. Senator Barack Obama (like former candidate John Edwards) has spoken frequently about society’s responsibilities to the poor, the voiceless, and the homeless in the United States and abroad. As for the link between trade and human rights, each candidate has discussed the relationship only in specific terms relating to countries like China, Colombia, Cuba, or Myanmar. The two Democratic candidates have human rights scholars and activists as key advisers. In particular, Obama is advised by Samantha Power and Susan Rice, both experts on policy responses to genocide. But not one has made human rights a centerpiece of his or her foreign policy, as did Jimmy Carter in 1976. According to William Schultz of the Center for American Progress, only 5.1 percent of the questions posed to the candidates during the debates in 2007 concerned human rights.

Moreover, neither Republicans nor Democrats have developed a reasoned approach on trade policy, let alone on the relationship of trade to human rights. Republican candidates say little about trade. When front-runner Sen. John McCain talks about trade, he describes it as an engine of economic growth. But neither McCain nor Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee have yet explained why they believe trade sanctions are appropriate for some countries, while expanded trade is appropriate for others. McCain, for example, has said that he is troubled by China’s failure to be a responsible world leader, yet he would not cut off trade to change its behavior. In fact, McCain has stated, “Only risks to the security of our vital interests or egregious offenses to our most cherished political values should disqualify a nation from entering into a free trade agreement with us.” Huckabee, for his part, does argue that future trade with China should be contingent on the Chinese improving their record on religious freedom and human rights.

The Democrats have been united and outspoken in demanding that trade agreements should also include rules governing
treatment of workers and environmental impact. But they have not linked these goals to a considered position on the relationship of global economic growth to the United States and its trade partners. They insist they care about poverty at home and abroad, yet have not articulated the means to that end. Journalists in the United States and abroad have described Clinton’s and Obama’s trade positions as “protectionist” or “populist,” but neither word accurately describes their position. Protectionists want to set high trade barriers to discourage imports or to raise tariffs to enable U.S. producers to compete successfully with foreigners. While the two Democratic candidates do not want to alienate union supporters—who may well be inclined toward protectionism—they also want to preserve America’s ability to influence domestic and foreign regulations. They see inadequate governance overseas as a major hurdle to trade, and want to ensure that the food, toys, and chemicals we import will not endanger the workers who produce them or the consumers who use them. Thus, both Obama and Clinton have concluded that some trade agreements do not deserve approval because they lack sufficient regulatory safeguards.

In fact, Clinton surprised the trade pundits when she told the Financial Times: “I want to have a more comprehensive and thoughtful trade policy for the 21st century.... There is nothing protectionist about this. It is a responsible course. The alternative is simply to pick up where President Bush left off and that is not an option.” In addition, she called for a time out on new trade agreements. Her frank talk was admirable, but it still begs the question of how our trade partners would respond to a hiatus on trade talks without a specific commitment to a more development-oriented, multilateralist policy.

Obama’s position is equally incomplete. “We need new approaches to help people to help themselves,” he has said. “We must continue investments in agriculture, infrastructure, and economic growth so that all developing countries are in a position to reap the benefits of globalization.” But many developing countries cannot reap the benefits of globalization because the United States (and other industrialized nations) have imposed stiff trade barriers on the very commodities and manufactured goods they produce. The best way to facilitate growth and development in the United States and in the developing world is to focus on a multilateral round of trade talks under the WTO. But neither candidate has stated clearly that multilateral trade liberalization is a priority, nor that such trade liberalization will be a centerpiece of efforts to link trade, human rights, development, and security.

The Democrats have yet to reconcile an internationalist and cooperative worldview with a desire to reassure traditional constituents (e.g., union members, unskilled workers) that they will be protected from globalization’s adverse consequences. Clinton and Obama have stressed that American security depends on increasing economic growth and supporting good governance in the developing world. The two also have called for foreign assistance designed to ensure that more people have access to education, health care, and other public goods. But in varying degrees, the two also support an Americans-first approach (e.g. Americans must be protected from imports even when such protectionism undermines the achievement of other important policy goals).

The Colombian Case
The two Democrats mostly focus their criticism on specific Bush trade agreements. Both Clinton and Obama voted against the Central American Free Trade Agreement in 2005 on the grounds that it would undermine workers’ rights at home and in Central America. Clinton has hinted that she will vote against free trade agreements with Colombia and Korea. Sources close to the Obama campaign suggest that he also will vote against the Colombia agreement be-
cause of that country’s inadequate response to extrajudicial killing of union leaders.

But neither candidate has explained how voting against the Colombia agreement will advance human rights and the rule of law. Certainly, the agreement would offer a significant incentive for reform in Colombia, but the senators seem concerned about whether this is the right time to make such an offer. Opponents to the agreement argue quite rightly that Colombian workers continue to face legal and practical obstacles to their right to freely associate, join a trade union, and bargain collectively. And the U.S. Department of State has noted that unionists live under the constant threat of death. Not surprisingly, the number of union members has declined to less than five percent of the workforce.27

Colombia is much more likely to respond to incentives than to the lack of a trade agreement. It already has put considerable effort into trying to improve the rule of law, reduce crime, and improve labor rights governance. The International Labour Organization (ILO) now has a representative on the ground to report on labor rights, per an agreement between the government, trade confederations, and business representatives. The government has established a new prosecutorial office to combat impunity for violence against trade unionists, and has put considerable funds toward its mission.28

The government is much more likely to continue this course with the incentives of a trade agreement and increased foreign aid, rather than with no agreement. But neither Democratic candidate has made these arguments, which do not neatly fit into a soundbite.29

Clinton and Obama also know that trade sanctions may in fact undermine human rights, in such countries as China, Myanmar, or Zimbabwe. Sanctions can cut off needed food, water, shelter, and jobs for innocent citizens in dictatorships. And foreign governments may seize upon sanctions as cause to further punish their publics. Obama is the only presidential candidate to argue that cutting off trade may not be the best (or only) strategy to bring democracy to Cuba. He has not, however, made that case for Myanmar, and he may feel some human rights situations are so egregious that trade sanctions are the only option. Obama also has taken a leadership role in condemning the actions of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, but he has thus far not called for enhanced sanctions against that country.

Both Democrats and Republicans have spoken of the need to help Americans succeed in the global economy. Obama would like to offer tax breaks to businesses that hire Americans; he also wants to encourage the government (and business) to retrain Americans for jobs in areas with potential growth. Clinton has taken a similar position, arguing that policymakers need to address outsourcing. “There is no way to legislate against reality,” she says. We are not in favor of fences.” Both Democratic candidates recognize that the solution to job loss in the United States is a new approach to worker adjustment, funding for further education and retraining, and extension of health and employment benefits.30

While Clinton and Obama see government investments in research and education as the answer, McCain thinks the focus must lie with the individual. As he has stated, “While we embrace free trade, it is important to recognize that trade can lead to painful dislocations for some individuals. We must remain committed to education, retraining, and help for displaced workers all the while reminding ourselves that our ability to change is a great strength of our nation.”31

Each of the candidates has relied on jargon to communicate with constituents and funders. All the candidates have talked about “leveling the playing field” with other countries that do not trade fairly. Huckabee, Clinton, and Obama have called for fair trade, yet each has a distinct definition of what indeed constitutes “fair trade.” In
Obama’s and Clinton’s version, fair trade includes stronger enforcement of labor and environmental rights in trade policy, even if that means that the United States leans toward protectionism. While McCain also wants the United States to do a better job of enforcing trade agreements, he does not believe protection ever results in a more equitable or efficient outcome. But no candidate has elucidated how he or she would ensure that trade policies are fair to all Americans in their oft-competing roles as producers, consumers, taxpayers, and citizens.

**Getting America’s Trade Policy Right**

Global economic interdependence is here to stay. Americans who want to make the world a better place have a choice: they can ignore trade issues and stick with the muddled status quo, or they can demand coherence. Policymakers can begin by acknowledging an important point: If the United States is to reclaim its moral and economic authority, its trade policies should not undermine its human rights objectives. Forging a coherent trade policy has to begin by asking the right questions. Is trade policy an effective tool to achieve human rights objectives? If so, what rights, and whose rights, might be affected by a cutoff in trade? Would the United States have more or less leverage with less commerce?

It also means thinking about human rights as a market. We know that market actors respond to incentives. So how do we increase the supply and demand of human rights in markets overseas? On the supply side, we can provide foreign aid to improve the rule of law; encourage policymakers in nations with inadequate governance protect worker rights, monitor food safety, and ensure access to affordable health care and education. On the demand side, we can press our trade partners to provide their citizens with political participation and due process rights. By bolstering both the supply of good governance, and the demand for it, policymakers abroad are much more likely to achieve economic growth that advances human welfare.

Incentives can work to change behavior, especially when coupled with foreign aid. The European Union, for example, made human rights improvements a condition of membership for candidate states. Thus, in the 1980s, EU policymakers provided funds and expertise to help Spain and Portugal improve their rights performance, and more recently it has worked with Croatia and Turkey, which are current candidates for admission. Similarly, when the United States signed trade agreements with countries such as Mexico, Morocco, and Oman, those agreements included requirements on transparency, political participation, and due process rights. These trade partners must meet these conditions, or they could face being challenged with a trade dispute.

The United States should take several additional strategic and structural steps to develop a reasoned approach to balancing trade and human rights. Today, policymakers working on development issues and human rights issues work in separate spheres, speak different languages, and rarely communicate. In the interest of coherence (as well as saving taxpayer funds), a trade and human rights czar should be appointed to coordinate efforts and ensure that foreign aid complements these strategies. In addition, Congress should require that trade agreements include a human rights impact assessment, which would supplement the existing requirements of labor rights and environmental impact assessments. The United States then would be sending a clear signal that advancing human rights should not be subordinated to expanding trade.

The United States also should work internationally to build a more consistent approach to linking trade and human rights. For example, the United States should call on other countries and on the WTO secretariat to examine how the organization’s rules affect member states’ advancement of human rights at home and abroad.32
While trade and human rights are not yet a national campaign issue, there are times when the American people want policymakers to use trade to punish human rights violators, and to use trade as an incentive to advance human rights. Under the next president’s administration, the United States should work to ensure coherence.

Policymakers must think clearly and creatively about how to offset the perceived imbalance between trade and human rights in huge markets like China, as well as in smaller countries like Colombia. If the United States could collaborate with other countries and better utilize existing multilateral agreements, perhaps the threat of an Olympic boycott would not be necessary to encourage Beijing to moderate its repressive behavior, or at least to stop arresting its opponents. Trade agreements can certainly enhance human rights, but only if Americans take the lead in rewriting these policies.

—February 16, 2008

Notes

2. Jim Yardley, “Dissident’s Arrest Hints at Olympic Crackdown,” The New York Times, January 30, 2008. Democratic and Republican members of Congress have put forth three resolutions calling on the President to boycott the Olympics. U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and other leaders, are under similar pressure to boycott the event.

3. While the United States boycotted the Moscow Olympics, it attended—and prodded others to attend—the 1988 Seoul Olympics, which analysts credit with helping South Korea transition to democracy. They assert that the televising of democracy protests forced the Korean leadership to make concessions. James F. Larson and Heung-Soop Park, Global Television and the Politics of the Seoul Olympics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).


5. While I have not seen specific data on the link to the Olympics, a majority of Americans favor linking trade to China’s human rights performance. See World Public Opinion online.


7. For more detail see, Trade Imbalance, Chapter 6, pp. 150–85.

8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.


12. For an interesting, albeit short, summary of 2007 polls on trade, see The Custom House blog,


14. Zoellick argued that the United States should “create a new competition in liberalization, target the needs of developing countries, and create a fresh political dynamic.” On October 9, 2006, E.U. Trade Minister Peter Mandelson noted that the European Union also would pursue bilateralism. Susan Ariel Aaronson, “The Man who could Right the Trade-Development Imbalance,” Policy Innovations, June 14, 2007; and Aaronson, “George W. Bush, Protectionist.”

15. The Global Competitiveness Report 2007–2008, World Economic Forum, October 2007; The U.S. economy grew at an annualized rate of just 0.6 percent from October to December, according to Department of Commerce data. In the previous three months, between July and September, the economy was growing at annualized rate of 4.9 percent. The Commerce Department estimated 2007 growth at 2.2 percent. BBC News, “U.S. Economic Growth Drops Sharply,” January 30, 2008.


18. Edwards made eradicating American poverty (“Two Americas”) the centerpiece of his now-ended campaign.


21. See report from On the Issues online.

22. I take this definition from the U.S. Trade Representative, A Preface to Trade (Washington: GPO, 1982), p. 149.


29. As of February 2008, the Democrats are trying to posit an alternative to the Colombia FTA, an extension of trade preferences, introduced in Congress as H.R. 5264.

30. Hillary Clinton on free trade at On the Issues online.

31. Candidate’s website, and Address to the Economic Club of New York, June 2006.