The Problem of Lasting Change
Civil Society and the Colored Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine

NICKLAUS LAVERY

Abstract: Civil society played a vital role in the colored revolutions of Georgia and Ukraine, exemplified by the activism of the youth groups Kmara and Pora. As democratic reform has stalled, however, these groups have found themselves increasingly marginalized because of the reemergence of authoritarian practices and elites. Only the renewed inclusion of civil society can restore the democratization process.

Keywords: civil society, colored revolutions, democratization, protest, public sphere, social movements

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, popular mobilization has played a key part in effecting change in the post-Soviet states. The first instances were seen during the collapse of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, epitomized by the activism of Solidarity in Poland, but as post-Soviet states disappointed expectations of democratic change, such activism has been redirected at the successor regimes, often to great effect. The most recent events that fit this description have been generally referred to as the “colored revolutions,” arguably inaugurated with the electoral revolutions in Bulgaria (1996–97), Slovakia and Croatia (1998–99), and the nonviolent ouster of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia in 2000.1 Partly inspired by the Serbian example, nonviolent regime changes occurred in Georgia in 2003 (the Rose Revolution), Ukraine in 2004–05 (the Orange Revolution), and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 (the Tulip Revolution). There were also unsuccessful attempts in Uzbekistan and Belarus in 2005 and 2006. These events have captured the attention and imagination of many international observers, who have speculated that the colored revolutions might represent the beginning of a new wave of democratization. This article’s purpose is twofold. First, I examine the role of social movements and civil society in sparking the colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, focusing specifically on the activities of the youth groups Kmara (“Enough”) and Pora (“It’s Time”). Most conventional accounts of the two revolutions focus primarily on the proximate causes (fraud, corruption, etc.) or the nature of the organized political opposition, spending less time on the strategies and tactics employed by civil society and social-movement actors.

Nicklaus Laverty is a doctoral student in political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He is also a Jack Kent Cooke graduate scholar. Copyright © 2008 Heldref Publications
I will use new social movement theory to explore how these groups took advantage of political opportunities, acquired and used repertoires of contention, and interacted with conventional actors and the media. This requires examining how the post-Soviet period shaped the revolutions’ political context.

Second, I look at each revolution’s aftermath to determine how successful each has been in promoting effective change. Both Georgia and Ukraine experienced problems with democratization because of the new regime’s actions while in office (Georgia) or the resurgence of the previous authoritarian elites (Ukraine). It is important to account for these difficulties, and determine what role (if any) civil society has played in the post-colored revolution political environment. If accounts of the revolutions rely too heavily on analysis of the regime and the opposition, this interpretation is even more prevalent in postrevolution political developments. Does this empirical silence mean civil society is no longer seeking an active role in the political process or does it mean that the state is actively excluding civil society from playing such a role? Could it indicate that the revolutionary governments have effectively coopted civil society, absorbing it into political society? I aim to answer these questions to create a more complex picture of the type of change that has resulted from the colored revolutions.

**Theoretical Framework**

This article, and the theoretical framework that undergirds it, is divided into two parts—prerevolution and postrevolution. Examining the prerevolution situations in Georgia and Ukraine, I use the new social movement theory, as characterized by Sidney Tarrow’s book *Power in Movement*, to provide a framework for understanding popular and political mobilization and how such mobilization can effect political change. Before new social movement theory began to make an impact, many accounts of political change relied on a top-down account, with the bargaining and actions of political elites given the most importance. The role of elites is far from irrelevant to the Georgian and Ukrainian cases, but focusing on such bargaining alone would produce an impoverished account of such exciting and dynamic political events. To help remedy this difficulty, I offer a bottom-up account focusing on the roles Kmara and Pora played in exploiting political opportunities leading up to the revolutions. Although the scale of these revolutions were very different (the Rose Revolution attracted at most 100,000 participants while the Orange Revolution engaged nearly 20 percent of Ukraine’s population), a similar framework can be employed in both cases.

Tarrow identified four key dimensions in successful social movements. First is the presence of a political opportunity structure. This term can be understood very broadly—and very subjectively—as the presence of conditions that contribute to a favorable context for change. Other scholars have criticized such broadness, but it offers an indispensable flexibility in assessing very different political contexts while pursuing comparative study. It could be said both Georgia and Ukraine shared similar political opportunity structures: corruption and electoral fraud rendered the regimes susceptible to popular challenge. It is also important to integrate the differences of the two cases—namely, the difference in the relative strengths of the state and civil society (in Georgia, the state was weak and civil society strong while in Ukraine the opposite held true)—while still being able to hold to the concept of political opportunity structure. This allows us to consider and compare the different repertoires of contention, Tarrow’s second dimension, and their adaptation to dif-
different political opportunities. Repertoires of contention are the strategies and the tactics that social movements use to produce political change. Both Kmara and Pora derived their repertoires of contention from the same source (Otpor and prior colored revolution groups) while native strategies allowed them to cope with the different nature of their respective political opportunities.

Social movements and civil society groups do not conduct their campaigns separate from society as a whole, however, so Tarrow’s third and fourth dimensions, mobilizing structures and framing, must also be taken into account. Mobilizing structures are often institutions or organizations that provide movements with a vehicle for their political action, such as friendly media outlets, allied or even neutral nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or opposition political parties. Without these kinds of structures, movements are often unable to build a sustainable coalition capable of effecting real change. Kmara and Pora profitably used all three of the above types of institutions to varying degrees; without them, success would have been unthinkable. All these strategic and structural elements are tied together by framing—how the movement communicates its goals to society at large. It would be inappropriate to reduce this to ideology, although it is often an important component. Instead, it should be viewed as what elements of protest the movement emphasizes and broadcasts with the hope of finding an appeal that resonates with a substantial portion of the populace. In Georgia’s case, the relatively prominent focus was on administrative corruption, while the Ukrainian coalition focused more on the blatant fraud committed by Kuchma and Yanukovych and how it affected democracy. After evaluating these four dimensions of social movements, we can begin to understand the success of the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.

Social movement theory is not sufficient for explaining the postrevolutionary situation, however, because it serves as a heuristic device for understanding conditions leading up to the moment of political change, not beyond. Although it can elucidate the situations in Georgia and Ukraine and their respective revolutions, we require another analytical tool for understanding the success or failure of the revolutions in producing lasting change. Democracy and democratization are not simply qualities that culminate in a final, definitive form, but are instead dynamic processes requiring continual participation, contestation, and improvement. To adequately understand the postrevolutionary situations in Georgia and Ukraine, we must employ the concept of the public sphere. Without the concept of the public sphere, the concept of civil society is hollow for political analysis. The contemporary notion of the public sphere is derived from Jurgen Habermas’s *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, where he describes the sphere as a public place existing between state and society where individuals engage in rational critical debate on political issues, constituting a “public opinion” that exercises influence over the state. The public sphere can provide a form of political participation (and education) necessary to the functioning of democracy even after the social movement has successfully undertaken political action.

Habermas’s formulation of the public sphere has been subject to various challenges, including Leonardo Avritzer’s argument that it (and existing democratization theory) does not take into account the different experiences of late democratizers. Avritzer identifies part of the problem as being the tradition of democratic elitism, which conceptualizes elites as the primary movers of democratization, whereas in the post-Soviet world, elites often become a major impediment to democratization. According to Avritzer, this problem is
not solved through the democratic transition paradigm often applied to late democratizers, which posits the possibility of nondemocratic elites, because this body of theory does not fully address the issue of popular participation and the public sphere. This omission of the public sphere in many ways captures the problems experienced by civil society in Georgia and Ukraine, and how such problems thus far have been only inadequately addressed analytically.

Avritzer’s solution to the elite-masses distinction that clouds traditional democratic theory is to more fully include the public sphere, while also modifying the concept beyond what Habermas intended. Habermas’s conception of the public sphere only possesses discursive power: it seeks to transmit influence to the state. This is lacking in the post-Soviet environment of semiclosed political institutions because the public sphere does not possess the faculties of deliberation, decision making, and oversight, and without these, the state retains the ability to ignore the public sphere’s input. Avritzer, conversely, proposes that we imbue the public sphere with these greater powers through the creation of political institutions that can be used by “participatory publics.” This allows the state to retain its administrative capacities while civil society possesses the institutionalized ability to ensure accountability from state bodies. Operating within this framework offers a novel way of understanding the postrevolutionary situations in both Georgia and Ukraine. The problems described later—the absorption of civil society by the Georgian state and the exclusion of civil society in Ukraine because of structural and political divisions—may have been avoided if the newly ascendant revolutionary coalitions had realized the importance of continued political participation by implementing something akin to Avritzer’s participatory publics, rather than simply assuming the day was already won.

Trouble on the Black Sea

What gave rise to the political opportunity that the Rose Revolutionaries exploited, if political opportunity is understood as a change in the usually stable conditions of state structures and political cleavages? Most accounts discuss a confluence of factors, including economic problems, corruption, the weakness of the Georgian state, and an increase in nondemocratic practices in the late 1990s and early in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Most of these problems were interrelated and stemmed from problems with the state budget and public financing in the early 1990s, which laid the groundwork for the 1998–2003 budget crisis. The budget crisis produced economic stagnation—disastrous for a nation that was already poor following the collapse of the USSR. The poverty rate hovered at around 50 percent, which led to social unrest. In addition to Georgia’s fiscal problems, it also suffered from endemic administrative corruption, which further exacerbated social unrest. As officials enriched themselves at the public’s expense, the state failed to provide basic public goods while the public sector atrophied (presumably one of the reasons why the regime was unable to crack down during the revolution). Absent the ability to provide public services or enforce its will, the Eduard Shevardnadze regime increasingly came to rely on electoral fraud and violations to remain in power, as evidenced by the brisk decline in the quality of elections from when Shevardnadze came to power until his fall in 2003.

The weakness of the state actually served to strengthen the emergent civil society, unlike in many other post-Soviet societies where stronger states managed to assert some control. Civil society in Georgia is rooted in the informal networks of the late Soviet period, which
later became NGOs that dealt with more explicitly political issues. As the state reconstituted itself in the mid-1990s, its conscious identification with democracy and Europe preserved the NGOs’ autonomy, allowing them to grow. Even as the regime began to drift away from these commitments, the weakness of the state and the relative strength of civil society made it difficult for the government to coopt the sector, so instead it seemed to merely ignore NGOs as a force in the political process, a mistake for which the regime would later pay. Although the regime eventually recognized civil society’s importance and attempted to suppress it, these attempts were usually limited to passing laws the state could not enforce, such as strengthened libel statutes, and disseminating propaganda to discredit the groups, usually by painting them as foreign agents. These efforts were ineffectual and probably convinced major civil society actors and the political opposition that the regime had to go.

Many different groups sought to take advantage of the political opportunity caused by these factors; one of the most interesting of these groups was the student organization Kvma. Kvma began as an advocacy group called the Georgia Students Movement at Tbilisi State University in 2000. The group campaigned against corruption in higher education and quickly began criticizing the Georgian political system as a whole, especially when the regime attempted to exert control over the largest and most important independent (and pro-opposition) television station, Rustavi 2, in 2001. Kvma emerged with the Georgia Students Movement at its core in 2003, but also incorporated student groups from across the country thereby giving it a national reach. It was structured in a highly horizontal fashion to frustrate regime attempts of repression and stimulate autonomous action and participation through a number of different methods. The group’s first actions took place in April 2003, when they marched to the state chancellery on the anniversary of the 1978 Georgian student demonstrations to build up and mobilize in anticipation of the November 2003 parliamentary elections. At the time, Kvma’s methods of protest seemed limited to graffiti and symbolic acts, such as burning flags. To build up their repertoire of contention, Kvma activists traveled to Serbia to consult with activists within the dissident Otpor movement and had Otpor activists visit Georgia in the summer of 2003 to train Kvma in methods of nonviolent protest. Otpor’s influence is very evident in how Kvma conducted itself before, during, and after the parliamentary elections, including the group’s use of humor and mass entertainment to sustain mobilization and assault political apathy, and its assiduous discipline in maintaining order and promoting itself to the media (developing its brand).

The cultural politics inherent in Kvma’s use of humor, mass entertainment, and art appear especially crucial to the group’s successful mobilization strategy. The Soviet experience left citizens weary and distrustful of political participation, which made it difficult for groups to mobilize support and easy for semiautocratic post-Soviet regimes to clamp down on dissent. The strategy derived from Otpor, however, combated this difficulty in
two distinct ways. First, it mobilized disinterested groups by engaging in fun activities such as rock concerts or getting cultural figures such as musicians, poets, and authors to campaign on behalf of the group, while also performing important community functions that the regime would not, such as organizing book drives for schools and performing trash collection, to highlight the group’s sincerity. Humor (such as daily circulated jokes or amusing graffiti) further lightened the mood and also caused citizens to begin viewing their governments in an absurd light, which was conducive to activism. Second, it made it more difficult for the regime to repress protests by creating an atmosphere more akin to a carnival than a political demonstration. When the government sought to restrain mock funerals or toilet humor directed at the state in a limited way, it reflected poorly on the regime’s ability to tolerate even nonthreatening activism. Pora and the Orange revolutionaries later adopted much the same tactics in their own revolution, and even succeeded in effectively harnessing star power for their cause when they were able to gain the support and active involvement of Ruslana, the energetic Eurovision contest winner. Both groups employed a form of cultural politics that successfully addressed the largest political problems of post-Soviet political culture: citizen apathy and the heavy hand of state involvement.

Protest and opposition activities before and after the election, which made clear that widespread fraud had been committed, attested to Kmara’s and other groups’ increasing organizational sophistication. These included widespread protests in June 2003, when Kmara and other groups articulated the demand that the Georgian Central Election Commission be changed to include more independent oversight. When it became clear the authorities would not concede to such a demand, groups turned their attention to organizing independent exit polls and observers to unmask fraud once it occurred. In this capacity, Kmara worked with other groups, including the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, who managed to supply several thousand volunteer observers and set up a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) operation, which Kmara publicized on distributed flyers after the fraud was committed. Foreign NGOs such as the British Council, the Open Society Georgia Foundation, and the Eurasia Foundation also conducted exit polls, which helped to legitimize the opposition’s claims. In conjunction with these more technical procedures of the opposition, Kmara also engaged in more traditional protest tactics, including a coordinating role in the protests at Freedom Square on November 17, 2003 which drew more than 50,000 people, and later protests attracting at least 100,000 participants. One move that was especially humiliating to the regime was when the opposition managed to gather a million signatures on a petition demanding that Shevardnadze resign after he had derisively suggested that such a number would be a better expression of opposition than a few groups and politicians getting up in arms.

While it was not Kmara and civil society alone that brought about the Rose Revolution, these groups were a vital part of the network that was mobilized in opposition to the regime. This mobilizing structure arose as an alliance between groups such as Kmara, opposition parties, nonpartisan NGOs, and the media, and it allowed these diverse components to overcome their own differences by framing the Rose Revolution as a broader problem concerning both democracy and, more crucial, corruption. When Kmara was first forming, it enjoyed the assistance of both the National Movement (Saakashvili’s party) and the United Democrats, who augmented Kmara’s numbers during protest actions and provided valuable logistical assistance. Saakashvili’s strategy during the 2003 election effectively aided Kmara by broadening the public sphere; without viable opposition
parties, Kmara’s efficacy would have been highly unlikely. Rustavi 2, the previously beleaguered television station Kmara and others successfully defended in 2001, also provided a vital source of information and a venue for both the opposition and civil society groups. Foreign NGOs, such as those previously listed, also played a significant role, but one that is far different than is sometimes portrayed by critics of the revolution, including Russia. Instead of funneling monetary assistance to the opposition, most Western funding was directed toward technical ends, and none of the $4.6 million from foreign sources went to Kmara. As Kmara activist Giorgi Kandelaki observed, Western NGOs were generally constrained by their elitism and their caution when it came to directly funding the opposition. Although the U.S. government sympathized with the opposition, it did not want to risk its relationship with Shevardnadze if the protests failed.

Kmara and other civil society groups, coordinating with the opposition parties, acted as a crucial component to the Rose Revolution’s success. The political opportunity arose because of the economic and administrative failings of the Georgian state, which was subsequently unable to exert enough force to stop the protests. Using a repertoire of contention largely inspired by Otpor’s role in the Serbian protests of 2000, Kmara morphed from a political neophyte group with limited influence to a sophisticated organization with the ability to challenge the state. The same sort of influences and organizational transformation also worked for the Ukrainian student group Pora, which bears a striking resemblance to the experiences of its Georgian cousin.

**Overcoming “Virtual Politics”**

The emergence of political opportunity in Ukraine relied more on political problems, such as nondemocratic practices, rather than economic problems and corruption. Although economic problems and corruption were present—Ukraine experienced corruption through the influence of clan-linked oligarchs and local political machines—these were less important causes of the Orange Revolution. Post-Soviet Ukraine’s political problems largely concern the use of political violence (especially during the Leonid Kuchma regime), and blatant electoral fraud and manipulation. The most shocking instance of these tactics was demonstrated when dissident journalist Hryhoriy Gongadze was savagely murdered in 2000 after launching a Web site that delved into the seamier side of Ukrainian politics. The regime’s complicity in this brutal act came to light when Mykola Melnychenko released transcripts of secret tapes recorded in the presidential office, which also revealed Kuchma’s role behind fraud in the 1999 presidential elections. The release of the tapes sparked a protest movement in west-central Ukraine—which later became the epicenter of the Orange Revolution—called “Ukraine without Kuchma.” Although it did not succeed in its objective, the protest signaled the popular mood, which was darkened further when the regime effectively stole the 2002 parliamentary election by using “administrative resources” to dominate the single member district portion of the ballot even after it suffered a stunning defeat in the Party of the Regions (PR) portion.

This was all prologue to the 2004 presidential elections, when the scale of fraud dramatically increased to ensure the successful succession of Viktor Yanukovych. Kuchma’s handpicked heir. With the memories of the 2002 elections still fresh, an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians believed a free election was effectively impossible, with only 15 percent disagreeing. Furthermore, Yanukovych was an unwise choice as an heir, given his criminal background, tendency toward thuggish language, and his close connections to
the corrupt Donetsk clan (his popularity among the electorate did not redeem these traits, as he appealed to just 44 percent of the populace in 2004 and 32 percent in 2006). Such an unlikely candidate required a great deal of prior planning, as Taras Kuzio writes:

That there was such a setup becomes evident if one looks at the amount of planning needed to organize Ukraine’s dirtiest election, the involvement of Russian political “advisers,” and the massive use of slush funds. The financial and logistical complexity of supporting the sixteen “technical candidates” (Potemkin candidates used to divert votes from Yushchenko), the massive abuse of state administrative resources, the hostile television and media campaigns directed against Yushchenko, the use of a transit server located in the presidential administration to massage the vote, and many other factors testify to the extent of the advance planning to steal the election.

When the authorities pulled off the huge fraud in the second round of the elections (Viktor Yushchenko and Yanukovych had “tied” in the first round with neither receiving a majority of votes), no one was surprised and the situation was ripe for unrest. An independent NGO suggested that up to 2.8 million ballots had been falsified in Yanukovych’s favor, mainly through absentee ballots and manipulated turnout rates in Yanukovych strongholds in eastern Ukraine. When the Central Election Commission (CEC) announced the results, only about 13 percent polled believed them to be legitimate, indicating extensive distrust from both sides, with each assuming the other committed the fraud. All of this opened up immense political opportunity for both civil society and the political opposition.

The primary movement that emerged to take advantage of this opportunity was the group Pora, a radical student organization very similar to Kmara. This is not surprising, because younger people overwhelmingly preferred Yushchenko and were generally disgusted with Yanukovych. Many of these young people became the Orange Revolution’s foot soldiers. Pora is comprised of two groups that came together for the purpose of the 2004 election, but, in contrast to Kmara, the groups retained some operational autonomy. The first group, Black Pora, was composed of veterans of the “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign and took responsibility for some of the more subversive antiregime actions and refused to openly associate with the opposition coalition of Our Ukraine, Yushchenko’s party, and Blok Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT). Black Pora’s members were generally younger student activists of the Otpor/Kmara type. Yellow Pora was much more organized and media savvy and overtly coordinated with the political opposition, especially after electoral fraud was committed. Yellow Pora’s members were older, linked to the Lviv-based For Truth NGO, and included individuals with operational links to Yushchenko, such as Taras Stetskiv. This organizational duality served Pora’s purposes rather well, as it was able to balance between provocation and moderation accordingly. Pora’s overall strategy was modeled on Otpor’s and Kmara’s emphasis on nonviolence and humor, making it difficult for the regime to crack down on it. As with Kmara, Pora’s actions dovetailed neatly with
the activities of more neutral NGOs, such as Znayu (“I Know”), which emphasized voter participation and electoral oversight.50

In contrast to Georgia, however, NGOs and civil society groups faced a very different general atmosphere in Ukraine. The Ukrainian regime did not have to contend with problems of weakness in the same way the Shevardnadze regime did, partly because Ukraine did not have to deal with significant territorial separatism, although regional and linguistic divides play a large role in Ukrainian politics, and partly because Moscow exerted more control over Kyiv before the USSR’s collapse. Consequently, civil society did not enjoy the same sort of autonomy in Ukraine; it was relatively shallow and weak. If associational density is vital for the efficacy of civil society in influencing the state, Ukrainian civil society’s relative immaturity was a challenge for collective action and political change.51 According to Michael Walzer, such density is necessary if civil society is to successfully act as a pluralizing force, civilize the public sphere, and aid the development of democracy.52 Part of this problem can be seen in the Ukrainian regime’s vigorous response to civil society’s activities, including raiding NGO offices prior to the election and arresting movement activists.53 The regime was so concerned about Pora that it actually planted explosives in the group’s office so that it could claim the group was planning to engage in antiregime violence.54 These actions only succeeded in turning more people against the regime, demonstrating how much worse the Ukrainian situation was overall.

Given all these difficulties, it is truly astonishing how successful the opposition coalition was during the Orange Revolution. With the lessons learned from the “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign (the ineffectiveness of the tent city, the need for better coordination), which drew between 20,000 and 50,000 people,55 and large preelection rallies held as trial runs,56 the opposition coalition of Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and Pora demonstrated highly sophisticated organizational skills. As the CEC announced the preliminary results, between 200,000 and 300,000 protesters occupied Kyiv’s Independence Square (The Maidan).57 As the numbers grew (to more than 500,000 in many estimates), the coalition set about creating a division of labor to organize and maintain the protests.58 Yushchenko generally remained above the protest actions by adhering to the constitutional high ground and appealing to domestic and foreign elites, while Yulia Tymoshenko spent more time in the trenches stirring up trouble through inflammatory speeches. Pora served as the glue of the demonstrations by ensuring there was no drinking and no violence, while also striving to avoid confrontation with the police and identify agent provocateurs.59 The student organization also used its Internet prowess to stage a highly effective media campaign.60 The unity displayed by the coalition was crucial—especially because it overcame severe ideological differences—in pressuring the regime, which opened up the political space that made it possible for the Rada to dismiss Yanukovych as prime minister and for the Supreme Court to eventually void the electoral results.61

Civil society also overcame the accusation that groups like Pora were cover groups for Western interests. This accusation appeared somewhat foolish because Russian political “technologists” like Marat Gelman and Gleb Pavlovsky intervened so heavily on the side of Yanukovych, but it reflects the fact that it was almost taken as a given that the United States and Western Europe had stage managed the Rose Revolution.62 Any actual relationship between Western interests and the opposition coalition was minimal; no Western groups contributed to Pora63 and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) only
spent about $350,000 in Ukraine from 2001–04. As NED Director for Eastern and Central Europe Nadia Diuk put it:

We have been working in Ukraine since 1989. As in Russia, our programs there have a limited character. In the current situation in Ukraine we are occupied with monitoring the election, conducting parallel vote counts and exit polls. But you know, neither our modest organization nor all of the Western foundations together could bring a million people out on the streets. Ukrainian freedom like any other has a local origin. You can’t import freedom and the struggle for it. Would hundreds of thousands of Muscovites really come out for a meeting with Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Sakharov for money?

As in Georgia, the Orange Revolution depended on the mobilizing structure of domestic opposition networks (political parties and civil society groups), certain repertoires of contention inherited from Otpor and Kmara, and their experiences in the “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign as a means to exploit the political opportunities brought about by gross fraud and political repression.

**Diminished Pluralism**

In the period immediately following the Rose Revolution, many encouraging signs pointed to progress in both Georgian state and society. The Saakashvili administration aggressively moved forward in an anticorruption effort to root out some of the most troubling problems of government. The economy rebounded impressively, yielding annual growth of around 7–8 percent between 2004–06, state revenue increased as the administration began to reform governmental structures, the state police force was completely refashioned (beginning with the layoff of the previous force), and the legislature began to move Georgian law closer to EU standards in the hope that one day EU accession would become a real possibility. The regime also moved to reform higher education—Kmara’s original raison d’etre—by instituting new exams and other changes through World Bank funding and vigorous NGO collaboration. Moreover, the Rose Revolutionaries consolidated their political gains by sweeping into office en masse in early 2004, as Saakashvili legitimated his administration through a rout of a presidential election and his National Movement took more than three-quarters of the seats in parliament. The administration even managed to find a resolution to one of Georgia’s nettlesome territorial disputes, in the breakaway region of Ajaria. Confidence was so high regarding the triumph of the revolution that the government established the Community of Democratic Choice, a group dedicated to advising other states in the region about civil society and democratization.

Despite these advances, power in the Georgian political system has been increasingly centralized in the executive branch and Saakashvili himself. According to Charles Kupchan, some are calling it the “Putinization” of Georgia, referring to the autocratic practices of Russia’s leader. This is reflected in the specific way in which Saakashvili is pursuing the goals of the Rose Revolution. Shortly after the revolution, Saakashvili changed the constitution, weakening the powers of parliament and reconcentrating that power in his hands, further demonstrated by the fact that under the new rules he can easily dissolve parliament while it is nearly impossible to impeach the president. These changes were largely justified by claiming that Georgia was still in a state of emergency after the revolution and thus required assertive executive power. Legal principles have not constrained the exercise of this newfound power. The previously mentioned anticorruption campaign
has been prosecuted through a mélange of extralegal procedures, including detention without due process, extortion, and search and seizures conducted without warrants. These measures do not suffer from the vulnerability of legal challenge; the judicial branch is not independent of the executive, and is thus easily intimidated. As one civil rights activist and former Saakashvili supporter put it, a regime founded on protest seems incapable of handling dissent:

Paata Zakareichvili believes that it’s too soon to use the word dictatorship here. “Autocracy is more appropriate,” he says. “Saakashvili doesn’t believe in civil rights or in governing by consent. All opposition demonstrations are quashed, and the government has reinforced a state of fear. Power is now in the hands of a nonelected elite of ministers, all personal friends of the president.”

This narrative of progress in some areas, notably corruption, and regression in other areas is largely borne out by the 2006 report of the democracy watchdog Freedom House. In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the regime resorted to torture to extract confessions from those they felt had eluded justice under Shevarnadze, and although subsequent efforts have been made to curb this practice, there are still many reported cases each year. Similarly, even though the parliament passed a new law on the freedom of speech and expression in June 2004, there has been a problem of violence against journalists, and crackdowns on lawful public demonstrations. To wit:

The government officially permits public demonstrations; however, on several occasions the police used excessive force to break up peaceful protests. In one example, law enforcement used batons to beat participants in a protest in Terjola on January 11, 2004, against imprisonment of a local man charged with firearms possession. Saakashvili later defended this violent response. On January 28, 2004, police violently dispersed the protests of street traders who were objecting to a recent decision to prohibit street trading in Tbilisi.

The Freedom House report goes on to state that while civil society possesses formal mechanisms of influence over the political process, such as public hearings and inclusion on commissions, and while the regime has consulted with NGO representatives from time to time, the greatest criticism that civil society groups level against the government is that it avoids such extensive discussion and deliberation over the most crucial policies (the constitutional amendments, for example). Although much progress has been made by the Saakashvili administration in the areas of corruption and legal reforms, the persisting challenge has been to translate reform into practice.

Ironically, part of the problem might be that the revolution was too successful—all political opponents were effectively swept aside. While the 2004 elections can be seen as the legitimization of the revolution’s goals, they were also marked by a profound lack of pluralism and reduced participation by civil society. In the absence of effective political opposition in the parliament, the onus for checking and restraining governmental power generally falls on either an independent media or groups within civil society. Tragically, it appears the media that was so vital to overthrowing the Shevardnadze regime is no longer independent. Following the revolution, the government assumed state control of the three leading television networks (something that Shevardnadze had attempted to do) while also closing down three talk shows that had traditionally been critical of government authority. According to David Zane Mairowitz, it is also possible the government has revived the Soviet era practice of exerting “telephone pressure” on journalists.
The lack of active opposition stemming from civil society as Saakashvili amasses power is largely because the regime has absorbed civil society, including groups like Kmara. According to Laurence Broers:

The flattening of the Georgian political arena also impacted NGO capacity. One of the consequences of the Revolution was the ‘decapitation’ of civil society due to the shift of a significant number of its most experienced activists into government office. Over a dozen prominent activists now hold leading posts in the new administration, including three ministries (Education, Culture and Sport, and Justice), the mayor of Tbilisi, and several members of parliament.81

While this might superficially appear to integrate civil society concerns more directly into the policymaking process, it effectively removes civil society’s most important source of power: autonomy. According to Larry Diamond, to succeed in its primary purpose of constraining and monitoring the state, civil society must be autonomous from the state but not alienated from it.82 Civil society should not seek to capture the state for itself, because it must always seek to further the public good while maintaining political pluralism and avoiding political monopoly.83 The potential problem of coordinating with political parties seems crucial in the Georgian case, given the closeness between the National Movement and groups such as Kmara: “Organizations and networks in civil society may form alliances with parties, but if they become captured by parties, or hegemonic within them, they thereby move their primary locus of activity to political society and lose much of their ability to perform certain unique mediating and democracy-building functions.”84 In the aftermath of the Rose Revolution, it appears civil society has severely compromised many of its primary functions by effectively merging with the parts of political society involved in the revolution.

Ultimately, the problems encountered by the Rose Revolutionaries in effecting lasting democratic change are connected to institutional factors, both in terms of constitutional structures and the relationship between the state, the media, and civil society. A healthy civil society fundamentally depends on the construction of healthy political institutions.85 Saakashvili has said as much, stating that effective democratic reforms require government accountability and the participation and cooperation of the public and civil society groups.86 To secure the kind of democracy and civil society the Rose Revolution initially sought, the first step should be to fix the institutional impediments, such as reversing the ill-advised constitutional changes of 2004.87 If left in place, those changes will likely lead Georgia down the same semidemocratic road that Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia have followed, where the executive has enjoyed similar advantages over the other branches of government. The next step would be akin to what James Wertsch has suggested: the creation of consultative forums where civil society could seek to deliberate with the regime without being vulnerable to cooptation.88 If the attempt to address these institutional obstacles is not made, however, the Rose Revolution may represent the transition from what Broers has called “democracy without democrats” to “democrats without democracy.”89

East versus West

If the Rose Revolution’s problems can be summarized mainly as the lack of meaningful opposition and the growing authoritarianism of the Saakashvili government, then the Orange Revolution’s problems have proven to be almost exactly the opposite. Even with
Yushchenko winning the third round of the election decisively, a healthy minority continued to back Yanukovych, making it likely that the former prime minister would stand to challenge the 2006 parliamentary elections as a Party of the Regions (PR) candidate. Moreover, Yushchenko proved to be an indecisive leader once in power, accomplishing little that had been on the Orange agenda—during his relatively brief time as president, he has submitted fewer draft laws than any other president during Ukraine’s post-Soviet period. This reflects what was the very tenuous nature of the Orange Coalition—Yushchenko is a natural centrist who has not pursued the revolution’s goals with the partisan fervor expected. This led to a crisis in the coalition, because the radical branch of Pora and Tymoshenko did not have the patience to deal with this kind of maneuvering. The crisis came to a head in September 2005, when Yushchenko removed Tymoshenko from prime ministership, and her electoral vehicle BYuT left the coalition and voted no confidence in the subsequent government. Attempts to reform the coalition before the 2006 parliamentary elections failed.

The fracture in the coalition and general dissatisfaction with Yushchenko’s leadership created the context for what became Yanukovych’s and the PR’s dramatic resurgence. The 2006 parliamentary elections only returned 14 percent of the list vote for Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine—a decline of 10 percentage points from the 2002 election results. Conversely, PR won a stunning 32 percent of the vote (over For a United Ukraine’s 12 percent in 2002), followed closely by Tymoshenko’s BYuT at 22 percent (up from 7 percent in 2002). These results tracked closely to presidential poll ratings, showing that if another presidential election had been held in 2006, Yushchenko would only win between 8–14 percent of the vote. This outcome set the stage for a much more serious crisis, as Yushchenko appeared unwilling to accept the fact that he and Our Ukraine no longer had control over the political situation. This prompted a last ditch effort to rebuild the Orange Coalition, with negotiations conducted between Our Ukraine, BYuT, and Oleksandr Moroz’s Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) from March 2006 until June 2006. Yushchenko’s lack of sincerity in dealing with the Orange Coalition partners undermined this effort—he acted antagonistically toward the BYuT and negotiated separately with PR as a means to maximize his political leverage. These efforts ended when the SPU defected to the PR after Yushchenko refused to consider Moroz as parliamentary speaker under the proposed government (partly as retribution for Moroz sponsoring constitutional changes that shifted power from the presidency to the prime minister, in effect correcting the institutional imbalance of Ukraine’s semipresidential system). Nevertheless, Yushchenko did not want to accept Yanukovych as prime minister, because he viewed him as a polarizing figure and one of the compromises that had occurred at the end of the revolution was to transfer power from the president to the prime minister after 2005 (contra Georgia’s path). In response, Yanukovych and the PR effectively halted parliamentary work for ten days in June and July. The eventual result was a coalition of National Unity, comprising PR, the SPU, the Communists, and parts of Our Ukraine, which prompted BYuT and Pora to claim that Yushchenko had abandoned the revolution’s principles and should no longer derive legitimacy from it.

More than the problems of coalition politics, however, the obstacles the Orange Revolution faced are rooted in the structure of Ukrainian society and divisions in political culture. Without the ever-present threat of Yanukovych, the Orange Coalition may not have splintered, and without eastern Ukraine it is hard to envision Yanukovych’s continued relevance.
As Kuzio puts it, at its foundation, the 2004 election that resulted in the Orange Revolution was a “clash of civilizations” between the Eurasian culture and the major political clans (Donetsk, Dniepropetrovsk, Kyiv) of the east, and the European culture espoused by the revolutionary coalition. Donbass, Yanukovych’s stronghold, reflects this divide well. Part of Russophone eastern Ukraine (Ukraine is roughly divided between Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers), many residents feel closer to Moscow than Kyiv and consume Russian popular culture, including television, books, and newspapers. Donbass, and other eastern oblasts, demonstrate a great deal of independence from Kyiv, not least of which is the language issue, where several regions have declared Russian an official language and it is used almost exclusively. This cultural difference has contributed to the impression that the revolution is better understood as a coup d’état conducted by western and central Ukrainians rather than a collective action on behalf of democratic principles and personal rights. Yanukovych and the PR have been able to exploit these popular feelings by refusing to accept the revolution’s outcome, framing it instead as a “U.S.-backed conspiracy.” The increased freedom of state television channels under Yushchenko has failed to combat these beliefs, mostly because the citizens of the east believe the television stations are lying to them, caught up in the machinations of traitorous Kyiv bureaucrats. They do not watch the state channels, instead opting for the pro-Yanukovych TRK Ukraine or Russian channels.

The problems encountered by the Orange Revolution can be best understood as a combination of political problems within the coalition and larger structural characteristics of Ukrainian society that allowed Yanukovych’s resurgence. Civil society has been generally excluded from the postrevolutionary political process in much the same way it was excluded before the revolution. This is tied to the historical legacy of the USSR, which left Ukrainian civil society weak, but it is also intrinsically tied to institutional factors of the post-Soviet political system. Until the 2005 law that shifted power away from the president and toward the parliament, Ukraine was a semipresidential system, a type of system that is generally immune to societal influence. With the president possessing the ability to issue decrees and exert administrative control over the terms of parliamentary elections, and with the style of leadership found under Kuchma, there is little incentive to seek legitimation in civil society. This weakens civil society immensely (if we accept Diamond’s contention that civil society’s strength can generally be measured by how much it can influence all levels of government), because, as Robert Putnam put it, access is absolutely crucial to the ability of civil society to promote good governance. Putnam assumed the need for fairly dense associationalism, complicating things even further for Ukraine because of the relatively anemic nature of Ukrainian civil society. The profound sense of weakness is no doubt exemplified by Pora’s 2006 contestation of parliamentary elections as part of a bloc with the Reforms and Order Party, presumably seeing no other way to influence the postrevolutionary political order as it failed to pass the electoral threshold. Civil society cannot afford to be coopted as it was in the Georgian context, but neither can it afford to be entirely alienated from the state.

Civil society’s weakness and its relative exclusion from the postrevolutionary political process has been demonstrated in its role in reforms under Yushchenko. On the positive side, the parliament passed a new electoral law in 2005 that improved the transparency of elections by allowing domestic NGOs to observe the voting process. This was mainly due to the instrumental role played by such groups in unmasking the fraud that sparked
The Problem of Lasting Change

The Orange Revolution, and perhaps also partially due to the fear that Yanukovych might try to perpetrate such fraud again if precautions were not taken. Conversely, the reform of state media (television and radio) has gone the other direction; the administration made changes that ignored the contribution of nongovernmental bodies while the process has lacked transparency.\textsuperscript{111} The Yushchenko government has resisted efforts to transform state media into an autonomous body much like the United States’ PBS, presumably seeing this as a loss of control over a politically useful asset. The difference between these two examples betrays the way in which the Ukrainian government views civil society: a useful tool for achieving its ends rather than a valuable contributor to the deliberative process. Only a systematic framework of oversight and deliberation can consistently contribute to lasting democratic change. The state holding an instrumental conception of the public sphere undermines the deliberative dimension of democracy.

For civil society to gain a meaningful position within Ukrainian politics, the same institutional changes that Georgia requires need to be made. The fact that power was shifted to the prime minister will probably prove useful for this goal in the long term because it strengthens the Rada as a representative institution, but something like a consultative forum is also needed. Unfortunately, it is unclear how these changes will occur. Yushchenko is not likely to be reelected to a second term in 2010 because of his single digit popularity.\textsuperscript{112} Moreover, Ukraine has recently succumbed to yet another constitutional crisis, following stage managed demonstrations by Yanukovych and PR supporters that mimicked the demonstration tactics of the Orange Revolution itself. In response to these provocations, Yushchenko moved to dissolve the parliament and schedule snap elections as a means to legitimate his position. The PR-led parliamentary majority, however, passed a resolution stating the parliament would continue to function, with Yanukovych denouncing the dissolution as unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{113} The move could have turned out disastrously for Yushchenko, who is still unpopular, but, for the time being, it has been a successful gambit, producing a victory for the reunited Orange Coalition, with the BYuT winning 30.7 percent of the vote along with the Our Ukraine and People’s Self Defense Party taking 14 percent.\textsuperscript{114} PR increased its share of the vote to 34.3 percent, but it is no longer in the position to dictate political outcomes because Yushchenko has ruled out a grand coalition. The Orange Coalition’s ability to hold together in the long term and the results of the next presidential elections in early 2010 will largely dictate whether such institutional changes are possible, or whether Ukraine will end up in a situation like Serbia, where the previous authorities were also able to make a comeback that stalled democratic reform. It would be tragically ironic if Pora was forced to suffer the same kind of purgatory-like fate as Otpor.

Conclusion

The story of Kmara and Pora, and their involvement in the colored revolutions of Georgia and Ukraine, is very different depending on whether we focus on the period leading up to the revolutions or the period after the regime change started. Before and during the revolutions, both groups served as integral parts of the revolutionary coalitions, acting as conduits for popular mobilization while also employing sophisticated protest strategies that the authorities could not stifle. The strategies were derived from their past experiences combined with repertoires of contention borrowed from predecessor groups in the post-Communist world, such as Serbia’s Otpor. In the spirit of the postmodern world, both groups assiduously framed their goals by operating extremely media savvy cam-
campaigns related to both foreign and domestic media, while also cultivating the new sphere of political contention offered by Internet technologies. With all of these connections, it was easy for the groups to broadly publicize the electoral fraud once it happened, working in conjunction with other NGOs that conducted PVT and their allies in political society, such as Mikheil Saakashvili’s National Movement and Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine. Without the assistance of Kmara and Pora, it is difficult to see how the political opposition alone would have been successful in challenging the fraudulent poll results.

If the Rose and Orange revolutions can be considered parts of a broader cycle of contention (including the Serbian, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Belarusian, and Lebanese demonstrations as part of the cycle), then they have encountered many of the difficulties typical of past cycles, where lasting political change has been elusive. In the post-Soviet context, this problem is not specific to Georgia and Ukraine, but instead represents a deeper institutional problem where the political system excludes and stifles civil society. This can manifest itself either through cooptation (as in Georgia) or alienation (as in Ukraine), but both seem to require the same refashioning of the political context. It is here that Avritzer’s notion of “participatory publics” becomes useful as a way to combat postrevolution problems regarding civil society. Naturally, it is improbable that troubled systems such as Georgia and Ukraine could implement such changes immediately, but a good first step would be to follow Wertsch’s advice of establishing consultative bodies while reversing questionable constitutional changes (such as in Georgia). Heading down this road would ensure smoother long-term democratization processes, while overcoming the cooptation/alienation problem and reducing the potential for system volatility, which can be driven either by the sort of centralization that Saakashvili has been pursuing or the structural divisions of Ukrainian political society.

NOTES

1. Although there is a relatively unbroken genealogy among these different revolutions, I choose to take the Serbian case and Otpor as a convenient starting point to keep the narrative to a fairly compressed time-frame. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik have written several useful pieces connecting the earlier revolutions to Ukraine and Georgia.


6. Ibid., 31–35.

7. Ibid., 48–54.


10. Ibid., 27–28.


12. Ibid., 335.

13. Ibid., 335–36.
15. Ibid., 337–38. Without an independent source of natural wealth, Georgia relied heavily on international aid flows for revenue in the post-Soviet period. Had this not been the case, it seems unlikely that civil society would have been accorded the same degree of breathing space.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 5–6.
25. Kandelaki, 5, 8.
26. Ibid., 8.
30. Ibid., 9.
31. Ibid., 5.
32. Ibid., 4.
33. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 21–23.
34. Kandelaki, 7.
35. Ibid., 8.
36. Ibid., 9.
38. Kandelaki, 10.
39. Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), xvi–xvii. Andrew Wilson aptly used this term to describe administration of elections in post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia. The strategy is marked by a number of dupe parties and candidates to draw off opposition votes, while the authorities use media control and “administrative resources” (a euphemism for fraud and electoral manipulation) to secure the result they desire.
40. Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, 51–56.
41. Ibid., 60–69.
43. Ibid., 33.
44. Ibid., 31.
45. Ibid., 41.
46. Ibid., 31.
47. Ibid., 33.
48. Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, 73–74.
49. Ibid., 75.
50. Ibid.
54. Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 76.
55. Ibid., 58-60; Kuzio, “From Kuchma to Yushchenko,” 34.
57. Ibid., 123–25.
58. Ibid., 126.
60. Ibid., 132.
61. Ibid., 141–47.
64. Corwin, “Regime Change on the Cheap.”
65. Quoted in Corwin, “Regime Change on the Cheap.”
69. Ibid., 71–72.
72. Wertsch, “Georgia as a Laboratory,” 532–33.
73. Ibid., 531–32.
74. Ibid., 533.
77. Ibid.
80. Ibid., 35.
83. Ibid., 6.
84. Ibid., 7.
87. Wertsch, “Georgia as a Laboratory,” 533–34.
88. Ibid., 534.
94. Ibid., 481.
95. Ibid., 478.
96. Ibid., 482.
97. Ibid., 483.
100. Kuzio, “From Kuchma to Yushchenko,” 35.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., 504.
111. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
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