

# Security in Flux: International Integration and the Transformations of Threat in Estonia

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**N**ational security has been a keyword in Estonian politics throughout the past decade. Although it has remained a prominent topic, the specific ways in which the concept of security is used in political debates have changed considerably as Estonia has integrated with the European Union (EU) and NATO. Estonia's foreign policies largely are undertaken in the name of security, yet these same foreign policies also change how security is discussed and acted upon. Furthermore, different political groups use the category of security for different, and sometimes divergent, arguments.

In this article, I analyze how security is problematized in Estonia—that is, how security is constituted as a specific type of a problem requiring specific types of solutions—and how these problematizations have changed in the course of Estonia's pursuits of EU and NATO membership. I do not ask the conventional questions of whether Estonia is becoming more secure, whether its people are feeling more secure, or whether Estonia's foreign and security policies accurately reflect its national interest and geopolitical context. Rather, I ask how the category of security is used in political debates and with what political effects. My concern therefore lies not with what different individuals “really” think, but with how they invoke security in their public statements.<sup>1</sup> I analyze two foreign policy issues—EU and NATO membership and Estonian-Russian relations—of which the debates revolve largely around the notion of security. Instead of assuming monolithic categories of “the Estonian view” or “the Estonian interest,” I investigate the differences among the claims put forth about, and in the name of, security. I thereby dissect the role of specific political groups, institutions, and individuals in defining what are Estonia's security concerns and how security should be approached in policymaking. The

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analysis shows that although security in Estonia is habitually viewed as thoroughly straightforward and unproblematic,<sup>2</sup> that category in fact has multiple meanings and is hence used for multiple political strategies. Foreign and security policies are conducted internationally, but they are legitimized domestically. An in-depth understanding of these policies requires a nuanced grasp of their domestic legitimization.

The rest of the article is divided into three sections. The next section briefly outlines how the uses of (the concept of) security in the Estonian media, academia, and parliamentary debates have changed during the 1990s. I argue that Estonia's security has become framed not in terms of interstate military competition but in the more cooperative "soft" terms of multilateral cooperation in the new Europe. As the EU and NATO security rhetoric have changed,<sup>3</sup> so have Estonia's articulations as to why it wants to be a member of these organizations. In particular, NATO membership has become construed not in terms of military defense, but as a codification of Estonia's European values and European geopolitical location. Likewise, in relations with Russia, statements about Estonia's national security have shifted from an inflexible and at times confrontational stance to a more cooperative mode. The third section concentrates on differences among the groups that employ the notion of security in Estonia. I argue that even though security is a matter of a strong consensus in Estonia, statements directed to different audiences frame security differently. By analyzing the role of Estonia's statecraft intellectuals—the state bureaucrats, leaders, foreign policy experts, and advisors who comment upon, influence, and conduct the activities of statecraft<sup>4</sup>—in the making of security in Estonia, I highlight their key role in reshaping how security is conceived in political debates. The concluding section highlights the implications of these findings to our understanding of Estonian politics.

I do not analyze policy in this article. I outline the assumptions, claims, and modes of analysis that are used to construe certain policies relevant and feasible while framing other policies as irrelevant and unfeasible.<sup>5</sup> It draws not only from official policy documents, but also from the national media, ministerial and presidential speeches and interviews, academic analyses, and transcripts of parliamentary debates. The analysis focuses on the second half of the 1990s as the period of Estonia's rapid integration with the EU and NATO. I concentrate on statements by prominent mainstream politicians, academics, and other public figures who regularly and publicly comment on the security of the state and the nation. My objective is not to provide a comprehensive account of Estonian security debates, but to elucidate the problematizations that have most influence and legitimacy in Estonia and cannot be discarded as ignorant or irrelevant. Such reliance on the dominant security discourse does not imply that this discourse is monolithic or that everyone subscribes to it. Rather, it is to illuminate these problematizations that set the parameters of public discussions. It is through the statements that repeatedly appear in public policy discussions that certain ways of discussing security are legitimized as mainstream, relevant, and natural, while others are de-legitimized as marginal, irrelevant, and unthinkable.

### From Threats to Risks, from “Hard” to “Soft” Security

The ways that the concept of security is evoked in Estonian political debates have shifted since the second half of the 1990s. Security has become framed not in “hard” military terms but in “soft” societal stability and quality of life terms. This “softening” has not undermined but, on the contrary, further bolstered and legitimized Estonia’s pursuits of NATO membership. I suggest that this apparent paradox of seemingly subsiding threats, but continued political mobilization in the name of security can be explained if we examine how security is used in Estonian politics.

On the one hand, national security no longer seems to be an urgent issue. Statements on the immediate Russian military threat, common in political rhetoric in the early to mid-1990s, had all but disappeared from mainstream political debates by the late 1990s.<sup>6</sup> Although the National Defense Policy Framework from 1996 stated that the main sources of threats to Estonia were “aggressive imperial ambitions and political and/or military instability,”<sup>7</sup> then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Toomas Hendrik Ilves stressed only a year later that “Estonia sees no specific threats to regional security.”<sup>8</sup> In 2001, the National Security Concept posited that Estonia perceived no military threat to itself, and there was no direct danger of Estonia yielding to outside political pressure in its domestic or foreign policy.<sup>9</sup> Significantly, the compilation of the National Security Concept was coordinated not by the Ministry of Defense, but by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The document articulates Estonia’s security concerns not in terms of military threats, but in terms of soft security risks, such as environmental degradation, large-scale migration, and transnational crime.<sup>10</sup>

Security has become framed, not in exclusive terms of confrontation with Russia but in inclusive terms of alignment with the West. In 1997 Ilves declared: “Estonia does not want to join the NATO of the Cold War. In both location and spirit Estonia is a part of the new Europe and we feel entitled to be constructively involved in the formation of the new European defence arrangement.”<sup>11</sup> NATO is not conceived as a defense alliance, but as an expression of democratic European values. In the words of Ilves, NATO membership would codify “common values—peace, freedom, democracy, and welfare—which Estonia values above all.”<sup>12</sup> Russia no longer preoccupies foreign policy speeches as it did until late 1990s. Security is discussed in the framework of EU and NATO accession, and Russia often receives only a passing mention at the end of speeches. Even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official brief on Estonian-Russian relations first emphasizes Estonia’s desire to develop relations with the EU and NATO, and only then mentions Estonia’s wish to maintain neighborly relations with Russia.<sup>13</sup> Since the second half of the 1990s, speeches by various foreign ministers to international audiences and Parliament have consistently implied that Estonian-Russian relations are mostly normal and good in some fields. Business circles in particular are openly advocating better relations with Russia, arguing that Estonia should take a more open stance toward economic and political cooperation with Russia. This is notable because public arguments that Estonian-Russian relations should be improved *from the Estonian side* (as opposed to only from the Russian side) have been rare in Estonia for the past

decade.<sup>14</sup> When Duma Deputy Chairman Dmitri Rogozin visited Estonia in 2001, the media coverage focused as much on the accompanying business delegation as on Rogozin himself. The National Security Concept likewise mentions Estonian-Russian relations not in the context of interstate power politics, but within the framework of multilateral cooperation programs such as the Northern Dimension and the Northern European Initiative.<sup>15</sup> When Estonia received an invitation to NATO in November 2002, Russia hardly was mentioned in the media coverage. This seems to indicate that security is less important in political debates because Estonia's relations with Russia have improved.

In domestic affairs, the keywords have changed from confrontational terms such as de-colonization in the early 1990s to the more cooperative and inclusive accents on integration and multiculturalism in the late 1990s. A decade ago, Estonia's 35 percent non-Estonian population was frequently represented as a "fifth column" that Russia could use to destabilize Estonia. The last half decade has witnessed numerous proclamations by politicians and academics on the importance of integrating non-Estonians into the Estonian society.<sup>16</sup> This seems to indicate that national security is no longer conceived in terms of the dominance of the titular nation, but in terms of the stability of the society as a whole.<sup>17</sup>

Public opinion surveys also show that Estonians are not overly afraid of foreign threats. Although there is no organized opposition to NATO accession, support for NATO is not excessively high. In March 2002, only 20 percent of Estonia's adult population said they "strongly support" Estonia's membership in NATO, and 33 percent said they "support rather than oppose" membership.<sup>18</sup>

The above account, implying a declining profile of threat in Estonian politics, is only one side of the issue. On the other side, security continues to play a central role in political debates. Despite Estonia's success in integrating with the EU and NATO, the concept of security, and hence the threat, has not lost political salience or prominence. The image of an invasion by the Russians is still used to promote certain foreign and domestic policies and to de-legitimize domestic political dissent. For example, as late as October 2001, Mart Laar, a politically troubled prime minister at the time, wrote an e-mail to his party, the Pro Patria Union, warning against the potential repetition of the events of 1939.<sup>19</sup> In late 2002, Prime Minister Siim Kallas (who replaced Mart Laar in January 2002) also used the image of the invasion of Russian troops in 1939 to discredit a leftist critic of the government's plan to support the United States stance on the International Criminal Court (ICC).<sup>20</sup> Even when direct military threat is not mentioned, Estonia's foreign policies are framed in terms of the need to defend the country. When arguing that Estonia should support the U.S. position on the ICC, Mart Helme, a prominent foreign policy commentator, said that Estonia should stop following Europe and immediately sign a bilateral agreement with the United States because "exalted flag-waving Americans offer [Estonia] a better protection than bureaucrats soaked in Brussels-style cleverness."<sup>21</sup> The government uses public opinion polls to paint an image of Estonia as a nation acutely concerned about national security. With regard to NATO membership, for example, the government proclaims that 65 percent of Estonians support NATO membership. The

same survey indicates that only 20 percent of the population strongly support NATO membership. The government is not incorrect. The 65 percent mark is correct if “Estonian” means ethnic Estonians and “supports” means the sum of those who “strongly support” and those who “support rather than oppose.”<sup>22</sup> My intent here is not to discuss whether Estonia “really” supports or opposes NATO membership, but to point out the use of survey data to construct a particular image of public attitudes in Estonia. The elites use security rhetoric even when it is not necessarily popular with the voters. With respect to EU accession, for example, even when pollsters note that arguments highlighting the anticipated economic benefits of accession would increase popular support for accession, politicians reiterate the security line.

When popular opposition to EU membership rose to 51 percent of the electorate in March 2001, several prominent public figures summarized this as the ignorance of the masses who do not grasp the threats to Estonia’s statehood. Andres Tarand, Chairman of Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee at the time, remarked that people

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who are not supportive of EU membership need to be reminded “where we are on the globe.”<sup>23</sup>

One could indeed argue that security concerns have not contracted, but have expanded as security has been reconfigured into a “soft” societal stability issue. Through such reconfiguration, security has become not a matter of specific foreign policy, but part of a broader realm connected to language, education, and a number of other areas of social life traditionally not viewed in terms of security. For example, the National Security Concept states that the goals of Estonia’s national security policy are not simply the maintenance of the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and progressive development of the state, but also “the preservation of the Estonian people, language and culture as well as Estonian identity through ages.”<sup>24</sup> The political documents listed as the basis of the National Security Concept include defense, economic, health, regional, and environmental policies, as well as the framework document for ethnic integration policy and the guidelines of cultural policy.<sup>25</sup> All of the above issues are framed in terms of the survival of the Estonian state and nation.

Culture is central here—the argument for international integration hinges on the notion of culture. Within these arguments, Estonia is not pushed to the West by a threat of invasion, but is pulled by common values. For example, an authoritative book on Estonia’s post-communist transformations, *Return to the Western World*, views Estonia’s international integration primarily in terms of culture.<sup>26</sup> Estonia is framed as a European state, which, after being held captive by the Soviets for fifty years, is now returning to its cultural roots.<sup>27</sup> The security of the state

is thereby premised on the security of the Estonian culture. At the parliamentary discussions of Estonia's National Security Concept, several parliament members underscored the central role of culture and values in ensuring the security of the state. They emphasized the importance of patriotic education in national security, and suggested that the document should further accentuate the pivotal role of culture and values in the security of the state.<sup>28</sup> The speeches and newspaper editorials celebrating NATO's membership invitation did not emphasize increased security, but did stress a sense of achievement and belonging.<sup>29</sup>

The soft concept of security, premised on culture and values, is nebulous and flexible. It can be used for various strategies by various groups. National security is evoked both by those who advocate the relaxation of citizenship and language laws, and by those who oppose such steps. For example, the state program on ethnic integration starts from the premise that there are two distinct societies in Estonia—the Estonian and the non-Estonian one—and that this “may become dangerous both socially and from the point of view of security policy.”<sup>30</sup> Estonian liberals and ethnic Russian politicians use such constructions of danger to argue that Estonia should follow EU recommendations and liberalize its citizenship and language laws. They maintain that this would increase the country's internal stability and improve its relations with the EU and Russia.<sup>31</sup> More conservative and nationalist arguments also rely on the notion of national security. These arguments maintain that the relaxation of citizenship and language laws would increase the share of potentially disloyal citizens, jeopardize the survival of the Estonian national culture, and make Estonia vulnerable to further external pressure from the EU and from Russia.<sup>32</sup> For example, Vihalemm and Lauristin, argue that multiculturalism in Estonia can work only on the basis of Estonian cultural dominant:

For small nations like Estonia and Latvia, with a considerable number of immigrants from a neighbouring large “home country” in their territory, the multinational solution could be a source of future permanent insecurity. Even when they have their own states, the small nations remain vulnerable to the political and cultural expansionism of big nations, especially if they have enclaves of these big nations on their own territory.<sup>33</sup>

Such dual use of security has made that concept a double-edged sword in debates on EU accession, particularly when these debates touch on language and citizenship issues. Insofar as EU recommendations on citizenship and language policies are cast as a potential threat to Estonian culture, the notion of security functions against EU accession. Members of the parliament from the Pro Patria Union stress that “Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) recommendations” should be read as “Russia's demands”<sup>34</sup> and Estonia should “make no concessions to demands coming from Russia and Europe.”<sup>35</sup> Thus, the cultural framing of security serves not only to juxtapose Estonia against Russia but also, and more intriguingly, to selectively equate Europe with Russia. It is deployed in criticism of the EU not only by Euroskeptics but also by pro-EU commentators. Selectivity is the key here; the above statements come not from marginal Euroskeptics, but from prominent politicians of a mainstream pro-EU party.

These examples indicate that Estonian security concerns are neither clear-cut, nor simple reflections of popular fears. Rather, we can think of Estonia's security concerns as flexible constructions that are evoked and articulated on specific issues for specific foreign and domestic policy goals.

Fluidity, flexibility, and softness do not mean ineffectiveness. Quite the contrary, security has remained highly effective in mobilizing public support for the government's foreign and security policies.<sup>36</sup> In discussions of security, however "soft," Estonia's foreign policy options are molded into a binary framework in which Estonia either integrates with the EU and NATO or falls back into the Russian sphere of influence. For example, the conception of Estonia as a bridgehead of Western civilization juxtaposed against non-European Russia frames Estonia's foreign policy in terms of survival, even if no specific threat is mentioned. In the words of former President Lennart Meri, Estonia's options are as unambiguous as "a mathematical equation." "We are on the border," Meri says, "and therefore only a small push is needed to make us fall into one side or rise into the other."<sup>37</sup> Statements such as this one do not mention an immediate threat, but they do evoke a critical situation that urgently necessitates political mobilization and determined action. In other words, casting a social issue in terms of survival legitimizes quick and dramatic measures to deal with the alleged threat.

Although security risks are articulated in soft terms, solutions to these concerns are continually premised on NATO membership. Andres Kasekamp points out that although the representations of threat in public debates may have "softened" over the last half decade, "hard" security is still considered as the only possible protection for Estonia.<sup>38</sup> Many indeed believe that NATO membership alone, without EU membership, would be most beneficial to Estonia. The government has been trying to dispel the view that the EU is a poor (and maybe even unnecessary) substitute for NATO by insisting that entry into the EU is a necessary step toward NATO. For example, former Defense Minister Jüri Luik argued in a 2001 newspaper article that Estonia must make progress in its integration with the EU if it wants to accede into NATO; to think that Estonia could do otherwise is a "dangerous self-deception."<sup>39</sup> Luik warns that Estonians' Euroskepticism might leave an impression abroad, as if Estonians did not cherish European values. Such repetitive references to danger construe politics in black-and-white terms of survival or extinction so that anything but rapid integration with the EU and NATO becomes unimaginable. Whereas scenarios of Estonia as a neutral meeting point, a gateway between the West and Russia, had considerable currency in the first half of the 1990s, such visions have been gradually supplanted by a concentrated pursuit of NATO membership. One could indeed argue that statements about "soft" risks are *more* effective in promoting and legitimizing rapid NATO accession than rhetoric of "hard" threats. A military threat can subside, but a cultural threat is infinitely amorphous and hence infinitely usable.

As NATO pursuits become discursively linked to a broader sphere of culture and values instead of the narrow technical sphere of defense, challenges to the pursuit of NATO membership amount not only to disregarding the security risks to the Estonian state and nation but, more fundamentally, to denying Estonia's

culture, tradition, heritage, history, and identity of its people. NATO membership has become less contested as security has been reframed in cultural terms.<sup>40</sup> I suggest that NATO membership is exceedingly uncontested precisely *because* it is framed in terms of the more fundamental categories of culture and moral values instead of narrow military terms.<sup>41</sup>

### **Foreign Policy Professionals and the Reconfiguration of Security**

The flexibility of the concept of security points to the need to examine the general question of how security is framed in political discussions and the more specific questions of who exactly is doing the framing and how will particular social and institutional positions influence framing statements. The shift toward soft security has not emerged spontaneously but has been crafted into a common and common sense framework by specific groups and individuals. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has played a key role in the reconfiguration of security in Estonia. Even when domestic political debates operate with confrontational terms and evoke the threat of an unstable Russia possibly falling back into imperial ambitions, foreign ministers conjure images of cooperation in a new Europe and consistently frame security in terms of values. Although statements in national newspapers commonly warn that Estonia should pursue policies of protecting the ethnic nation, official speeches applaud multiculturalism and allude to rapid ethnic integration.<sup>42</sup> Eiki Berg demonstrates that, in the context of Estonian-Russian border negotiations, some of the breakthroughs were essentially uncoordinated “improvisations” by key officials.<sup>43</sup> These officials pursued the relaxation of Estonia’s position in border negotiations with Russia even though elected politicians were more concerned about appearing “brave” vis-à-vis Russia to the (domestic) voters. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not simply reflect the views prevalent in the Parliament, but in many instances acted with little consultation with Parliament. Former Foreign Minister Ilves published an article in Estonia’s principal news magazine in 1997 in which he reprimanded Estonian politicians for the “un-European behavior” of fuelling unfounded fear of Russia.<sup>44</sup> In terms of domestic issues of ethnic integration, Priit Simson points out the different strategies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the governing coalition in ethnic integration.<sup>45</sup> Some of the most persistent counterarguments to the confrontational rhetoric toward Russian speakers in Estonia come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These strategies have not always received warm welcome in the Estonian media or even the Parliament. For example, the National Security Concept, instrumental in shifting security debates in Estonia, received criticism in the Parliament on the grounds that it is overly general and does not mention any direct threat to Estonia’s security.<sup>46</sup> Aap Neljas, a member of the working group that developed the concept, says that it contains a contradiction between “Euro-Atlantic rhetoric” and the “actual evaluation of risks.” He notes that this contradiction is common among NATO applicant states that must work within the rhetoric of NATO while pursuing membership in the alliance. As the National Security Concept is primarily directed toward an international audience, Neljas jokes, those who do not know the Estonian context may not understand



that when Estonia says “teddy,” it means “bear.”<sup>47</sup> In a similar fashion, when Foreign Minister Kristina Ojuland made several statements in early 2002 in which she advocated better relations with Russia, she was sharply accused of contradicting Estonia’s established policy line and of being naïve with respect to Russia.<sup>48</sup> However, representations of Estonian-Russian relations have become more cooperative since Ojuland took office and possibilities of improvement have received more attention.<sup>49</sup>

Security has a dual function. In official documents and foreign policy speeches, the “soft” notion of security functions to frame Estonia as a cooperative mature member of the enlightened Western community. In the domestic media, security is used to selectively demonize Russia, Russian speakers in Estonia, and domestic political dissent. To point out these multiple framings, which often do not openly clash yet tacitly operate with different conceptions of security, is not to search for a “true” underlying position. It is rather to highlight that security is a flexible category, which can be presented differently for different audiences. It is therefore not sufficient to view the changing problematizations of security in Estonia as a “natural” development in the sense that Estonia feels less threatened as it integrates with the West. These changes also do not flow naturally from the global political context, even though the improvement of Western-Russian relations after September 11 surely has played a part. Finally, the reconfiguration of security in Estonia is not simply an issue of left-right differences and domestic political reconfiguration, although the replacement of the coalition of the Pro Patria Union, Moderates, and Reform Party by a coalition of Reform and the Center Party in January 2002 is a factor. In addition, a close examination of statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals that all foreign ministers since the mid-1990s have been considerably less confrontational with respect to Russia than either parliamentarians or the national media. Thus, the reconfiguration of security also has been crafted, in part, by a small number of Estonia’s foreign policy professionals.

My concern here does not lie with whether the intellectuals of statecraft cited “really” think this way or whether they are correct. Rather, I am interested in how different statements function together in domestic political debates. I underscore these apparent inconsistencies to challenge the convenient assumption that public statements about security simply reflect geopolitical realities, national interest, or public opinion. Estonia’s foreign policy does not emerge somehow naturally and magically but is forged from many different opinions and claims over time. Intellectuals of statecraft, particularly officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are in key positions for articulating Estonian views and interests to international audiences and explaining the international situation to domestic audiences. The Ministry does not merely repeat ready-made conceptions of security. It also *makes* what security means in Estonia. In order to gain a nuanced view of how security is made in Estonia, it is not sufficient to ask whether there is an officially declared change to foreign policy (which there is not). We also need to dissect the unremarkable details of how key foreign policy professionals frame security, and how their statements impact the discussion of security in

domestic politics. The seeming political consensus on security does not preclude different uses of security. Foreign ministers have *not* contradicted official parliamentary line or government position, yet in many cases they have employed the concept of security in slightly different manners to suit the specific needs and occasions of specific groups, institutions, and individuals. Through their repetitive use of cooperative notions of security, foreign policy professionals have been instrumental in making these frameworks commonplace and accepted in public discussions.

### Conclusions

In this article, I argued that security in Estonia has been reconfigured into a broad and flexible category. Even though national security is frequently evoked in political speeches, media reporting, and academic research, there are significant differences in the ways in which that concept is deployed in different circumstances for different audiences. We cannot simply review what is said about security. We also must unravel how issues are framed in terms of survival, even if no security threat is mentioned. In counterpoint to the existing research, which conceives security in Estonia as natural and ready-made, this article stresses the need to lay bare the specific ways in which different groups problematize the notion of Estonia's security to advance their particular goals. In order to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the making of security in Estonia, we should refocus from seeking to reveal "the Estonian view" to examining the unremarkable differences in the ways in which different groups or key individuals frame security in Estonia. We must consider not only what is said about security in general but also in what context these things are said, what issues are accentuated for different audiences, and with what political effects.

From the point of channeling public discussions in certain ways and not in others, the softness and flexibility of the concept of security are important strengths. The seeming incongruities among statements directed to different audiences function to further reinforce the notion of threat even if the specific content differs. The inconsistencies bolster the assumptions that Estonia is threatened and that NATO membership is Estonia's only possible option. The reconfiguration of security from a "hard" yet narrow military issue to a "soft" yet broad and general one has considerably contributed to the stated goals of Estonia's foreign policy.

### NOTES

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1. It is through public statements that political and intellectual elites shape discussions of security. The important issue, therefore, is not what politicians and academics think, but what they say.

2. For recent studies on security in Estonia, see Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); Mare Haab, "Potentials and Vulnerabilities of the Baltic States: Mutual Competition

and Cooperation,” in *The Baltic States in World Politics*, eds. Birte Hansen and Bertel Heurlin. (Richmond, Va.: Curzon Press, 1998), 1–23; Mare Haab, “Estonia,” in *Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects for Europe’s Baltic Rim*, ed. Hans Mouritzen (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998), 109–129; Graeme P. Herd and Joan Löfgren, “Societal Security, the Baltic States and EU Integration,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 36, no. 3 (2001): 273–96; Ahto Oja ed., *Eesti 21. sajandil: arengustrateegiad, visioonid, valikud* (Tallinn: Estonian Academy of Sciences Press, 2000); Peeter Vares, “Estonia and Russia: Interethnic Relations and Regional Security,” in *Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Russian, Nordic and European Aspects*, ed. Olav Knudsen (London and Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1999), 155–164.

3 See Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000): 357–87.

4. For the concept of intellectuals of statecraft, see Gearoid O’Tuathail and John A. Agnew, “Geopolitics and discourse: practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy,” *Political Geography* 11 (1992): 193.

5. The article draws theoretically and methodologically from the so-called critical security studies literature. See David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, 2d ed. (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall eds., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

6. For analyses of political debate in the early 1990s, see Maaris Raudsepp, “Rahvusküsimus ajakirjanduse peeglis,” in *Vene küsimus ja Eesti valikud*, ed. Mati Heidmets (Tallinn: Tallinn Pedagogical University, 1998), 113–134; Rein Ruutsoo, “Eesti kodakondsuspoliitika ja rahvusriigi kujunemise piirjooned,” in *Vene küsimus ja Eesti valikud*, ed. Mati Heidmets, 139–202. For the late 1990s, see Merje Kuus, “Toward Co-operative Security? International Integration and the Construction of Security in Estonia,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 31, no. 2 (2002), 297–317.

7. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Guidelines of the National Defence Policy of Estonia* (Tallinn: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996).

8. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, “The Road to European Integration: EU and NATO,” remarks from the annual Stockholm Conference on Baltic Sea Security and Co-operation, 6 November 1997 (Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997).

9. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia* (Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001), 5.

10. *Ibid.*, 8.

11. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, “Estonia’s Return to Europe,” remarks from the Società Italiana per l’Organizzazione Internazionale, Rome, 20 March 1997 (Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997).

12. Toomas H. Ilves, “Address to Riigikogu,” 5 December 1996 (Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996).

13. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Estonian-Russian Relations in Brief* (Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002).

14. For recent arguments on the need to change Estonia’s policies and attitudes toward Russia, see Mihkel Arop, “Ojuland silub Vene-suhteid,” *Eesti Päevaleht*, 25 January 2002; Mihhail Bronstein, “Hädise idapoliitika hind,” *Postimees*, 4 May 2002; Indrek Neivelt, “Unustatud Venemaa,” *Eesti Päevaleht*, 6 November 2002.

15. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia*, 4. For analyses of the Northern Dimension and the Northern Europe Initiative, see Edward Rhodes, “Rethinking the Nature of Security: The U.S.–Northern Europe Initiative,” *COPRI Working Paper* no. 9/2002 (Copenhagen, 2002); Dmitri Trenin and Peter van Ham eds., *Russia and the United States in the Northern European Security* (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000).

16. For a detailed discussion of the representations of Russian speakers in the Estonian identity discourse, see Merje Kuus, "European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 1 (2002): 91–108; Marju Lauristin and Mati Heidmets eds., *The Challenge of the Russian Minority: Emerging Multicultural Democracy in Estonia* (Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2002).

17. However, integration is premised on the so-called "Estonian cultural domain," which is to ensure the dominance of the culture of the titular nation in Estonia. See Ministry of Ethnic Affairs, *State Programme Integration in Estonian Society 2000–2007* (Tallinn: Ministry of Ethnic Affairs, 2000), section 3.4.

18. ES Turu-Uuringute AS, *Avalik arvamus ja riigikaitse: kokkuvõte uuringust*. (Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Defense, 2002). These numbers are consistent with earlier surveys.

19. Laar is referring to the establishment of Soviet military bases in Estonia following the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. *Eesti Ekspress*, "Mart Laari salasõnum Isamaaliidule," 8 November 2001.

20. Siim Kallas, "Vaata raevus kaugemale," *Eesti Päevaleht*, 30 October 2002.

21. Mart Helme, "Eesti teevalik Euroopa ja USA vesikikivide vahel," *Eesti Päevaleht*, 28 September 2002.

22. ES Turu-Uuringute AS, *Avalik arvamus ja riigikaitse: kokkuvõte uuringust*.

23. Toomas Mattson, "Andres Tarand: Eesti tee viib Venesse või Euroopasse," *Postimees*, 28 March 2001.

24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia*, 5.

25. *Ibid.*, 8.

26. Marju Lauristin, Peeter Vihalemm, Karl-Edgar Rosengren and Lars Weibull eds., *Return to the Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition* (Tartu: Tartu University Press, 1997).

27. Merje Feldman, "European Integration and the Discourse of National Identity in Estonia," *National Identities* 3, no. 1 (2001): 5–21; Mikko Lagerspetz, "Postsocialism as a Return: Notes on a Discursive Strategy," *East European Politics and Societies* 13, no. 2 (1999): 377–390.

28. Riigikogu, *Riigikogu toimetatud stenogramm*, 18 January, 25 January, and 6 March 2001 (Tallinn: Riigikogu, 2001). See also Kaido Jaanson, "Mis on Eesti rahvuslik julgeolek?," *Postimees*, 13 August 1997.

29. See Kristiina Ojuland, "Main Guidelines of Estonia's Foreign Policy," Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland's speech to the Parliament, 19 December 2002 (Tallinn: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002); *Postimees*, "Meie NATO," 22 November 2002. At the same time, invitation to NATO has intensified, not reduced, concerns about the personal safety of Estonian citizens as it is linked to an increasing threat of terrorism. Thus, contrary to the common-sense expectation that an invitation to NATO would inspire writings on the declining threat, it actually gave rise to warnings about an increased threat.

30. Estonian Ministry of Ethnic Affairs, *State Programme Integration in Estonian Society 2000–2007* (Tallinn: Ministry of Ethnic Affairs, 2000), 17.

31. See Riigikogu, *Riigikogu toimetatud stenogramm*, 18 November 1998 (Tallinn: Riigikogu, 1998).

32. Merje Kuus, "Sovereignty for Security? The Discourse of Sovereignty in Estonia," *Political Geography* 21, no. 3 (2002): 393–412.

33. Triin Vihalemm and Marju Lauristin, "Cultural Adjustment to the Changing Social Environment: The Case of Russians in Estonia," in *Return to the Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition*, ed. Marju Lauristin, Peeter Vihalemm, Karl-Edgar Rosengren, and Lars Weibull (Tartu: Tartu University Press, 1997), 280.

34. Mart Nutt, "Kui Läti murdub, asutakse Eesti kallale," *Eesti Päevaleht*, 20 June 1996.

35. Kai Kalamees, "Kõrge euroametnik sarjas Eesti keeleseadust," *Eesti Päevaleht*, 8 July 1999. Kalamees is quoting Vardo Rumessen.

36. The focus here is not on whether the reframing of security in cultural terms is “correct,” but on whether it is effective in mobilizing public support for Estonia’s foreign and security policies.

37. Lennart Meri, *Lennart Meri: valik on Euroopa ja Venemaa vahel*, interview by *Eesti Päevaleht*, 6 March 1999. Meri made these comments in the context of approaching national parliamentary elections.

38. Andres Kasekamp, “Euroopa ühine kaitsepoliitika ja meie,” *Postimees*, 15 May 2001.

39. Jüri Luik, “Ohtlik enesepettus,” *Postimees*, 15 May 2001.

40. There is virtually no public opposition to NATO accession in Estonia. Interestingly, however, the invitation to NATO was marked by an unprecedented number of satirical pieces in major newspapers. See *Eesti Ekspress*, “NATO kutsub, Eesti kratsib alles pead,” 21 November 2002; *Eesti Ekspress*, “Drang nach Osten,” 28 November 2002; Andrus Kivirähk, “Halb ilm ei häiri enam,” *Eesti Päevaleht*, 23 November 2002; Andrus Kivirähk, “Pärast Prahat,” *Eesti Päevaleht*, 23 November 2002; Mihkel Raud, “Me teame,” *Eesti Ekspress*, 28 November 2002.

41. My claim that NATO accession has become virtually unchallenged is based on the absence of NATO-skeptical arguments in the Parliament and the national media. It is no longer thinkable that a mainstream politician could openly oppose NATO membership.

42. For specific examples, see Andrei Hvostov, “Kübaratrikiga Euroopasse,” *Eesti Ekspress*, 8 February 2001; Merje Kuus, “Toward Co-operative Security? International Integration and the Construction of Security in Estonia” (lecture at Rutgers University, 23 October 2001).

43. Eiki Berg, *Eesti tähendus, piirid ja kontekstid* (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2002), cf. 107–114.

44. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, “Eesti poliitika euroopastumine,” *Luup*, 17 March 1997.

45. Priit Simson, “Keelenõuete rääkimata lugu,” *Postimees*, 23 October 2001.

46. See Riigikogu, *Riigikogu toimetatud stenogramm*, 2001.

47. Aap Neljas, *Eesti julgeolekuriskide analüüs Eesti Julgeolekupoliitika Aluste Kontseptsioonis* (paper presented at the First Estonian Social Science Conference, Tallinn, 24–26 November 2000).

48. Mart Arop, “Ojuland silub Vene-suhteid,” *Eesti Päevaleht*, 25 January 2002; Kärt Karpa, “Välisminister Ojuland võrdleb Eesti-Vene suhteid kassi ja hiirega,” *Eesti Päevaleht*, 13 October 2002.

49. Marko Mihkelson, “Sammuke lahenduste suunas,” *Postimees*, 11 June 2002. For a more conservative argument that stresses continued Russian threat, see Mart Nutt, “Uus poliitika vene moodi,” *Eesti Päevaleht*, 12 November 2002.