

Is Russia Becoming a Normal Society?

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Abstract: What Russians mean by *normalno* is much the same as what English speakers regard as normal, according to New Russia Barometer surveys. However, because of political transformation, Russians have not been living in a normal society. The percentage that considers society as becoming at least somewhat normal is increasing. Moreover, the obstacles to normalcy are not seen as inherent in Russian culture or history but as faults that the government could and should correct, such as corruption and unemployment. The majority of Russians now expect that twenty-five years after the start of perestroika, Russia will be more or less normal. This assessment reflects the increasing stability and order in Russia and Russians' readiness to settle for a second-best rather than an ideal society.

Keywords: normal, order, patience, public opinion, Russia, society

The word *normal* is ambiguous in English. It can refer to acting in accord with a given standard of behavior, a norm, or it can refer to the way the average person behaves. In societies in which citizens and institutions act as they ought to, this makes social life both predictable and acceptable. However, what is *normalno* in Russia is much more problematic. Some scholars have argued that the autocratic institutions of tsarist and Soviet times survived because Russian subjects regarded the state's demands as normal in both the normative and the positive senses.¹ However, the Soviet regime has been characterized as a "dualistic" hourglass society because of a conflict between the norms of the Communist regime and how people actually behaved.² Vladimir Shlapentokh has recommended managing the resulting tension by adopting the approach of a herpetologist, studying life in *A Normal Totalitarian Society* as dispassionately as one might study the behavior of other parts of the animal kingdom.³

The dissolution of the Soviet Union created the classic structural conditions for anomie in Durkheim's sense of the breakdown of the norms and institutions of polity, economy, and state. The upheavals that followed meant that Russians could not go about their everyday lives normally because they had been socialized to live in the Soviet era. People were forced to cope amidst the turbulence of a society that had not yet established routines of what was normal in the statistical sense. Most Russians have coped by adopting and adapting networks and strategies that were familiar in Soviet times.⁴

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By definition, a period of turbulence—and the transformation of Russia’s polity, economy, and society was certainly that—can only be sustained for a limited period of time. At some point the void created by the repudiation of the Communist party-state and the command economy is filled by new institutions that require people to behave differently if they are to eat enough, enjoy their leisure, and get the benefits to which they are entitled from public services. Moreover, transformation has brought opportunities that people can seize to better their conditions. For example, by saving money in the knowledge that the shops will have goods if a person can pay the market price or studying English in the expectation that this will lead to a better job.⁵

Two decades after the abrupt start of glasnost and perestroika, Russians have had time to learn, for better or worse, what is now statistically normal in their society. However, the regime’s failure to live up to the values that Russians hold about what makes a normal society has led to widespread dissatisfaction with the institutions to which they have had to adapt.⁶

The ambiguity of contemporary Russian life is expressed in the hybrid characterizations that international organizations and many area-studies experts use to describe it. Westerners use compound labels to emphasize values inherent in European norms and deviations from them, such as characterizing the country as “partly free” or exhibiting “managed pluralism” or a “predatory capitalism.” Compound labels can also be used by Russians to emphasize what is valued by the Russian using them. For example, Vladimir Putin’s deputy head of administration characterizes the country as a “sovereign democracy,” an implicit assertion to foreigners that they have no right to comment on what the government does within Russia. The point is made more strongly by Dmitry Medvedev dropping the adjective to assert the claim that Russia is just as democratic as any other country of the G-8, a political challenge to G-7 leaders.

However, all assessments of Russian society as a whole have limitations. It is assumed that there is agreement among Russians about what constitutes normal life and that Russians have the same norms and values as Western (that is, European and Anglo-American) citizens. But this assumption has no empirical validity. I draw on New Russian Barometer (NRB) survey data to examine what Russians mean by a normal society, whether they think it is normal today and if not, how many years will it take for Russian society to become normal or if it will ever do so. The chief survey analyzed here, NRB XV, was a nationwide random sample in which the Levada Centre interviewed 1,606 Russians between April 13 and 23, 2007. Earlier surveys from the Centre for the Study of Public Policy NRB series, launched in 1992, are cited as relevant.⁷


What Do Russians Mean by Normality?

The turbulence of transformation confronted Russians with political, economic, and social institutions that question the very foundations of what they had been socialized to regard as normal in Soviet times. To ascertain how people responded to the combined experience of very different norms, the NRB asked people to evaluate the importance of various social phenomena for the achievement of normal society. The seven criteria focused on aspects of life for which government could be deemed responsible, such as preventing inflation and maintaining full employment, or where there was a marked contrast between Soviet and federation governments, such as the government interfering with its citizens’ everyday lives. Unlike questions about abstract concepts

such as capitalism or democracy, Russians had no problem understanding the meaning of these terms. The “do not know rate” was very low, an average of one percent across seven questions.

Russians are virtually unanimous about what is needed for a normal society: the proportion endorsing each of seven attributes as essential or important ranges between 96 and 99 percent (see figure 1). The only difference is whether a person thinks a given characteristic is essential or important. The great majority described each attribute as essential. A total of 85 percent said it is essential to be without fear of street crime and to have opportunities to improve your living standards; more than four-fifths said it is essential that everyone be able to find a job and not fear inflation; and 72 percent believe freedom from government interference and state provision of welfare are essential for a normal life. In short, the popular Russian ideal of a normal society is not one with a weak or powerless state but a society with an effective, free, and fair state.

The way that Russians view normality has significant parallels with another word frequently invoked in Russian political discourse: order (*poryadok*). In-depth interviews with Russians by Ellen Carnaghan emphasize that this term is not used in the colloquial “law and order” sense of gun-toting American politicians, but in the Weberian sense of a *Rechtsstaat*, in which the state is effective in performing its normal responsibilities.⁸ For Russians, disorder (that is, unpredictable novelty) began under Gorbachev and intensified



during the Yeltsin administration. President Putin has taken advantage of this by frequent references to the need for order and predictable behavior.

The characteristics endorsed by Russians as essential for a normal society are similar to what one would expect to be endorsed in Western countries. However, the ambiguity of the term *normal* is a caution that what may be considered normal in both the ethical and the statistical sense in a Western society is not necessarily so in Russia. There the population may regard the way in which Russian society currently functions as very different from how it ought to function.

Do Russians Think Their Society Is Normal?

Given what Russians associate with the idea of a normal society, the next question is whether people think that Russia today is a normal society. The NRB first asked this question in January 2000, fewer than eighteen months after the ruble crash of August 1998. By then a lot had transpired to change the Soviet system that Russians had been socialized to treat as normal. Queuing had disappeared and a shortage of money to buy what shops had to sell replaced a shortage of goods. People were now free to vote for competing parties, but politicians were widely distrusted and the popular assessment of President Yeltsin was by that time very negative. There was a clear consensus that Russia was not a normal society. One-third thought it was definitely not normal and more than half thought it was only slightly normal. By contrast, only 2 percent considered Russia to be definitely normal and one in nine thought it somewhat normal (see table 1).

A lot has happened in Russia since, starting with the economic recovery in response to the ruble crash and the subsequent boom in world energy prices. Russian households have become more economically secure, too.⁹ In 2000 a total of 51 percent were not working in a normal economy because they had been receiving wages late or not at all in the past twelve months. By 2007 only 19 percent reported they were having difficulty in being paid normally. In Vladimir Putin, the country had a president who was as popular as Boris Yeltsin had been unpopular. In a 2007 NRB survey, Putin was given a mean rating of 7.2 on a 10-point scale measuring approval, while Yeltsin was given a mean rating of 2.7.

The passage of time has resulted in many Russian adults being resocialized. The median Russian adult in his or her early forties has now lived about as long in the Russian Federation as in the Soviet Union. A systematic analysis of successive Russian age cohorts

TABLE 1. Russian Views about Whether Their Society Is Normal (%)

<i>Do you think Russian life today is that of a normal society?</i>							
	January 2000	June 2001	June 2003	March 2004	January 2005	April 2007	Change
Definitely normal	2	9	15	10	10	19	+17
Somewhat normal	11	13	25	18	26	27	+16
Normal	(13)	(21)	(40)	(28)	(36)	(46)	(+33)
Slightly normal	54	50	40	45	49	40	-14
Not at all normal	33	29	20	27	15	14	-19
Not normal	(87)	(79)	(60)	(72)	(64)	(54)	(-33)

Source. Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer VIII, X, XI, XIII, XIV, XV. For further details, see www.abdn.ac.uk/cspp/catalog1_0.shtml.

finds that while there is marginal tendency for age groups to differ, there is a consistent readiness for all generations to react in the same way to political and economic developments.¹⁰ The political inertia of new institutions has exerted a steady pressure on Russians to accept what the Kremlin supplies, whether or not it is what they want. Thus, when the 2007 NRB surveys asked whether people have adapted to the big changes since Soviet times, 44 percent said they had adapted, and an additional 33 percent were trying to adapt. Only 10 percent were social refuseniks, saying they were unable to adapt.¹¹

The proportion of Russians thinking that society is more or less normal is increasing (see table 1). In April 2007, 19 percent viewed Russia as definitely a normal society, and 27 percent thought it was somewhat normal. However, the median Russian continues to see the country as only slightly normal. The position today can be interpreted as showing that since Vladimir Putin became president the proportion tending to see Russia as normal has more than trebled, or the same figures can be described as showing that most Russians still see their society as far from normal.

A multiplicity of potential hypotheses—economic, sociological, political—about why Russians differ over whether their society is normal can be tested statistically with multiple-regression analysis. A preliminary regression analysis with more than two dozen independent variables was first undertaken to screen out measures of no statistical or theoretical significance. The regression in table 2 focuses on those with the most potential impact. Collectively,

TABLE 2. What Makes Russians See Society as Normal

<i>Dependent variable: Russian views of normality, 2007</i>			
Variance explained: R^2 ; 16.6%			
	b	Standard Error	Beta
Economic circumstances			
Number of consumer goods	0.03	0.03	0.03
Experience of destitution	0.01	0.01	0.01
Poor better protected since 2000	0.06	0.03	0.06*
Unemployed	-0.01	0.12	0.00
Social structure			
Social status	0.09	0.02	0.12***
Trusts most people	0.06	0.02	0.09***
Education	-0.03	0.01	-0.07**
Political performance			
More order since 2000	0.14	0.04	0.12***
Government officials fair	0.09	0.02	0.09***
Contact with officials	-0.03	0.02	-0.05
Has to bribe officials	-0.02	0.03	-0.02
More freedom than in Soviet time	-0.01	0.02	-0.02
Expectations of			
Political system in five years	0.03	0.01	0.11***
Democracy in five years	0.04	0.01	0.06*
Economic system in five years	0.02	0.01	0.08**
Adaptation	0.10	0.05	0.05*

Note. *significant at .05 level. **significant at .01 level. ***significant at .001 level.

Source. Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV (April 13–23, 2007).

nine influences can account for 16.4 percent of the variance among Russians about whether their society is normal.

The colloquial argument—“It’s the economy, stupid”—is supported by neoclassical economics and Marxist theories. People who have benefited the most materially by buying consumer goods normal in West European households ought to be most likely to view post-transformation Russia as normal, while those made destitute should take the opposite view.¹² Prosperity is spread widely but not evenly. By 2007, 97 percent of Russian households possessed a color television set, 70 percent a video cassette recorder or other electronic entertainment system, and 36 percent a car. Only a small proportion of households are destitute, frequently going short of food, clothing, and heat during a year. By 2007 the median respondent reported rarely doing without these necessities and only one in six sometimes or often go without necessities. Notwithstanding the theoretical importance of economic conditions, neither destitution nor owning consumer goods has any significant influence on whether Russians see their society as normal, nor does unemployment. While a majority of Russians see government as improving programs for protecting the poor, this does not make them more likely to see society as normalizing.

An alternative hypothesis is that social structure shapes individual views of society. The disruption of Soviet political institutions created massive status insecurity. When Russians are asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale, more than half place themselves below the midpoint of four; 30 percent place themselves at the midpoint; and only 17 percent see themselves as above average. The minority who see themselves as now in a relatively high status are also more likely to view society as normal. However, this effect is partially offset by a negative correlation between education and views of Russian society: those who are more educated are less likely to see society as normal, an indication of the devaluation of professional skills as compared with market-oriented “smarts.” Age and gender are not reported in table 2 because analysis showed that, net of other influences, they had no significant effect on whether society is seen as normal.

How Russians relate to others in society also affects how they evaluate it. Those who tend to trust rather than distrust most people in society are also more likely to see it as normal (table 2).

Since the Russian idea of normality reflects conditions for which the government is responsible, political performance should matter, and it does. When asked whether order has increased since 2000, when Vladimir Putin became president, 61 percent say it has, 12 percent see order worsening, and 27 percent see no change. Those who see society as more orderly tend to see the society as becoming more normal. Russians do not need to rely on a semi-controlled media to make judgments about the state of their society. They also experience the performance of government in their everyday lives. Most Russians expect to be treated unfairly in their encounters with public officials, but the minority who feel they are treated fairly are also more inclined to judge their society as normal.

The ambiguity of normality is illustrated by the fact that corruption does not alter popular views of society. Russians who report paying a bribe to a public official are just as likely to see their society as normal as those who receive public services to which they are entitled without paying a bribe, or who have no contact with public officials. The failure of corruption to influence attitudes is likely to reflect the fact that although a large number of Russians see it as morally wrong, it is nonetheless perceived as normal in the statistical sense.¹³ Freedom is valued as evidence of normality, seeing society as freer than

in Soviet times. Net of other influences, this does not make Russians more likely to see society as normal. This is because other factors, such as low social status and a distrust of other people, push strongly in the opposite direction.

Because transformation is a process, its full effects will take years to achieve. A single free election starts a democratization process: it does not create a consolidated democracy. Likewise, a post-transformation society must go through a normalization process before arriving at a normal state. While no one can be sure whether conditions are actually improving, having an optimistic view of the future can affect views of current circumstances. If a person expects conditions in society to improve, he or she is more likely to view society as somewhat normal rather than as only slightly normal, insofar as expectations affect judgments.

The NRB asks people to evaluate how they see the country's political and economic system five years ahead and also the prospects for the regime to become more democratic in that time. In Russia today there is widespread optimism about what the country will be like in 2012. Among those with an opinion, three-quarters are positive about what the regime will be like and a similarly large proportion think it will be more like a democracy than a dictatorship. More than three-quarters of Russians also have positive expectations of the national economic system. The regression analysis shows that being optimistic about the future encourages Russians to see society as at least more normal rather than not at all normal (see table 2). Those who have adapted their relationship to the new society or are trying to adapt are also significantly more likely to see Russian society as becoming normal.

On the other hand, Russians having a below average social status, distrusting other people, expecting unfair treatment from public officials, and not being optimistic about the future have a negative view of their society. Table 1 shows that most Russians do not regard their society as normal because negative attitudes are more common than positive attitudes (please see Appendix for variable for regression analysis.).


Obstacles to Normality

Although expectations are positive, major obstacles to society becoming normal remain—and Russians are well aware of this fact. When asked about obstacles to society becoming normal, there are hardly any “do not knows.” To focus attention on what are seen as the biggest obstacles to society becoming normal, the NRB survey asked the respondents to select what they see as the two top obstacles (see figure 2).

The biggest obstacle to normality is corruption and the failure of government to enforce laws. This is not a demand for “order” as in the law-and-order posture of tough-minded right-wingers. It is the demand for the government to set a good example by making its own officials obey the rule of law. This interpretation is reinforced by one-third of Russians also seeing the Kremlin's behavior as a major obstacle to Russia becoming normal.

The concept of a normal society covers the economy and the polity: almost half see low wages and unemployment as an obstacle to Russia becoming normal. This is a reminder that many Russians do not expect the wealth created by a boom in the export value of natural resources to result in a property-owning democracy. Instead, they see the fruits of growth as encouraging a predatory oligarchy that siphons off much of the country's wealth in a corrupt manner.

The culturalist view that Russia's past is an obstacle to change is rejected. Only 13 percent see national traditions or how ordinary people behave as an important obstacle to achieving normality as Europeans define it today. Equally striking, although many Russians are aware



of the problems arising from the Soviet legacy, only 11 percent now see it as a major obstacle to Russia becoming normal in the future. The disruption caused by the transition to the market and the introduction of some democratic institutions in the 1990s are not considered excuses for abnormal actions by the government.

The chief obstacle to the normalization of society is not Russian mores but the Russian state's performance, which has failed to make its officials obey the law and failed to manage the economy so that most people can have a steady wage and avoid the need to juggle resources from official and unofficial economies.

How Long Before Russia Becomes a Normal Society?

Whatever else the Soviet system achieved, it taught Russians to be patient, whether waiting years for the chance to buy a color television set, to return from exile in Siberia, or for the ultimate end-of-time event, the achievement of communism.¹⁴ In his farewell address as president on December 31, 1999, Boris Yeltsin admitted that he himself was mistaken in having unrealistic hopes about the speed with which transformation could make Russia a normal society:

What we thought would be easy turned out to be painfully difficult. I ask you to forgive me for not fulfilling some hopes of those people who believed that we would be able to jump from the grey, stagnating, totalitarian past into a bright, rich and civilised future in one go. I

myself believed in this. But it could not be done in one fell swoop. In some respects, I was too naive. Some of the problems were too complex.

Ordinary Russians were never sanguine about when or whether transformation would reach a desirable end when confronted with what Mikhail Gorbachev described in April 1991 as “a large turn that is beyond anyone’s dreams.”¹⁵ Not only was the scale of transformation great but also, as Gorbachev noted, “No other people has experienced what has happened to us.” In the 1990s the corrupt privatization of the economy created what was then described as a low-level equilibrium trap.¹⁶ While the outcome of privatization was costly, it was not a permanent equilibrium but one stage in a continuing and erratic process of dynamic transformation.

Initially, there was very widespread uncertainty about the transformation’s long-term consequences. When the NRB asked in the spring of 1994 how long it would be before people thought they would be satisfied with the political system, 65 percent said they did not know, and 64 percent were also uncertain whether they would ever be satisfied with the economic system. By 2001, when the NRB asked how long it would take for Russian society to become normal, people divided into four groups. The largest, 50 percent, said it was difficult to know. The nine percent who said the country would never become normal were offset by an equal proportion saying it was already normal. The remaining third estimated it would take from one to ten years to achieve normality (see table 3). Since then signs of optimism have emerged. In a 2007 NRB survey, the percentage thinking Russia was already normal had doubled and so had the percentage expecting the country to become normal in another five years.

The chief influences encouraging the belief that society can become normal in the next decade are much the same as those influencing people to regard it as already normal today.¹⁷ Expectations of the future, a positive view of the government’s performance, and current social status combine to encourage people to believe that there is the prospect of normality in future.

The increasing expectation that Russian society will become normal in the future reflects two sets of influences: real improvements in everyday life and a resigned acceptance that replaces ideal standards for a normal life with standards more suited for Russian life as it now is. In 2001 a total of 14 percent thought the country would be normal in five years; 19

TABLE 3. Expectations of Russia Becoming Normal (%)

<i>How long do you think it will be before Russia becomes a normal society?</i>						
	June 2001	June 2003	March 2004	January 2005	April 2007	Change
Already normal	9	15	10	10	19	+10
1–5 years	5	10	12	8	12	+7
6–10 years	27	34	33	31	22	–5
Never	9	11	11	8	9	0
Difficult to know	50	30	34	42	38	–12

Source. Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometers X, XI, XIII, XIV, XV. For further details, see http://www.abdn.ac.uk/cspp/catalog1_0.shtml.

percent believed this in 2007. Moreover, the 27 percent who thought Russia would be normal by 2011 are the same percentage as the 27 percent who see society as somewhat normal in 2007. Thus, if current expectations are realized, 31 percent will view society as normal and a majority see it as at least somewhat normal by 2012, more than a quarter-century after Mikhail Gorbachev opened a Pandora's box of reforms (see tables 1 and 3).

The patient expectation of change is a bulwark against radical rejection of the current regime. Even though there are many features of society that Russians do not like, such as corruption, the passage of time has begun to normalize a regime that offers people some (though not all) freedoms and some (but not all) material benefits that people would ideally like to enjoy. Order and predictability a la Putin is a second-best solution, but Russians prefer it to the risk of another cycle of disruption and disorder that would follow.¹⁷

The widespread Russian belief that their society could become normal at some point rejects the idea of Russian exceptionalism, that there is something about the Russian soul that makes the society incapable of becoming normal by the standards of modern societies. While most Russians see the legacy of the Soviet system as imposing great burdens, few see it as a permanent curse.

The euphoria that was created by the start of Russia's transformation is no more. The unpredictable shocks of transformation are now part of the past, too. Today, Russian society is in its post-transformation phase, in which what happens next year is not expected to be radically different from what is happening this year. While there is a degree of path dependence in every society, transformation is about heading off in a different direction from a familiar path. The longer the federation continues, the more distant Russia's society today becomes from what it was in 1992, and the more likely the path taken becomes the norm around which a new equilibrium is established.

Acknowledgment

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NOTES

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2. Richard Rose, "Russia as an Hour-Glass Society: A Constitution without Citizens," *East European Constitutional Review* 4, no. 3 (1995): 34–42.

3. Vladimir Shlapentokh, *A Normal Totalitarian Society: How the Soviet Union Functioned and How It Collapsed* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), xi.

4. Richard Rose, "Uses of Social Capital in Russia: Modern, Pre-Modern and Anti-Modern," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16, no. 1 (2000) 33–57; Natalia Tchernina, "Rising Unemployment and Coping Strategies," in *The Mortality Crisis in Transitional Economies*, ed. G. A. Cornia and R. Paniccià, 151–73 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

5. See Richard Rose and Martin Bobak, "Stresses and Opportunities of Post-Communist Transformation: The Impact on Health," *Aberdeen Studies in Public Policy* no. 432, 2007.

6. Ellen Carnaghan, *Out of Order: Russian Political Values in an Imperfect World* (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).

7. For details see www.abdn.ac.uk/cspp/barometers (accessed December 2, 2007); Richard Rose, *The Climax of the Putin Years: New Russia Barometer XV* (Aberdeen, UK: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 2007).

8. Carnaghan, *Out of Order: Russian Political Values in an Imperfect World*, 156.

9. EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), *Transition Report 2006: Finance in Transition*. (London: EBRD, 2006).

10. William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Generation, Age and Time: The Dynamics of Political Learning through Russia's Transformation," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 4 (2007): 822–34.

11. Among those under the age of thirty, 20 percent indicated that they had no need to adapt; for them, the Soviet Union was not normal but part of history. By contrast, among those over forty, 10 percent have managed to ignore the great upheavals of society, saying they live as before the breakup of the Soviet system.

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17. Because future expectations about normality are not linear, the statistical analysis of influences was conducted by multiple discriminant function analysis.

APPENDIX
Variables for Regression Analysis

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent:				
Is Russia normal	1 (Disagree--)	4 (Agree++)	2.50	0.96
Economic circumstances				
Number of consumer goods	0 goods	3 goods	2.03	0.82
Experience of destitution ^a	0 Not at all	9 (Severe)	3.63	2.79
Unemployed	0 (No)	1 (Yes)	0.04	0.19
Social structure				
Social status	1 (Lowest)	7 (Highest)	3.32	1.31
Trusts most Russians	1 (Least)	7 (Most)	4.09	1.55
Education	1 (Elementary)	8 (University)	5.08	2.06
Poor better protected since 2000	1 (Much worse)	5 (Much better)	3.38	1.00
Political performance				
More order since 2000	1 (Much worse)	5 (Much better)	3.14	0.82
Government officials fair ^b	-2.28 (Least)	2.32 (Most)	0.00	1.00
Contact with officials ^c	0 (None)	7 contacts	2.12	1.63
Has to bribe officials ^d	0 (None)	3 or more	0.38	0.78
More freedom than in Soviet time ^e	0 counts	4 counts	2.98	1.46

(appendix continues)

APPENDIX (CONT.)

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Expectations of future				
Political system in five years	-10 (Worst)	10 (Best)	3.28	3.68
Democracy in five years	1 (Least)	10 (Most)	6.50	1.64
Economic system in five years	-10 (Worst)	10 (Best)	3.32	4.27
Adaptation	0 (No)	1 (Yes)	0.44	0.50

Note.

^aFrequency of being deprived of food, clothing, and heat or electricity.

^bSingle factor score for expecting fair treatment from police, doctors or hospitals, office for permits or registration, army recruiting office, education officials, tax office, and social security office.

^cNumber of contacts with officials from list above during the past two years.

^dNumber of times had to bribe officials during the past two years.

^eNumber of areas in which people feel freer than before perestroika: free to say what you think, join any organization you like, not participate in politics, and decide own view on religious matters.