Introduction

Nontraditional Approaches to Russian Politics and Security

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Abstract: This introduction to a special section of Demokratizatsiya describes the European University at St. Petersburg/Georgetown University project on “New Approaches to Russian Politics and Security.” The guest editor reviews the literature on nontraditional approaches to security studies, illustrates the policy reasons for applying some of these concepts in the Russian context, and introduces the section’s four articles.

Keywords: nontraditional security, politics, Russia, security studies

The Soviet system’s demise created a tremendous opportunity to unleash creative energies that had been ideologically constrained for decades. Even though some individuals ingeniously pushed the USSR’s intellectual boundaries, most Soviet social scientists worked within the established Socialist paradigm. The opportunities to “break out” were greater in Central Europe than in the Soviet Union.

Despite high hopes for new collaborative efforts, post-1991 scholarship has failed to produce much paradigm shifting. In Russia, the country that dominated Soviet social science, the stronger trend has become the defense of “traditional” analytical modes, not the challenge of old assumptions. There are exceptions, however. Several universities established since 1992 offer a blend of Russian and Western scholarly approaches. In the best cases, they expose students to Russian and Western (mirovoi, literally “world”) scholarly literature.

The Carnegie Corporation of New York invited the European University at St. Petersburg’s political science and sociology faculty and Georgetown University’s Government Department to explore potential synergies in a collaborative project involving scholars from both institutions. For three years, European University scholars developed their expertise in nontraditional approaches. During the project’s final year, each of them spent time at Georgetown, presented their work at seminars, and consulted with American colleagues to sharpen their scholarship’s focus. The four articles published here present some of the results from this collaboration.

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The Soviet system’s collapse provided tremendous opportunities for scholars to rethink basic assumptions about politics and security. In the first months of 1992, almost anything seemed possible. This gave extra potency to existing efforts to encourage “new thinking.” In comparative politics, the “transitions” paradigm—the dominant discourse—was quickly challenged by a chorus of critics who accused “shock therapists” of “market bolshevism.”¹ In both economics and political analysis, opposing sides tended to talk past each other. Political debates often involved a basic difference between procedural and substantive definitions of democracy. Economic arguments were similarly procedural, but ever more bitter, with rapid-reform advocates focusing on process, whereas gradualists emphasized outcomes.

After 1998, the focus increasingly shifted to nondemocratic systems, joining a growing literature on hybrid regimes and new varieties of authoritarianism.² This literature, and the related discussions’ shift toward “the political,” is well-known to Demokratizatsiya readers. The backgrounds of nontraditional security topics may be less familiar, however.

The Security Studies Dilemma

Early Nontraditionalists

The mainstream security studies community finds the integration of “new” security issues difficult, especially given the post–September 11 focus on terrorism. Many security studies experts have responded to perceived threats to traditional security studies by defending the fortress rather than reexamining assumptions.

Some of the earliest and most influential scholars who challenged traditional security approaches include Richard Ullman, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, and Thomas F. Homer-Dixon.³ Writing in the early 1980s, when the Soviet Union was still very much in business, Ullman warns that “every administration in Washington has defined American national security in excessively narrow and excessively military terms.”⁴ He attributes this to politicians finding it easier to focus public attention on military rather than nonmilitary threats, and analysts’ inability to calculate the relative security value of alternative priorities in resource allocation. This policy makes everyone less secure by encouraging excessive militarization.

Ullman proposes “moving toward a more comprehensive definition of security,” but he poses the question in terms of a trade-off between security and other values.⁵ Those who would shift the security studies agenda have constant tension in their work: should “new” issues be considered in place of or in addition to the traditional agenda? Adding a host of new concerns to the agenda creates the same resource-allocation problem that these analysts critique.

Ullman’s work foreshadowed Homer-Dixon, Michael Klare, Robert Kaplan, and others, who suggest that territorial conflicts are likely to diminish as self-determination is enshrined, but that resource-related conflicts will increase.⁶ Ullman notes the paradox that “resource wars” will rely on traditional military force, and predicts that they will be short, sharp conflicts, mostly over continental shelf oil.⁷ He also draws a distinction between threats to well-being and security threats, privileging traditional concerns: “In my 1983 article, I pointed to the absence of a methodology for comparing the utility of different categories of societal expenditure, such as the security that may be added by a given expenditure on guns vs. the additional well-being that can be bought with the same expenditure on butter. I did not expect any methodology to emerge. The two sides of the ledger are truly incom-
Ullman emphasizes the need for comparison, however, noting that “within the fog of politics, traditional security establishments have usually seemed to prevail.”

Ullman describes “what has come to be the standard list” of such threats: “organized crime, environmental degradation, pandemic disease, accidents in or caused by nuclear facilities of all sorts, uncontrolled emigration.” He identifies organized crime as the most serious new threat: “compared with the costs imposed by organized crime, the other posited harms are not really significant.” Ullman does not draw a connection between criminal activity and the military. The most profoundly disturbing new threat is the creation of criminalized military units that blur the distinctions between regular military units and paramilitaries and fight wars to support their illegal business activities. Traditional and new security studies merge on this issue.

For Ullman, demographic change is primarily the movement of refugees and immigrants, rather than declining populations or significantly altered age and gender distributions. Similarly, he sees the threat of disease as exogenous, rather than coming from within a country (as multidrug-resistant tuberculosis [MDR TB] did). Scholars have not seriously evaluated the problem of a shrinking, older, more fragile, and less-educated population incapable of meeting postindustrial society’s challenges and the post–September 11, 2001, military equation. What happens when a society’s lack of healthy young men makes it impossible to recruit an army large enough to maintain security, or when their education levels are not sufficient to produce or use modern weapons?

Although Ullman’s treatment underestimates the ways domestic, or “butter,” issues impinge on the “guns” that a country may deploy, his policy recommendations are absolutely on the mark:

> Years of Russian strength left residual images engraved deeply into the minds of Russian elites. Those images of a hegemonic past die hard. New images are not easily accepted. Western powers will find the process frustrating, but they can make their greatest contributions to Russia if, through their own examples, they can imbue with good sense the process of thinking through the connection between security and welfare.

Mathews articulates a sweeping agenda for new thinking about security and welfare, calling for “a redefinition of what constitutes national security.” She contends that the addition of international economic issues in the 1970s was only the beginning of an expansion that must extend “to include resource, environmental and demographic issues.” She emphasized state-based institutions’ incapacity to cope with transnational environmental, financial, and information challenges.

Mathews warns that “ignorance of the biological underpinning of human society blocks a clear view of where the long-term threats to global security lie.” However, telling security studies practitioners that they ought to shift their focus presumes that the traditional security studies agenda is passé, which is hardly the case (after September 11, it has been enhanced and adjusted). It is also precarious—an effort to mobilize security studies professionals to implement an extensive human-security agenda does not nearly go far enough. The problems are so immense that they require a far broader coalition of agents. Mathews implies this herself in the logic of “Power Shift.”

Homer-Dixon produced some of the most rigorous evidence proving the relationship between environmental conditions and violence. Whereas Klare, Kaplan, and others warn of impending dangers, Homer-Dixon proved the connections. Although his initial
formulations invited the criticism that he advocated replacing the security studies agenda, his exchanges with critics elucidated his view that environmental issues exacerbate traditional conflicts.

Mathews’s and Homer-Dixon’s work provoked particularly strong reactions. Marc Levy voices the concern that the security studies community failed to defend its core mission from their demands: “Since the late 1980s, when public discussion of environment and security links began in earnest, a ground swell of support for the core proposition that environmental degradation constitutes a security risk has encountered hardly any voices of dissent.” Levy examines what he terms “existential,” “physical,” and “political” connections between environment and security. He dismisses Mathews’s “existential” view, finding the direct physical link more compelling. According to Levy, environmental problems should be solved with containment and coexistence, not rollback. Political threats (e.g., environmental refugees and resource wars) are “both the weakest substantive threat to U.S. security and the strongest intellectual challenge to the field of security studies.” He argues that, among the environmental issues, only climate change and ozone depletion are direct threats, but that calling these “security issues” does not improve our thinking about them or enhance our ability to respond.

Levy argues that Ullman’s definition “appears to have broadened the scope so much that the original content of ‘security’ is swamped by intruders, rendering it utterly alien to the security studies community.” Levy views the “security studies community” as an ethnic or religious group with fixed beliefs based on sacred texts, which is highly distrustful of outsiders. Those who shift attention to new topics are heretics. Levy asserts that “a focus on the actions of foreigners is a defining trait of security studies; one cannot expunge that from one’s definition and still claim to be talking about the same subject,” reinforcing the impression that he is defending an obsolete fortress. After September 11, the role of transnational actors in terrorism has made it difficult to determine who is foreign; Samuel Huntington’s recent work calls for redefining the term “foreigner.”

Homer-Dixon rejects Levy’s parochial America-centric focus, emphasizing resource scarcity in exacerbating conflict: “Our research shows that it is rare for people to fight directly over resources. Violence usually arises indirectly from the economic and institutional dislocation caused by resource stress,” and these conflicts are “diffuse, persistent, and subnational.”

Post–Cold War Trends

The Cold War’s conclusion opened space for a major project focusing on “human security.” Without any commanding paradigm, research agendas and subschools proliferated, creating a situation in which many scholars write for specialized journals and communicate primarily with like-minded colleagues. The 1994 United Nations Human Development Report and the Copenhagen School’s research (discussed in detail later) directed attention to welfare issues, individual and societal security, and “existential” security issues. This agenda is highly applicable to the post-Soviet countries.

The 1994 United Nations Human Development Report, compiled in preparation for a “Social Summit,” focuses on “human security in the daily lives of people,” and identifies economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security as its key components. Few would criticize the report’s laudable goals. However, it raises
important issues of cause and effect. To assert that “the world will never be secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and in their jobs” invites precisely the sort of broad definition of security that military professionals abjure. Police—not the armed forces—protect people in their homes.

Defining an issue as a national security concern (“securitizing” it) to raise its importance (and its claim to limited funds) has a long history. William Brian Reddaway’s pioneering pre–World War II economic demography study notes that “the most effective way of securing attention for a social problem has been to link it up with ‘national defence.’” The Copenhagen School scholars have taken Reddaway’s insight further, discussing how “the speech act” is used to securitize specific issues.

The Copenhagen School analysts have been highly influential in developing new paradigms that securitize such issues as immigration, food, and human trafficking. Barry Buzan puts forward a compelling argument for a broader security studies agenda: “Security Studies could provide the field as a whole with an integrating framework that would help to tie together sub-fields such as Strategic Studies, Human Rights, Environmental and Development Studies and International Political Economy that are now too isolated from each other.” However, to suggest that the existing concept of security is “simple-minded” or that it cannot be rehabilitated until it is first “habilitated” is a needlessly aggressive approach to building a unified theory.

Ole Wæver and his coauthors focus on identity issues and societal security, with an emphasis on European immigration’s security implications. The authors reject the broad human security approach adumbrated in the United Nations Human Development Report, claiming that security must always be a collective phenomenon. But their claims that ethnonational identity is the “most common source of societal identity” and that “societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” are problematic. Who determines any society’s “essential character”? They are correct that perceived threats and “actual” threats are equally important. (This is the security dilemma’s essence.) They share Stephen Larrabee’s view that Europe will be swamped by immigrants, and argue that the European Union would undermine members’ ability to cope with this problem. They miss the possibility that EU borders could provide states with a way to surmount internal debates and concerns about human rights and refugees by invoking EU standards. Rather than fostering fragmentation, immigration may be enhancing EU integration.

Bill McSweeney notes Buzan’s muddled message in subsequent publications. His review of the Copenhagen School provoked an extended exchange.

Roland Parris sought the middle ground in this debate, offering a useful distinction between human security, focused on “nonmilitary threats to the safety of societies, groups and individuals,” and traditional approaches that “focus on protecting states from external threats.” Parris shares Levy’s view of human security advocates as a threat to “real” security studies: Advocacy groups and advocates, including some national governments like Canada and Norway, intentionally articulate a vague and extensive definition of security to make it a more effective rallying cry. When he talks about the human security movement’s ethic, Parris verges on creating an “enemy other” out of this transnational community of well-intentioned activists. However, he correctly observes that amorphous definitions are not helpful to decision makers who are faced with competing urgent priorities. Parris’s matrix keeps traditional and new issues separated. I am inclined to emphasize linkages:
The crucial nontraditional issues are nonmilitary problems that degrade a state’s capacity to protect itself from threats. Security studies specialists beyond the Copenhagen School have given significant attention to demographic issues. Myron Weiner proposes elevating population flows from a dependent to an independent variable in studying conflict. Weiner takes it as a given that immigration is a security issue. In later work, he focuses specifically on refugees, which he views as a more serious and less predictable threat.

There is always a temptation to exaggerate threats when securitizing nontraditional issues. For example, experts warned of massive migration following the USSR’s demise. Larrabee attempted to project the potential number of Soviet migrants and the resulting security threat. He was careful to note that the transport systems’ physical capacity would limit movement; that receiving countries could impose visa requirements and other restrictions; and that emigration always entails personal and practical costs. Receiving countries generally have the major role in determining whether migration takes place and the form it assumes. He took account of the important distinction between a desire to emigrate and a willingness to emigrate and cited such skeptics as Klaus Segbers and the example of Central Asians, who long confounded geographers by refusing to move to other parts of the USSR. Despite all of these cautionary notes, he warned that “the pattern and extent of emigration could change if social and economic conditions in many areas of the former Soviet Union continue to deteriorate.” He suggested that a rapid demilitarization of the Soviet economy could mean 35–40 million unemployed workers, which would constitute a first wave of new immigrants. Eastern Europeans, themselves only recently freed from emigration restrictions, would find it difficult to resist allowing Russians and others from the USSR to either immigrate or use their territory for transit. This led Larrabee to highlight “the degree to which migration from the East is beginning to become a major security issue,” and to express his concern about “slowness in appreciating the broader security implications of the issue.”

Buzan; Wæver and his coauthors; Weiner; Larrabee; and others portray population movement as one of the most important new security threats. Ironically, for Europe, Japan, and Russia, the lack of immigration may be an equal or greater threat. These countries have been reasonably successful at preventing large-scale immigration. Headline-grabbing tragedies involving illegal immigrants indicate successful barriers as much as would-be immigrants’ desperation. But all of these countries need large numbers of immigrants. Maintaining these countries’ current age structures would require immigration on a scale so vast that it would totally remake their “essential character.” And all are competing with each other (and with the United States) for immigrants with high human capital. Resolving this politically fraught tangle of issues will be a crucial security concern in the twenty-first century.

One international collaborative project assessing the former Soviet space’s security did attempt to address new security issues. But, as is generally the case, the new issues are ghettoized, treated in separate sections at the end of each volume, and only cursorily discussed in the introductions and conclusions. The result is an impression that, in addition to the extensive and growing security studies agenda, analysts must also devote attention to an array of new issues. Although including the new issues adds an important dimension, addressing them separately from traditional security concerns perpetuates the impression that they must either replace or hopelessly clutter the traditional security agenda.

Irina Zviagelskaia and Vitali Naumkin offer a list of “non-traditional threats, chal-
challenges, and risks” to Russia emanating from the southern tier of countries bordering Russia, including drug trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, Islamic extremism, mass migrations and refugees, and environmental degradation. They conclude that “only drug dealing and terrorism” directly threaten Russia’s security in the near term. The data they present, however, suggest that the human capital implications of population growth and migration will be enormously important. They do not discuss some key issues, such as information security.

Galina Vitkovskaia suggests that the USSR’s demise and “subsequent” (some would say accompanying) economic crisis “resulted in the rise of various forms of social tension, criminality, demographic issues, and ecological problems, which today constitute the main threats to the security of the Russian Far East.” She notes that “these problems are tightly interconnected,” but does not link them to the inherited security environment or evolving security needs.

Russian scholar A. V. Vakhrameev analyzes Russia’s security situation based on a frank assessment of economic, demographic, and human capital conditions, along with traditional factors. While providing a comprehensive account of the new security agenda, his policy recommendations amount to an impossibly broad and contradictory laundry list of things the state “must” do.

As these examples indicate, efforts to include new issues on the security studies agenda for Russia have for the most part represented arguments by analysts for the importance of the particular topic they study—essentially versions of the resource claims noted by Reddaway. The growing list of “new” issues means that fragmentation in security studies is likely to continue, even as scholars continue to search for new paradigms. Michael Brown calls for studies integrating new issues into security studies. Several scholars have produced precisely the sort of integration of traditional and new security issues necessary to resolve the security studies dilemma. Following Homer-Dixon, Valerie Hudson and Andrea Den Boer write that “international security and stability rest in large measure on the internal security of nations.” They cite scholars’ attention to “unemployment rates, water tables and river flows, infant mortality, migration patterns, infectious disease epidemiology and other variables.” In their view, “security scholarship is theoretically and empirically impoverished to the extent that it fails to inquire into the relationship between violence against women and violence within and between societies.” They focus on exaggerated gender inequality: “Because of gender, one child is allowed to live while another is actively or passively killed.” When this happens on a large scale, it results in young males who will not be able to find marriage partners in their own society—what the Chinese call “bare branches.” These surplus males tend to be “losers” and are more inclined to violence: “Compared with other males in society, bare branches will be prone to seek satisfaction through vice and violence, and will seek to capture resources that will allow them to compete on a more equal footing with others.”

They take Francis Fukuyama one step further: “The very type of government to which a nation can aspire may be tied to the status of women in society.” High sex-ratio societies (that is, societies with a disproportionate number of individuals of one gender) are likely to be governable only by authoritarian regimes. Hudson and Den Boer also focus on integrating the issues, emphasizing that sex ratios do not necessarily cause violence, but do significantly exacerbate conflict when it ignites.

Stefan Elbe’s discussion of AIDS and warfare in Africa is a particularly chilling
formulation of the ways that traditional and new security issues intersect. He writes that rape camps staffed by HIV-positive soldiers represent a qualitatively different phenomenon from disseminating infected corpses or blankets. This certainly meets Levy’s standard of being a distinct variety of threat worth examining and a case of regional conflict. When al-Qaeda finances its terrorist networks by trafficking women and selling narcotics, using some of the proceeds to aid the Taliban, distinctions between traditional and new security issues are of little importance.

**Contemporary Work**

This project’s issues have indirect policy ramifications for the United States and Europe, and quite explicit policy importance for Russia. Russia’s failure to appreciate how old and new security issues interact has a highly detrimental impact on military and security planning. Russian leaders face excruciating choices between staffing the military, restoring a skilled labor force, and educating the next generation for an increasingly competitive global economy. In the face of these daunting challenges, they continue to perceive security issues in old ways, barely acknowledge threats from HIV/AIDS or MDR TB, and rely increasingly on natural resources for economic growth and international influence.

Ironically, some of the most interesting work on nontraditional security issues is being produced in and about Asia, particularly East and Southeast Asia. Li Dongyan offers a useful distinction between nontraditional security, involving issues that connect new traditional security studies, and the broader human security approach that invites viewing everything as a security issue. Li’s work markedly contrasts with the highly traditional (in some cases, essentially nineteenth-century) work that dominates Russian approaches, particularly government-authorized studies. Russia’s slow adjustment to the new security agenda has caused them to lose valuable time in responding to growing threats and to adopt ineffective—often Soviet—solutions.

Russia’s demographic and human capital challenges threaten the country’s capacity to be a great power and increasingly threaten its position as a regional power capable of stabilizing Eurasia. Russia’s leaders continue to perceive Russian security in terms of the country’s relationship with NATO. Despite the understandable concern about NATO’s activities in Kosovo and Iraq, and U.S. President George W. Bush’s preference for unilateral action, NATO does not represent a security threat. Russian policymakers’ excessive focus on NATO caused them to egregiously misjudge the impact of EU expansion. Russian leaders began assessing the problems that restricted population movement and changed economic relationships that were generated only as accession for ten new members, including eight former Soviet bloc countries, became imminent. Further, they ignored the degree to which the new EU members could influence policy and make the union suspicious of, if not directly hostile toward, Russia. As late as 2007, then–Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested that Ukraine should join the EU, but drew a firm line against it joining NATO.

Russian policy in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has been equally short-sighted. Russia’s inability to meet personnel needs for the military and the labor force in the coming decades suggests that Russia’s optimal strategy would be a major program to foster economic development and close relations in Central Asia—a region with a large and growing population, much of it still Russian-speaking. With the exception of Kazakhstan, this will prove difficult, but a genuine economic assistance effort could
eventually produce the basis for a Eurasian common market and cooperative security environment. An approach that seeks to weaken neighboring states will inevitably result in greater problems for Russia itself.

The former superpower’s policy community appears almost incapable of altering their assumptions about Russia’s role. Alexei Arbatov’s writings provide an excellent example of analysis starting from the assumption that Russia is a great power and the international system should adjust accordingly. Rather than evaluating Russian capabilities and options, he repeats warnings about the baleful effects of NATO expansion on arms control and Russian policy. His argument is that NATO is driving Russia to do things that it is not capable of doing and therefore NATO, not Russia’s leaders, will be responsible for the consequences.67

Despite the substantial literature on Eurasia’s special character,68 Russia is far from being the first case of when leaders of a major power find it difficult to adjust to what Yegor Gaidar calls “Post-Imperial Syndrome.”69 In Spain, Britain, and France, statesmen have undertaken defense commitments when they were fully aware that they did not have the resources to uphold them.70 Charles Kupchan, seeking to explain why elites would adhere to policies that inevitably weaken the state, notes that French and British elites “reacted to decline by demonstrating hypersensitivity to issues of national prestige and reputation. The preservation of prestige was one of the key reasons that both Britain and France clung desperately to their peripheral empires.”71 Financial and industrial elites may drive this process for economic reasons, a situation that Jack Snyder termed “cartelization.”72

Another possible explanation for Russian leaders’ insistence on chasing the great power chimera is that the country is now a democracy and is giving the people what they demand. This argument is at best ambiguous. Polling data does show that a majority of Russians regard national greatness as an important goal. Yuri Levada’s surveys found that 58 percent of Russians wanted the president to restore the country to great-power status.73 These data may reflect deeply held views, or they may indicate that Russian leaders successfully used the media to constantly promote this theme.74 It would take sophisticated panel data to determine whether the Russian public has shifted its views because of a reassessment of their expectations of Russia’s role in the world or as a result of a popular president emphasizing this theme. Putin began stressing Russia’s great-power status while still prime minister, and the theme persisted throughout his tenure in office. As Vitkowskaia argues, many Russians base their opinions of immigration on the leadership’s discourse.75 President Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s successor, has sounded similar themes, envisioning Russia as the world’s new financial center.76

Discussions of imperial decline have focused primarily on the loss of relative economic capacity to maintain primacy.77 Statesmen might be forgiven for failing to recognize changes that take place over an extended period and only become clear when a powerful competitor has already achieved a stronger position. Sometimes the data are ambiguous. Paul Kennedy was correct that the USSR was overextended, but contrary to his prediction, the United States became even more powerful in the 1990s as the hyperpower in a unipolar world.78 The Soviet demise, however, was clear enough and rapid enough that there should be little doubt about its significance. The Russian economy’s performance after 1998 is impressive, but it represents recovery growth, with most improvement derived from the ruble devaluation and natural resources, especially hydrocarbons. Productivity
has somewhat increased, along with increased investment and diversification since 2000, but development of the real economy is at best just beginning. The structural problems remain enormous. Since the industrial revolution, no nation has built a great-power economy on commodities.

It may be asking too much for a superpower’s heirs to do better than other former great powers’ leaders in lowering their expectations, but if Russia truly is a unique nation, more unique than all the other unique nations, this would be a good opportunity to demonstrate that uniqueness. Otherwise, dealing with Russia’s decline will be a major item on the twenty-first century’s security agenda.

The Special Section

This section’s four articles offer examples of linkages between traditional and new approaches to politics and security. Alexander Etkind and Andrei Shcherbak blend a cultural studies approach with mainstream political science to help elucidate Russian political processes. They portray the evolving political environment as an interrelated double monopoly encompassing energy and security. The Russian state controls oil and gas, which do not require a large labor pool or a highly educated population to produce large profits. They do require security, supplied in part by large groups of young men who also provide support for the regime and help define its culture.

While the regime intended to institutionalize the “double monopoly,” Ukraine’s Orange Revolution served as the catalyst for fully deploying the technologies. Ivan Krastev characterized Ukraine’s democratization as “Russia’s 9/11.” The pro-Putin youth group Nashi was fostered by Kremlin advisors who stated that if opponents brought 100,000 young people into the streets in Moscow, the regime would counter with 200,000. Etkind and Shchebak show how Russia’s reaction to the Orange Revolution became institutionalized in a way that has caused the reaction to persist even as Ukraine’s democratic “revolution” has looked increasingly tarnished.

The article was written during Putin’s second presidential term, and refers to the presidential administration as the focal point for deploying the double monopoly and accompanying political technologies. Since Medvedev’s election, the government has “redecorated,” with Putin’s new apparat in the prime minister’s office providing much of the guidance. Etkind predicted at least some of the change, forecasting the appearance of a new “secretary general.” The new presidium is a logical corollary.

Vadim Volkov employs a unique approach to political economy, comparing early capitalism in America and Russia. He views Standard Oil’s demise as structurally similar to the Yukos affair. In both instances, weak state capacity encouraged tenacious individuals to use the available resources—including corrupt judicial authorities and force—to forge large corporations with vast economic and political ambitions.

Volkov notes that the two situations are not entirely comparable. His critics will point out that the battles over the Erie and Pennsylvania railroads were fought in courts, not in the White House, and that American presidents did not routinely intervene to determine ownership or nationalize private corporations. The Roosevelts were already wealthy enough that they did not seek personal profit from antitrust actions and recognized that their own property rights could be jeopardized if antitrust actions challenged basic ownership rights. Volkov’s comments about Rockefeller being more wealthy a decade after
Standard Oil’s breakup may be read as an affirmation of the goal to end monopoly, rather than to destroy wealth.

Eduard Ponarin takes on the intricately intertwined issues of Islam and nationalism, using the Republic of Tatarstan as his case study. Tatarstani President Mintamir Shamiev sought to use assertive Tatarstani nationalists to pressure Boris Yeltsin to make concessions when he negotiated Tatarstan’s power-sharing treaty. But those same nationalists also stood to become a threat to Shamiev, particularly when Islam became part of the nationalist agenda. The Tatarstan story in the 1990s mirrors Yeltsin’s advocacy of centrifugal forces in his struggle with Gorbachev and then his endeavor to curtail autonomy once he emerged victorious. When the USSR was gone, regional sovereignty, particularly in ethnic-based and Muslim republics, looked quite different to Yeltsin. So, too, for Shamiev: The Tatarstani nationalists were useful as long as he could point to them as a reason why the federal government should make concessions, but a Soviet holdover like Shamiev would never accept their limiting his power within the republic.

Shamiev sought to foster a tame variant of Islam. His advisor, Rafael Khakimov, developed a neo-Jaddid formula that he labeled “Euro-Islam” (perhaps evincing an imperfect understanding of Islam’s European development).

Anna Temkina and Elena Zdravomyslova provide a thick description of what goes on in prenatal facilities as women consider pregnancy and endure the medical processes related to childbirth. Some of the descriptions they present may at times remind Western readers of films like Hospital or The Barbarian Invasion. Others might note that, like the campaign against smoking, concern for bedside manner was a post–World War II phenomenon that is now taken for granted. But the cumulative effect of what Temkina and Zdravomyslova describe goes further. In a country that identified demographic decline as among its most serious problems, the women’s voices presented in this research cannot be ignored without serious repercussions. There is a glaring contradiction between the emphasis on “modernization,” which will generate growing numbers of educated, assertive young women, and old-style pronatalist policies. No government cheerleading or modest financial incentives will induce educated women to subject themselves more frequently to the sort of treatment described here.

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NOTES

1. The rapid shift from Socialism to a market economy, which came to be called by the unfortunate term “shock therapy,” is outlined in Jeffrey Sachs, Poland’s Jump to the Market Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). For an extensive critique characterizing the approach as “market bolshevism,” see Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press). The “classic” studies of transition include Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C.


5. Ibid., 130.


7. In the early 1980s, Ullman still suggested that “one approach to the resource problem is slowing the growth of demand by slowing the growth of population.” See Ullman, “Redefining Security,” 145. This no longer seems plausible. Europe, Russia, and Japan have declining (or negative) population growth among “native” groups. Slowing third-world population growth appears to require turning them into postindustrial societies as quickly as possible, but this puts an even greater strain on resources. Greater affluence increases the demand for commodities at the same time it creates a declining birth rate.


9. Ibid., 203.


11. Ullman, “Russia, the West, and the Redefinition of Security,” 204–05.


13. Russia is an epicenter of MDR TB, stemming from the failure of patients to take the full regimen of drugs prescribed for treatment of tuberculosis. The problem has been particularly severe

16. Ibid., 173.
17. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Power Shift,” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 (1997): 50–66. Mathew’s specific policy recommendations are: (1) include resource depletion in GNP calculations, (2) develop solid indicators for global environmental health, (3) rely on nonstate actors for development assistance, (4) orient scientific-technical capabilities to the developing world’s problems, (5) adapt diplomacy and regulatory regimes to cope with environmental problems, and (6) focus on regional solutions (transcend borders). Also see Mathews, “Redefining Security,” 173–76.

These recommendations represent additional tasks, functions, and responsibilities beyond security studies’ traditional domain. Although, in a few instances (e.g., redirecting scientific efforts) the recommendations involve directly reallocating specific resources, the list mostly calls for new types of activity in addition to the existing security burden. It asks security studies professionals to do something other than what they have traditionally done, at a time when many perceive the traditional dangers to be greater than ever before.

21. Ibid., 47, 58. Levy concludes that we need to understand regional conflict, not the environment.
22. Ibid., 40.
23. Ibid., 40–41.
27. Ibid., 25.
29. A “speech act” is used to legitimate a claim to special powers and resources to resources to counter threats. “A threat exists because an audience has been convinced it exists by the elite and they have granted the elite the authority to use emergency powers to counter the threat. The threat therefore is not something that simply exists; it has to be articulated as a threat for it to become a matter of security.” See Alan Collins, “What is Security Studies?” in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Alan Collins, 6 (New York: Oxford University Press). For discussions of securitization treating the Copenhagen School and the Iraq War, see Ralf Emmers, “Securitization,” in Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, 109–25.
31. Ibid., 1–3.
33. Ibid., 23.
37. The “enemy other” is any person that is “in a specifically intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in extreme cases, conflicts with him are possible.” See Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 27.
43. Ibid., 7.
44. Ibid.
49. Irina D. Zviagelskaia and Vitali V. Naumkin, “Non-Traditional Threats, Challenges, and Risks in the Former Soviet South,” in Menon, Fedorov, and Nodia, *Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia*, 245.
50. Ibid. Compare with Levy’s privileging of climate change and ozone depletion. Both assertions are equally plausible and unfalsifiable.


52. Vitkovskaia, who focuses on lawlessness, environmental dangers, and center-periphery relations, suggests that “the remoteness of the region from the central authorities makes some of these threats even more dangerous than traditional geopolitical threats.” Ibid., 179–80.

53. A. V. Vakhrameev, “Nationalnaia bezopasnost Rossyskoi Federatsy (deklaratsy i realnost)” [National Security in the Russian Federation], *Sotsialno-gumanitarnye znanya* 2001, no. 3 (2001): 65–79. Vakhrameev makes a solid case regarding the need for limited aspirations, but also argues that the Russian state must protect Russians living in former republics, pay scientists at unrealistic Soviet-era levels, and essentially reconstitute much of the Soviet economic system without again becoming the USSR.

54. See Reddaway, *The Economics of a Declining Population*.


59. Ibid., 6.

60. Ibid., 12. Chinese reaction to their work has been, unsurprisingly, negative. Chinese demographers point out that China is about to experience the most rapid aging of any society in history because of the one-child policy, and that young men will need to care for their parents and grandparents rather than engage in warfare. These points are certainly important, but do not address the problem of mateless males that Hudson and Den Boer raise. See Joseph Kahn, “The World: China’s Time Bomb; The Most Populous Nation Faces a Population Crisis,” *New York Times*, May 30, 2004.


62. Hudson and Den Boer, “A Surplus of Men,” 15; cf. M. Steven Fish, “Islam and Authoritarianism,” *World Politics* 55, no. 1 (2002): 4–37. The gender imbalance that Hudson and Den Boer described could have an impact on Russia because of its geographic proximity to the major surplus male countries. Russia’s own gender imbalance—a surplus of females—occurs among the demographic that is thirty-five and older, so Russian women are unlikely to constitute a source of spouses. To the extent that the effects Hudson and den Boer predicted materialize, however, we should expect labor migration, efforts at colonization, and the potential for instability and violence. The unfavorable ecological situation in the Chinese provinces bordering Russia is likely to exacerbate negative developments.


65. Putin also initially spoke favorably about Central European and Baltic countries joining the EU.


71. Ibid.


74. The same poll found that great power status had replaced ending the war in Chechnya as the number one concern. The major Russian television stations have managed to convince most Russians that the war in Chechnya is over. This would indeed be news to most Chechens. Polls in the early 1990s did not show a similar yearning for great power status.


84. In 1902, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt formulated the issues in a way that both supports Volkov’s arguments about state building and emphasizes the difference from the Russian case: “Corporations, and especially combinations of corporations, should be managed under public regulation. Experience has shown that under our system of government the necessary supervision
can not be obtained by State [U.S. states’] action. It must therefore be achieved by national action.” He went on to emphasize that “we can do nothing of good in the way of regulating and supervising these corporations until we fix clearly in our minds that we’re not attacking the corporations, but endeavoring to do away with any evil in them.” See Maury Klein, The Genesis of Industrial America, 1870–1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 150.