Zhirinovsky’s Strategy to Succeed Yeltsin
And How to Thwart It

ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

Who Voted for Zhirinovsky and Why
One “surprise” of the national elections in December 1993 was the sharp strengthening of the far-Left (Communist) and far-Right (nationalist) political forces. However, this turn was quite predictable. It is even worthwhile to say that there was not much chance at all for the democrats to win. Some observers had been prophesying this from the very start.1 Warning signs also came from the elections in Lithuania and Poland, which resulted in the victory of former Communists. But the real surprise for almost all political observers and analysts was the enormous success of the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDP), led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

Most observers agree that the vote for Zhirinovsky was a protest vote against economic difficulties.2 But this is only partially true, because, according to the polls of the All-Russian Center for the Study of Social Opinion, the constituency of the LDP included at least one stratum of the population which was far from being in a desperate economic position. Unlike those who voted for the Communists, a significant part of those who voted for Zhirinovsky are young, relatively educated industrial workers from small and medium-sized towns. These voters are concerned not so much with the decline of the economic situation in their native towns as with the situation in Russia as a whole.3

Indeed, probably only a minority of the LDP voters are firm supporters of the party and its program. According to polls, most of those who voted for the LDP made their decision during the last week before the elections.4 Nevertheless, the success of this group contradicts the image of the party as ultra-populist with no substance other than the presence of a gifted demagogue. But, this image is not confirmed either by an analysis of the pre-election speeches or interviews with the head of the LDP. The party has both a personality and a developed platform, in particular: Russia’s military prowess, territorial expansion, the ethnic purity of Russians, and a pattern of rigidly authoritarian modernization. It is hard to forecast the further

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evolution of the party. But both the results of the elections and the further worsening of the economic situation could make Zhirinovsky a very real candidate for the presidency in the near future.

Zhirinovsky's success was also possible thanks to Yeltsin's ban of other influential ultra-nationalist organizations, such as the National Salvation Front (Ilya Konstantinov, Mikhail Astafev, Sergei Baburin), the Russian All-People's Union (Sergei Baburin), the Russian National Council (Russkie natsionalni sobor—of Alexander Sterligov), Russian National Unity (Alexander Barkashev), and others. Once these organizations were banned the bulk of their supporters almost automatically became supporters of the LDP. It is also worth noting the demagogic talent of the LDP leader and his ability to maintain his credibility, as well as his ability to electrify his audience using the TV and radio time generously given to him. Unlike the Communists, Zhirinovsky got the support of a significant portion of the society in a very short time and without having a strong organizational network. Also, he received his strongest support from a number of industrial centers in the Far East, eastern Siberia, the Urals and European Russia—the bulk of which had voted for Yeltsin as late as April 1993 (Krasnoyarsk, Ivanovo, Rostov-na-Donu, and others).^5

Today, after the elections, one can hear that Zhirinovsky's fortunes have been significantly reduced. Yet the reasons for the Zhirinovsky phenomenon are still far from understood. Besides, one must not neglect the fact that the potential of the ultra-Right political forces in Russia is still quite great, almost alarmingly so. This article will touch upon the topic of Zhirinovsky's political strategy. For this purpose it is important to (1) look at Zhirinovsky's political connections; (2) find out whether there is any kind of logic or consistency in his political statements that seem so irrational and irresponsible; and (3) raise the question "What can be done to respond to the threats presented by Zhirinovsky and other extremists?" Altogether it is important to find out the main components of his political strategy.

Political and Social Connections

Ruling Regime: It may be assumed that some figures in the ruling regime would like to take advantage of Zhirinovsky's success to get more space to maneuver—in particular, those figures who would like to restore Russia's dominance over the former Soviet Union while preserving Western relations and support. Zhirinovsky's success expedites the goals of Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and Russia's Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who announced after the elections that it would be impossible for Russia to withdraw its troops from the Baltic states. According to Kozyrev and Grachev, such a withdrawal would damage Russia's interests, exacerbate the nationalist and fascist sentiments inside Russia, and help those extreme forces gain power. Later, Kozyrev also declared that the central European
states of the former Warsaw Pact are in the sphere of Russia's influence.

Although Zhirinovsky presented himself as a political outsider, he has always tried to establish connections with the ruling regime. Observers have no information about the direct contacts of the LDP with Yeltsin's regime, except a one-hour and then a half-hour conversation between Yeltsin and Zhirinovsky right after the elections (that is sometimes mentioned in private conversations with various Russian figures). But Zhirinovsky's ability to help Gorbachev's regime is well-known. During Gorbachev's presidency, Zhirinovsky managed to negotiate the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union as the CPSU's first official "opposition" after a series of consultations with top leaders such as Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoly Lukyanov, and KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov. It is possible that Zhirinovsky also managed to find common ground with representatives of Yeltsin's regime. Despite the fact that Zhirinovsky opposed Yeltsin during the attempted coup in August 1991, he supported Yeltsin's actions against the Parliament in October 1993. It is also recognized that Yeltsin's draft constitution could not have been approved without Zhirinovsky and the support of his electorate. This possible collaboration between Yeltsin and Zhirinovsky merits further examination, but concrete information concerning their relationship is not available.

"... Zhirinovsky has received support from a significant part of the armed forces ..."

Military and Security Bodies: From the very beginning of his political career Zhirinovsky looked to the military and security bodies for support. He met the KGB chief under Gorbachev, spoke many times at assemblies of army officers, and has given excessive compliments to the security bodies in his interviews. Zhirinovsky's tactics were designed to persuade people that he and his party had respected the legitimacy of the power structures. In April 1993 Zhirinovsky celebrated his birthday at the Praga restaurant. The celebration was important because it included not only the Iraqi ambassador, but also the reading of a congratulatory telegram from Russia's Defence Minister Grachev, which was most likely false. It said that Grachev wished Zhirinovsky all the best, as well as success in his political struggles.

Zhirinovsky has worked to cultivate the support and loyalty of the military. According to data from 12 December 1993, Zhirinovsky has received support from a significant part of the armed forces, including the Black Sea, Pacific Ocean, and North Sea fleets, 45 percent of the air force, and the special forces in Tajikistan where Russia's Choice did not receive even one percent of the vote. Other data show that the average number of votes for the LDP at ballot boxes close to military installations was 34 percent, compared to 9 percent for the Communists and 11 percent for Russia's Choice.

It is possible that in the absence of a strong alternative with military
connections, military personnel might give Zhirinovsky the necessary support to win the presidency. The military has been hesitant because they realize that Zhirinovsky is undertaking new efforts to strengthen his influence. One example of his efforts was a January 1994 confidential meeting with the commanders of a few divisions of a Moscow military district. The meeting had an anti-Yeltsin orientation and resulted in Zhirinovsky’s offer to cooperate with the military and to work closer with the factions in Parliament.10

Religious Circles: The contacts between Zhirinovsky and Russia’s Orthodox Church have not been visible. Clearly the religious beliefs of the Russian population are not the basis of their support for the LDP. The LDP mainly relies on individuals who are in desperate economic situations. As Zhirinovsky said at one of his meetings in Volgograd, “Hungry people will vote for me.”11 However, there is a reason to suspect that Zhirinovsky hopes to establish relations with the Russian Orthodox Church as well as some part of the Russian religious community. First, he stresses in his autobiography that he foresees the future Russia as Orthodox Christian.12 Secondly, Zhirinovsky’s foreign policy speeches, in particular those in support of the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, demonstrate that he understands very well the importance of utilizing the Orthodox Church to strengthen his authority as a Russian nationalist.

The Far Right: As discussed earlier, Zhirinovsky’s success was magnified by Yeltsin’s ban on other influential nationalist organizations. Their electorate turned into Zhirinovsky’s electorate almost without exception, and it has strengthened the authority of his party as an influential nationalist organization. Zhirinovsky’s success has been interpreted by some representatives of the right-wing opposition as evidence of the beginning of a Russian national revival process.13 The election campaign and the results have also helped Zhirinovsky to gain notoriety as a defender of ethnic Russians both inside Russia and the “near abroad.” He has frequently criticized ethnic groups from the Caucasus14 and since March 1993 has consistently supported the nationalist and separatist Russian party in Crimea. In February 1994, he was the first to congratulate Yuri Meshkov on his victory in the election there.15

Although some right-wing newspapers endorsed the LDP and Zhirinovsky,16 it is premature to conclude that he has popularity in right-wing circles. Basically, he is treated cautiously, and is often suspected of cooperation with the democrats,17 rejected because of his Jewish background,18 or taken for a clown.19 To date, leaders like former Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, former Security Council member Yuri Skokov, Sergei Baburin,20 and Alexander Solzhenitsyn have far more respect as established non-democrats. This position may change under a further worsening of the political situation, but rightist forces, while not having excluded possible cooperation with Zhirinovsky, are busily looking for another leader close to patriotic and military circles. After the State Duma decision in favor of
amnesty for Rutskoi following his role in the October 1993 uprising, he has become a possible candidate for opposition leader and has lessened Zhirinovsky's prospects.

The Far Left: The vagaries of some points of the LDP political platform and its reliance on votes from lower-income social groups have generally placed the party closer to far-Right political forces. After the elections, the positions of the LDP and the Communist faction of the State Duma corresponded a number of times and the party's economic program is very similar with the Communist program. For example, in the middle of February, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov agreed with Zhirinovsky's opinion that the West's air strikes against Bosnian Serbs would signify the beginning of World War III and that Russia should be in this war on the side of its "Orthodox brothers."

It is likely that cooperation in the State Duma between the LDP and the Communist Party of Russia will continue. However, this hardly aligns Zhirinovsky closely with the Communists. As the election revealed, one of the key components of his strategy has been to distance himself (at least in public) from both democrats and Communists in order to win recognition as the most radical and honest party, having nothing to do with the "establishment."

Ties Abroad: The foreign connections of the LDP strengthen its reputation as a party favoring rigid authoritarian and aggressive militant positions. These include the agreement with Saddam Hussein; hints of ties to Libya; meetings with fascist German parties; support of Slobodan Milošević and open confrontation with the West on the resolution of the Yugoslav conflict; and threats to use nuclear weapons against Germany and Japan if they interfere in Russia's domestic affairs. These arrangements and threats clearly identify Russia's potential allies and enemies should Zhirinovsky and the LDP take power.

Zhirinovsky's connections in the "near abroad" are less clear and only beginning to be established. In May 1993, the LDP held an interregional conference with the participation of Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Belarusian representatives. Zhirinovsky's policy in the "near abroad" is, first, to support Russian minorities (as was the case with Meshkov in Crimea) and, second, to support those political groups who at that time would have liked to join Russia. It is likely that Zhirinovsky's meeting in September 1993 with Ruslan Aushev of Ingushetia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia of Georgia (who at one point was flirting with admission into the Commonwealth of Independent States only to preempt his arch-rival Eduard Shevardnadze) and Dzhokhar Dudaev of Chechnia (who since then has abandoned all pretensions of cooperation with Moscow) was devoted to these issues. Eventually, such a policy could provide the LDP with support from forces interested in restoring Russian regional dominance and returning authoritarian regimes to countries which border Russia.
The Main Elements of Zhirinovsky’s Strategy

With Zhirinovsky’s parliamentary power and international support from extremist regimes, he could have some serious advantages in an election for the presidency. After two previous elections, he has become a national figure and one of the most visible political leaders. He has a strong social base that can be increased further under certain circumstances, and a fairly strong, well-organized political organization with a permanent parliamentary forum.

Prior to 1994, Zhirinovsky based his political strategy upon two central objectives. First, he used open and charismatic messages addressed directly to the people in order to gain their direct support without help from the elites or the establishment. Second, he utilized back-room negotiations with elites to secure their financial and emotional support. Now Zhirinovsky will likely adjust his strategy in favor of strengthening the first component. The second component may continue to be used, but the LDP leader is probably preparing for the worst—the absence of support from the elites. If the elites abandon him, then his strategy will likely change to the following principles. First, he will hope for and expect a further worsening of social and economic conditions in Russia. Secondly, he will encourage the deterioration of social and economic conditions with damaging foreign and domestic policy statements. Lastly, he will maintain an irresponsible and propagandist position inside and outside the Parliament in the hope to later use the “I-told-you-so” card.

Zhirinovsky understands that currently he does not have enough resources to win the presidency. His first challenge will be to form steady relationships with influential elite groups. The LDP lacks steady support from the military, and right-wing and religious circles do not trust him. Except for the Crimean and Chechen leaders, regional elites have not spoken out in favor of Zhirinovsky and his party. He did receive support from some national financial and industrial circles. However, this support was temporary and was designed to counterbalance Yeltsin’s and Gaidar’s policies. It is unlikely that these circles would be interested in a Zhirinovsky dictatorship. These groups, knowing the impulsiveness and irrationality of Zhirinovsky, must realize that supporting him could lead to devastating consequences for all. Also, a rigid authoritarian militaristic regime would deprive them of significant economic freedom and independence. Zhirinovsky’s imperialistic ambitions and his plans to capture new territories would force industry to function as it did under Stalin. This result would be counter to the interests of the new economic bosses who have already tasted the advantages of “nomenklatura privatization” and prefer to negotiate with the state rather than be forced to obey it.
As the industrial and financial elites become increasingly aware of the negative consequences of a Zhirinovsky presidency, Alexander Rutskoi appears to be a more viable candidate. Since his release from the Lefortovo prison, the opposition has begun to consolidate around him. Due to his connections with the military, support from industrialists, and favorable treatment of the church and Russian right-wing forces, Rutskoi, not Zhirinovsky, is probably the main opposition candidate for Russia's presidency. In one interview, Zhirinovsky himself recognized this. Such an observation seems quite accurate, considering that the financial and military elites prefer Rutskoi. To counter Rutskoi's support from the elite, Zhirinovsky must attract votes from those groups who are tired and want simple and rapid decisions. Nobody has been more persuasive in promising such decisions than Zhirinovsky. For example, he promised to provide Russians with cheap vodka, to double the standards of living of all people in six months, and to eliminate 5,000 mafia groups in Russia.

Zhirinovsky cannot depend solely on support from Hussein and German neo-Nazi parties. He needs national support, but if he is unable to garner national political backing from Russia's most influential political elites, he is likely to pursue another, "democratic" strategy. Instead of appealing to the elites, he may turn directly to the people, using legitimate and illegitimate methods for his political struggle—including renewing his most blatant demagoguery in Parliament, militant statements, street meetings, and possibly armed provocations. After all, Zhirinovsky has never trusted the elites, and looked for their support only out of necessity. His behavior before and during the last election campaign demonstrated that he deliberately choose a strategy which gave him the image of an outsider and the most radical critic of the existing political economic institutions and of the establishment. In fact, his ability to persuade the Russian people that he was not involved with the current leadership, or responsible for the present crisis, partially explains his electoral success.

However, total destabilization of the situation or even a civil war, with a complete breakdown of democratic institutions, is not in Zhirinovsky's interests. In this scenario, those who have economic and military resources will usurp power. For Zhirinovsky to take power, he would either have to win a democratic election like Hitler or, like the Bolsheviks, assume control with a disciplined and organized party without elections, after the other political factions exhausted their support and resources through prolonged bickering.

**Containing Zhirinovsky**

Democrats inside and outside Russia have considered forming a broad political coalition in order to respond to the threats posed by extremists. Democrats must soberly evaluate the need for cooperation especially inside Russia. Under the current circumstances, they cannot overpower Zhirinovsky and other extremists independently. Such a broad-based coalition between moderate forces with different political orientations could be founded upon pacifism or a principal orientation toward a peaceful
development of events. Recent clashes between Zhirinovsky and his top manager Viktor Kobelev imply that even "Liberal Democrats" do not always agree with the militant statements of their unstable leader. There are also sober-minded leaders among both Communists and Agrarians. State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin, in response to the amnesty granted to the Lefortovo prisoners, publicly expressed his intention to work together with Yeltsin on the restoration of order if necessary. In sum, cooperation among them, and conciliatory behavior toward everyone else, must be used by the democrats to combat Zhirinovsky.

Another possible basis for compromise is the recognition that rigid authoritarian regimes, like those of Stalin and Hitler, are predisposed to chaos and instability. No current member of the elite is interested in the establishment of such a regime. Industrial and financial circles, as well as regional elites, must realize that this regime would deprive them of any power or independence. In this situation, all elite activity, including in the military, would be subordinated to political forces which would devastate national resources. The preservation (and possibly the development) of democratic institutions provides Russia with an opportunity to learn to negotiate and compromise among different interests. Gradual democratization can preserve stability and fight against crime on the basis of law. But it has to be real democratization, loyal to the vertical and horizontal separation of powers, to strengthen the Parliament and to respect the sovereignty of the newly independent states. Only movement along this path can result in the development of a system with genuine checks and balances sufficient to immobilize extremist forces such as Zhirinovsky and the LDP.

Of course not all Russians would agree with the preceding conclusions. Variants of the authoritarian modernization model have been receiving broad support among both right-wing and democratic forces. In any case, democrats can and should negotiate for the preservation of "minimal democracy" as well as a functioning parliament. Some democrats might also reevaluate their initial support in favor of a strong presidency and consider strengthening parliamentary power. With Yeltsin's weakness and the upcoming elections, the consequences of Zhirinovsky or another like-minded extremist taking control of a presidentially controlled system with a weak parliament and no operating checks and balances could easily lead Russia directly into national or international conflict. Parliament has to be reinforced to be an effective check against presidential authority in case Zhirinovsky or someone similar gets the presidential post.

Moderate groups must also reach a consensus on Russia's "near abroad" and foreign policies. Zhirinovsky has been extremely active in foreign policy and has launched some of his most aggressive and militant statements from this platform. Certainly today it is hardly possible to speak about the
realization of a genuinely democratic foreign policy strategy in the "near abroad." However, alternatives do exist to Zhirinovsky's imperialistic intentions to immediately absorb former Soviet republics in Russia's borders through threats and blackmail. Most of the Russian parties, including the Communists, have spoken out against open violence and threats to the former Soviet republics, choosing instead the restoration of primarily economic relations among them. Economic integration together with respect for political sovereignty could help to establish genuinely cooperative relationships within the CIS and compel political groups to resist Zhirinovsky's aggressive policy. In addition, a moderate bloc could jointly denounce Zhirinovsky's aggressive policy more effectively.

Upon entering into a coalition with other political forces, democrats must keep their distance from centrists and Communists and openly explain existing political contradictions. The democrats' strategy should include the following points:

1. Not enter into a coalition with Zhirinovsky and the LDP under any circumstances. However, such an agreement should remain unstated; otherwise, it could lead to the opposite result. Zhirinovsky is strong enough to use to his advantage claims such as the creation of an "anti-fascist front." The opposition must learn to explain in detail the selfish motives and contradictions within the LDP, and avoid using slogans, labels or broad generalizations which spark interest or give legitimacy to Zhirinovsky's party. For example, Zhirinovsky's popularity rose dramatically before the recent elections after a TV documentary called "Yastreb" about him was aired. "Yastreb" was intended to decrease his popularity.

2. Support those actions and statements of the current regime and political leadership which would help stabilize Russia and weaken Zhirinovsky's extreme positions. The Agreement on Civil Accord initiated by President Yeltsin and signed in May 1993 by political parties of different colors might serve as a good example of such activity.

3. Develop an alternative democratic strategy for Russia to overcome the current crisis. The leadership and moderate forces might want to launch a broad informational campaign in the center and regions to explain that democratic and peaceful development is the only acceptable path for Russia with its very complex interest structure. Such an effort would also strengthen the authority of democratic leaders and help to develop regional democratic structures.

4. Implement the new Constitution and restore the balance of power among the presidential, legislative and judiciary branches. In addition to a vertical balance of power, relationships between the Center and regions have to be restored too. There are broad possibilities for cooperation with regional elites as well as political organizations of different positions.

"Parliament has to be reinforced to be an effective check against presidential authority in case Zhirinovsky or someone similar gets the presidential post."
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(5) Strengthen the political sovereignty of the newly independent states and encourage economic cooperation, human rights and the protection of minorities. Russia and other former Soviet republics might also sponsor "dual citizenship" negotiations to address ongoing concerns over Russians in "near abroad" countries and non-Russians inside Russia.

Notes

17. See Volodin, op. cit.
23. FBIS-SOV, no. 226, 26 November 1993, p.34.
26. LDP, p.6.
27. For example, Zhirinovsky's former manager Viktor Kobelev mentioned that three main LDP sponsors stopped their financial support to the party: see V. Kobelev, "Came, Saw and Left," Novaya Zhestkennaya Gazea, 23 April 1994, p.2.
28. See A. Shubin, "Russian Hangover," Solidarnost, #16, 1994, p.7; V. Nikonov, "Perspectives of Fascism in Russia, or Who Will Be the Next President?" Vechernaya Moskva, 10 February 1994; Zavtra, March 1994, No. 9, p. 3.
31. Alexander Yanov also made this point. See Yanov, p. 60.
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