Thwarting the Specter of a Russian Dictator
A New Agenda for the Clinton Administration

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MOSCOW, November 1993—After several days of bloody fighting, Russian troops have defeated the Ukrainian national guard and captured Kharkov, the industrial city in northeast Ukraine. Calling the military conquest a victory for human rights over Ukrainian fascism, Russian President Alexander Sterligov ominously vowed to continue his quest to liberate all Russian minorities living in other republics, whatever the cost, despite threats from Kiev of nuclear retaliation to any further acts of Russian aggression. Near Kazan, Tatar guerrilla forces claimed to have ambushed a Russian convoy, killing twenty and wounding another thirty-two, in their quest to regain their capital city. If these reports are accurate, the death toll in Tatarstan has risen to 1,250 since fighting began in June. Here in Moscow, the treason trial against former Democratic Russia leaders continues. Today, the state prosecutor produced receipts which allegedly document that Democratic Russia received over $100,000,000 from “the CIA, the Government of Israel, and other, anti-Russian, Jewish organizations in the United States and Great Britain.” Meanwhile, from Ankara, exiled Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev called on the U.N. Security Council to intervene militarily to restore the sovereignty of Kazakhstan, which was annexed by Russia last month. NATO troop movements have been reported in Turkey and Germany, despite President Sterligov's warning that further acts of aggression by NATO risks the start of World War III. Though Russia's ability to launch strategic nuclear weapons has been significantly damaged by the July mutiny within the Russian army, Pentagon officials warn that as many as 1,000 Russian warheads may still be aimed at the United States. As

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democracies demonstrated by the bombings in Tbilisi earlier this month, Sterligov has demonstrated his resolve for killing innocent civilians in the “defense of Great Russia.”

Far fetched? Of course. Unlikely? Yes. Impossible? No. The chances of fascist dictators seizing power in Russia are still slight. In a Las Vegas casino, the odds would still firmly be with Boris Yeltsin. Yet, the specter of Russian dictatorship is real and growing at a frightening pace. Meanwhile, American engagement, and Western involvement more generally, has come under sharp criticism by both Russian nationalists and even Russian liberals who vested their political careers on their ability to deliver Western assistance. Despite nationalist resurgence in Russia and Western neglect, the reform process will still probably survive albeit amended to deal with these new circumstances. If reforms turn sour, however, the West will have missed the most important opportunity for promoting democracy and insuring world peace of this century. The Clinton campaign correctly made the analogy between the Bush administration winning the Cold War and the rooster calling the sun to rise. However, if the sun sets during the Clinton administration, they will still be blamed for loosing the peace.

To explore this potential foreign policy failure, this article (1) outlines the contemporary balances of political forces within Russia, (2) assesses the current Russian attitude towards the Clinton administration, the United States, and the West, and (3) suggests a partial list of recommendations for restructuring American policy towards Russia.

I. The Current Balance of Political Forces in Russia

Though the situation remained fluid for the first nine months after the August coup, three main political blocs coalesced during the summer and fall of 1992.

Though weakened by splits, the core of Democratic Russia, now referred to as Democratic Choice, still constitutes one of the main political forces in Russia today. This group firmly supports President Boris Yeltsin and supported former acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar. They have promoted a tight money supply and rapid and massive privatization. Democratic Russia supported the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and initially called for greater independence for the autonomous republics within the Russian Federation. More recently, however, the coalition has remained consciously quiet regarding the further destruction of the
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Russian Federation. Tactically, Democratic Russia has the capability to organize popular demonstrations, though with increasing difficulty, as most Russian citizens are tired of meetings and the radical actions of Democratic Russia. While Democratic Russia has representation in the Supreme Soviet and all major local soviets, their blocs have withered due to splits and internal infighting.

Democratic Russia's major strength during the Communist era is its major weakness in the post-Communist period. From its creation in October 1990, Democratic Russia was a grassroots anti-Communist political movement which relied on demonstrations, strikes, and other mass actions. While effective in opposition, these tactics are inappropriate for the post-Communist era of building a new state and economy. Today, Russia needs competent bankers and civil servants, not rally organizers. Moreover, Yeltsin no longer needs Democratic Russia for his political survival, though Democratic Choice still represents his loyal political allies. Finally, Democratic Choice has no social base. The group claims to defend the interests of the middle class in a country where no middle class exists.

Civic Union (Grazhdansky Soyuz) constitutes the second major coalition of parties and personalities to form after the coup. This coalition formed in June 1992 initially as an alliance between three parties: (1) the Democratic Party of Russia headed by Nikolai Travkin, (2) the People's Party of Free Russia headed by Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, and (3) Union of “Renewal,” the political arm of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs headed by Arkady Volsky. Regarding economic policy, Civic Union declared its support for then Prime Minister Gaidar's general strategy of market formation and privatization. Civic Union, however, disagreed with Gaidar's tactics. In particular, Civic Union wants to (1) slow down the pace of privatization, focusing on small enterprises first, (2) increase credits to large state factories, (3) accompany these credits with indexed wages and prices (to stimulate demand), and (4) disregard the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, which Civic Union considers to be a set of guidelines for turning Russia into a Third World country (i.e., increase the export of raw materials and decrease industrial production). Regarding state power, most Civic Union member organizations lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union, and stand unequivocally against the dissolution of the Russian Federation. According to Civic Union, Russian minorities living in neighboring republics should be protected at all costs, even if this includes military intervention. To achieve these objectives, Civic Union
works more as a lobby than a political party or mass movement. The coalition also has strong representation in the Supreme Soviet.

Civic Union's greatest strength is its position as the “constructive opposition.” Many people agree that the Gaidar government made many mistakes. Civic Union claims to offer an alternative. Given the increased activity of the nationalist-Communist coalition, Civic Union leaders have argued that they represent the “center” in Russian politics. Despite claiming to be in the opposition, however, Civic Union's members and supporters actually occupy senior government positions. Rutskoi is the vice president. Two deputy prime ministers, Georgy Khizha and Alexander Shumeiko; as well as the new prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, are closely associated with Civic Union. Anatoly Sobchak, the mayor of St. Petersburg; Oleg Rumyantsev, the secretary of the Russian Constitutional Commission; and Sergei Gonchar, the chairman of the Moscow City Council; also have begun to support this new movement. Arkady Volsky, Alexander Vladislavlev, and Nikolai Travkin are all high profile political leaders. Finally, of the three major political coalitions in Russia today, Civic Union has attempted to represent concrete social groups: the directors' core and workers collectives. Because these groups exist and are organized, they are a potentially powerful social base. Moreover, both the Democratic Party of Russia and the People's Party of Free Russia have well-organized branches throughout all major cities and regions in Russia.

Civic Union, however, could collapse just as quickly as its formed. First and foremost, Civic Union became very popular very fast as the pragmatic alternative to the Gaidar reforms; if Civic Union assumes a greater role in government, it will lose its status as an opposition movement. Second, internal splits between Civic Union's powerful leadership have begun to manifest. In particular, Travkin has called for the removal of the entire Gaidar team, while Volsky and Rutskoi have pushed for the removal of only certain ministers. Third, the actual social forces behind Civic Union are vague. Volsky claims to represent directors and managers of large Russian enterprises. Many industrialists, however, have openly criticized Volsky. Likewise, more progressive unions of industrialists (i.e., Academician Vladimir Tikhonov's Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs) and more conservative organizations (i.e., the parliamentary faction Industrial Union) now compete with Civic Union to represent the directors. As such, many have concluded that Civic Union is only a façade with little organizational or social support behind it. Even as a façade, however, the group has been very successful at altering
the course of reform.

The third major force to coagulate after the coup has been the nationalist-Communists. For the first year after the August coup, Communist and nationalist forces floundered in the new political situation. Popular fanatics like Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Viktor Anpilov led almost weekly demonstrations to protest the collapse of the Soviet state and economy, but militant opposition to the Yeltsin government was disorganized and dispersed. In October of 1992, however, several smaller nationalist and Communist organizations joined together to form the Front for National Salvation. Regarding economic policy, this group radically opposes Gaidar-style reforms, claiming that his actions were a deliberate strategy aimed at destroying Russia's power. This coalition, however, does not have a common alternative plan as some within it would like to see a return to Stalinism while others long for the re-creation of prerevolutionary Russian society. Regarding state power, the Front has called for the reconstitution of the Soviet Union and the immediate defense of Russians living abroad. Tactically, several Front leaders have declared that force (including, according to some, a forceful seizure of state power) may be necessary to restore law and order to anarchic Russia.

Like Civic Union, the Front for National Salvation is capitalizing on widespread discontent to mobilize support. Western advisors, “southern” (i.e., Azeris, Georgians, etc.) traders, and Jews serve as easy scapegoats for Russia's adversities. Support for the Front, however, does not appear to be widespread thus far. Despite the hardships, few Russians want to incite a civil war. Nor have military leaders demonstrated any support for the Front. Perhaps because the group is new, the Front has not established regional branches. Finally, several important nationalist leaders, including Viktor Aksyuchits of the Russian Christian Democrat Movement and Viktor Anpilov, the charismatic neo-Communist leader of Working Moscow, have refused to join the Front. Nonetheless, the Front remains a dangerous threat to stability in Russia. By merely existing, the group has pushed Russia's political discourse to the right. If the Front does seize power, there will be civil war.

**A Replay of Weimar Germany?**

Striking parallels exist between the situation in Russia described above and Germany in the 1930s. First, like Germany after World War I, Russia has just lost a major war, the Cold War. Like a large proportion of the German people after the war, many Russians are unhappy with the terms
of the peace, which has included the destruction of the Soviet Union, and the possible division of the Russian Federation.

Second, because the once artificial boundaries between republics have now become real borders between sovereign states, millions of Russians live as minorities in countries bordering Russia. Just as Hitler claimed that Germans living in Austria and Czechoslovakia should be part of Germany, right-wing leaders in Russia vow to defend and, if necessary, liberate the large Russian populations in Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan and the Baltics.

Third, like Weimar Germany, the present Russian government is newly democratic in a country without democratic traditions, while factions and political parties within the parliament are becoming increasingly divided. In particular, Democratic Choice is now very weak, while Civic Union flirts between working with the democrats and cooperating with the nationalists. Most importantly, in a direct affront to Yeltsin, this bloc sided with the nationalist-Communist leaders in the Supreme Soviet to call for the convention of the Congress of People's Deputies on December 1, 1992. Such dangerous maneuvers offer fascist groups opportunities they might otherwise not have if democratic forces were united and consolidated.

Fourth, Russia's rapidly deteriorating economy is reminiscent of the wheel barrels of marks needed to buy a loaf of bread under the Weimar Republic. Because the current Russian government has done so little to explain the market or the stages needed to make the transition to a real market, people now associate that very word with outrageous prices, job insecurity, and the mafia.

Finally, isolationist foreign policies by the major Western powers are reproducing the international context which allowed the rise of fascism in the 1930s. Recession in the United States has turned Americans inward, Germany has been consumed with unification, while Japan (also suffering a financial crisis) has used the issue of the Kuril islands to remain disengaged from the Russian crisis.

II. The End of Russia's Romance with the West

Despite these many parallels, Russia is (or at least was) distinguished from Weimar Germany in one important aspect. Whereas Germany was surrounded by vengeful and hostile neighbors determined to restrain German economic recovery, Russia and the other states of the Commonwealth are entering an international community committed, at least rhetorically, to assisting their transitions to the market and
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democracy. In these conditions, international involvement and assistance can be critical in thwarting the specter of a Russian dictator.

Unfortunately, Russia has been disappointed with Western engagement—and American engagement in particular. The greatest impediment to effective cooperation has been a set of false expectations about the benefits of revolutionary victory. Once they defeated communism, Russians expected to enjoy overnight Western standards of living. Instead, most Russians have been frustrated with the minimal fruits of nascent capitalism or democracy. Life was better and easier under Brezhnev.

These unrealized expectations have been compounded by the form, amount and speed of Western assistance. Great fanfare surrounded both the 47-nation conference on aid to the former Soviet republics hosted by the United States in January 1992, and the April pledge of $24 billion. Only a fraction of these funds, however, have been delivered. Some of these funds will be useful whenever they arrive, but others, such as the $6 billion for currency stabilization, may no longer be effective given Russia's new economic conditions.

Russian leaders are also unhappy with the type of economic assistance. The West has focused on macroeconomic issues such as the convertibility of the ruble, and humanitarian assistance such as food and medicine. This focus, to many in Russia, is misplaced. Rather, the West should concentrate on helping to rebuild Russia's infrastructure and providing technical assistance and training programs.

The form of Russian assistance is also degrading. “Made in America” labels on food packages disturb proud Russian citizens. Many Russians leaders have criticized American aid programs in particular as self serving and political, more important for the voters of New York or the quarterly newsletters than for the Russian people. Several political leaders and movements have gone even farther to suggest that the United States has a comprehensive strategy for reducing Russia to a Third World country. Russian political elites associate institutions such as the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Peace Corps with Zambia and Ecuador, two countries which Russia does not want to emulate. The very word “aid” offends many Russian politicians.

Finally, the souring of Russian goodwill towards the United States is exacerbated in the short run by the election of President Clinton. However disappointed Russians were with the last administration, they knew Bush and Baker. Bush also was the successor to Reagan, an American president still loved and praised by most Russian “democrats.” Clinton, on the other
hand, is totally unknown. Because Clinton focused on domestic issues during the campaign, many Russians believe that the new administration will be less knowledgeable and less interested in Russia's transition.

III. Reconstructing Russian-American Relations

It is in the national interest of the United States to play an active and leading role in Russia's economic and political reforms. In fact, the United States cannot afford to remain disengaged from the transformations unfolding in Eurasia today. We have spent billions deterring the Soviet threat for the past forty years. Now, we must devote a fraction of this cost to ensuring that the threat does not return.

The Framework of American Foreign Policy Towards Russia

The Cold War is over. With it ended bipolarity, superpower summits, and the East-West divide. In the post-Cold War order, Russian-American relations should not be framed in terms of superpower summits. Rather, the United States needs a comprehensive and multi-faceted policy regarding Russia which is implemented every day at multiple levels. Nor, however, should American foreign policy-makers think of Russia as a client state, or an Upper Volta with missiles. However bankrupt the economy now, Russia is still the largest country in the world, endowed with a long history, a rich culture, and a highly educated people. Moreover, Russia has its own national interests which do not always coincide with American concerns. American diplomats must seek to find a proper balance between respecting Russia's national interests while at the same time addressing the difficult realities of Russia's present situation.

When attempting to understand Russian politics and thereby develop an effective foreign policy, American decision-makers also must realize, first and foremost, that Russia is not a monolithic regime run by a general secretary, a president, or a security council in the Kremlin. On the contrary, power has devolved, divided, and diffused among different government institutions, personalities, and levels of government. The greatest error of the past American administration was to focus on one individual, Mikhail Gorbachev. The Clinton administration cannot repeat this mistake by constructing American foreign policy towards Russia around Boris Yeltsin. Rather, American policy-makers should devise policy based on interests, not personalities, and then seek to implement
that policy through a wide range of individuals and institutions at all levels of government and society.

This kind of policy formation will require better information about the Russian transition. Tired dichotomies such as Communist/democrat, progressive/reactionary, or reformer/anti-reformer no longer apply. New types of sources must be monitored, while different kinds of people should be consulted. Just as Izvestiya must now be supplemented with Den, DR Press, and party publications, American diplomats should spend more time meeting with Russian regional leaders, party officials, and businessmen to understand the situation there. Most immediately, President Clinton could signal the high priority of Russian-American relations by sending out several missions to Russia from the new administration to listen to Russian ideas about American foreign policy. Here at home, old-style Sovietologists or former arms control negotiators have limited insights regarding the current Russian predicament, while unconventional sources such as the manager of McDonald's, the Russian representative for Project Hope, or people involved in technical assistance programs may be more informative.

A new framework for American-Russian relations combined with better information will provide a starting point for reengaging the United States in Russia's reform process. In this context, the Clinton administration must seek to improve those effective policies already initiated, change those which are not working, and draft new policies regarding issues in American-Russian relations which have not yet been addressed.

**Economic Assistance**

Thus far, most discussion regarding economic assistance to Russia has evolved around the question of how much should the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank be spending and lending to Russia. This focus is misleading as no one really knows how much. These financial institutions have never dealt with an economic restructuring situation on the scale of Russia's.\(^{20}\)

Less attention should be wasted on “how much,” and more attention should be devoted to “how.” Macroeconomic adjustment is complex and precarious even in relatively stable Western economies. Even when compared to east-central Europe, unique features of Russia's economy further complicate Western strategies for market transformation. Consequently, heated disputes have divided macroeconomic economists in
the West (both between and within institutions) regarding the proper timing and sequence of adjustment policies. In particular, questions of money supply, industrial credits, and the rate of privatization fuel heated debates between economists in both the U.S. and Russia.

The Clinton administration will not be able to resolve these debates nor control the actors involved in these controversies. The new administration can, however, seek to expand the range of views on this subject, and then make these ideas accessible to both Western lending institutions and the Russian government. In Moscow, Russian politicians and economists in particular should understand that policies advocated by the IMF or Jeffrey Sachs do not represent the only options available. Bankers in Washington, London, and New York should better understand the differences between the Bolivian and (former) Soviet economies.

Equally important, discussion of microeconomic policies should be placed higher on the agenda. In seeking ways to provide billions to the Russian government, American government officials also should focus on procedures for lending thousands to small Russian businesses. Private foreign investment in Russian firms will provide the greatest positive force for economic transformation at the micro-level. In this regard, the Clinton administration should provide tax incentives, Eximbank credit lines, and OPIC investment guarantees for American firms willing to invest in Russia. Special incentives should be provided to American companies making investments which foster the demilitarization of the Russian economy. Finally, all trade restrictions and COCOM regulations must be reviewed; those which hinder American-Russian joint ventures (particularly in the aerospace industry) and are no longer vital to U.S. national security interests should be removed.

Perhaps most importantly, the United States must initiate an aggressive economic technical assistance program to insure that these macro and microeconomic policies can be understood by Russian politicians, business people, and common citizens. Knowledge, not money or handouts, is the key to the success of the market in Russia. If the Russian mass privatization program succeeds, Russia will have more individual stockholders than any other country in the world. Yet, few Russians understand what stock is. Similarly, the Russian privatization program creates more employee ownership than any other country in the world, yet few workers understand ownership, let alone an Employee Stock Ownership Program (ESOP) or a shareholders meeting. Even basic concepts of supply and demand are novel for most.

As such, the United States should devote considerable resources to
educating Russians about capitalism. At the elite level, politicians must understand the relationships between taxes and profits; bankers must become acquainted with the range of monetary instruments used in the West; stock brokers must learn about leveraged buyouts; lawyers must learn to defend intellectual property rights; plant managers must understand marketing, etc. To accomplish this transfer of know-how, two forms of technical assistance are most effective. First, the United States can send Western advisors to work directly in key government offices and ministries. These kinds of programs already have been established in several areas, particularly in the State Committee on Property, but they need to be expanded to all spheres of activity which affect the market. Second, scholarships, training programs, and internships for Russians to study and work in the United States must be expanded. While the payoffs in these kinds of programs take longer, they are vitally important for training a new generation of business people and market-oriented politicians.

Technical assistance also must be geared towards educating the greater public about the mysteries of the market. Educational television programs, translations of basic economic texts, and information centers (staffed by Western experts) scattered throughout Russia would help to begin this process. Later, Western educators should assist in designing high school and college courses on market economics.

A variety of institutions and networks already have begun to carry out these kinds of economic technical programs, including the Harvard group of economists working with the State Committee on Property, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Commerce, the International Executive Service Corporation (IESC), and most recently, the Peace Corps.26 Other kinds of organizations, particularly NGOs and even technical assistance programs operated by individual companies (i.e., a sister-to-sister program for American and Russian companies) must be encouraged. The more decentralization and the less government involvement, the better.

**Humanitarian Assistance**

Humanitarian assistance will still be needed during the next few years of Russia's transition. The kind and method of assistance, however, must
be rethought.

First, humanitarian assistance should be channeled through the lowest levels of government possible. In major cities, this means dealing directly with the elected city councils. In rural areas, this means cooperating directly with those administrative governors appointed directly by President Yeltsin. In those places where there are conflicts between these two government authorities, Western government officials should work with and between both.

Dealing directly at this level of government is necessary for several reasons. First and foremost, no central distribution system exists. Soviet ministries have either been closed or taken over by Russian government authorities. In the transition, however, these potential channels for distribution are either being sufficiently sabotaged by their outgoing Soviet authorities or still controlled and operated by these same apparatchiki, rendering them inefficient for the foreseeable future. In addition, new ministers and government heads now being appointed by Yeltsin are the first to admit that they have neither the experience nor the background to take immediate control of these unwieldy and corrupted central structures. Unlike the other republics, Russia never had real government structures autonomous of the Soviet system. Finally, this level of government is more directly accountable to the people. If corruption or mismanagement of aid occurs, it will be more readily detected and corrected if those administering it are locally elected officials.

Second, international assistance programs should cooperate directly with nongovernmental organizations operating at the local level. As a general rule, aid programs always try to avoid government and work instead with independent institutions and organizations. Unfortunately, Russian non-partisan civic organizations independent of the state are still weak and ill-equipped to help coordinate a massive, all-Russia assistance program. Nonetheless, those that do exist should be utilized, if not subsidized. At the same time, the formation of new Russian charities should be encouraged.

Coordinating international assistance through these nongovernmental channels would (1) use effective and accountable distribution networks, (2) avoid inefficient government channels, and (3) help to further legitimize the democrats and democratic institutions. However crude it may sound to Western political attitudes, distributing aid through these kinds of political organizations could quell anti-reform and anti-democratic appeals. To counter Vladimir Zhirinovsky's promise to subsidize vodka, the United States should help democrats assist people in
acquiring basic food items.

Third, food, in general, should not be shipped. Instead, the United States should focus on sending medical supplies. If food is sent, it should be sold, not given away. Dumping Western goods into an empty Russian market will discourage new forms of production and retard the development of discriminating consumers. But if Western food, for instance, was sold, the increasing supplies of goods would have a deflationary effect on food prices without disrupting or interfering with the market. Profits from these sales could then be distributed to pensioners and others too poor to participate in the emerging Russian market economy.28

Fourth, the United States and other Western donors must deploy several dozen administrators to oversee the distribution of aid. These administrators must consciously keep a low profile in order to not offend Russia's pride. But, at the same time, even the Russian government has asked that the West play a more active role in administering their aid programs, as the new government has neither the staff, expertise, nor funds to do so alone. Such a network of administrators would discourage the diversion of aid while also providing crucial information on the specific needs of individual areas.

Fifth, all forms of assistance should be tied openly with clear statements about why the United States and the world is giving it. Rather than trying to camouflage this assistance as an altruistic endeavor, American officials should candidly underscore that American national interests are best served by strengthening democratic governance and a market economy in Russia and the other new states of the former Soviet Union.

Political Assistance

Both economic and humanitarian assistance must be accompanied with political technical assistance programs which promote democratic institutions and thereby foster a cordial political environment for private property and the market.29 A year after the August coup and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has yet to accomplish several basic steps towards consolidating a stable democracy. (1) There have been no major post-Communist elections. The current parliament was elected in March 1990. (2) Russia does not have a new constitution. (3) Though the Constitutional Court was created last year, it does not have a constitution to defend. Meanwhile, a new legal system based on the rule of law is only
beginning to be created. (4) Political parties are very weak and without clearly defined social bases. In place of parties, as noted above, loosely-constructed and highly volatile movements still dominate Russian politics. (5) Without a new constitution, the division of powers, especially between the executive and legislative branches, is still poorly defined and highly contentious.

No outsider can solve all of these problems, but technical assistance programs can at least help provide the menu of options available. Like technical assistance for the economy, programs should place greatest emphasis on transferring know-how about Western democratic systems. Just as there are many forms of the market, there are many different kinds of democracy; no one system should be propagated as better than others. But exchanges of experience and knowledge about democratic governance from a variety of countries is critical to combating authoritarian tendencies in the former Soviet Union.

Know-how can be transferred through a variety of channels: (1) placing Western advisors in Russian government agencies, political parties, or political training programs, (2) training Russian parliamentarians, party leaders, civil servants, and community organizers through courses and seminars, either in Russia or the West, (3) offering scholarships to young politicians interested in completing public policy programs in the West, (4) opening information centers in Russia about the democratic process, (5) translating and distributing texts about democracy, or (7) helping establish a Library of Congress for the Russian Parliament.

The form for distributing these kinds of resources must be carefully planned. Thus far, the bulk of America's programs for promoting democracy has been handled by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). These agencies should continue with their operations, but they must be accompanied by less-centralized, faster acting, nongovernmental agencies also working to promote democracy in Russia. In this respect, USAID should be encouraged to fund Western nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) currently or planning to work in Russia, while these Western NGOs must be compelled to work with nongovernmental institutions in Russia. Operating (nongovernmental) technical assistance programs such the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, the Free Trade Union Institute, the Harvard Project on Strengthening Democratic Institutions, and the American Bar Association, should be expanded. Additionally, organizations which deal with corruption, decentralization,
and political parties must begin more extensive work in Russia. Finally, all of these technical assistance programs must focus their work outside of Moscow and outside of the government. They also should be geared towards younger politicians who are still willing and able to learn.

Conclusion

The current balance of political forces in Russia threatens the prospects for political and economic reform. The democrats did not win after the August coup; their struggle still continues. The Clinton administration must be ready to constructively engage the United States in this ongoing political struggle. Changes in approach and tone cost little or nothing. Other recommendations outlined in this essay do require money, but money well spent in the defense of American national interests. Though not insignificant expenditures, these short term investments pale in comparison to the costs of doing nothing. A Russian dictator will be far more threatening to American security than the one we spent billions to defeat in Iraq. By strategically coordinating a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the collapse of the Soviet Union now, we can save ourselves the billions which would be needed to deter a new Russian adversary in the future.

Notes

1. Boris Yeltsin himself, however, could become more authoritarian.
2. Democratic Russia was a united front of political parties and social groups which organized the main anti-Communist demonstrations in 1990-1991. This movement also ran Yeltsin's campaign for president in June 1991 and organized the initial resistance to the coup in August. On July 4-5, 1992, Democratic Russia in conjunction with several other organizations and several other leading personalities convened the Coalition in Support of Reforms, later renamed Democratic Choice. See Yevgeny Yanayev, «Kto-to eshe lubit pravitelstvo?» Kommersant, No. 28, 6-13 July 1992, p. 21.
3. It is important to emphasize that Democratic Choice supports Yeltsin and the “liberal” side of the government, which includes deputy ministers Anatoly Chubais and Alexander Shokhin, and ministers Pyotr Aven, Andrei Nechaev, and Andrei Kozyrev. Other political organizations support Yeltsin, but not these liberal ministers.
4. Several leaders within Democratic Russia are currently devising a new scheme for strengthening the Commonwealth (author's interview with Kirill Ignatiev, Coordinating Council member of Democratic Russia, Moscow, August 1992).
5. In November 1992, however, Democratic Russia managed to collect 1,000,000 signatures in support of a referendum on private property.
6. In November, the Democratic Party of Russia (Nikolai Travkin), the Russian Christian
Democratic Movement (Viktor Aksyuchits) and the Constitutional Democratic Party—the Party of People's Freedom (Mikhail Astafiev)—quit Democratic Russia. In February 1992, a major scandal erupted between “radicals” led by Yuri Afanasiev and Marina Salye, and “pragmatists” led by Lev Ponomarev and Vladimir Boxer. The effect of this split will become apparent at the November 1992 congress of the movement.


11. Additionally, Vasily Lipitsky, the number two person in Rutskoi's party, has a serious rivalry with Volsky's number two, Alexander Vladislavlev. Splits are emerging within the Democratic Party (Travkin versus the “liberal” fraction lead by Alexander Sungurov), and the Union of Renewal (Vladislavlev is tired of playing second fiddle to Volsky).

12. Several days later, Yeltsin banned this organization as anti-constitutional, but the group continues to function.

13. Of course, there are many other differences, but this one seems most important.

14. American propaganda, be it Coke commercials or Radio Free Europe, helped to fuel these kinds of expectations.

15. International financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development argue that they cannot find good projects in which to invest. They blame the Russian government for not preparing sound proposals. Given that no Russian bureaucrat has ever had the experience of applying for a grant or loan, this is not surprising. However, this should not be an excuse for inaction.

16. The following paragraph is based on the results of a seminar organized by the author and Sergei Markov dealing with American-Russian relations. The seminar was held in October 1992 at the Constitutional Commission of the Russian Supreme Soviet and was attended by people's deputies from the Foreign Affairs Committee, officials from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives from several political parties, and Western diplomats based in Moscow.

17. Author's conversations with Ilya Roitman, Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia (October 1992).

18. For instance, Russia has a set of special interests in those former republics where Russian minorities now live. Russia also has special interests regarding Islamic fundamentalism in countries bordering Russia.

19. Both Americans and Russians must candidly realize that Russia is not a Third World country, but it is also not a West European country.

20. Once figures have been announced, however, these Western institutions must follow through on delivery.

21. By citing these two examples, I do not mean to criticize either Jeffrey Sachs or the IMF. Jeffrey Sachs, in fact, has done more to put the issue of Russian reform on the
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American agenda than perhaps anyone else. Rather, his opinion should be placed in a context of the wide range of views on stabilization programs in former Communist countries. Of course, the IMF and Jeffrey Sachs have significant differences of opinion about methods to assist Russia's reforms. Neither does everyone within the IMF agree on a common strategy.

22. I do not mean to argue that Soviet or Russian specialists should formulate economic assistance programs. This would result in disaster. Rather, economists trained to work in Latin America and Asia should work in teams with those acquainted with the specific features of the Russian economy, society, and state.

23. Enterprise Funds were created for Poland and Hungary but have not been established for Russia. I am grateful to Condoleezza Rice for this observation. See also Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger, "Extending Assistance to Newly Emerging Democracies," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 3, No. 11, 16 March 1992, p. 206.

24. Strategic alliances between Western companies and Russian enterprises can help conversion in America as well.

25. In March 1992, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater announced that the “United States and our allies have reduced COCOM (Coordinating Committee on Export Controls) by over two-thirds...” (Fitzwater, “Trade with the Former Soviet Union,” in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 3, No. 13, 30 March 1992, p. 252). Directors of Russian military enterprises, however, complain that these restrictions are one of the biggest impediments to Russian-American joint ventures (author's interviews with directors from Khrunichev, Vypmel, and Arsenal; Moscow and St. Petersburg, October 1992). For a new formulation of COCOM restrictions, see Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbrunner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 39-40.

26. The Peace Corps should change its name for work in Russia, as this organization is affiliated with CIA agents and the Third World in the eyes of most Russian citizens.

27. Currently, United Way is seeking to train new Russian charity organizations.

28. Poor people in Russia rarely eat the food given to them through Western humanitarian assistance programs. Instead, they sell this expensive food (i.e., processed hams, cheese, cereals) to buy cheaper items such as bread and potatoes.


31. The recently passed Freedom Support Act will create “America Houses” which are designed to provide this function.

32. The USIA program is called “Building Democratic Institutions.” AID launched a “Democracy Initiative” in December 1990.

33. Moreover, nongovernmental sources of funding such as the Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, and the Soros Foundation also should be encouraged to expand their operations in Russia.