By 1989, the SB had become one of the most important power structures in the Polish state. Most of the SB’s 24,000 functionaries were well-trained professionals with logistical support from the governmental administration. The SB’s huge archival resources, accumulated throughout the decades, and its network of thousands of secret collaborators (some of them strategically placed within the ranks of the opposition), also constituted major factors in the agency’s position of power.

The SB’s political dominance remained largely unchanged despite the tumultuous events of June 1989. This was ensured by the elevation of General Kiszczyk, Jaruzelski’s confidante, to a preeminent position in the new, post-Communist political order. During Kiszczyk’s tenure as Minister of Internal Affairs in the administration of Tadeusz Mazowiecki (July 1989–May 1990), no structural or personnel changes took place in the MSW. Indeed, of all the officials in this branch of government, only Krzysztof Koslowski, the former deputy editor of the influential Tygodnik Powszechny Catholic weekly, had not held a Communist Party identity card earlier. (Koslowski would be promoted to Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in February 1990.)

Nor were there any changes in the area of the military special services, which functioned as Administration II of the General Staff of the Polish People’s Army (intelligence) and Military Internal Service (WSW, or counterintelligence and military police). Not many people were aware of how often the military special services were used to combat the opposition and to penetrate Polish political circles. But these elements enjoyed a special trust from General Jaruzelski, and General Kiszczyk had come from their ranks.

A revolution in the special services was certainly hard to accomplish. For many months, even under the new political conditions that prevailed after the summer of 1989, the special services were supervised by the same people that had led them earlier in the struggle against the anti-Communist opposition. It was also significant that the opposition did not have people at its disposal who were versed in the specific tasks and features of special services. Further compounding the problem was the involvement of many influential figures from among the new political elites with the secret agencies. It was a foregone conclusion that these factors—which made it impossible to bring about “de-Communization” as a process—would also prevent a squaring of accounts with the legacy of the special services of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL).³

At the same time, however, there were attempts “from below,” inspired by various political circles and milieus, to carry on this process. The question of dealing with the special services became the focus of a bitter political dispute that far transcended the technical transformation of the PRL. This was because the essence of the dispute touched on the foundation of Poland’s political transformation and the pace and depth of Polish reforms. Among the factors that galvanized public opinion on this topic was the government’s decision to establish an extraordinary parliamentary committee to investigate the activities of the MSW. In particular, the committee was charged with identifying the individuals responsible for the death of nearly one hundred persons who lost their lives in
unexplained circumstances through the activities of the SB and the police (the “citizens’ militia” or MO) during and after the martial law period. Expectations of such changes were rising in society, steadily fuelled by new information about past crimes committed by SB functionaries.

The Establishment of the Office of State Protection (UOP)

On January 19, 1990, the Citizens’ Parliamentary Club (OKP), representing the still-unified bloc of the former anti-Communist opposition, adopted a proposal for two “police laws”: one designed to revise the scope of the office of Minister of Internal Affairs and the other providing for state security and public order. The proposal envisioned a division of the services, especially in the archival and technical units, between the police and a new agency, the Office of State Protection (UOP). Under the proposed measures, police functionaries would be barred from membership in political parties and the functionaries of the Office would be prohibited from associating in trade unions. In response, the then-leadership of the MSW submitted its own proposal for a reform of the special services, in which it opposed a clear elimination of these services from the structure of the Ministry, claiming that a common technical and logistic infrastructure was necessary in the interests of efficiency. But in early February 1990, the Council of Ministers adopted the proposal prepared by the OKP and forwarded it to the Sejm, the lower chamber of the Polish parliament.

Following a stormy debate, the Sejm adopted the new law on April 6, 1990. It provided for the replacement of the MO by a new structure with the prewar name of the State Police (PP). For its part, the SB was disbanded and its functionaries dismissed. At the same time, the law created the UOP as a new institution performing both intelligence and counterintelligence functions. Like the SB before it, the UOP remained part of the MSW—which continued to hold the status of a “superministry” uniting police, fire department, and special services functions. On May 10, 1990, the day the law entered into effect, Krzysztof Kozlowski was appointed as the UOP’s first head, and Andrzej Milczanowski as his deputy.

Compared to the SB structures, the UOP and its branches were radically smaller in size and scope. The UOP employed only about six thousand functionaries, and its operational techniques—censorship of correspondence, surveillance, and other activities by secret agents—were sharply limited under the April 6, 1990 law, which also prohibited the recruitment of politicians, clergymen, and journalists. The law’s restrictions on operational work also extended to the activities of legal political parties and trade unions. Institutionally, the UOP also housed an information and analytical unit of the Bureau of Analyses and Information, the cadres that were composed mainly from personnel that had joined the services after 1989.

Verification of the Former SB Functionaries

From the very beginning of the intelligence reform process, however, much controversy was engendered by the fact that the UOP’s initial core consisted of old SB functionaries. These Communist-era cadres had been brought into the new
agency under the prevailing rules of verification. At that time, persons over fifty-five years of age and core functionaries of the SB (those responsible primarily for surveillance of the political opposition, trade unions, workers, the rural population, the Churches and the intelligentsia) were not eligible for service. But others were.

From among the SB’s 25,000 functionaries, 14,500 chose verification. The remainder, including the Bureau’s leadership, resigned their posts and made no attempt to find employment with the UOP.

Further complicating the matter were ambiguities in the verification process. Carried out on both a federal level (through the Central Qualifying Commission) and through district commissions, the procedures raised a number of questions. Given the difficulty of determining clear, set criteria for exclusion of former SB officials, the process in practice became wholly dependent upon the composition of the individual commission presiding over the case at hand. There were instances where officers previously disqualified by a district commission would appeal to the Central Commission in Warsaw and—by virtue of its decision—were accepted to work. In complicated cases, final decisions were made by the head of the UOP. In turn, nearly 4,500 of the more than 5,000 negatively verified functionaries filed appeals.

After all the appellate procedures, 9,800 functionaries of the SB (75 percent of all verified persons) were positively verified. Not all of them found employment with the UOP, and some of them moved to the police and the border guard. Only twenty persons belonging to the old leadership cadres of the MSW (which had numbered 137 persons in 1989) remained, mainly in the executive structure of the fire department and the Central Police Command.

The results were pronounced. The MSW troops, renamed the “Vistula Troops,” were placed under new command. No verification took place with respect to police functionaries. And most SB workers employed in technical sections such as codes, communications and the like were positively verified. In principle, the intelligence and counterintelligence personnel transitioned from the SB to the UOP without major changes (the notable exception was that some of the former PRL intelligence officers chose not to assume jobs in the new formation). Recruitment of new candidates for service commenced immediately after verification, resulting in the UOP inheriting 75 percent of its estimated operations personnel.

**The Reform Debate**

Critics of these measures emphasized that they were both perfunctory and taken too late. (Their shortcomings were compounded by the lax approach taken by the administration of Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki, which gave the old team more than seven months to destroy or remove the SB’s archives—something that would play a destabilizing role on the Polish political stage for a long while.) The result was that former SB functionaries soon found new niches in the post-Communist reality. Most of them had no illusions about being able to serve as functionaries in the special services of a democratic state. Instead, taking advantage of their operational know-how and network of secret collaborators, they...
became active in the economy, banking, and news media. As early as autumn 1989, a sizeable group had become ensconced among the various units of the State Police.

These circumstances engendered a serious debate. The fact that the UOP remained within the MSW power structure was heavily criticized by advocates of reform on the grounds that too much power was still concentrated in the ministry, and in particular in the hands of its minister. In the meantime, those in favor of the plan, mainly the MSW’s then-leadership, lobbied to limit the costs of reform. Within the MSW, they argued, there were a number of common units linked to both the UOP/police infrastructure and that of social services that had to remain unaltered. (Among others, this included the medical service, which was common to all units of the MSW.) In addition, the common central archives of the MSW, which continued to store materials accumulated by the SB, had to remain unchanged. This model, they stressed, was the only feasible one, given that the state lacked the capacity to bring about a total personnel change, especially under the increasing threat of rising criminal elements and organized crime.6

The power wielded by the Minister of Internal Affairs also prompted a heated debate over the Ministry’s position in the Polish power structure. Ever since the 1993 adoption of the “Little Constitution” (a temporary instrument that preceded the drafting of a new Constitution), appointments to the post of Minister of Internal Affairs had been judged to be within the competence of the President. Along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ) and the Ministry of National Defense (MON), this governmental department was one of the “presidential departments.” This principle, however, proved to have corrosive effects. By the parliamentary elections of September 1993, the management of the UOP was already gradually being taken over by functionaries who had gained their experience in the MSW prior to 1989, mainly in intelligence.7

All of this occurred against a turbulent political backdrop. After the June 1992 fall of Jan Olszewski’s right-wing administration—which had undertaken an unsuccessful effort at the lustration of Polish politicians—right-wing politicians accused the office of President Lech Walesa of shielding former security functionaries from a radical decommunization. Minister Mieczyslaw Wachowski, an eminence grise behind the Presidency who had served as Walesa’s Chief of Staff since 1994, reportedly played an important part in these activities.8

Finally, in 1996, as part of a central reorganization, the UOP was removed from the supervision of the President’s Office and subordinated to the Office of the Premier. Furthermore, two institutions were set up: a minister to coordinate

“The SB’s political dominance remained largely unchanged despite the tumultuous events of June 1989.”
the special services and a board (“Kolegium”) for their governance. Both mechanisms were designed to facilitate the coordination of the services’ civilian and military activities and improve their political oversight.9

Ultimately, however, the fate of the UOP would only be decided in September 2001, in the wake of the electoral victory of a coalition made up of the Democratic Left Alliance–Polish Peasants’ Party (SLD-PSL) and the Labor Union (UP). In spring 2002, a law was drafted dissolving the UOP and creating the Internal Security Agency (counterintelligence) and the Intelligence Agency. The law allowed the return to active duty of former SB officers who had been dismissed from the UOP between 1997 and 2001, including even those who had not undergone verification in 1990.

The Reorganization of the Military Special Services

Poland’s new political forces turned out to be even less consistent in reforming the military special services. During the Mazowiecki administration, the national defense department had been led by army general—and close Jaruzelski colleague—Florian Siwicki. For a long period of time, the armed forces remained outside of any external political oversight. Apart from sheer negligence, this was due to the awareness that the changes in the armed forces—which, in the initial phase of the Poland’s systemic transformation, were part of the Warsaw Pact forces—had to proceed with great caution, to avoid straining relations with Moscow. Moreover, the military special services were not perceived as a tool of political repression, but rather as a body concerned with strictly military problems.

Yet the reorganization of the civilian special services inevitably led to changes in the structure of other military counterparts. By order of the minister of national defense on April 19, 1990, the Military Internal Service (WSW) was dissolved. A Military Gendarmerie, reduced by about 70 percent, was formed from the WSW’s prevention and counterintelligence personnel. It was subordinated to Administration II of the general staff, forming a new structure: Intelligence and Counterintelligence.10 Its legal status, however, remained unregulated.

In spring 1990, the public learned about a number of the WSW’s past political actions, including the destruction of its own archives, which had occurred in summer 1989, by order of then—WSW head General Edmund Bula. Among other materials, some forty thousand operational files covering 1945 to 1988 had been destroyed. In autumn 1990, these developments led to the creation within the Sejm Committee for National Defense of the Extraordinary Subcommittee for Investigating the Activities of the former WSW. (Though an important political move, the Subcommittee produced no serious results.)

In summer 1991, the MON was split into a civilian ministry and a military general staff of the Polish Armed Forces (WP). Janusz Onyszkiewicz became the first civilian minister of national defense. Further changes were spurred by events in the Soviet Union; the failure of the August 1991 coup in Moscow exposed the helplessness of the old structures in the face of new threats and challenges. In part as a reaction to that coup, the Minister of National Defense in August 1991
dissolved the WP’s General Staff Administration II and replaced it with another organization, the Chief Military Information Services (WSI), which fell under the civilian auspices of the MON. Rear-Admiral Czeslaw Wawrzyniak, who previously had no connection with any special services, became the WSI’s first head. The division was envisioned with approximately 1,000 persons on staff.

In a further reorganization, a department of the WSI directly under the civilian minister was formed within the MON.

The WSI would prove to be immune from verifications, even to the limited extent that they were carried out within the UOP. In practicality, all WSI cadres had already served in the military special services of the PRL, especially in intelligence. The department would also largely be free of oversight, since no statutory regulation governed the service’s legal status. In 1991, the WSI was placed under the special custody of the Office of the President—a move that was decried as integrating the military special services into the country’s ongoing political struggle. In February 1994, the WSI were subordinated to the Chief of General Staff, which meant that, in practice, no civilian oversight of its activities existed.

Efforts to curb the WSI’s powers continued to little avail. In July 1994, then-Chief Prosecutor Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz submitted a request to the Constitutional Tribunal for a ruling on the WSI’s right to use listening devices. The next year, Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia reiterated this request. Yet six years after the onset of systemic change, representatives of the new authority, including the Chief Prosecutor, still did not know whether the WSI had the right to install listening devices and censure correspondence, demonstrating the chaos surrounding the oversight of the military special services.

The dispute over the scope and powers of the WSI was finally resolved under President Aleksander Kwasniewski, with the department becoming officially subordinated to the civilian oversight of the MON in December of 1995.

Problems of Apolitical Services

As outlined above, effective supervision of the special services suffered from serious deficiencies. Foremost was the absence of parliamentary oversight. Despite successive MSW leaderships declaring their willingness to submit to such supervision, no appropriate legal solutions were adopted for years. It was not until March 1995 that the pertinent parliamentary bodies adopted a draft resolution creating a special committee to oversee the special services. The members of that committee were selected in October 1995 from among the representatives of Poland’s major political groupings, including the opposition.

Among the factors that contributed to the new push for regulation were revelations about the involvement of the Polish security services in thwarting an arms-transit operation by a Northern Irish terrorist group. This operation, executed with British counterintelligence (MI5), was revealed by the press in November 1993 and hailed as a success. Yet the press also reported that UOP functionaries were responsible for alleged wrongdoings in connection with the incident. The whole affair became the subject of hearings before the parliamentary Committee on Public Administration and Internal Affairs. One of the
conclusions was a recommendation to set up the aforementioned parliamentary committee to oversee the special services.

Another factor was the public concern engendered by dubious personnel decisions and political activism among UOP functionaries—a development that led to an organizational reshuffle within the UOP.

Of these cases, the most prominent was that of Major Adam Hodysz. In the summer 1993, Hodysz, the head of the Gdansk branch of the UOP, was recalled from his post. In the past, as an SB officer, Hodysz had established contacts with activists from the anti-Communist opposition, supplying a large amount of essential information to Solidarity members and acquainting them with the government’s preparations for the introduction of martial law. He was discovered by the SB, apprehended, and imprisoned. After his release, Hodysz received personal thanks from Lech Walesa for his services to Solidarity. Yet shortly thereafter, on President Walesa’s personal intervention, Hodysz was replaced with Colonel Wiktor Fafara, a career investigative officer with many years of SB service, who enjoyed the trust of the president’s office. Shortly thereafter, Professor Jerzy Konieczny, a former adviser to Walesa, was similarly dismissed from his post as head of the UOP. Colonel Gromoslaw Czempinski, an officer with some experience in counterintelligence in the PRL, was appointed as his successor. These cases marked the start of a process of public rehabilitation among former SB officers.

Former Chief of Staff Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s 2001 disclosure of the Bureau of Analyses and Information’s secret Instruction No. 0015 also aroused strong emotions. Housed within the UOP, the bureau was tasked with a range of “white intelligence” functions, including the collection and analysis of materials pertaining to the public and political lives of select individuals. Notably, the bureau’s scope was not extended to the application of operational techniques. Kaczynski, however, interpreted the UOP’s mandate to include the placement of secret agents—including so-called consultants to the agency—within the ranks of political parties, trade unions, and social organizations.

In the wake of Kaczynski’s revelation, the UOP strongly denied all wrongdoing. Nonetheless, the controversial Instruction No. 0015 was promptly rescinded. But the atmosphere of scandals and recriminations would prove more difficult to diffuse; suspicions that the practice of utilizing “consultants” was a method of circumventing the statutory ban on operational work in various important political milieus persisted. Especially vocal were protests by the anti-communist opposition, which claimed to be the UOP’s target. The UOP’s leadership, as well as members of Walesa’s inner circle, adamantly denied these accusations.

**Problems with Secret Collaborators (“Agentura”)**

A separate phase in the transformation of the special services surrounded the question of revealing secret SB collaborators and limiting their rights to political participation. This became a subject of great debate, as the Sejm attempted to design mechanisms for identification and disclosure of persons involved in the “agentura.” On May 28, 1992, the Sejm adopted a resolution obligating the Minister of Internal Affairs to submit full information on civil servants from the rank
of the district head ("wojewoda") upwards, as well as on senators, Sejm deputies, judges, and attorneys, that had been collaborators of the UB (later SB) between 1945 and 1990. Subsequently, on June 4, Internal Affairs Minister Antoni Macierewicz submitted a document to the Sejm detailing the contents of the Ministry’s files on Sejm deputies, senators, and persons holding the highest offices in the state, including the president. From that moment, however, it could no longer be argued that there was no parliamentary mechanism governing lustration.15

The MSW leadership that succeeded the Macierewicz team proved to be the most ardent opponent of the lustration bill. This was especially true of Minister Andrzej Milczanowski, Deputy Minister Jerzy Zimowski, and the two heads of the UOP: Professor Jerzy Konieczny and Colonel Gromoslaw Czempinski. Many of their arguments centered on the depleted state of the Ministry’s archives. Minister Milczanowski, for one, argued that such measures were unnecessary because between September 1989 and February 1990, about 60 percent of MSW documents and other materials—and more than 50 percent of materials concerning personal sources of information, mainly on secret collaborators—had been destroyed. In his opinion, SB officers had occasionally forged documents, adding to the unreliability of the materials in question. Former Minister Macierewicz, however, held a different view; according to him, former SB collaborators could be identified on the basis of other documents. Macierewicz also claimed never to have come across cases of information about fictional UB or SB collaborators.

The issue of lustration returned to the public eye in December of 1995, when Premier Jozef Oleksy was accused of collaboration with Soviet, and subsequently Russian, intelligence. In response to such charges against a leading Polish political figure, President Kwasniewski penned a new lustration bill, sparking a fresh debate about the form and scope of lustration and the accountability of those proven to have collaborated with the UB and SB. The protracted debate came to a close in spring 1997, when the Sejm officially adopted the Lustration Law.16

The law provided that certain public figures would be forced to submit an affidavit confirming or denying their collaboration with the Communist secret police. It was designed as a verification—rather than a punitive—tool; collaboration itself did not incur penalties, but the submission of a false affidavit did. The law also created the post of a spokesman of public interest, who would be appointed by Poland’s chief justice and charged with checking the veracity of the lustration declarations. In questionable cases, the spokesman was authorized to institute proceedings before a special lustration court appointed by the Warsaw Appeals Court.

The activities of Judge Boguslaw Nizienski, who subsequently became the spokesman of public interest, engendered a great deal of controversy over the implementation of the Lustration Law. Yet the fact that Nizienski pursued a wide range of persons who had submitted false lustration declarations, regardless of their political persuasion, appears to be a testament to his impartiality. With all its deficiencies, the law of April 11, 1997 was a major step toward the purification of public life and the reconstruction of public trust in those holding public office. It also ended years of emotional—yet ultimately futile—discussions about secret collaboration with the Communist secret services.
Troubles with the Archives

For a long time, however, Poland did grapple with the creation of a custodial body to take charge of the archives of the Communist special services. This was largely a function of the fact that the real condition of the documents taken over by the UOP and the WSI was unknown. Public opinion prevailed that a majority of the most important operational materials had been destroyed.\(^\text{17}\) Yet there was evidence that—although many SB officers were eager to conceal their criminal activities—there was no shortage of those who carried away secret materials in hopes of eventually using them as a unique “insurance policy” for a better life, or simply as convenient material for blackmail. On March 20, 1990, in reaction to information about the destruction of the records, National Education Minister Henryk Samsonowicz established a special commission to review the MSW archives. The activities of this body, however, failed to clarify the ultimate fate of the archives.

A comprehensive proposal for managing the accumulated archival resources of the UOP, MSW, and WSI did not emerge until the enactment of the Law on the Institute of National Memory (IPN) in 1998.\(^\text{18}\) This law was designed to allow citizens access to the files accumulated on them in the past by the security organs of the Communist state. But the law, drafted by the Electoral Action Solidarity and the Freedom Union, was vetoed by President Kwasniewski, who in turn prepared his own proposal—namely the creation of a so-called citizens’ archives, accessible mainly to a select group of scholars. The presidential version of the law was a giant step backward, making it possible to retain a shroud of secrecy over the names of agents, and opening access to the files of former functionaries to secret collaborators of Communist security organs.

To override the president’s veto, the coalition had to agree to a revision of their law. Among other new provisions, the revised law stipulated that the president of the IPN would be elected by a two-thirds vote of the Sejm and not by a simple majority—a provision that ensured the opposition had a vote in the appointment of the President of the IPN. But as it turned out, filling this post was no simple matter; a year would elapse before Professor Leon Kieres was elected to the presidency of the IPN.

The protections enshrined by the revised law were considerable. Today, each affected individual has the right to acquaint himself with the relevant materials accumulated on him by security organs, as well as finding out the names of those who conducted operations against him and who informed on him as secret collaborators. Furthermore, it has become possible for scholars to obtain access to, and work on, materials produced by the PRL special services now in the custody of the IPN’s Bureau of Archives and Records. Finally, an important element of

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“Outstanding issues relating to the old system were not resolved at the time of the 1989 Roundtable talks, allowing SB and WSW functionaries to destroy or ‘privatize’ a considerable portion of the organizations’ archives.”
the IPN is its chief commission for the prosecution of crimes against the Polish nation, the task of which is to prosecute the perpetrators of Nazi and Communist crimes. The concept of the Communist crime, introduced into Polish law with the IPN Law of 1998, encompasses all crimes committed until September 1989, making it finally possible to prosecute functionaries of the UB and SB.

**Conclusion**

The transformation of the special services has been among the most challenging tasks to confront Polish democracy since 1989. It has been an inconsistent process, largely because of the lack of a common approach on the part of the country’s major political forces. Moreover, the evolutionary nature of political changes within Poland has largely predetermined the manner in which the special services transformation has taken place. Outstanding issues relating to the old system were not resolved at the time of the 1989 Roundtable talks, allowing SB and WSW functionaries to destroy or “privatize” a considerable portion of the organizations’ archives. It was also difficult to instill a new ethos in a service that, until 1997, was predominantly occupied by former members of the Communist secret services.

The anti-Communist opposition, which assumed power after 1989, lacked the know-how, political will, and appropriate infrastructure to carry out the consistent reforms necessary in this area. The failures of that initial period were fraught with long-term negative consequences for Poland’s systemic transformation. First, no headway was made in the creation of apolitical special services; these departments would be complicit both in efforts to dismantle legitimate parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activity in 1993 and in the ultimate overthrow of the administration of Waldemar Pawlak in 1995. Their illegal financial operations, conducted both at home and abroad, also became a source of great controversy.19

Moreover, doubts were raised about the value of the special services in combating penetration by the Russian intelligence services.20 In an attempt to change this state of affairs, the Task Force for Special Services attached to the Chairman of the Electoral Action Solidarity launched a program of radical reforms in the spring of 1997.21 Its premise was to reconstruct the special services from their very foundations, hence its name: “the zero variant.” Though not implemented fully, the program did foment some changes within the UOP between 1997 and 2001. (Notably, the leadership of the revised services succeeded in intensifying activities against organized crime and penetration by foreign intelligence services.) But the program’s most important achievement was to create a real basis of cooperation with the special services of NATO countries, which had a significant effect on Poland’s chances for membership in the Atlantic Alliance.

Initiated in 1990, the process of the transformation of the special services has been a constant theme in the Polish political life. Yet, even today, this remains far from a finished process. For Poland, the question of adapting the secret police structure inherited from the Communist era to the requirements of a democratic state remains a work in progress.
List of Acronyms

IPM—Instytut Pamięci Narodowej—Institute of National Memory
MO—Milicja Obywatelska—Citizens’ Militia
MON—Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej—Ministry of National Defense
MSW—Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych—Ministry of Internal Affairs
MSZ—Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych—Ministry of Foreign Affairs
OKP—Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny—Citizens’ Parliamentary Club
PC—Porozumienie Centrum—Centrum Agreement
PP—Polska Panstwowa—State Police
PRL—Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa—Polish People’s Republic
PZPR—Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza—Polish United Workers’ Party
RP—Rzeczpospolita Polska—Polish Republic
SB—Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa—Security Service
SLD–PSL—Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej–Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe—Democratic Left Alliance–Polish Peasants’ Party
UB—Urzad Bezpieczenstwa—Security Office
UOP—Urzad Ochrony Panstwa—State Protection Office
WP—Wojsko Polskie—Polish Armed Forces
WSI—Wojskowe Sluzby Informacyjne—Military Information Services
WSW—Wojskowa Sluzba Wewnetrzna—Military Internal Service

NOTES

1. Specifically, these were the law concerning the MSW of July 31, 1983, and the law on the office of the minister of internal affairs of July 14, 1983.
11. Ibid.

15. Macierewicz also proposed the creation of a special commission charged with verifying these materials. This, however, never materialized. Premier Olszewski, who would have taken charge of this initiative, was ousted by President Walesa and other opposition parties. Krzysztof Kaszynski and Jacek Podgorski, “Pandora’s Files” in *Files or Ghosts of Security Service* (Warsaw: n.p., 1992): 48–79.


17. Among the documents destroyed were files of operational records, work files, and records of assets. On the other hand, cards containing obligations and registration cards were known to have survived the destruction that accompanied the fall of Communism and the collapse of the Communist secret services in Poland.


