The Representation of Political and Economic Elites in the Russian Federation Council

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Abstract Today’s Russian Federation Council, the upper chamber of the bicameral parliament, effectively represents the federal government in the regions rather than providing the regions representation in federal policy-making. The system of choosing members has evolved considerably over time, from direct elections in the early to mid-1990s, to appointments today by the regional executive and legislative branches. In practice, the appointment process is neither democratic, nor representative, instead giving strong benefits to the ruling United Russia party, whose members dominate the chamber. Businesspeople make up a third of the members, but Russia’s largest energy and metals companies do not see the rubber stamp body as a way to influence policy-making.1

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According to Article 1 of the December 1993 Constitution the Russian Federation is “a democratic federative rule-of-law state with a republican form of government.” However, there are major concerns over the current regime’s commitment to the principles of federalism. Since the inauguration of Vladimir Putin as Russian President in May 2000, federalism has come under attack and we have witnessed a concerted effort to rein in the power of the regional governors and presidents. Although Russia may have adopted all of the key structural trappings of a federation, neither the federal authorities nor the regions actually operate according to federal principles. Behind the formal veneer of democracy and constitutionalism, federal relations in Russia are dominated by informal, clientelistic, and extra-constitutional practices.

Putin’s first two terms in office (2000-2008) saw the reinstitution of Soviet-style principles of hierarchy and centralized administrative control from Moscow. As a 2008 report of the Russian Federation Council stressed, “federal relations between the Russian Federation and its constituent entities are being replaced by administrative relations between federal and regional bodies of state power... Federal units are turning into administrative-territorial ones, which threatens to reform a federal state into an administrative and unitary one.” Russia’s regions are now fully integrated into Putin’s “power-vertical” and the country is, in reality, a quasi-unitary state dressed in federal clothing.

Defining Federalism

According to Requejo, federations display the following key characteristics: 1) The existence of a two-tier government, both of which have legislative, executive and judicial powers with respect to their own competences, and... fiscal autonomy; 2) mechanisms that channel the participation of the federated units in decision-making processes at the federal level...usually a second chamber whose representatives are elected according to territorial criteria; 3) an institutional arbiter, usually a supreme court or a constitutional court; 4) the agreement on which the federation is based cannot be reformed unilaterally; and 5) the existence of mechanisms that facilitate and promote communication and co-operation. 4

As point 2 notes, one of the key prerequisites for a federation is the creation of a bicameral national parliament with an upper chamber.

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specially designed to accommodate regional interests. In this study we examine the powers and composition of the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council.

**The Russian Federation Council**

All federal systems, as Stepan notes, “constrain elected governments at the center.” However, they vary considerably in the extent to which representation departs from the “one person, one vote” norm in favor of a “territorial concept of representation.” In the Russian Federation all 83 republics and regions have equal representation in the Federation Council, even though there are massive variations in the size of their populations. Thus, for example, Moscow city and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug both have two “senators” even though Moscow’s population is 273 times larger than that of Nenets, according to the 2010 census. This is in sharp contrast to Germany, where the most populous states get six votes in the upper house, those of intermediate size get four, and the least populous get three, whilst in India representation of the federal states varies from 12 to 86.

Stepan also alerts us to the fact that, the greater the competence of the upper chamber, the more the “demos” of the lower house will be constrained. Thus, for example, the “German, Spanish and Indian systems are less demos-constraining, because their upper houses are less unrepresentative and less powerful.”

On paper the Federation Council would appear to be a powerful body. According to Article 102 of the Russian Constitution, the following issues are within the competence of the Chamber:

- Approval of changes to borders between the subjects of the Federation;
- Approval of Presidential Decrees on the introduction of martial law or the state of emergency;
- Taking decisions on whether the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation should be used outside the territory of the Russian Federation;
- Declaring the date of Presidential elections;
- Impeachment of the President of the Russian Federation;
- Appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the Higher Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation;
- Appointment and dismissal of the Procurator-General of the

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7 Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy,” 27.
Russian Federation; and

- Appointment and dismissal of the Deputy-Chairman and half the members of the Accounting Chamber of the Russian Federation.\(^8\)

However, as demonstrated below, in practice, the Federation Council has failed to act as a true representative of the regions in federal policy-making or to provide an effective check on executive power. Under Putin there has been a de-regionalization of the Chamber, which is now dominated by former members of the state bureaucracy, regional executives, and entrepreneurs from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Moreover, the independence of the Council has been seriously compromised by the domination of members of United Russia (the “party of power”) who in October 2011 made up 82 percent (136 of 166) of its members.\(^9\) The share of United Russia members in the Council is even higher than that in the State Duma, making it virtually a one-party Chamber.

Methods of Appointment

According to the Russian Constitution, the Federation Council consists of “two representatives from each component of the Russian Federation; one each from the representative and executive bodies of state power” (Article 95). However, the Constitution did not stipulate the precise method by which members were to be chosen. In 1993, members of the first Council were elected via national elections. New methods of choosing members came into force under Yeltsin in 1996,\(^10\) under Putin in 2002,\(^11\) and under Medvedev in January 2011. Further amendments to Medvedev’s reform were adopted in October 2011 and these also are now in force.\(^12\)

Method of Election/Appointment under Yeltsin

From 1993 to 1996

The members of the first Federation Council were elected directly in December 1993, with each region consisting of a two-mandate electoral district. However, the first convocation lasted for only two years in

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\(^8\) See the website of the Federation Council at: \(<\text{http://council.gov.ru/eng/about/status/index. html}>\) (Accessed 1 October 2009).

\(^9\) See website of United Russia, \(<\text{www.er.ru}>\)


\(^12\) See Federal Law No. 295, 15 November 2010, “O Poryadke Formorovaniya Soveta Federatsiya Federal’novo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” \(\text{Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii}, 2010, \text{No. 47}, \text{article 6029}.\)
accordance with the transitional articles of the Constitution. It is important to note that even this first convocation could not be considered a truly democratic institution. On the contrary, the Council was seen as a forum representing regional ruling elites rather than facilitating free competition among political forces. The widespread practice of regional governors and other high-ranking officials choosing to run for seats illustrated this problem. Moreover, our calculations show that the Federation Council which was elected in 1993 included 40 officials nominated by the President (31 regional governors, four mayors, five presidential representatives to the regions), which comprised almost one quarter of the total number of senators. The competition among parties was low at this time for two reasons. Firstly, the party system in 1993 had only started to form and parties were weak and fragmented. Secondly, the formal principle of regional representation in the Federation Council forbids any structuring of the Chamber on a party basis, and no party factions are permitted.\(^\text{14}\) This restriction explains why a majority of candidates running for seats were governors and members of their clienteles (who were chosen to fill the second post from each region). In some regions there was fierce competition between competing clienteles and opposition forces. However, although the Federation Council at this time appeared to have been democratically elected, in reality it was dependent on presidential power. Under such conditions, the president was able to ensure that his protégé Vladimir Shumeiko, a former Russian deputy prime minister, was elected as speaker.

\textbf{From 1996 until 2002.}

From 1996 until 2002, the heads of the legislative and executive branches of government in each region were granted ex-officio membership in the Council. Thus, during this period, the Council was indirectly elected, and was comprised of governors and the chairmen of regional legislatures. Members of the Council could retain their seats as long as they held their regional posts. Initially, Yeltsin was able to exert a powerful influence over the work of the Federation Council as he had the power to directly appoint the governors. However, in the mid-1990s, the president was forced to relinquish his powers of gubernatorial appointment, allowing the governors to be elected directly by their constituents, which seriously weakened his ability to control the Upper Chamber.

The authority of the Federation Council during this period was weakened by the fact that most of its members were too preoccupied with their

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duties in the regions to attend its sessions and/or carry out their legislative duties on a regular basis. Up until 2002 the Council met for only one or a few days each month, hardly sufficient time to initiate and consider legislation. Thus, the Council adopted many laws passed by the Duma without proper scrutiny. Another sign of the weakness of the Federation Council was its failure to use its right of legislative initiative. Thus, “only about 7 percent of draft laws prepared by the upper chamber and its members in 1994-8 passed all stages of the legislative process and were adopted as federal laws.” Nonetheless, during this period the Council acted as a forum for the airing of regional interests in the center. Popularly-elected governors and speakers of regional assemblies were able to defend the interests of their regions. Thus, for example, the Council successfully thwarted the adoption of a number of key laws which would have tightened up center-periphery relations and reduced the powers of the regions vis-à-vis the center.

Methods of Appointment under Putin

In August 2000 Putin oversaw the adoption of legislation which stripped the governors and chairs of regional assemblies of their ex officio right to sit in the Federation Council. These regional leaders were subsequently replaced (from January 2002) with full time “delegates,” chosen by the regional assemblies and chief executives.

Chairs of the assemblies chose candidates from the regional assemblies who were then confirmed by a secret ballot vote among the deputies. In theory, groups of not less than one third of a chamber’s deputies could propose alternative candidates, but this provision has rarely been put into practice. Before the December 2011 elections, United Russia held a majority of seats in 82 of Russia’s 83 regional assemblies, and a plurality in one (St. Petersburg). After the December 2011 regional elections, the number of regions where United Russia does not hold a majority increased only slightly. The opposition often does not even control a third of the seats, which would enable it to propose an alternative candidate, and to date it has never been able to elect its own senators. Moreover, the process of nominating candidates has been dominated by the speakers of the regional assemblies, all of whom are currently members or supporters of United Russia. As a result, the voting procedures in the legislatures have become

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mere formalities. In such a situation, the most interesting part of the selection process is when the choice of candidates is drawn up, rather than the actual elections.

Candidates from the regional executive branch were to be chosen by the governors subject to a veto by two thirds of the deputies in the assemblies (later even the right to this veto was abolished). However, in practice, regional legislatures have never been able to muster the two thirds votes necessary to block the nomination of the governors’ candidates.

As a result of these reforms, it is not surprising that we now have a much more compliant and passive body that acts more as a champion of the federal center in the regions than a representative of the regions at the center. Thus, for example, whereas during the late-Yeltsin period (1996-9), the Federation Council rejected approximately 23 percent of the legislation that reached it from the State Duma, since Putin came to power in 2000, the Federation Council has turned into a “a kind of legislative conveyor belt.”\(^{18}\) All bills, even those that directly infringe upon regional interests, are quickly considered and approved.\(^{19}\) In the summer of 2002 deputies even supported changes to the law on the police, which rescinded the governor’s powers of appointment of top regional law-enforcement officials. In 2004 the Council ratified Putin’s legislation abolishing the direct election of governors and over the period 2003-6, the Council also ratified a series of laws which substantially weakened the powers of the republics and regions.\(^{20}\)

In July 2007 new legislation placed a ten-year residency obligation on new members of the Council. However, the law, which was highly controversial and full of loopholes, was in force for just a few years before it was rescinded by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2010. Thus, for example, the residency requirement did not apply to acting senators if they ran for a new term in the same region. Another exemption reflected the rising influence of military and security elites under Putin. The new law did not apply to those who had served for more than 10 years in the armed forces, the police (militia), the prosecutors’ office, penitentiary system, and the anti-narcotics agency. Indeed, the exemptions in the law were so numerous that the vast majority of senators were able to win new terms in office. Moreover, under the new rules, high-ranking members of the security bodies (siloviki) could now become senators without any legal barriers (see below).

Changes under Medvedev

In his speech to both chambers of the Federal Assembly in November 2008, President Medvedev outlined further new proposals for the method of forming the upper chamber, which came into force on January 1, 2011.\(^{21}\) The Federation Council, he noted, “should be made up only of people elected to the representative assemblies and deputies from the local self-government bodies of the region in question.”\(^{22}\) Furthermore, Medvedev asserted that “the residence requirement that requires members of the Federation Council to have lived for a particular number of years in the region should be abolished. In this way, people who have gone through a procedure of public election, have experience of working with voters and represent not only the regional authorities but most importantly represent the region’s people will work in the Federation Council.”\(^{23}\)

On the surface Medvedev’s reform appears to be democratic, as only elected deputies are permitted to take up seats in the Council. It also appears more representative, as it calls for the mandatory representation of regional politicians. In the second half of 2011, yet one more category of would-be senators was added to the list: members of the State Duma elected from the regional parts of the party lists in the regions in question. However, in practice, Medvedev’s reforms have been neither more democratic nor more representative. Here we have to take into account the far from democratic method of electing deputies to regional and local assemblies and the domination of United Russia in these councils.\(^{24}\) The same is true for the State Duma elections. The simplest way for a candidate to win a place in the Federation Council is to gain a place on United Russia’s party list. Owing to the fact that all regional elections are held on a party list basis (fully or partly), and the State Duma through 2012 was elected on party lists only, there is no need for a candidate to run in a single-mandate district and/or organize a personal election campaign. In 2011, 40 of the would-be senators were elected regional deputies on United Russia’s party lists (see Table 1). Another simple way into the Council was to be elected as a municipal deputy (14 cases out of 60), usually in a small settlement in the countryside. In addition, three United Russia deputies of the State


\(^{23}\) Ibid.

Duma elected in 2007 moved to the Upper Chamber.

The most important part of the election process takes place in the shadows well before the election itself when candidates compete for their rankings on the party lists. A good example of this was the farcical nature of the election of the current Chair of the Federation Council, Valentina Matvienko, who stood for elections in two St. Petersburg municipal districts and was officially declared to have won 95.61 percent of the votes in the Petrovsky district, and 97.92 percent in the Krasnen’kaya Rechka district. She finally opted to accept a seat in the latter council, but of course, without any intention of ever participating in the work of the local parliament.

The new laws adopted in 2011 returned us to the initial situation when regional ties did not count for much in the formation of the Federation Council. There is no longer an obligation for a candidate to reside or to have been born in the region to serve as its senator. Nor does being a local give one an advantage in the party list votes. Thus, United Russia can easily include an incumbent senator or a candidate for the post of senator in its regional party lists, no matter where they come from. Under Medvedev regional representation was sacrificed in favor of the representation of elites and the support of incumbents who are loyal to the federal Center.

To date, 60 senators have been appointed under the new rules, which came into force in January 2011 (see Appendix 1). The failure of Medvedev’s reform can be seen by the fact that only half of these appointees have ties with their regions, while eight have only partial ties and 22 have no ties at all.

In January 2011, the regions also regained powers to dismiss their senators taking this power from the speaker. Previously, only the Federation Council Speaker could initiate the dismissal of a senator, by filing a complaint to the regional authorities or lawmakers. These developments have undoubtedly weakened the powers of the Chair of the Federation Council to influence the selection and dismissal of members.

The De-Regionalization of the Federation Council

Our study of the career backgrounds of the members of the Federation Council also confirms that there has been what Vladimir Leksin terms a “de-regionalization” of the upper chamber, which is now dominated by elites from Moscow and St. Petersburg (see details below).  

After the new law on the Federation Council was adopted in 2000, it became clear that it was the federal government which had the real power to select new senators. At the same time, political clans and business

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25 See Leksin, Federativnaya Rossiya.
groups were able to forge informal ties with regional authorities in an attempt to promote their candidates. The new reality reflected the centralization of Russian politics in two dimensions. First, in center-regional political relations after Putin’s reforms, when the regions lost much of their independence in decision-making. The second and more constant factor has been the inequality of resources in center-periphery relations, which led to a situation whereby political and economic groups coming from Moscow and St. Petersburg could promote their senators much more easily than their regional counterparts.

Regional elites also changed their ways of thinking when they realized that powerful entrepreneurs from outside their localities could act as effective lobbyists in Moscow. Thus, in many cases, regions “chose” Moscow insiders and/or high-ranking entrepreneurs from the capital as their new senators rather than local notables. As Thomas Remington observed, “in 2003 regions drew heavily on Moscow-based officials for their representatives. Overall, 45 percent of the 165 members where prior residence could be determined were Moscow-based.” In addition, by 2006 elites from the two “capital cities,” Moscow and St. Petersburg, dominated the leadership of the Federation Council.

As a result, the share of senators who had never lived or worked in the regions they represented skyrocketed and in the period 2006-08 exceeded half of the members of the upper chamber (see Figure 1). This figure peaked in 2007 (at the time of new Duma elections and towards the end of Putin’s second term) and started to decrease, but did not fall sharply after the introduction of the new residence requirements which, as we noted above were largely ineffective. Under Medvedev the share of “authentic” regional representatives increased slightly but this was more to do with the delayed impact of Putin’s reforms than the new electoral requirements introduced by Medvedev in 2011.

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26 See, Turovsky, “The Mechanism of Representation.”
27 Remington, “Majorities without Mandates.” 675.
29 For this research project we compiled our own database which includes information on all members of the Federation Council who held posts in the Chamber over the period August 5, 2000 - December 31, 2011. Given the lack of comprehensive information in official sources (such as the Federation Council’s website, www.council.gov.ru) we consulted a wide range of additional sources, including the biographical handbooks, Sovet Federatsii Federal’noe Sobranie Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1994-2004: Entsiklopedicheskii Spravochnik edited by P.F. Tkachenko (Moscow, Izdatelskii tsentr Prizident, 2005), and internet sources (primarily Panorama’s Labyrinth database, www.labyrinth.ru), all of the senators personal websites, and finally all 83 official websites of Russia’s regional administrations. In the database we paid particular attention to the collection of comprehensive data on the senators’ territorial origins (especially place of birth and places of residence before entering the Federation Council), ethnicity, gender, party affiliation, business affiliation, and former posts in state and municipal administrations and assemblies.
In our study, we divided senators into three groups regarding their regional affiliation, “outsiders”, “locals” and, “intermediates.” We took into consideration their biographical ties with the region (place of birth, places of education and work, and other cases of permanent residence). According to our study, as of January 2012, almost 43 percent of the senators still had no ties with the regions where they were nominated. About 46 percent were rooted in the regional elite and worked and lived in the region at the time of their nomination. ³⁰ The intermediate category refers to those individuals who either left the region some time before their nomination (in some cases, a considerable time ago), or those who came to the region only a short time (1-2 years) before their nomination and therefore cannot be considered as true locals.

Moreover, we should also note that a similar division applies to the six members of the top leadership of the Federation Council, of which three have close connections to the regions, which they represent. Mironov, the Chair of the Federation Council (until his ouster in May 2011), made his career in St. Petersburg. The same applies to his successor Matvienko, a former St. Petersburg governor. Deputy Chair Vyacheslav Shtyrov had a long association with the Republic of Sakha where he rose to the post of

³⁰ In this category we included formal Muscovites who were regional officials working in Moscow as regional representatives and State Duma deputies rooted in the regions at the time of their election.
president of the republic and Deputy Chair Ilyas Umakhanov had close ties with the Republic of Dagestan, where he became deputy chair of the Government. The other three, First Deputy Chair Alexander Torshin, and the deputy chairs of the Council, Yury Vorob’ev and Svetlana Orlova, are “outsiders” from the regions where they were nominated.

In his 2003 study of the Federation Council, Remington found “evidence that regions sought some balance in their delegations in types of career experience, and that the presidential administration sought to balance representation regionally, by career sector, by business sector and perhaps even by patronage networks.”31 This is an excellent point, as it reflects a key aim of Kremlin policy. However, we cannot be sure that the selection of senators was so sophisticatedly and successfully managed by the Presidential Administration. In some regions the choice of senator was decided only after a protracted struggle between powerful competing elites, whilst in other cases regional authorities have been more or less left free to choose their senators.

Our study also shows that there has been a change in the balance between “locals” and “outsiders.” The prevalence of “outsiders” was more typical for the period 2006-08, after which the “locals” fought back in the wake of the introduction of residence requirements, and the influx into the Council of regional retirees under Medvedev, who removed many governors. In 2011, with the introduction of new electoral criteria, there has been a new, but small, rise in the overall share of locals in the Council (see Figure 1).

It is also important to mention the differences between “privileged” regions, which have been granted informal rights to choose senators for themselves, and “unprivileged” regions. In most cases the “privileged” regions are those with the most powerful elites and the largest economic resources. Senators representing these regions come from local elites and are chosen by the regional authorities themselves with little or no interference from the federal center (e.g., Moscow City and the Republic of Tatarstan). “Locals” also represent the City of St. Petersburg. In addition, the federal center gives such “privileges” to the republics of the North Caucasus, where it has proved very difficult to nominate outsiders of Russian nationality. The converse situation is found in the most economically impoverished and dependent regions of Central Russia. This is true for Lipetsk, Ryazan’, and Tambov regions in central Russia, and for the regions of Novgorod, Penza, and Magadan. But, under the current, highly centralized, system of inter-governmental relations, almost no region has been left completely free of interference from above. In some ethnic regions such as Altai, Mary-El, Khakasiya, and the Nenets Autonomous

31 Remington, “Majorities without Mandates”: 674
Okrug, “outsiders” are the norm. Even in Ingushetia an outsider was introduced in 2011. Outsiders can also be found in rather wealthy regions, such as Vologda and Rostov Oblast’.

Before residence requirements took force, there was even a phenomenon that we term “travelling” senators. In our study, we counted at least 16 cases where senators changed their region in order to hold on to their posts in the Federation Council. Often, such cases arose as a result of a change of power in the region (if the patron of the previous senator left) or because of a deterioration of the relations between the regional elites and the senators. For example, Rafrat Altybaev used to be one of the leading politicians in his native Tatarstan and was even considered a potential candidate for the post of president of the republic. In 2001, President Mintimer Shaimiev sent him to the Federation Council, but later Altybaev was forced to find another region and he became the senator representing Ryazan region in central Russia. He is one of those senators who lost his original regional power base, but was still able to become one of the most influential members of the Council under Mironov. The list of “travelling” senators also includes Lyudmila Narusova, the widow of the former Mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak. She worked as a senator representing Tuva’s Parliament, which was openly unhappy with her (in)activities. As a result, she moved to her native Bryansk region where she was able to meet its residence requirements. In some cases, senators were able to stay in the same region if they changed the regional branch of power (executive or legislative) which they represented. We counted nine such cases.\textsuperscript{32}

Bicameralism and Ethnic Representation

From a positive perspective, federalism is a source of empowerment for regional groups as it protects minorities from the tyranny of the majority. Furthermore, as Daniel Kempton notes, “By providing a democratic alternative to nation-statehood, federalism provides a viable alternative to regional secession and the potential disintegration of multinational states.”\textsuperscript{33} Scholars of federalism have also pointed its success in such diverse countries as Canada, Belgium, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Spain and South Africa.

In Russia, the Federation Council plays an important role in providing representation to the titular nationalities in the ethnically-defined regions. In such cases, regional elites decide informally how to divide

\textsuperscript{32} Such examples show that tactical moves have often dominated the decision-making process in the nomination of senators, rather than the strategic choice of a particular power body in favor of a particular person. Usually there was an obligation (perhaps a federal decision) to nominate a different person from one of the regional branches of power, and the acting senator was “saved” by being nominated from the other branch, either the executive or legislative.

their two Senate seats between their ethnic groups. In the two Russian 
republics which have two titular ethnic groups, the selection process is 
easier to manage than in those regions where there are larger numbers 
of ethnic minorities. Thus, for example, in Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, one 
senator usually represents the Karachai people who account for more than 
40 percent of the republic’s population, and the other usually comes from 
the Circassian minority. At the individual level, however, changes are 
possible, and there is often a struggle within each ethnic group over who 
should gain the senator’s seat. In most cases entrepreneurs have been key 
players in this struggle. For example, the Circassian family of Derevs, 
owners of one of the biggest regional companies “Merkuriy,” formerly 
were represented by (the late) Stanislav Derev. His brother Vyacheslav 
competed for the senator’s seat in 2010, but was unsuccessful. However, 
he succeeded in 2011, when the republican president was replaced. The 
Karachai were long represented by the influential businessman Ratmir 
Aybazov, who lost his seat in 2011 and was replaced by another Karachai, 
Murat Suyunchev.

Neighbouring Kabardino-Balkariya is another good example of a 
region where the seats in the Senate have been shared between the two 
titular nationalities. This republic is more politically stable, and the process 
of choosing senators has been less competitive than in Karachaevo-
Cherkessiya. The executive power of the republic has always been 
represented in the Federation Council by the Balkarians (the ethnic balance 
was enforced by the fact that the ethnic Kabardinian president nominated 
the ethnic Balkarian senator), while the Kabardinians have represented the 
legislative branch. However, it should also be noted that the second-largest 
etnic group in Karachaevo-Cherkessiya and Kabardino-Balkariya, the 
Russians, has never been represented in the Federation Council.

In republics with large Russian populations, it would be logical to 
suppose that the two seats in the Federation Council would naturally be 
split between the titular ethnic group and the Russians. But such a situation 
is typically found only in Tatarstan, where the ethnic Russian senators have 
usually been representatives of the legislative branch. However, at the end 
of 2011 this tradition was brought to an end when ethnic Tatars received 
both of the regional slots.

There are also a number of republics where the regional authorities 
do not appear to have sought to balance the ethnic representation in the 
upper chamber. In some cases titular groups are not represented at all and/or 
all the senators come from Moscow (e.g., the Republic of Mary-El). 
Alternatively, both senators may come from the titular ethnic group (e.g., 
Chechen Republic, North Ossetiya).

The function of ethnic representation is extremely important, but also difficult to implement in multi-ethnic Dagestan, where there are over 30 ethnic groups. Nevertheless, one of the seats has traditionally been occupied by a Dargin (the second-largest ethnic group), and in this case by the same person (Ilyas Umakhanov since 2001, representing the republic’s executive branch and holding the post of deputy speaker). The second seat has usually been held by the Kumiys (the third-largest group). However, in 2008 the second seat went to the Lezgin, Suleyman Kerimov who is one of the most prominent businessmen in Russia (the Lezghins are the fourth-largest group).

The balance of seats in the Federation Council should be seen as part of a much wider distribution of posts in these republics. For example, the largest ethnic group in Dagestan, the Avars, has not been granted representation in the Federation Council since Putin’s reforms. However, they have held top posts in the republic. Thus, for example, the ethnic Avar, Mukhu Aliyev, was a speaker of the republican parliament, then the president of the republic, and after the end of his term, another ethnic Avar, Magomed Abdulaev, became prime-minister. At the same time, the Dargins have held presidential office twice (before and after Aliyev). The prime ministers traditionally came from the Kumiys, but recently a representative of this ethnic group gained the position of speaker, instead. In other words, the Dargins have enjoyed the best of both worlds, being represented in both the highest positions in the republic and in the Federation Council. The nomination of Kerimov was at his own initiative, but it was also a kind of Lezgin “revenge,” since this ethnic group has been consistently under-represented in the republic.

However, the function of more or less (un)even ethnic representation in the Federation Council is significant for just a handful of republics. These are the three multiethnic Caucasian republics and Tatarstan, where the authorities take the issue of ethnopolitics seriously. It should be noted that most senators are unknown to the public and their ethnic affiliation is not seen as an important factor in their appointments. The republican authorities, in their turn, are often more interested in cultivating relations with prominent Muscovites than in promoting their kith and kin. For some Caucasian republics, this means that the senators are recruited not from the republic itself, but from the Moscow ethnic Diaspora (this is the case in the Chechen Republic, Ingushetiya, and Dagestan). As noted above, many republics have preferred federal politicians and businesspersons as their senators. For example, the republic of Tuva was represented for many years by the business tycoon Sergei Pugachev, and Narusova.
Gender

The representation of women in the upper chamber has traditionally been tiny and currently there are just 10 female senators who make up just 6 percent of the Council’s members. Nevertheless, the distribution of leadership positions follows the Soviet tradition of giving some representation to women. One of the five deputy chairs of the Council is a female (Orlova) and the current chair of the Council is a female (Matviyenko).

Representatives of Former Members of the State Bureaucracy

One of the supposed advantages of the new system of appointing the Federation Council, which came into operation in 2002, was that it removed members of the executive branch from the Chamber. Making the governors ex-officio members from 1996 until 2002 violated the principle of the separation of powers. However, a study of the current membership shows that there are a large number of Council members who made their careers in the executive branch. Our study shows that approximately half of the senators worked in the state or municipal service at the time of their nominations (including military service). Former state bureaucrats hold the largest number of seats, followed by entrepreneurs. Even such a high ranking member of the Soviet nomenklatura as former Chair of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov is still a senator (from Belgorod region).

The Federation Council also serves an important function as a place of “soft” retirement or “temporary placement” for members of the power ministries and military elite. Currently there are ten members of the Council who made their careers in these bodies, including: the former powerful minister of internal affairs Vladimir Rushailo, two first deputy ministers of internal affairs, Vladimir Fedorov and Alexander Chekalin, Deputy General Prosecutor Yury Biryukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Nikolay Frolov, and First Deputy Minister of Justice Alexander Savenkov. In actual fact, the number of former military officers in the Federation Council is much larger, as many former government officers from both the federal and regional levels previously served in the military. Figure 2 shows an influx of members from the power ministries (siloviki) into the Federation Council. They did not have to meet the residence requirements, which is why the growth of their number has been almost uninterrupted, and the Federation Council has become a place for many retirees from the top brass.
The representation of governors and deputy governors

Under Medvedev, the accommodation of members of the older generation and politicians who were out of favor in the Upper Chamber became more pronounced (see Figure 3). This can be seen most clearly with regard to governors. Frequently, a new governor will nominate his predecessor to be his representative in the Federation Council. This practice has become common as it helps to smooth the painful process of changing power in the region. Currently there are 17 former governors in the Federation Council (their highest number was 18 in 2011).

Former governors are often considered high-ranking politicians, and once in office they are usually able to prolong their terms two or three times. For example, Valery Sudarenkov has held a post in the Federation Council since he resigned from the governorship of Kaluga Oblast’ in 2000. Newcomers to the Council, who have been appointed since Medvedev became president in 2008, include several experienced former governors, such as Eduard Rossel’ from Sverdlovsk Oblast’, Yury Neelov from the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Vladimir Fedorov from Chuvashiya, and Konstantin Titov from Samara Oblast’.
In addition, the Federation Council is packed with a large number of former deputy governors. Usually, they are posted to the Council in “honorable retirement” and sometimes they continue to play an important role as regional lobbyists. The most interesting example here is that of Yury Luzhkov, the former Mayor of Moscow City, who posted prominent members of his “old guard,” Boris Nikol’sky and Oleg Tolkachev, to the Federation Council. In 2010, his successor Sergey Sobyanin nominated one of the key figures from Luzhkov’s former administration, Yury Roslyak, as the new representative of Moscow City’s executive branch. It should be noted that Roslyak was considered at this time to be the likely successor to Luzhkov, and therefore not surprisingly, Sobyanin decided to remove this potential rival from his administration. Thus, “out” in Russian politics often means a move to a seat in the Federation Council.

In neighboring Moscow Oblast’ a similar political reshuffle took place in 2009, which led to the resignation of Oleg Panteleev, the second-ranking person in the regional government, who became the senator from the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (as a former military officer he could be appointed to any region). In addition, we should note some examples
from the republics of the North Caucasus, where it has been common practice to send retiring prime ministers to the Federation Council (e.g., Zaynalov followed by Aliyev in Dagestan, Khusein Chechenov in Kabardino-Balkariya).

As a result of these and similar developments the share of “pensioners” in the Federation Council increased (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Average Age of Federation Council Members

Source: Calculated by the authors from the biographies of members of the Federation Council.

However, a post in the upper chamber can sometimes be a stepping-stone to the office of governor (and also to mayor’s and assembly speakers’ offices, see below), though such cases are rare and relevant primarily for influential senators of St. Petersburg origin. In 2010, the Karelian Senator Andrey Nelidov (a businessman and politician from St. Petersburg) replaced Sergey Katanandov as regional governor. The same happened in Irkutsk region in 2009. Here the experienced and influential senator Dmitry Mezentsev was chosen by Medvedev to become the new governor. Mezentsev was formerly a prominent figure in St. Petersburg, where he worked together with Putin in the government of Anatoly Sobchak. In the Federation Council, he was a deputy speaker. A similar example can also be found in Pskov region where Andrey Turchak, another previous member of the St. Petersburg elite, became a senator in 2007 and a governor in
2009. Here we can detect an interesting pattern: an “outsider,” representing the St. Petersburg elite, becomes a senator in a different region and subsequently is promoted to the office of regional governor. Other notable examples of members of the Federation Council who went on to become governors are to be found in Amur, Kostroma and Smolensk regions.

The Representation of Mayors and Regional Assembly Speakers

In addition, the Federation Council can employ the former mayors of large cities. For example, the previously mentioned Mezentsev nominated Irkutsk Mayor Vladimir Yakubovsky to be his successor in the Federation Council, while he tried (unsuccessfully) to replace him with another more loyal mayor. Another interesting example is that of Yekaterinburg, where in 2010 Mayor Arkady Chernetsky was moved to a post in the Federation Council in order to allow the new Governor Alexander Misharin to consolidate his political control over the city. Ironically this led to a situation whereby two bitter rivals, Rossel’, the former governor of the region, and Chernetsky, the former mayor, both ended up in the Federation Council (representing the executive and legislative branches of the region, respectively). The Federation Council also played an important role in the transfer of power in Perm’ in 2010-11. Here, Governor Oleg Chirkunov transferred Perm Mayor Igor’ Shubin to the Federation Council in order to enforce his political control over city on the eve of the next electoral cycle. On the other hand, there is only one example in which a senator has moved to the post of mayor – Igor’ Pushkarev from Vladivostok.

The number of former speakers has fallen sharply compared to the early 2000s. Over the period 2000-2001, a rather large group of speakers decided to remain in the Federation Council and not to return to their regions. This fact points to the low informal status of regional speakers (governors at the time of the 2000-2001 reform decided to stay governors). However, usually their posts in the Federation Council were short-lived and lasted for just one term. The only example of a former speaker who performed well in the Federation Council is Viktor Ozerov from Khabarovsk Kray. He became senator in 1996, when he was elected speaker of the regional legislature. He heads the Committee on Defense and Security. Currently, there are only four other former regional speakers in the Federation Council.

Representatives from the Business Elite

Acting as a forum for elite recruitment from among the business elite has become one of the most important functions of the Federation Council. As of Fall 2011, about one third of the senators were private entrepreneurs or former managers in private or state companies (see Figure 4). Biographical
analysis shows many cases of individuals transferring from business to political posts and back. In our study, we count as members of the business elite those who led their own private businesses before becoming senators or held significant positions in state or private enterprises. However, most members of the Russian political elite have business connections.

The largest group of entrepreneurs comes from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Thus, for example, by 2011 the Federation Council had become the main place of work for such rich and famous entrepreneurs as Suleyman Kerimov (Nafta Moscow), Akhmed Bilalov (state enterprise Resorts of the North Caucasus and a private business building Olympic sites), Aleksey Ananyev (Promsvyaz’bank, media resources), Andrey Molchanov (LSR, a leading construction and development group in St. Petersburg), Andrey Gur’yev (Fosagro, largest producer of fertilizers), Vadim Moshkovich (Rusagro, agriculture, sugar production, and construction business), Vitaly Malkin (Impexbank, previously Rossiisky Credit Bank), Sergey Bazhanov (International Bank of St Petersburg), Leonid Lebedev (Syntez group), Pavel Maslovsky (Petropavlovsk group). Many of these senators hold high rankings in the *Forbes* list of billionaires. In the 2011 Forbes Rating, five current and two former senators hit the top 100 (Kerimov was 19th, Molchanov 34th, Guryev 41st, Ananyev 49th, and Moshkovich 61st; former senators Fetisov and Komarov were 63rd and 97th respectively). It is typical that only one State Duma deputy (from the 2007-2011 convocation) made it into the top 100.\(^{35}\)

**Figure 5. Number of Federation Council Members Closely Affiliated with Business (Entrepreneurs, Top Managers)**

![Graph showing the number of Federation Council members closely affiliated with business from 2002 to 2011.]

Source: Calculated by the authors from the biographies of members of the Federation Council.

In addition, we should also note Akhmet Palankoev (Acropolis group), Sergey Lisovsky (agriculture), Valentin Zavadnikov (alcohol

production, agriculture), Raif Safin (formerly LUKOIL shareholder and top manager), Nikolay Ol’shansky (fertilizers), Oleg Yeremeev (insurance), Vitaly Bogdanov (media), Oleg Tkach (publishing), Boris Shpigel’, Anatoly Bondaruk, and Alexander Ter-Avanesov — all of these businessmen are based in Moscow. Among the leading businessmen coming from regions outside the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, the most famous is Derev — Karachaevo-Cherkesiya (mineral water and other sectors).

A key reason why entrepreneurs seek membership in the upper chamber is to gain access to the top decision-making bodies in the federal executive. Sometimes senators also seek to increase their business ties with the regional authorities whom they represent. Or if they have political interests, senators may use their position in the Federation Council to create their own local support groups in the regions in order to gain influence over the regional political agenda (Kerimov in Dagestan is a good example as he promotes his clients to different political posts in his native republic) or even to make a bid for the post of regional governor.

Entrepreneurs are “ideal” senators for the current Federation Council as they have ample resources to promote themselves, and they are often viewed by local elites as effective lobbyists. Legally senators are not allowed to engage in entrepreneurial and other paid activities, or to be a member of the board of directors of commercial enterprises. In reality, however, senators find ways to avoid these legal limitations, and most of them do not even hide their business activities. However, the share of businessmen among senators began to fall after hitting its peak in the period 2004-08. Compared to previous years, the current Federation Council can be seen as being much more of a club for regional and military retirees than for representatives of the business elite (see Figures 2 and 3).

Analyzing the limitations to the scope of business interests in the Federation Council, it is important to mention that no business group in Russia can create even the smallest “faction” in the upper chamber. Technically, it is impossible for any single business group to win enough seats in the Council to create a powerful lobby. Besides, entrepreneurs in the Federation Council have to be politically loyal to the Kremlin, otherwise they risk being dismissed. Some attempts were made to create such business factions in the early 2000s, when business elites were more independent from the state. At that time, the giant oil company Yukos was the most active in this field. One of its leading figures, Leonid Nevzlin, became a senator from Mordoviya (representing the executive branch) in 2001.36 In 2003, Nevzlin resigned from the Federation Council, giving his place to another Yukos top manager Anatoly Bychkov, who hung on until 2004. However, during Putin’s second term (2004-08), the largest

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36 Yukos registered some of its enterprises in the small republic of Mordoviya to obtain tax privileges.
business groups turned away from the Federation Council, regarding its status as too low. In the wake of the YUKOS affair, they were reluctant to play an active political role, following the authorities’ clear signal to focus on business issues instead.

Among the oligarchic groups that rose up under Yeltsin and were represented in the Federation Council were representatives of Oleg Deripaska. His close partner Arkady Sarkisyan, who was a representative from the Khakassian Parliament from 2001 until 2006, was the head of one of the principal aluminum factories situated in Khakassia. The governor of Samara Oblast’ also chose another prominent employee in Deripaska’s business, German Tkachenko, as his senator in 2001. The Sibneft’ group of Roman Abramovich was represented by Valery Oyf, the senator from Omsk, where the company was registered. Later, when Abramovich became the governor of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, he appointed one of his associates, Yefim Malkin to the Federation Council.

Our research suggests that the representation of business in the Federation Council is primarily driven by the personal decisions of individual entrepreneurs rather than organized as some form of corporate representation. This conclusion is proven by the extremely low representation of the largest business groups and state corporations. Executives from leading companies in the oil, gas, coal, ferrous or non-ferrous metals sectors are not currently represented in the Federation Council. With power concentrated in the executive branch, it makes little sense for such large concerns to seek representation in what has become a rather weak, rubber stamp chamber. Moreover, one, two, or three senators coming from even the most powerful business groups are unlikely to be able to exert much influence over the policy-making process. Thus, by 2011, there were just a handful of representatives of the largest business groups; Nikolay Kosarev (a former member of the Interros group, who represents Tambov Oblast’) and Vladimir Dzhabarov, a top manager in the renowned investment company Troika Dialog (representing the Jewish Autonomous Oblast’).

Large state enterprises are also unwilling to promote their leaders to the Federation Council. One of the rare exceptions to this rule has been the diamond producer ALROSA, where Alexander Matveev, the senator from Yakutia, has been a representative since 2003. The representation of ALROSA is logical as the company is based in Yakutia and its members are deeply integrated into the regional elite and play an active role in the affairs of the region.

**Conclusion**

As Watts notes, “In those federations where the members of the federal second chamber are directly elected, generally they are representative
of the interests of the regional electorates [but]... where senators are appointed by the federal government, as in Canada and Malaysia, or where the Center has a major influence over their appointment, they have had the least credibility as spokespersons for regional interests, even when they are residents of the regions they represent.”37 As we have demonstrated, the methods of appointing members of the Federation Council under Putin and Medvedev have largely failed to provide meaningful representation of the regions in the Federation Council.

Since Putin came to power in 2000, we have witnessed the de-regionalization of the Upper Chamber. The large number of outsiders and “travelling senators” who currently hold seats in the Federation Council and who sit alongside large contingents of former members of the federal bureaucracy and entrepreneurs from Moscow and St. Petersburg has seriously undermined one of King’s key prerequisites for a federation, namely “the legislative entrenchment” of the regions in central decision-making.38 The Council has largely been reduced to a forum, which provides symbolic representations of different elites, including ethnic groups, and a honorable retirement for former notables of the political establishment.

Figure 6. Share of Incumbents Appointed for New Terms

![Graph showing the share of incumbents appointed for new terms from 2002 to 2011.]

Source: web-site of the Federation Council www.council.gov.ru

There has been a sharp drop in the number of legislative initiatives


from the upper chamber which have been successfully adopted as laws and the number of bills vetoed by the Federation Council has been steadily falling as well. Whereas the upper chamber vetoed 89 bills in 1997, this number has fallen to between 3 and 6 bills per year since 2003. No draft federal laws were vetoed by the Council in the Spring Session of 2011.39

Toward the end of Medvedev’s terms, there were major changes in the composition of the Federation Council. Over the period 2010-11 more than a half of the senators were replaced. Figure 6 shows that the power of incumbency started falling in 2011 and the rapid turnover of members has led to the replacement of the Council’s speaker and other leadership posts. But this sharp rise in the turnover of Council members did not appear to increase the status and powers of the Chamber. It is important to note that Putin created new competing bodies, such as the State Council and the Council of Legislators, which have usurped many of the functions of the Federation Council. Moreover, while party factions are not permitted in the upper chamber, it is nonetheless dominated by members of United Russia. Such developments have turned the Council into a passive body which is rapidly becoming a representative of the federal center in the regions — rather than a champion of the regions in the center.

Appendix 1: Members of the Federation Council Appointed under Medvedev’s New Rules in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date and Length of Appointment</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Branch of Power</th>
<th>Incumbent Senator</th>
<th>Elected Post</th>
<th>Regional Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aksakov, V.Ye.</td>
<td>29.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Moscow Oblast’</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional assembly (former speaker) (United Russia party list)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belousov, S.V.</td>
<td>20.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Altayskiy Kray</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bilalov, A.G.</td>
<td>10 October 2011 - April 2012</td>
<td>Krasnodar Kray</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional assembly (deputy-speaker) (United Russia party list)</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bordaark, A.M.</td>
<td>15.03.11-July 2015</td>
<td>Bashkortostan</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional parliament (United Russia party list)</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borisov, A.A.</td>
<td>15.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Pskov Oblast’</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Chernetsky, A.M.</td>
<td>27.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Sverdlovsk Oblast’</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Chilingarov, A.N.</td>
<td>14.11.2011 – August 2016</td>
<td>Tula Oblast’</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>municipal council (Solopenskoye rural settlement, three-mandate district, United Russia)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chub, V.F.</td>
<td>24.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Murmanak Oblast’</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>municipal council (Varzuga rural settlement, three-mandate district, United Russia)</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Derev V.E.</td>
<td>7.04.2011 – March 2016</td>
<td>Republic of Karachai-Cherkessiya</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional assembly (single-mandate district, United Russia)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Dzhabarov, V.M.</td>
<td>15.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Jewish autonomous oblast’</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
<td>None</td>
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<td>Fetisov, V.A.</td>
<td>16.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Primorsky Kray</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
<td>None</td>
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<td>Gorbunov, G.A.</td>
<td>15.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Astrakhan’ Oblast’</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>municipal council (Limansky rayon, two-mandate district, United Russia)</td>
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<td>Ivanov, N.B.</td>
<td>21.12.2011 – October 2013</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Ingushetiya</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>(O’gett rural settlement, United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Kavdzharadze, M.G.</td>
<td>13.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Lipestk Oblast’</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakovtsev, O.A.</td>
<td>28.04.11-March 2016</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Kirov Oblast’</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Kerimov, S.A.</td>
<td>31.03.2011-March 2016</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Republic of Dagestan</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Regional parliament (United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Kosarev, N.V.</td>
<td>30.03.11-March 2016</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Tambov Oblast’</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Krivitsky, D.B.</td>
<td>26.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Novgorod Oblast’</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Lebedev, L.L.</td>
<td>22.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chavashiya</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Municipal council (Shumerlya rural settlement, single-mandate district, United Russia)</td>
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<td>Lisitsyn, A.I.</td>
<td>22.11.2011 – March 2013</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yaroslavl’ Oblast’</td>
<td>State Duma</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Lityushkin, V.V.</td>
<td>15.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mordovia</td>
<td>Regional parliament (United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Mayorov A.P.</td>
<td>5.07.2011 – March 2013</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Kalmykiya</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Municipal council (Tsagan Us rural settlement, three-mandate district, United Russia)</td>
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<td>Makin, G.I.</td>
<td>2.11.2011 – March 2014</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Voronezh Oblast’</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Malkin, E.N.</td>
<td>29.03.11-March 2016</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chukotka Autonomous Okrug</td>
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<td>Regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Mamedov, S.V.</td>
<td>23.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Samara Oblast’</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Municipal council (Dva Klyuchi rural settlement, single-mandate district, independent)</td>
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<td>Maslovsky, P.A.</td>
<td>19.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Amur Oblast’</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Matviienko V.I.</td>
<td>31.08.11-August 2016</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Saint Petersburg</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Municipal council (Kraten’skaya Rechka, three-mandate district, United Russia)</td>
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<td>Mingazov, V.V.</td>
<td>01.12.2011 – March 2014</td>
<td>Tatarstan</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional parliament (single-mandate district, United Russia)</td>
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<td>Molchanov, A.Yu.</td>
<td>15.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Leningrad Oblast¹</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Munzuk, G.M</td>
<td>2.04.11-April 2012</td>
<td>Republic of Tuva</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional parliament (United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Novikov, V.A.</td>
<td>28.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk Kray</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Of'shanskii, N.M.</td>
<td>20.01.11-March 2015</td>
<td>Voronezh Oblast¹</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>municipal council (Rossosh' rayon, United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Palankoev, A.M.</td>
<td>23.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Ingushetia</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional parliament (United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Petrov, A.Y.</td>
<td>28.04.11-March 2014</td>
<td>Bryansk Oblast¹</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>municipal council (Klimovo settlement, United Russia party list)</td>
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<td>Petrov, V.A.</td>
<td>15.04.11-March 2016</td>
<td>Tver’ Oblast’</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
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<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pimanov, A.V.</td>
<td>17.01.11-October 2014</td>
<td>Republic of Tuva</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional parliament (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pichugov, V.A.</td>
<td>6.04.11-March 2016</td>
<td>Khanty-Mansi AO</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ponomarev, V.A.</td>
<td>28.04.11-19.12.2011 – December 2016 (appointed for second term)</td>
<td>Kamchatka Kray</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ponomarev, M.N.</td>
<td>15.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Tyumen’ Oblast’</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pozhitkov, N.F.</td>
<td>11.05.11-March 2016</td>
<td>Orenburg Oblast¹</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryazanskii V.V.</td>
<td>23.06.11- March 2016</td>
<td>Kursk Oblast’</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Savinov, G.A.</td>
<td>14.04.11-April 2016</td>
<td>Ulyanovsk Oblast¹</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>municipal council (Ulyanovsk rayon, two-mandate district, United Russia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Oblast - Oblast
² Kray - Kray
³ AO - Autonomous Okrug
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Parliament Type</th>
<th>Current Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samogov, N.A.</td>
<td>24.08.11- March 2016</td>
<td>Adygeya</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional parliament (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selyubgin, S.Ye.</td>
<td>16.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Oryol Oblast'</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shumeiko, E.A.</td>
<td>21.04.11-March 2015 (replaced then)</td>
<td>Republic of Komi</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional parliament (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smyagin, A.M.</td>
<td>28.12.2011 – March 2013</td>
<td>Vladimir Oblast'</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional assembly (deputy speaker) (CPRF party list)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skomorokhin, K.B.</td>
<td>13.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Stavropol' Kray</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional parliament (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sokin, A.A.</td>
<td>17.03.11-March 2012</td>
<td>Omsk Oblast'</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>municipal council (United Russia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suyunchev, M.Kh.</td>
<td>7.04.11-March 2014</td>
<td>Republic of Karachai-Cherkessia</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional parliament (United Russia party list)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyul’panov, V.A.</td>
<td>14.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional assembly (former speaker) (United Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udalov, Yu.N.</td>
<td>6.06.2011 - December 2012</td>
<td>Yelets Oblast'</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>municipal council (Dmitrievskoye rural settlement, four-mandate district, United Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vainberg, A.V.</td>
<td>23.06.2011- March 2016</td>
<td>Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vasil’ev, V. N.</td>
<td>29.03.11- December 2015</td>
<td>Ivanovo Oblast'</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional assembly (deputy speaker) (United Russia party list)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlasenko N.V.</td>
<td>09.06.11- March 2016</td>
<td>Kaliningrad Oblast'</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vorosheev, Yu.L.</td>
<td>14.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Vologda Oblast'</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yeremeev, O.V.</td>
<td>26.01.2011-March 2015</td>
<td>Ryazan Oblast'</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhidikikh, V.A.</td>
<td>20.12.2011 – December 2016</td>
<td>Tomsk Oblast'</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>regional assembly (United Russia party list)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhuravlev, N.A.</td>
<td>18.05.2011 - October 2015</td>
<td>Kostroma Oblast’</td>
<td>Executive No</td>
<td>regional assembly (first deputy speaker) (United Russia party list)</td>
<td>Partial</td>
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