Plant-Level Responses to Antidumping Duties: Evidence from U.S. Manufacturers

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- For plants that received antidumping protection,
  - the paper finds that while their revenue-based productivity increases, the physical productivity falls.
  - it also shows that the relatively low-productivity firm is able to continue production because of the protection.
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  - these plants adjust by dropping the unprotected product and producing other, potentially higher-productivity products
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It also examines plants’ responses in a number of dimension and decomposes the aggregate effect to between- and within-firm adjustment.
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- Are these firms experiencing an increase in productivity because of the greater incentive to innovate?
- Are they adjusting the weight of protected products in their production?
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• **Exporters v.s. non-exporters:** Is the effect of antidumping protection uniform between exporting and non-exporting plants?
Vertically linked industries: It might be interesting, as a future extension, to examine the effect of antidumping protection on the productivity of upstream and downstream plants.