Viktor Yanukovych’s First 100 Days
Back to the Past, But What’s the Rush?

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Abstract: This article explores the first 100 days in the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, the defeated candidate from Ukraine’s 2004 elections, who made a surprising comeback and was elected in February 2010. The article analyzes the possible sources of his switch to a radical pro-Russian agenda and the content of the domestic and foreign policies that he has begun to pursue. The article surveys the root causes and origins of the factors behind the speed and nature of the policies that stunned many inside Ukraine and abroad.

Keywords: Black Sea Fleet, Orange Revolution, Ukrainian democracy, Viktor Yanukovych

Attempting to see into Viktor Yanukovych’s mindset is not easy, although there are many clues from his social, economic, regional and political background. These factors have been ignored by the majority of Western analysts and journalists writing about Ukraine.

No Reformer

Yanukovych’s presidency will not bring reform to Ukraine for two reasons.

Government. The make-up of the Yanukovych administration and government is not, as was promised up to and during the 2010 election campaign, composed of technocrats and reformers, but of former President Leonid Kuchma’s officials with disreputable pasts; some have expressed Sovietophile leanings, and half of the cabinet is drawn from only one region, Donetsk. Four cabinet members, including the prime minister and one deputy

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prime minister, are of retirement age, while another 15 ministers are in their late 50s. The formative years of 62-year-old Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov—and the majority of the cabinet ministers—occurred during the Leonid Brezhnev “era of stagnation” in the 1970s.

Additionally, this is the first of seventeen governments over two decades of Ukrainian independence with not a single female cabinet minister. Indeed, both Yanukovych and Azarov have expressed disdain for women, and Yanukovych made an excuse to not attend a televised election debate with Yulia Tymoshenko because she, like all women, he believed, should “be in the kitchen” and not in politics.1

Following Viktor Yushchenko’s election, a generational shift moved Ukraine’s ruling elites to the middle generation who are less tainted by Soviet rule and the Brezhnev era, having built their careers during the 1980s and 1990s. The Yanukovych era is developing similarities to the Kuchma era, wherein it was ruled by an older, far more neo-Soviet generation who had emerged during the 1970s. With that generational shift comes an ideological shift to the fetishisation of an authoritarian “vertical of power,” “stability” and nostalgia for Russia and the Soviet past.

**Policies.** As the violent events in the Ukrainian parliament on April 27, 2010 during the ratification of the Black Sea Fleet base treaty—wherein eggs and punches were thrown and smoke-bombs were set off—showed, the administration’s policies will bring instability, not stability, to the country. The undertaking of radical and unpopular reforms requires political stability and national consensus, both of which are unlikely to appear in Ukraine.

**Instability, Not Stability**

Yanukovych will be unable to bring stability to Ukraine for two reasons.

**Regionalism.** Ukraine’s regional divisions will prevent any political force from building a monopoly of power. The Party of Regions is unpopular in Kyiv and central Ukraine, let alone in western Ukraine. The country, divided by language and historical legacies, could never develop the type of nationalism that would unite behind the Party of Regions. This is again different from Russia, where anti-Western nationalism has mobilized around the Unified Russia party led by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Democratic and nationalist opposition to the administration will inevitably grow.

**Bribery.** Ukrainians cannot be bought off; Ukraine is not Russia, where abundant deposits of raw materials are exported and provide a large amount of support for the state budget. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has been fortunate in being able to buy off Russians by trading stability for democracy through record-high oil and gas prices throughout most of this decade.

**The Yanukovych Enigma**

During Ukraine’s 2010 presidential election campaign, many Ukrainian and Western experts and analysts convinced themselves that Yanukovych had “changed” over the last five years. A *Financial Times* editorial wrote, “Only a stable Ukraine can achieve economic reform and recovery. Ms. Tymoshenko is the polar opposite of a stabilising force. Mr. Yanukovich [sic], for all his manifest faults, may prove the lesser evil.”2

Yanukovych has been using American political and electoral consultants since the spring 2005 Party of Regions congress, at which he announced his candidacy with all the
hallmarks of a candidate’s entry into an American election campaign. The most optimistic vision of a “changed” Yanukovych was offered in a February 8, 2010 opinion editorial in the Wall Street Journal, entitled “Reintroducing Viktor Yanukovych.”

Some of this mistaken optimism in regard to Yanukovych is understandable in the wake of a disappointing 5-year tenure by President Viktor Yushchenko. Ukraine’s entrenched fatigue emerged after years of political instability, constitutional crises, inter-elite fighting, and the experience of (together with Iceland, Hungary and Latvia) Europe’s worst economic-financial recession, forcing the government to seek an emergency IMF Stand-by Agreement. An allegedly different Yanukovych, touted as newly pro-democratic, seemed to be a breath of fresh air who promised to bring stability and reform to Ukraine.

Tymoshenko, in contrast, was depicted in the Western media as a “chameleon” and “populist,” and was negatively associated with five years of Orange misrule. In one of the more interesting aspects of Ukraine’s election campaign, it was Tymoshenko who was more often than not seen—both in the West and in Ukraine—as the greater threat to Ukraine’s young democracy than Yanukovych.

The first two months of Yanukovych’s presidency have shown how wrong these views were. The spring 2009 congress that launched Yanukovych’s candidacy was “respectable and modern,” Ukrayinska Pravda reported. The April 23, 2010 congress that passed the leadership back to Prime Minister Azarov (who was the Party of Regions’ first leader in 2001-2003) was, in contrast, more similar to a “party-economic meeting in the Soviet tradition with delegates transforming themselves into live exponents of Lenin’s museum.” The congress was held in the former Lenin Museum, now Ukrainian House. A lack of discussion and criticism, unanimity of voting and Soviet-style atmosphere was described by Ukrainian journalists as a “party congress from the Soviet era” with the leadership question taking place “according to the best canons of a CPSU congress.” Gone was the 2009 American-style congress that had convinced so many domestic and Western analysts of Yanukovych’s democratic transformation. This was the real Yanukovych, now firmly ensconced in power.

It took Leonid Kuchma until his second term in office in November 2000, when the Kuchmagate crisis unfurled, for his reputation to be tarnished and for Ukraine to be increasingly described as a semi-authoritarian political system. Only two months had passed before criticism began to appear regarding the emergence of threats to media pluralism and the slip-back into semi-authoritarianism.

Following Yanukovych’s speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), former co-rapporteur of the Monitoring Committee of the PACE Hanne Severinsen noted, “In my opinion, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe should in no way halt its monitoring of Ukraine. On the contrary, even now, there are new grounds for the continuation of such monitoring.” Severinsen pointed to democratic regression in such areas as the presidential monopolization of power, infringements of the constitution, threats to media pluralism and the ignoring of the rights of the opposition.

Yanukovych and Putin

If it is Yanukovych’s intention to establish an autocracy, he is not taking his cues from Vladimir Putin, who transformed Russia into an authoritarian system in an evolutionary fashion over the four years of his first term in office (2000-2004). Western views of Russia only
began to change toward the end of his first term, and the erosion of Russia’s democracy
was noted from 2005 onward. The New York-based human rights think-tank Freedom House
downgraded Russia in 2005 from “partly free” to “unfree”; in that same year, Ukraine was
upgraded from “partly free” to “free,” which it has maintained throughout Yushchenko’s
tumultuous five years in office.9

During Putin’s first term, he removed threats to the regime he sought to build in a
piecemeal fashion by using “salami tactics” against different societal groups such as the
media, oligarchs, opposition factions and Chechen separatists. Putin’s evolutionary path
is different from Yanukovych’s strategy; Yanukovych’s first two months in office have
shown that he is a revolutionary seeking to push his policies through in the shortest pos-
sible timeframe, with no regard to domestic or Western public opinion.

Why the Rush? Five Possible Explanations

Social. Yanukovych’s method of approaching political power is a reflection of his working-
class roots, tough upbringing and former criminal past. Yanukovych grew up as an orphan
on the streets of the USSR and spent time in jail. His prison sentences offer the potential
for blackmail to Russian leaders who have inherited Soviet files on him—which would not
have been difficult for a former KGB officer, such as Prime Minister Putin, to obtain. In the
Soviet era, Yanukovych oversaw, as Donetsk governor, Ukraine’s tumultuous transition to a
market economy. Donetsk, together with the Crimea and Odessa, were the area’s three most
violent regions during the 1990s, and are today Party of Regions strongholds.

Yanukovych’s social and criminal background inevitably influences his lack of
finesse and articulateness (his gaffes are legendary), as well as his emphasis upon
achieving goals regardless of the means employed—even if this means ignoring legal
niceties. Ihor Zhdanov explained that, “the slogan ‘everything and right now’ and
the ‘aim justifies the means’ obviously have become the political credo of the new
authority’s team.”10

The “ends justify the means” argument was as much influential in driving Yanukovych
as a candidate in 2004—which led to Ukraine’s most fraudulent election campaign—as it
has been since he came to power this year. It was always wrong to assume that the circa-
2004 Yanukovych is any different from the circa-2010 Yanukovych.

Kuchma, in contrast to Yanukovych, belonged to the Soviet nomenklatura; he was the
director of the world’s largest military-industrial plant, which produced nuclear weap-
on, and had a direct telephone line to the Soviet leader. Anecdotal evidence points to
Kuchma never giving his full backing to Yanukovych as a candidate in the 2004 elec-
tions, and shows that he was quite willing to dump him after the second round. Kuchma
telephoned Putin, then on an official visit to Brazil, a day after the second round of
elections to ask for advice as to how to respond to the growing number of protestors on
the streets of Kyiv, which would grow into the Orange Revolution. Putin replied that the
choice was either to declare a state of emergency or to transfer power to Yanukovych.
Kuchma’s response was indicative: “How can I transfer power to him, Vladimir Vladi-
mirovych? He is a Donetsk criminal!” Kuchma had little faith in Yanukovych’s intellec-
tual potential, was unsure about his close links to oligarchs and organized crime and saw
him as a decoy to counter the opposition and railroad through constitutional reforms.11

At 59, Yanukovych is unlikely to change his mode of undertaking tasks and responsibilities
from the way he approached decisionmaking in the USSR and in Ukraine. Putin’s “salami
tactics” and Kuchma’s playing off of Ukraine’s business and political elites, both using evolu-
tionary methods, are very different approaches from Yanukovych’s revolutionary methods.

Ideological. Yanukovych’s statements between elections, his election campaign rheto-
ric, and the Party of Regions’ and his own candidate’s election programs, show him to be
ideologically pro-Russian. But these facts have been largely ignored by Western observers
of Ukraine and have been dismissed in one of two ways.

1. Pragmatists and Kuchma’s Multi-Vectorism. The first argument is that the Party of
Regions is controlled by “pragmatic” oligarchs who desire to become bona fide busi-
nessmen, valuing integration into Europe over integration with Russia and the CIS. Pau-
lilius Kuncinas, writing for the Oxford Business Group,12 emphasized the
pragmatism of the Yanukovych team
and his desire to “return to a more
pragmatic phase of realpolitik.” Kun-
cinas stressed that, “there seems to be
a genuine attempt among politicians
from Donetsk to bridge the national
divide and widen their popular mandate
beyond their Russophile heartlands.”
Adrian Karatnycky wrote a day after
Yanukovych was elected that, “the oli-
garchs around Mr. Yanukovych became
economically transparent. They hired
first-rate managers, rigorously paid their taxes, promoted sophisticated philanthropy, and
became globalized in their tastes and manners. Just as importantly, they now see their
future prosperity integrally linked to a reduction in corruption, the expansion of free market
policies, lower taxes, fewer regulations, and Ukraine’s eventual integration into the rich
EU market.”13 Andrew Wilson, writing for the European Council on Foreign Relations,
believed that “Yanukovych could turn out to be better for Europe than many expect. In fact,
he might even become something like Ukraine’s Richard Nixon.”14 Wilson downplayed
Yanukovych’s interest in national identity issues that are highly contentious in Ukraine.

Ukrainian analyst Mykola Riabchuk predicted that Yanukovych would return Ukraine
to Kuchma-style multi-vector foreign policy, as integration with Russia and the CIS is not
“in the interests of Ukrainian business and the political class.”15 Writing after the turbulent
parliament events of late April, Wilson still remained convinced that “Ukraine is back to
playing the game it knows best: the balancing act between East and West.” Wilson argues,
like many Western commentators, that Ukraine’s oligarchs cannot become russophiles
or slavophiles because “They still want to protect their own ‘backyard’” from Russian
encroachments.

Yanukovych’s first two months in office point to little evidence of such optimism about
the domination of “pragmatists” in the Party of Regions over its ideological wing who will
seek to foster national unity. The first 100 days point, instead, to ideologically driven pro-
Russian domestic national and foreign policymaking. Indeed, while Yanukovych has cam-
ouflaged his views through the use of American political consultants and choreographed
statements and comments—especially those made during election campaigns and foreign
visits—Prime Minister Azarov has never hidden his Sovietophile and russophile views.

“It was always wrong to assume that the circa-2004 Yanukovych is
any different from the circa-2010
Yanukovych.”
While Yanukovych learned the Ukrainian language during the 2004 election campaign, Azarov has always ignored Ukrainian legislation, refusing to learn the state language for government positions he held in the Kuchma era or currently as prime minister.

2. **Election programs are not fulfilled.** The second argument is to believe that election statements and programs have no value in Ukraine, as they are meant to mobilize voters and are typically ignored following elections. Kuchma’s 1994 election is routinely cited as evidence of this, wherein he spoke out in support of Russian an “official language,” only to ignore this policy after he came to power. When asked by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Is there anything Viktor Yanukovych has surprised you with in these two months?,” former President Yushchenko replied, “One thing—speed. He did what was written in his election slogans.”

In his first months in office, Yanukovych has shown that he is more than ready to implement pro-Russian rhetoric in both the domestic and foreign domains. These include the re-writing of school textbooks, Soviet tirades against “Ukrainian nationalism,” preference for the monopolization of religious life by the Russian Orthodox Church, servility for Russian policies in the CIS and support for reuniting major areas of the Ukrainian and Russian economies. Yanukovych supported calls for extending the Black Sea Fleet’s presence in Sevastopol long before the global financial crisis hit Ukraine’s economy in 2008, which casts doubt upon the claim that Ukraine was forced to take this official step on April 27, 2010 due to its dire economic situation. Yanukovych has long espoused antagonism toward Georgian leadership and the GUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) regional group, and has supported the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

**Revenge.** Yanukovych and the Donetsk clan have waited for five years for their chance to take their revenge against the “orangists.” Revenge in Western political systems is an unusual concept, and Western observers of Ukraine have therefore failed to grasp this component of the mindset of the Yanukovych administration. Revenge is personally and ideologically driven.

1. **Personal Revenge.** Yanukovych has felt personally humiliated since the second round of the 2004 elections, which he and his supporters believed was a betrayal by Kyiv’s ruling elites; fearing the mass protests of the Orange Revolution, Kyiv authorities patriciapted in EU-brokered roundtable deals that facilitated Yushchenko’s election in the second round of elections on December 26, 2004. Yanukovych and Eastern Ukrainians believe in a similar conspiracy theory to that found in Russia—namely, that Yushchenko’s election and the Orange Revolution was facilitated by Western forces (most notably the US and the Bush administration’s democracy-promotion agenda). This mindset, whether in Eastern Ukraine or Russia, does not accept that the millions who participated in the Orange Revolution did so voluntarily, and therefore dismisses claims that the 17-day protests were a genuine popular revolt. This conspiracy-prone mindset has deep Soviet roots, and views dissident groups as a Western-funded, rather than home-grown, phenomenon, manipulated by Western intelligence agencies and émigré diaspora groups.

Yanukovych believes he won the 2004 elections in a fair, fraud-free contest—if there were “minor infringements,” these took place on both sides, cancelling one another out. Although the Supreme Court ruled on December 3, 2004 that there had been systematic fraud and demanded a recount on December 26, there have never been criminal charges launched against the organizers of the election. This has always emboldened Yanukovych
and his team; as he has repeatedly said, no criminal charges imply that there was no election fraud.

Unfortunately, no Western governments took notice of Yanukovych’s views of the 2004 election and the Orange Revolution, which flatly contradicted the optimistic view of him as a pragmatic new democrat. Were this true, Yanukovych the democrat would have admitted responsibility for election fraud and accepted the 2004 election results. That was never the case, and in Yanukovych’s own view, Yushchenko was an illegitimate president brought to power by American “political technology.”

2. Ideological revenge. Yanukovych’s election is also a fortuitous opportunity to take revenge on the “nationalists” who allegedly ran Ukraine under Yushchenko. Similar “anti-nationalist” sentiment was aired by the Kuchma campaign in the 1994 elections, when it was directed against incumbent “nationalist” Leonid Kravchuk. Dmytro Tabachnyk headed Kuchma’s 1994 election campaign, and went on to become chief of staff of Kuchma’s presidential administration. The Kuchma regime revived Soviet-style anti-nationalist propaganda in the 2002 and 2004 elections as an ideological tool against the opposition to mobilize the Russophone vote against the “nationalist” Our Ukraine and Yushchenko. Ukrainian surveys have long shown that negative voting (i.e. voting against a party or candidate rather than in favor of one) is at its highest in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea.

Ideological revenge could explain why Dmytro Tabachnyk is Minister of Education and Science in the Azarov government. Tabachnyk wrote last year that Galicians are not really “Ukrainians,” a position long held by only the most extreme Russian nationalists. Hostility toward Western Ukrainians and diaspora Ukrainians (who mainly came from Western Ukraine) was a long-held staple of Soviet tirades against “bourgeois nationalism.” David Marples writes that Yanukovych’s “appointment of Dmytro Tabachnyk as minister for science and education seemed calculated to inflame Western Ukrainians.”

Much of the desire for ideological revenge rests on the over-domination of nation-building issues in Yushchenko’s presidency. His January 2010 decree to honor Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists leader Stepan Bandera crowned his presidency and provoked a counter-reaction from Eastern Ukraine, which led to a higher vote for Yanukovych in the second round and the later overturning of the decree in a Donetsk court. The timing of the decree was unfortunate, provocative and unnecessary.

The Azarov government is seeking to move quickly in many areas of ideological revenge. These include downplaying the 1933 Holodomor as a Ukrainian genocide or artificial famine; removing quotas on using the Ukrainian language in film, television and other areas of culture; jointly rewriting history school textbooks with Russia; and introducing a more Sovietophile outlook on Ukrainian-Russian relations and Ukrainian history. World War II is now to be officially described as the “Great Patriotic War”; Russian troops participated in four parades in four Ukrainian cities on the 65th anniversary of the ending of that war. All of these steps constitute a counter-revolution, not only against Yushchenko’s radical nation-building efforts but against Kuchma’s more moderate nationality policies, which were similar in content to his successor but were delivered with greater finesse.

Time Factor. There is a time factor, as well, as Ukraine is a parliamentary republic (not presidential, as was Russia when Putin came to power in March 2000). Ukraine will hold parliamentary elections in September 2012, and Yanukovych thus needs to rapidly push through his domestic and foreign policies while he still has a window of opportunity.
“Orange” political forces won majorities in the March 2006 (the Tymoshenko Bloc [BYuT], Our Ukraine, Socialist Party) and September 2007 pre-term elections (BYuT, Our Ukraine), and could again win a majority in 2012—and, in doing so, take back control of the government. This would mean, for example, that in 2012 a new coalition could annul the new Black Sea Fleet agreement extending the Sevastopol base until 2042-2047.

Authoritarianism Through Conflict. The most pessimistic reason could be that Yanukovych is seeking his own Putinesque way to autocratic consolidation. Yanukovych could be thinking that an autocracy is best built through conflict and confrontation, while the opposition would be depicted as “destructive” (a favorite Soviet word used repeatedly in Ukraine) and containing agents of “instability.” Yanukovych, in contrast, would be described as bringing “stability” to Ukraine, increasing social welfare payments, keeping gas prices low for household utility bills, rebuilding the economy and reducing unemployment. These were the ideological tenets found in Yanukovych’s April 28, 2010 appeal to Ukrainians in support of the Black Sea Fleet base treaty.

Putin built up Russia’s autocracy through conflict by reviving the Chechen separatist war and on the back of alleged terrorist attacks. In September 1999, terrorist explosions took place in four apartment blocks in Buynaksk, Moscow, and Volgograd, killing 293 people and injuring 651.22 The terrorist attacks were blamed on Chechen separatists, but they seemed very much out-of-character, and suspicion fell upon Russian intelligence services after a similar bomb was found and defused in the Russian city of Ryazan on September 23, 1999. The next day, Federal Security Service Director Nikolai Patrushev announced that the Ryazan incident had been a “training exercise.”

That the administration’s policies undermine the national consensus on domestic and foreign policies makes little sense unless Yanukovych has another agenda: building a “managed democracy.” The model would be the close nexus of state-big business-politics-corruption found in his home region of Donetsk, where the Party of Regions has monopoly power. Speaking to a conference on Ukraine at George Washington University in early April, University of Florida’s Paul D’Anieri did not see encouraging signs for democracy in Ukraine: “Will there be free and fair elections in 2015? It’s early, but the signs aren’t encouraging. Already it appears that Yanukovych seeks to eliminate political competition in Ukraine, and it is questionable whether there is any force powerful enough to stop him.”

The prosecutor general’s office has launched criminal charges against the opposition for their the violent disturbances in parliament on April 27 of this year.24 Kuchma-era criminal charges have also been revived against Yulia Tymoshenko; criminal charges are also reportedly in the pipeline against members of the outgoing Tymoshenko government for alleged corruption (i.e. theft from the state budget). Is this the beginning of a clampdown on the opposition to pave the way for a Party of Regions sweep for a full takeover of Ukraine’s political system in 2012?

This is damaging Yanukovych’s born-again-democratic credentials that American consultants have been nurturing for the last five years, uniting the fractious opposition, leading to the most violent moments ever in Ukraine’s parliament during the Black Sea Fleet treaty ratification, and deepening the country’s regional divisions even further. Putin-style “salami tactics,” for example, would have moved more slowly, and in the process encouraged further defections from the opposition to give the coalition...
a 300-constitutional majority by fall 2010. The Black Sea Fleet base treaty would not have been ratified by 236 votes without the support of sixteen BYuT and Our Ukraine defectors.

The extension of the Black Sea Fleet base inflamed Ukrainian and opposition opinion, due to how it was undertaken, the speed of the process (with only four working days between signing and ratification) and the fact that it was handled without parliamentary oversight or transparency. Three parliamentary committees on foreign policy and national security did not support the treaty. Yanukovych may have been able to convince parliament to vote for a five-year extension, as stipulated in Ukraine’s constitution, but not a thirty-year transfer of Sevastopol to Russia. As Marples wrote in the *Kyiv Post* (April 26), “Yanukovych manifestly failed to negotiate on Ukraine’s behalf. It is inconceivable why his starting point was not a five-year extension of the existing lease, which was stipulated as an option according to the 1997 agreement.”

Crossing further “red lines” are inevitable. Yanukovych’s denial of the 1933 famine as a “genocide” during his PACE speech on the same day as the Black Sea Fleet ratification was “like pouring oil on an already simmering fire in Ukraine’s polarized politics,” former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs David Kramer wrote in the *Kyiv Post*. The Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine did not vote for the October 2006 law on the Ukrainian famine and have pledged to overturn the law in parliament.

**Conclusion**

Is the Yanukovych administration’s strategy to deliberately provoke violence and civil conflict in order to use this as an excuse for a crackdown on the opposition? Or, on the other hand, does the Yanukovych administration still not understand that a sociopolitical explosion is possible by provoking violence and conflict unintentionally—or, possibly, as part of an undisclosed game plan? The administration could very well be duped by its own failure to understand the popular and spontaneous (rather than organized and pre-planned) Orange Revolution, or it could simply be counting on public apathy in regard to politics, which has led to a commonly held view of a “plague on all your houses.”

The Yanukovych administration could misjudge the popular mood by believing it will be faced by apathetic 1990s-style Ukraine rather than by the mass opposition protests of 2000-2004. In mistakenly betting on apathy, the authorities could unleash civil strife and political instability.

The 2004 Orange Revolution and Yushchenko’s election was meant to have transformed Ukraine, but failed to do so. Today, many events look like déjà vu from Kuchma’s second term in office, when Ukraine faced years of political instability. Yanukovych is already being described as a “new dictator” (shadow Prime Minister Serhiy Sobolyev) and the Yanukovych regime as a “return to Kuchmism” (Tymoshenko) and “totalitarianism” (Yushchenko). Tymoshenko’s formation of the People’s Committee to Protect Ukraine following the April 26 parliamentary riots bring back memories of her establishment of the National Salvation Committe in February 2001, which united those in opposition to President Kuchma.

The first 100 days of the Yanukovych administration point to two conclusions. Before Ukraine can ever move forward, it first needs to deal with its past and arrive at a consensus on national integration. National consensus cannot be imposed by either Lviv or Donetsk, but must be built around Kyiv. Peru, which experienced a similar tape scandal in the
same year as Ukraine (2000), dealt with its crisis by indicting and eventually putting in prison the head of the intelligence services and other senior officials, followed by former President Alberto Fujimoro after he returned from exile in Japan. Ukraine’s ruling elites have never been indicted for anything undertaken since the USSR disintegrated—the only ones to have gone to prison have been in Germany and the US.\(^\text{28}\)

Yushchenko failed to understand the need to deal with Ukraine’s past or how to integrate Ukraine and to follow through on pursuing criminal charges against the elites who had murdered journalists, abused their positions of power through massive corruption and theft of state property, and organized mass election fraud. Today, Ukraine is feeling the consequences of the failure of the Yushchenko administration to deliver the promises of the Orange Revolution.

NOTES

7. The Kuchmagate crisis unfurled on November 28, 2000, when a tape recording was unveiled that incriminated the president in the disappearance of journalist Georgi Gongadze. Gongadze had been kidnapped by police officers on September 16 of that year and his decapitated body was found near Kyiv in a shallow grave on November 2, 2000. The tape recording had been made in Kuchma’s office by Mykola Melnychenko, an officer in the presidential guard (Directorate on State Security [UDO]), the Ukrainian equivalent of the U.S. Secret Service.
11. These events are described in many places, including in Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 136.
17. See T. Kuzio, ‘‘Antinationalist Campaign’ to Discredit Our Ukraine,” RFE/RL Poland,
Belarus and Ukraine Report, April 9, 2002.

18. The survey results were published in a special issue of the magazine of the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies on national identity in Ukraine, *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Obronna*, no. 9, 2007, available at http://www.uceps.org/ukr/journal.php?y=2007&cat=37. Residents of Donetsk and Crimea gave the highest affiliation for identification with Soviet culture values (37.1 and 32.2 percent, respectively) with Ukrainian and Russian values coming in second and third. In Western Ukraine, by contrast, identification with Soviet values was highest in Volyn oblast (15.7 percent), still far lower than in Donetsk or the Crimea, and the lowest affiliation in Ukraine was to be found in the three Galician oblasts (0.3-1.5 percent).

19. Anti-Galician sentiment was a staple of Soviet denunciations of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism,” and this has carried over into the Yanukovych administration. Tabachnyk described Galicians as different to Ukrainians in his celebrated ‘Galician “crusaders” against Ukraine (see http://2000.net.ua/, July 11, 2008). Western Ukraine was demonized in the 2004 elections as the center of fraud through allegations that family members were voting for hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians working abroad (*Ukrayinska Pravda*, November 9, 10, 11, 2004). A victory for Yushchenko, Russian political technologist Gleb Pavlovsky argued, was a victory of Galicia over Ukraine (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, July 2, 2004). For further analysis see T. Kuzio, “Ukrainian Nationalism Again Under Attack in Ukraine,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7, no.138, July 19, 2010.


25. Marples, “Yanukovych fails to negotiate on Ukraine’s behalf.”

