Redefining Armenian National Security

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Abstract: The states of the South Caucasus share an underlying set of challenges, ranging from the imperatives of reform to the impediments of unresolved conflict. For Armenia, geographically landlocked and subject to blockade, national security is dominated by an external focus on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Yet the gravest threat to Armenian national security is not an external one, but is rooted in the internal challenge of corruption. Armenia offers a greater degree of political stability and institutional democracy than its neighbors, but it has been unable to confront this core internal threat. Armenia needs to redefine the concept of its national security beyond the rigid dominance of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and place national interest over self-interest, favor the statesman over the strongman, and prompt a new patriotism over outdated nationalism. Only in this way can Armenia forge true national security and state stability.

Key words: Armenia, ethnic conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh, national security, South Caucasus

As a region, the South Caucasus has traditionally been viewed as a prisoner to its geography, with its position as an East-West crossroads tending to also serve as an arena for competition among more powerful neighbors. For much of the past two centuries, this vulnerability was exacerbated by the competing interests of the dominant regional powers of Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Since the onset of independence in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus has also been seen as a hostage to history, with a particularly savage record of ethnic violence and outright conflict. It is this historical legacy that is most significant, however, as the region’s infant states struggle with the challenges of independence and statehood.

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For the three states of the South Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—there is an underlying set of shared challenges, ranging from the imperatives of economic and political reform to the impediments from a legacy of seven decades of Soviet rule. As each of these three infant states have adapted their own unique strategies for strengthening their sovereignty and statehood, the region has become increasingly marked by a deepening and diverging divide. Within this context, each state has followed a different trajectory that offers as much peril as promise for regional security. But of the three states in the region, it is Armenia that is in the weakest position, and perhaps most importantly, is the most unprepared to adapt to the dynamic shifts in regional security.

For landlocked and energy-dependent Armenia, the disruption of traditional trade and energy links was the most serious and devastating development. By imposing a trade and transport blockade on Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Turkey compounded Armenia’s economic vulnerability and isolation. It further excluded Armenia from participating in nearly all projects to promote regional integration and development, most notably the Baku-Tbilisi-Çeyhan oil pipeline.

Unlike its neighbors, the past fifteen years of Armenian independence have largely been marked by a comparative degree of internal unity and stability. Although there has been an absence of civil war or internal strife, external conflict and militant nationalism have, nevertheless, come to define Armenian national security. The core issue of Armenian national security since independence has been the unresolved conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan over the Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Karabakh issue has impacted a wide range of Armenian policies, from the economic to the political. It has also influenced broader geopolitics by triggering a profound disruption of regional trade and energy links and altering Russian, Turkish, United States, and even Iranian strategies in the region. But what is needed now is a redefinition of Armenia’s concept of national security. That redefinition necessitates an ability to go beyond the rigid confines of the Karabakh conflict, which continues to determine and dominate the parameters of Armenian national security.

Trends in Armenian Insecurity

In terms of national security, Armenia’s case represents an interesting paradox. Despite a comparatively longer and more peaceful record of democracy, an outwardly stronger state, and a dominant but stable military, there is a surprising degree of insecurity in Armenia today. Most surprising, there is an inverse relationship between the strengthening Armenian state and the country’s mounting insecurity. In this sense, Armenia is not alone, as recent events in other post-Soviet states, such as Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, have demonstrated the destabilizing effects of measures focused on state security at the expense of societal stability.

The roots of this Armenian insecurity can be traced to three specific trends, manifested in the military, political, and economic spheres. These trends are also interrelated, with a linkage that has only exacerbated the structural deficiencies in the process of Armenian statebuilding. Taken together, the failure to reverse, or
even recognize, these trends threaten to elevate Armenian insecurity to a broader level of potential regional instability.

The Militarization of the Armenian State

The first trend contributing to Armenia’s insecurity is evident in the militarization of the Armenian state. As with Armenia’s concept of national security, it is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that is the core of this militarization. Yet, given the complex record of the Karabakh conflict and its role as the primary issue of modern Armenian nationalism, such militarization was initially both natural and not particularly dangerous. The current threat of this trend of militarization, however, stems from its devolution from an agent of national security into a defender of regime security. For that reason, this devolution was allowed to transform the military and internal security forces from an instrument of the state into an institution within the state.

The course of the militarization of the Armenian state is largely rooted in Armenian history and heavily influenced by the tragic narrative of Armenians as eternal victims. It is first driven by the most basic and essential mission of survival. The sole driving force of this mission has been to ensure the physical survival of the Armenian nation and, for much of Armenian history, has emanated not from the imperatives of statehood but from the response of a vibrant nationalism. Most dramatically, it was the history of Ottoman period, with its sporadic threat of pogrom and massacre that culminated in the 1915 Armenian genocide, which forged this militant nationalism.

This historical influence also incorporated a second element, marked by the brief record of Armenian statehood. With the emergence of the first Republic of Armenia of 1918, the historically defensive concept of militant nationalism adopted new elements of state security and military strategy. Although the short duration of modern Armenian statehood ended abruptly with its Sovietization, there was a pronounced parallel between the sudden and rather unexpected independence movements of both 1918 and 1991. Such a parallel between those years was also seen in the perception of the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh as intrinsically linked to the historical threat of Turkey. This perception fostered an emotional and exaggerated identification of Turkey as an eternal enemy, an equation that continues to distort Armenia’s concept of military and national security.

The Institutionalization of the Military

In addition to the historical influence, the institutionalization of the military has also served to consolidate this trend of militarization of the Armenian state. Unlike many of the other post-Soviet states, the development of the Armenian military has its origins on a trajectory separate from the state. The emergence of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue preceded the birth of the Armenian independent state. It also preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union when, as early as 1988, within the context of the Gorbachev reform period, self-determination for Nagorno-Karabakh emerged as the core element of a new, vibrant Armenian
nationalism. With the outbreak of the pogroms, or a campaign of targeted ethnic violence against Armenians in several Azerbaijani cities, the Karabakh issue rapidly descended into open hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan proper. As a result, the Karabakh conflict was elevated as the pillar of Armenian unification and mobilization.

Militarily, the conflict went well beyond the control of the then Soviet Armenian state, with military action in Karabakh dominated by small, guerilla-type bands of paramilitary units operating under autonomous command by various Armenian commanders. Although the unification of these paramilitary groups into a new “national army” was one of the more understated achievements of the first post-Soviet government under former President Levon Ter-Petrossian, the powerful appeal of the military was already becoming well-entrenched in Armenia.

Politically, the lack of legitimacy inherent in the Soviet Armenian state only strengthened the appeal of those bold enough to challenge the regime. Led by former President Ter-Petrossian, the so-called Karabakh Committee was able to astutely outflank the Soviet Armenian leadership, maximizing the Karabakh issue and garnering both popular appeal and legitimacy. Thus, the Karabakh conflict, in both military and political terms, was the first and only source for legitimacy and power outside of the confines of the collapsing Soviet system. This initial disparity between the development of the military and the emergence of the state within the post-Soviet context further served as the foundation for the subsequent militarization of the state.

By 1993, the newly unified Armenian military secured a series of significant victories over Azerbaijan. The success in the latter stages of the conflict, as Armenian forces consolidated control over most of Nagorno-Karabakh and seized several districts of Azerbaijan proper beyond the Karabakh borders, led to a sense of invincibility. With military victory and the seizure of territory both being rare achievements in Armenian history, there was also a pronounced hardening of Armenian public opinion, with an adoption of a general militancy that increasingly viewed any degree of moderation of realism as signs of outright treason. Such general feeling, emboldened by a renewed sense of militant nationalism and a new military superiority, only encouraged the militarization of society.¹

**Civil-Military Relations**

As a result of the institutionalization of the military, Armenia’s civil-military relations have also exhibited a disturbing sign of an improper role. Similar to other post-Soviet states in transition, the Armenian military has held an essential role in state-building. Overall, civil-military relations are both sound and stable. But more than most countries, the Armenian military is more than a fundamental pillar of the state; it has become a foundational agent of the state.

The domestic aspect of the Armenian military, however, also raises some concerns. The concern is not the traditional worry of distorted civil-military relations, as there is no current danger of the Armenian military from directly intervening in the country’s political arena. Nor is there any real danger of it disregarding its role as protector of the state and defender of the constitution. The concern rests
more with the country’s civilian-military relations or, more precisely, with the civilians that see the military as instruments of their power. In this way, the civilian control over the Armenian military, and its defense policy and procurement, are directed by the distribution of power within the state rather than by the military needs of the state. As one scholar notes, “military doctrine is about state survival, but military policy is also about the allocation of power within society.” In the case of Armenia, this is particularly true, and dangerous, given its role within the broader trend of a militarization of the Armenian state.

The Rise of the Clan-Based Elite

The second trend that contributes to overall insecurity is political—Armenian politics is dominated by a clan-based elite but defined by an “arrogance of power” and a rule of law that has degenerated into a “law of the rulers.” Beyond a broader set of geopolitical challenges, the current threats to Armenian national security are increasingly internal challenges, ranging from authoritarianism to a widening deficit of democracy. In this sense, Armenian politics resembles the managed democracy of its unworthy Russian idol, with little tolerance for opposition and even less for an independent media.

Structurally, the closed nature of the Armenian political system, which constitutes the architecture of Armenian politics, has been policed by a narrow, clan-based elite through rigid control over discourse and democracy. Although the emergence of powerful clans formed a pattern of politics in many of the former Soviet states, Armenia differed in one critical area. Specifically, the avenue to political and economic power for the Armenian elite was the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. During the first stage of Armenian independence, this new elite emerged during the virtual state of war in Nagorno-Karabakh that served as the primary determinant of Armenian politics. This period not only established a preference for emotional militancy over rational democracy, but discredited moderate political leaders amid the rhetoric of Armenian nationalism. For the government of Armenia’s first democratically elected president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, it was increasingly apparent that this new elite or clan threatened to impede the overall course of democratic and economic reform.

With a ceasefire in 1994 that halted hostilities but merely froze the underlying conflict, the uneasy period of “neither peace nor war” that resulted only allowed this new political elite to accumulate and consolidate greater power. Steadily securing power from even within the Ter-Petrossian government, this elite was quickly dominated by Defense Minister Serge Sargsyan, Prime Minister Robert Kocharian, and former Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan. The first
two were natives of Nagorno-Karabakh, Sargsyan having led the small but impressive Karabakh armed forces and Kocharian previously serving as the Karabakh head of state. As their power and ambition grew, both men came to be seen as a new political force and, by 1996, combined to force the resignation of President Ter-Petrossian.

The most revealing aspect of the end of the Ter-Petrossian government was not the resignation itself, but the context. The ouster of Ter-Petrossian was orchestrated allegedly for his moderate approach to the Karabakh issue and justified by the pretext of Armenian national security. Assuming the presidency in subsequent elections, the rise of Kocharian demonstrated the ascendancy of this Karabakh elite and set forth to consolidate much of the country’s networks of crime and corruption. The end result was a new government, dominated by political figures who gained both political and economic power from the Karabakh conflict. It can also be argued that a significant degree of their power lies as with the unresolved nature of the conflict.

The New Oligarchic Elite

There is a smaller element of this new, clan-based elite that has attained significant political power in recent years. Although not as outwardly visible as the ruling elite, a new, wealthy political elite, so-called oligarchs, have managed to secure a sizable number of seats in the May 2003 Armenian parliamentary elections. Their election as deputies demonstrates a convergence of corporate, state, and in some case, even criminal, interests. In addition to gaining serious influence on the formulation of public policy and garnering substantial leverage over the course of governmental policies, this new oligarchic elite embodies the difference between the power to rule and the responsibility to govern.

In the case of the other former Soviet economies, this new class of oligarchs has tended to exploit the privatization process to gain economic power first, but has exhibited a subsequent appetite for political power. It is that political role that inherently threatens the course of democratization and political reform. In Armenia, these oligarchs have been able to extend their informal networks of political power through informal cartels and commodity-based semimonopolies, and now wield significant economic and political power. The key to defeating the power of the oligarchs is to attack the economic monopolies and cartels that fuel and finance the oligarchic system. Generally, such cartels and monopolies flourish within closed economies, averting the transparency and competition that dominate a more open marketplace. But in addition to the need for greater antitrust legislation and stronger state regulatory bodies empowered to limit or breakup monopolies, it is the rule of law and political will that is needed to overcome this cronyism.

Thus, the closed nature of the Armenian political system, utilized by a new dual clan-based and oligarchic elite, has significantly eroded the state’s most important asset of legitimacy. This has also been matched by a steady decline in good governance, with a tendency for both public policy and national security to be formulated by self-interest over national interest. In this context, Armenia’s vulnerability to a mounting overdependence on Russia has also deepened. Specifically, Armenia’s
strategic relationship with Russia has been transformed from that of a partnership based on bilateral interests to a platform serving to project Russian interests, which has had a cumulative effect of a steady mortgaging of Armenian national security. The clearest demonstration of this trend can be seen in the debt-for-equity agreements of 2002 and 2003, a series of questionable deals granting Russia control over key strategic enterprises and consolidating its dominance over the country’s vulnerable energy sector. Through mid-2005, Russia has been able to secure, with the assent of an overly compliant Armenian government, control or outright ownership of much of the country’s energy network, including its hydroelectric plants, its national electricity network, and its sole nuclear power plant.3

The New U.S. Democracy Standard

It is this set of political shortcomings that has eroded Armenia’s international standing the most. The damage to the Armenian reputation from its political shortcomings was most recently demonstrated by the December 2005 imposition of new restrictions on U.S. assistance by officials of the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation, which administers the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a recently formed initiative to channel U.S. aid to developing countries according to a strict set of eligibility requirements. In that case, officials warned that a massive $235.65 million aid package for Armenia would be conditional on the adoption of “corrective steps” designed to improve Armenia’s human rights record and strengthen democracy. The warning noted that the new preconditions require the Armenian government to address reports of widespread voting irregularities during the November 2005 referendum on constitutional reforms. In fact, final approval of the aid package was delayed following “allegations of fraud, electoral mismanagement, mistreatment of individuals from opposition political parties and uneven access to the media.”4

Armenia is particularly vulnerable to any limits or reductions in U.S. aid, given a pronounced dependence on both foreign aid and external remittances for its economic expansion. Armenia is a leading recipient of U.S. economic assistance, having received more than $1.5 billion since 1992, and is expected to garner another $75 million in separate aid appropriated by the U.S. Congress. But remittances from Armenians working abroad, and from Russia most significantly, represent an integral source of income for a large segment of the Armenian population. Although such structural dependence raises serious questions about Armenia’s record of statistical economic growth, the inflow of remittances is also vulnerable to outside pressure. For example, the substantial flow of remittances from the Russian Federation could easily be curtailed by any Russian crackdown, under the pretext of limiting potential avenues of terrorist financing.

Generally, the state of Armenia’s political and economic development, or more specifically, the depth of its democracy or free markets, has also become a new factor in determining Armenia’s position within the international community. Although not universally accepted, this new criteria is now key to the Bush administration’s interpretation of U.S. foreign relations. This new mandate for the promotion, if not imposition, of free market democracy abroad serves as a core
element in a more muscular and, at times, unilateral U.S. foreign policy. This is further expressed within U.S. national security as an avenue toward addressing the root causes of international terrorism and instability, arguing that a lack of democracy and a closed economy produces deep discontent and despair, thereby providing a classic breeding ground for terrorism. But the relevance for Armenia is much more specific. The standard of democracy has acquired a new significance in the past two years alone, and has now emerged as a metric for determining both regime stability and geopolitical value.

This political trend is visible in the open political confrontation between the ruling coalition government and a largely fractured group of opposition political parties, which escalated in the wake of tainted presidential and parliamentary elections in February and May 2003. Although this political confrontation is likely to escalate with the country’s parliamentary elections in 2007, the opposition remains limited by a dominance of personality over platform, offering little in the way of policy alternatives. But the priority political issue facing Armenia is the question of presidential succession, as President Robert Kocharian is constitutionally prevented from seeking a third term in 2008. This suggests a dynamic jockeying for position, both within the ruling three-party coalition and among the disparate opposition parties.

The Linkage between Economics and Politics
Economics is the third trend fostering an underlying insecurity. This trend is also composed of a linkage between economics and politics, which is important as economic growth, both real and promised, is used as an underlying factor for regime legitimacy. In the Armenian case, economic growth is commonly touted as an affirmation of its rule, but also to obscure its political deficiencies. Such a reliance on economic growth to argue political legitimacy also confers a related vulnerability, however, that in the event of economic crisis or decline, political legitimacy will be openly challenged.

There is also a link between economics and politics in terms of governance. This is demonstrated by the Armenian government’s tendency to formulate and implement economic reform based on short-term political considerations and, at times, on personal interests. Although such linkage is natural, in Armenia’s difficult period of transition, the tripod of corruption, inexperienced leadership, and a weak rule of law subjects economic reform policy to greater pressure and undue political influence. Thus, the imperative for strengthening the political institutions of democracy is an essential prerequisite for sustainable economic reform. The challenges of a mounting social divide, marked by widening disparities in wealth and income, constitute a dangerous economic insecurity.

The Cancer of Corruption
The threat of corruption is especially significant because no matter how impressive a country’s economic and political reforms, corruption impedes the fundamental transition to a market economy and hinders the establishment of a resilient democracy. During the longer term, corruption also weakens the state by under-
ming its legitimacy and credibility, and fosters a loss of public confidence in a
government’s policies. The negative economic effects of corruption are also siz-
able, especially for the infant Armenian state. An important aspect of corruption
is its hidden employment and unreported economic activity, known as a shadow
economy or black market. This underground economy denies the government an
essential amount of tax revenue and inherently deepens criminal activity. This is
a crucial factor, as tax revenue is necessary for the state’s vital social programs,
such as education and social services as well as benefits, such as health care, pen-
sions, and unemployment assistance. Thus, corruption denies the state much-
needed revenue, affirming that corruption is in no way a victimless crime.

In nearly all cases of endemic corruption, a significantly weak precondition of
the rule of law is common. For this reason, all post-Soviet countries in transition
are victims of corruption, as the breakdown of the rule of law and an already weak
state have combined to create an environment more conducive to an expanding
shadow economy. The post-Soviet states also have a historical legacy of illegal
economic activity, or black market, that has helped to encourage this trend. The
absence of good governance among the post-Soviet states continues to limit effec-
tive anticorruption efforts.

There are some important measures that may help to combat corruption, how-
ever. To achieve a deeper impact on corruption, such measures should be formu-
lated within an overall package designed to strengthen the state and ensure the
rule of law. A careful combination of measures to enhance both the powers and
independence of the state structures is needed, starting with a focus on creating
and strengthening regulatory agencies and bodies. In contrast to blanket measures
endowing the state with more powers, the fight against corruption must also be
carried out by oversight bodies empowered to supervise privatization and the
emerging securities markets as well as to police the economy for monopolies, car-
tels, and trusts. Such bodies should be independent from, but accountable to, the
government and need to be supported and supervised by relevant legislation. The
related introduction of greater mechanisms of transparency and oversight are also
crucial to bolstering these regulatory bodies.

But the primary element in such government measures is the need for good
governance. The prerequisites of transparency, ethics, accountability, and com-
petent administration are essential for good governance in these states. These pre-
requisites are notably lacking, however, as each country is currently defined by a
strong executive that dominates a weaker judicial branch and has marginalized a
rather ineffective legislature. There needs to be a determined effort to strengthen
judicial independence and restore meritocracy over favoritism in governance,
through building and bolstering necessary economic and political institutions. In
this context, institutions matter, and are essential to forge resilient democracy and
an open market economy.

**Economic Growth Is Insufficient**

Following an early period of economic reforms initiated in 1994–1998, the
Armenian economy has posted an impressive record of economic growth, with
real GDP growth averaging 12 percent a year. Over the medium- to long-term, however, Armenia must press ahead with structural reform in several areas. There is an obvious need to expand and broaden economic growth and the export base, improve capital formation, and further reform the banking sector, as well as focus on job creation. The country’s overall potential for economic development is tied to the region, however, as a normalization of trade relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey are essential factors for trade expansion.

In addition to the obvious linkage between sustainable, longer-term economic growth and the restoration of regional trade, Armenia should also prepare for the opportunities inherent in the trend of globalization. For Armenia, engaging the globalizing marketplace offers the promise of greater trade, development, and investment. Driven by the need to expand its economic growth beyond the confines of remittances and limited exports, Armenia also needs to focus on two essential prerequisites for globalization.

First, there is a need to develop the Armenian infrastructure. This encompasses both the physical and institutional infrastructure, with an emphasis on ending barriers and impediments to engagement. The physical infrastructure includes a priority of air links, especially crucial given the degradation of road and rail links resulting from the long-standing blockade of the country, and a need to address the poor state of the monopolistic national telecommunications network. Second, there is a related need for policies designed to forge a role within the globalized marketplace.

The Need for a Process of National Security

There is also an absence of any comprehensive Armenian strategy of national security, only matched by a lack of a coherent process of national security. This entails both organizational and ideological reforms, including a reexamination of commonly held but little questioned tenets of Armenian national security. Specifically, the course of Armenian national security has failed to evolve beyond the parameters of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This has only led to a hardening of Armenian political thinking in recent years, or more accurately to an increasingly rigid nationalist posturing, which has both contributed to the closed system of politics and curbed a more open and tolerant political discourse.

Such strident intolerance that now defines the tenets of Armenian nationalism has also infected the development of national security and defense. In a negative sense, there is a degree of identity politics at work, with a crude, yet effective manipulation of public opinion by a well-entrenched elite. The point here is not to casually discard or disdain Armenian nationalism, but to highlight the danger
of misunderstanding the true nature of threats facing Armenia and to elevate Armenian national security beyond such narrow, short-sighted nationalism.

But it is also the absence of the process more than the policy of national security that is most worrisome. Although a previous draft national security concept was previously presented to the Armenian parliament, the quality was so inferior that the Kocharian government quickly vetoed it. Currently, a new draft concept, first developed in early 2005, is being prepared for parliamentary consideration, although several senior security and military figures have dismissed the document as seriously deficient.5

One of the most glaring deficiencies is demonstrated by the current lack of an institutionalized national security. Under the nominal leadership of Defense Minister Serzh Sargsyan, the Armenian National Security Council has met infrequently and has been largely marginalized from the national security decision-making process. Although there has been a marked increase in the role of parliamentary committees with jurisdiction over defense and security policy in recent years, the sheer dominance of the executive branch in general, and the defense minister in particular, over all aspects of security has only meant that the dysfunctional nature of the national security process remains uncorrected.

The first problem is structural, as the Armenian National Security Council is rarely convened as a full consultative body. Even when it does meet, it is usually focused on the implementation of a decision already adopted. This distorted process stems from the fact that the body is headed by the powerful defense minister, whose dominant role over much of the country’s military and security apparatus questions the body organizational power autonomy and impartiality. This was not always the case, however, as the body was actively engaged in the formulation and implementation of national security policy throughout much of the Ter-Petrossian period.

The second problem is personal, and reveals an obvious conflict of interest, as the defense minister is empowered to represent the interests of his particular ministry and, therefore, holds a vested interest that can only interfere with his role as the head of the National Security Council. A related conflict, however, stems from Defense Minister Sargsyan’s role as the head of the intergovernmental commission for bilateral relations with Russia. There should be an obvious delineation of roles and responsibilities between positions that hold jurisdiction over such intertwined aspects of national security. Clearly, the need for a clear redefinition and coherent readjustment of Armenian national security is only matched by a challenge to ensure that both the definition and defense of national security is a dynamic, not static, process.

**Conclusion**

Thus, the redefinition of Armenian national security reveals three underlying trends. Each of these trends is an internal threat that, if not averted, only threatens to exacerbate Armenia’s underlying national insecurity. The need is not only for a clear redefinition and coherent readjustment of Armenian national security, but for a new recognition of national security as a dynamic, not static, process,
as well as policy. But the imperative for overcoming Armenia’s national insecurity is to first address the underlying military, political, and economic trends. The overwhelming focus on so-called external threats to Armenian national security has been both misplaced and mistaken.

Such threat misperception is rooted in a rigid nationalism has been compound-ed by the closed and subjective nature of national security and defense policy-making. The overwhelming need, therefore, is to institute a process of national security and defense that elevates Armenia’s true national interest over more parochial partisan interest. Only by admitting that the core challenges to national security come from within can true security and stability in Armenia be achieved.

Notes

1. This feeling is also reflected in the definition of the Armenian-held areas of Azerbaijan proper as “liberated” rather than “occupied” territory.
5. Comments made during interviews with author in Armenia in June and November 2005.