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biases. Perhaps the dilemma she identifies for bureaucrats is in fact nonexistent, and instead expert advice conformed to political ideology because the experts were already aligned with their political leaders. That would paint a very different picture of the dynamics of Latin American bureaucracies than the one Murillo suggests.

Globalization’s potential to damage democratic sovereignty comes in two guises: the constraints it places on the policy prerogatives of the electorate and their representatives and the consequences of its preferred policies for the quality of governance. Murillo suggests in this book that prerogatives continue to retain a fair degree of latitude over how and where the government participates in the economy. Whether and how that latitude affects the quality of the services that citizens expect remain topics of further investigation.

References


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In *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe,* Marc Morjé Howard addresses the question of why some European states adopt more restrictive citizenship policies than others. Howard makes an important contribution to the comparative citizenship literature, to the immigration literature, and to our understanding of European politics. He makes several counterintuitive arguments that challenge the conventional wisdom. Furthermore, Howard convincingly argues that political variables play a key role in explaining changes in citizenship rules. In terms of empirics, the book has an impressive scope, as it examines variation both across time and across many countries. Such testing is rare in the literatures on immigration and on comparative citizenship.

Howard argues that the most important determinant of changes in contemporary citizenship policies in Europe is the relative strength of far right political parties. European far right parties tend to seek to limit migrants’ rights. Meanwhile, opinion polls indicate that most Europeans take an unfavorable view of
immigrants and of the expansion of migrants’ rights (p. 58). Howard argues that, as long as those preferences remain latent, political elites can afford to ignore them and to expand migrants’ rights. If the anti-immigrant sentiment is politicized, most notably through electoral successes of the far right but also through referenda or petition campaigns, the elites can no longer afford to ignore it. A successful far right party, Howard argues, is a sufficient cause of the blocking of citizenship liberalization.

Howard further argues, following Joppke (2003), that the ideology of the party in power is a secondary determinant of citizenship liberalization. Left-wing parties are more likely than right-wing parties to favor expanding migrants’ rights. Right-wing parties instead tend to emphasize building links with coethnic populations abroad. This variable is of only secondary importance because, Howard argues, a leftist party in power that faces a relatively prominent opposition far right party will be prevented by that far right party from liberalizing the citizenship policy.

Howard also puts forward an explanation for historical citizenship policy legacies in Europe. He argues that the key changes occurred in the 19th century and that the key determinants of citizenship policy choices at this time were whether a state was a colonial power and whether a state was an early democratizer. Counterintuitively, Howard argues that being a colonial power increased the likelihood of permissive citizenship policies because colonial relationships introduced regular interaction with the populations that could be regarded as “the other.” Even though they were exploitative, these encounters provided the need for the redefinition and the expansion of the concept of citizenship. Early democratization is the other key variable, Howard argues, in part because democracy institutionalized and made permanent inclusive civic concepts of citizenship. In the countries where both variables were present, liberal citizenship rules were established and persisted over time.

Howard makes an important contribution to the comparative study of the politics of citizenship by developing a cross-national Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) indicator. The three components of the CPI are the extent to which a country grants jus soli rights (e.g., making children born on that country’s territory automatically eligible for citizenship), whether it allows dual citizenship rights to its migrant population (e.g., are the migrants allowed to retain their country of origin citizenship on naturalization), and the naturalization score—the relative restrictiveness of the criteria for naturalization (e.g., a residency requirement, a lack of a criminal record, and/or a civics test). Howard weighs all three of these components equally. The CPI ranges from a minimum (i.e., most restrictive) score of zero to a maximum score of six. It covers two points in time: the 1980s and 2008. The 1980s data are limited to the 15 “older”
European Union members (the EU-15), whereas the 2008 data also include the 12 newer members (the Accession-12).

The book includes two kinds of testing. First, using two-way scatterplots, Howard examines the correlation between the CPI (or the changes in the CPI) and the independent variables. He finds that the 1980s CPI is strongly correlated with measures of being a past colonial power and an early democratizer. Meanwhile, citizenship liberalization between the 1980s and 2008 is strongly negatively correlated with a measure of the electoral strength of far right political parties. Economic and socioeconomic alternative variable indicators tend not to be as strongly correlated with the CPI (or with the changes in the CPI).

The second testing method includes a set of detailed case studies of the citizenship policies of EU-15 countries and a briefer examination of the Accession-12 countries. The case studies examine the history of the politics of citizenship, often extending to the previous centuries. When analyzing contemporary debates, Howard identifies key actors and specifies the arguments used by the proponents and the opponents of citizenship policy liberalization. He argues that the far right was a key actor blocking liberalization, particularly in Austria, Denmark, and Italy, whereas in Germany liberalization was watered down because of the politicization of the issue in part through a petition campaign. Meanwhile, liberalization occurred in some of the countries where the far right is weak or nonexistent (e.g., Sweden, Portugal, etc.).

In addition to examining cross-national variation, Howard also uses the CPI and the case studies to further our understanding of Europewide trends. Contrary to the claims of the decline of the nation state in general and of the relevance of citizenship rights in particular, Howard finds that citizenship rights continue to inspire potent political conflicts. Furthermore, Howard shows that significant citizenship policy variation continues to exist among EU members, contrary to the claim that the citizenship policies of European countries have converged in the direction of liberalization.

Future research can build on Howard’s work in three key ways: by disaggregating the CRI and explaining the differences in how states regulate its different components, by providing a systematic explanation for why the effect of the far right on citizenship policy is nonlinear and context dependent, and by addressing in more detail the causal logic linking colonialist legacies and citizenship policy.

The CRI is based on two assumptions: that its three components are of equal importance and that they all measure the same phenomenon. Those assumptions are problematic to some extent, and additional explanatory
power can be gained by relaxing them. The jus soli and the naturalization score components of CPI measure the degree of difficulty that immigrants and their children have in acquiring destination country citizenship. Although being forced to give up one’s original citizenship is an obstacle to such naturalization, dual citizenship restrictions also measure the extent to which migrants can retain legal ties to their country of origin. States may restrict naturalization rules and dual citizenship rules for different reasons (e.g., to restrict migrants’ access to entitlement programs and to address national security concerns, respectively).

The explanatory power of this distinction can be illustrated by reference to Tables A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, and B3 (pp. 208-213). Howard points out that the overall trend in citizenship policy reform in the EU-15 between the 1980s and now has been that of liberalization: the average CPI increased by 0.95 (p. 30). However, the average naturalization score actually decreased by 0.12. The increase in the CPI came primarily from the liberalization of dual citizenship rules (an increase of 0.7) and secondarily from the granting of additional jus soli rights (an increase of 0.37). These data reveal two striking patterns: First, dual citizenship liberalization accounts for about 74% of all net citizenship liberalization in Europe between the 1980s and now. Second, dual citizenship and naturalization score changes have actually moved in opposite directions.

Meanwhile, the causal effect of the far right on citizenship policy as described by Howard is nonlinear and context dependent. He argues that a strong far right party is sufficient to block citizenship policy liberalization. However, he implies that a strong far right party in a country where citizenship policies are already liberal cannot make those policies significantly more restrictive. This pattern is puzzling: the far right is disproportionately influential in some contexts and relatively weak in others. The pattern described above also implies a strong path dependency effect—the far right finds it much easier to block change than to initiate it. Furthermore, Howard acknowledges that the politics of immigration are different and less influenced by the far right in the Accession-12 countries. These patterns indicate that additional variables, which systematically condition the effect of the far right on citizenship policy, need to be identified and emphasized.

Howard’s argument that colonialist legacies lead to permissive citizenship policies by introducing interactions with “the other” also suggests an avenue for further research. As Howard points out, in many European states a different kind of interaction with “the other” also occurred—the interaction with religious and ethnic minorities. The need to integrate (or, in some cases, the push to exclude) such minorities may have provided an alternative impetus for
citizenship reform. Furthermore, it is not a priori clear whether interactions with “the other” are likely to lead to more inclusive policies or whether the opposite, an increase in restrictions, is likely to occur. One implication of Howard’s argument, which stresses the interaction of being a colonial power and an early democratizer, may be that democracies are likely to respond to encounters with “the other” in an inclusive way, whereas authoritarian states are not. However, in the 19th century many democracies did exclude minority groups from citizenship rights.

Reference