

**Latin America's Third Wave:
Measuring and Explaining Variations
Across Seventeen Nations**

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Introduction

In recent years, numerous scholarly analysts have sought to determine the trajectory of the third democratic wave in Latin America.¹ The onset of the third wave in the region is widely dated as 1978, when civilian leadership was elected in the Dominican Republic; the last nation of the region to be caught by the wave was in 1990, when a new civilian president was inaugurated in Chile. Since 1990, scholars have debated whether the tide continues to flow or has begun to ebb in the region.² The premise of this work is that an assessment of democratic progress in Latin America as a whole is viable.

Although I agree that it is important to assess democratic progress in the region as a whole, the premise of this paper is that it is also important to explore the wide variations in progress across the seventeen nations of the region. In other words, the democratic tide has continued to flow in some nations, has crested in others, and ebbed in several; especially now that more than ten years has elapsed since all Latin American nations (with the probable exception of Mexico and the certain exception of Cuba in the Caribbean), it is time for rigorous analysis of these variations. To date, most scholarly analyses that have assumed considerable variations in democratic progress in the region have not attempted quantitative assessment and have emphasized primarily the larger Latin American nations.³

The paper first seeks to establish an index for the measurement of democratic progress in the region. To date, the primary indicator of democratic progress in empirical research on the region has been Freedom House's rankings of political rights and civil liberties. It is contended here that additional indicators are appropriate. I propose an index composed of four indicators—the Freedom House rankings of political rights and civil liberties, the Freedom House rankings of press freedom worldwide, the Chile-based Latinobarometro public-opinion survey item on citizens' satisfaction with democracy, and the occurrence or non-occurrence of the interruption of the constitutional order or a

major threat to its interruption. Based on their scores on these indicators, the Latin American nations' democratic progress are classified as "excellent," "good," "moderate-to-good," "moderate," or "poor."

Second, the paper seeks to explain these variations in democratic progress. Using the available empirical indicators for the independent variables that have widely been considered most important to democratic progress in the region, the paper explores the correlation, or lack of correlation, between these independent variables and democratic progress. The relationships of cultural, economic, and political variables to democratic progress are considered. The paper assesses to what extent correlations that were evident in earlier studies for previous democratic tides continue through 2000.

The scope of this paper is limited to Latin America--Mexico, Central America, and South America—and excludes the Caribbean. Many studies of Latin American politics include the larger Spanish-speaking nations of the Caribbean, in particular the Dominican Republic and Cuba. Also, some studies of democracy in the region include Haiti, in part because its poor democratic progress has engaged a large measure of policy interest. However, I decided to exclude Caribbean nations for two reasons. First, many analyses in this paper include public-opinion data from the Latinobarometro surveys; Caribbean nations are not included in these surveys and thus these data would be missing. Second, there was no scholarly reason for the inclusion of, say, Haiti but not other non-Spanish-speaking Caribbean nations, and data of many kinds are missing for these nations.

Measuring Democratic Progress

Given that Latin America's third democratic wave is relatively recent, scholars' efforts to provide rigorous quantifiable measures of democratic progress in Latin America during the third wave are also relatively recent.⁴ The primary indicator in these measures has been Freedom House's annual ranking for political rights and civil liberties. It is the contention of this paper that, although this indicator is necessary, it is not

sufficient. This paper proposes an index of democratic progress that uses four indicators, one of which is the Freedom House ranking for political rights and civil liberties. It is acknowledged that this index is preliminary and can likely be enhanced in various respects.

The Freedom House ranking for political rights and civil liberties is a seven-point scale where 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. In its measurement of political rights, Freedom House uses an eight-item checklist that focuses on the freedom and fairness of elections, the capacity for competition by the political opposition, freedom from domination by the military, foreign powers, or other powerful group, and minority rights and participation. In its measurement of civil liberties, Freedom House uses a fourteen-item checklist that focuses on freedom of expression and belief, freedom of association and organization, the rule of law and human rights, and personal social and economic rights (such as choice of marriage partners and right to establish private businesses).

Despite Freedom House's intensive effort over the years, virtually inevitably these measurements are complex and subjective judgment comes into play.⁵ The precise threshold for a ranking of say, 3 versus 4 is not clearly specified, and probably cannot be; positive and negative dimensions must be balanced somehow by the judges. Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán contend also that Freedom House has graded leftist governments more critically than rightist and that its grades during the 1970s and 1980s were lenient compared to the 1990s, resulting in various anomalies.⁶

The Freedom House annual ranking of political rights and civil liberties jibes well, but not perfectly, with other possible measures that will be introduced below. In this paper, the Freedom House indicator of political rights and civil liberties for each nation is the sum of six figures: its scores for political rights and civil liberties over the three most recent years for which data are available—1998-99, 1999-00, and 2000-01 (see Appendix 1). Nations are ranked in four tiers: Uruguay and Costa Rica are in the top tier with a score below 10; Panama, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina in the second tier with

scores 11-14; El Salvador, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Mexico are in the third, with scores 15-19; and Brazil, Guatemala, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Peru are in the lowest, with scores above 20. The most dramatic anomaly in the indicator is the score for Brazil, which as will be evident below fares better on other indicators.⁷

Freedom House provides an annual ranking not only of political rights and civil liberties but also of press freedom. The rankings consider the laws that influence media content, the political pressures on media content, the economic influences on media content, and actual repressive actions for both the broadcast and print media. Although these rankings are used less widely in empirical research on democratization than those for political rights and civil liberties, they are indeed used.⁸ Although Freedom House is the sponsor of both sets of rankings, they measure slightly different phenomena and nations' rankings are slightly different. For example, both Brazil and Venezuela fare better; Mexico fares less well. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to use both sets of indicators.

In this paper, the Freedom House indicator for press freedom reflects two averages: the average for the broadcast rating for 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the average for its print rating for 1999, 2000, and 2001 (see Appendix 1). (Or, more precisely, the "average" for the print rating is the rating for two of the three years of "free," "partly free," or "not free.") Nations are ranked in three tiers: scores of 30 and below for broadcast and "free" for print in the top tier, including Costa Rica, Bolivia, Chile, Panama, and Uruguay; scores of 31 to 49 for broadcast and "partly free" for print in the middle tier, including Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Nicaragua, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Honduras; and scores of 50 and above for broadcast and "partly free" or "not free" for print in the lowest tier, including Paraguay, Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru. Although Freedom House is the sponsor of both sets of indicators, they measure slightly different phenomena and nations' rankings are slightly different.

It is proposed in this paper that an additional indicator of democratic progress be citizens' own assessments. It is believed that citizens' assessments are an important

complement to scholarly experts' assessments. In recent years, Chile's Marta Lagos has coordinated annual public opinion surveys in the Latin American nations that include a broad spectrum of social and political questions, called the Latinobarometro.⁹

Increasingly, these surveys are widely reported in analyses of political trends in Latin America.¹⁰

One of the Latinobarometro questions is: "In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the democracy works in [country]?" The percentage of respondents who said that they were "very satisfied" or "fairly satisfied" with the way democracy was working in their country is reported in Appendix 1. Nations are ranked in four tiers: Uruguay and Costa Rica are in the top tier with over 50 percent satisfaction; Argentina is in the second tier with satisfaction between 41 percent and 50 percent; Venezuela, El Salvador, Panama, Guatemala, Honduras, Chile, and Ecuador are in the third tier between 30 percent and 40 percent; and Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay are in the lowest tier, below 30 percent.

While both experts' and citizens' evaluations of freedom and democracy are important, they provide no information about a critical dimension of democratic progress: the maintenance of the constitutional order. In 1991 in Santiago, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) signed Resolution 1080, which commits the OAS Secretary General to convene a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council when there is "a sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by a democratically elected government..."¹¹ Although the concept of constitutional interruption includes the traditional military coup, it also includes the "autogolpe" (a president's own "coup" or president's own suspension of the constitution) that occurred in two Latin American nations in the 1990s.

It is proposed in this paper that one indicator of democratic progress be constitutional interruption or a threat of constitutional interruption that results in the invocation of Resolution 1080 or the event required by Resolution 1080, a meeting of the

OAS Permanent Council. This indicator includes only two points—“Yes, constitutional interruption or threat of constitutional interruption that spurred OAS action” and “No constitutional interruption or threat of interruption that spurred OAS action.” Peru, Guatemala, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Ecuador are nations in the category “Yes, constitutional interruption or threat of constitutional interruption spurring OAS action,” whereas all the other Latin American nations are categorized as not having suffered an interruption or threat of interruption.

During the 1990s, Resolution 1080 was applied in three of the nations in this study: Peru, Guatemala, and Paraguay. In Peru in 1992, President Alberto Fujimori suspended the constitution and dissolved the legislature, among other actions; pressure from the OAS and other actors persuaded the government to hold prompt elections for a legislature that would draft a new constitution. In Guatemala in 1993, President José Serrano also suspended the constitution and dissolved the legislature; in the face of intense international and domestic pressure, Serrano resigned within ten days and a new president was elected by Guatemala’s congress. In Paraguay in 1996, President Juan Carlos Wasmosy’s order for the resignation of General Lino Oviedo sparked action by the General that was widely considered a coup attempt; support from the OAS and other international actors helped President Wasmosy to prevail.

Although Resolution 1080 was not invoked in the cases of Venezuela and Ecuador, an immediate meeting of the Permanent Council was convened and support for the democratically elected president resolved in both cases.¹² In Venezuela in February 1992, a military coup was attempted. Colonel Hugo Chávez led an uprising of junior military officers that planned to kidnap and assassinate President Carlos Andrés Pérez. The OAS Permanent Council vehemently condemned the coup attempt and proclaimed its support for President Andrés Pérez, who prevailed. A second unsuccessful coup attempt, in which higher-ranking officers participated, was made in November 1992.

In Ecuador in January 2000, President Jamil Mahuad was confronted by an uprising of indigenous groups that was supported by the armed forces. Although the

OAS Permanent Council expressed its support for the president, a triumvirate consisting of armed forces commander General Carlos Mendoza, indigenous leader Antonio Vargas and former supreme court president Carlos Solórzano proclaimed a “government of national salvation.” However, Mendoza was rapidly dissuaded from this course by international pressure; hurriedly convened, Ecuador’s congress elevated Vice-president Gustavo Noboa to the presidency. Ecuador also underwent an irregular and constitutionally questionable change of government in Ecuador in 1997, when President Abdalá Bucarám was declared mentally incapacitated and incompetent (without a trial or rigorous analysis of the case) by a simple majority of the congress and removed from office.

In Table 1, the democratic progress of Latin American nations is classified as “excellent,” “good,” “moderate-to-good,” “moderate,” or “poor” in accord with their scores on the four indicators in the index of democratic performance. Ranked in the top tier of scores on all four indicators, Uruguay and Costa Rica clearly stand out as the region’s democratic stars and their democratic progress is classified as “excellent.” Ranked in the top tier of scores only on the press freedom and constitutional interruption indicators but not in the bottom tier of scores on any indicator, the democratic progress of Argentina, Chile, and Panama is classified as “good.” The “moderate-to-good” category includes only Bolivia and is actually an ambiguous category; Bolivia was classified separately in large part because its scores on the different indicators varied considerably and accordingly to place it in one category over another seemed to be a bias in favor of one indicator over another. Not ranked in the top tier on indicators with three tiers nor in the top two tiers on indicators with four tiers, but ranked in the bottom tier on at most two of the four indicators, the democratic progress of Brazil, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador, and Venezuela is classified as “moderate.” Ranked in the bottom tier on three or all of the four indicators, the democratic progress of Peru, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Colombia is classified as “poor.”

It was decided that Mexico would be classified separately. In contrast to the other nations in this study, Mexico was not deemed democratic by many scholars until the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, or Institutional Revolutionary Party) lost the 2000 presidential elections. Until 2000, the PRI had been Mexico's ruling political party for some seventy years and was the longest-ruling political party in the world. In this context, the meaning of some indicators is different for Mexico. In particular, the meaning of responses to Latinobarometro's satisfaction with democracy item is not clear. Given this ambiguity (and also some variation in Mexico's scores as well as Mexico's importance), it seemed best to place Mexico apart.

Table I
Index of Democratic Progress, 1990-2000


	Freedom House <u>PR and CL</u>	Freedom House <u>Press Freedom</u>	Latinobarometro <u>Satis. with Dem.</u>	Constitutional <u>Interruption?</u>
<u>Excellent</u>				
Uruguay	Top tier	Top tier	Top tier	No
Costa Rica	Top tier	Top tier	Top tier	No
<u>Good</u>				
Argentina	Second tier	Top tier	Second tier	No
Chile	Second tier	Top tier	Third tier	No
Panama	Second tier	Top tier	Third tier	No
<u>Moderate-to Good</u>				
Bolivia	Second tier	Top tier	Bottom tier	No
<u>Moderate</u>				
Brazil	Bottom tier	Middle tier	Bottom tier	No
El Salvador	Third tier	Middle tier	Third tier	No
Nicaragua	Third tier	Middle tier	Bottom tier	No
Honduras	Third tier	Middle tier	Third tier	No
Ecuador	Third tier	Middle tier	Bottom tier	Yes
Venezuela	Bottom tier	Middle tier	Third tier	Yes
<u>Poor</u>				
Colombia	Bottom tier	Bottom tier	Bottom tier	No
Peru	Bottom tier	Bottom tier	Bottom tier	Yes
Guatemala	Bottom tier	Bottom tier	Third tier	Yes
Paraguay	Bottom tier	Bottom tier	Bottom tier	Yes
<u>Mexico</u>	Third tier	Bottom tier	Bottom tier	No

Sources: See Appendix 1.

Cultural variables and Democratic Progress

The concept of political culture has been one of the most controversial in comparative politics, and the importance of political culture to democratic progress has been intensely debated. This paper considers two dimensions of political culture that are regularly cited by scholars as important to democratic progress: social trust and democratic values.¹³

In this paper, social trust is measured by citizens' responses to the Latinobarometro question, "Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people, or that you can never be too careful when dealing with others?" Overall in Latin America, the level of social trust is low; Marta Lagos calculates that Europeans are three times as likely as Latin Americans to "trust most people" and U.S. residents more than twice as likely.¹⁴ Figure 1 indicates that social trust was at the same low level—about 15% to 20% of respondents—in the nations where democratic progress was classified as "good," "moderate-to-good," "moderate," and "poor." Only in the nations classified as "excellent" and especially in Mexico did social trust rise to clearly higher levels—above 30%. However, the relationship between social trust and "excellent" democratic progress is stronger than it would have been if the data had been calculated over 1996-2000 rather than 1997-98; for reasons that are unknown, in Costa Rica the percentage of respondents who expressed social trust was 30 percent or above in 1998 and 1999 but under 15 percent in 1996 and 1999-2000.¹⁵ The data for 1997-1998 are used in Figure 1, however, because Uruguay and Paraguay were not included in the paper from which the data were drawn and accordingly it was necessary to purchase data for these two nations.



In this paper, democratic values are measured by citizens' responses to the Latinobarometro question, "Which of the following statements do you agree with most? 'Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government'; 'In certain situations, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one'; or, 'It doesn't matter to people like me whether we have a democratic government or a non-democratic government.'" In general, in contrast to social trust, pro-democratic values are widespread in Latin America; whereas about 80 percent of Europeans held pro-democratic values between 1996 and 2000 and about 87 percent of U.S. respondents, approximately 60 percent of Latin Americans did.¹⁶

Table 1 Social Trust and Democratic Progress	
	Percentage of respondents believing one can “Trust most people.”
Argentina	20.5
Bolivia	17.5
Brazil	5.0
Chile	16.5
Colombia	23.5
Costa Rica	32.0
Ecuador	19.5
El Salvador	25.5
Guatemala	27.5
Honduras	22.0
Mexico	41.5
Nicaragua	23.0
Panama	19.0
Paraguay	11.5
Peru	13.0
Uruguay	32.5
Venezuela	13.5

Source: Latinobarometro




Figure 2 shows considerable variation in the extent of democratic values among the Latin American nations in the three Latinobarometro surveys from 1997 to 2000 and a moderate relationship between pro-democratic values and democratic progress. Pro-democratic values prevail among as much as 80 percent of respondents in Uruguay and Costa Rica; percentages descend gradually among the democratic classifications until the percentage averages roughly 55% in nations with “poor” democratic performance (and a scant 49 percent in Mexico). The percentages for several nations are anomalous relative to their classification for democratic progress: the percentage of respondents invariably favoring democracy is high in El Salvador (69%) but low in Chile (57%) and Brazil (48%).

Table 2		
Democratic Values and Democratic Progress		
1996-2000		
Country	Year	Percent responding that "Democracy is always preferable."
Argentina	1996-2000	73
Bolivia	1996-2000	61
Brazil	1996-2000	48
Chile	1996-2000	57
Colombia	1996 and 2000	55
Costa Rica	1996-2000	78
Ecuador	1996-2000	51
El Salvador	1996-2000	69
Guatemala	1996-2000	49
Honduras	1996-2000	61
Mexico	1996-2000	49
Nicaragua	1996-2000	68
Panama	1996-2000	68
Paraguay	1996 and 2000	54
Peru	1996-2000	62
Uruguay	1996 and 2000	82
Venezuela	1996-2000	62

Source: Stanford University, (<http://democracy.stanford.edu/Seminar/Diamond2001.htm>); Latinobarometro.

Data for all nations except Colombia, Paraguay, and Uruguay from Lagos, "Latinobarometro Survey Data 1996-2000."

Data for Colombia, Paraguay, and Uruguay for 1996 and 2000 from Stanford only.


Recently, scholars have advanced the concept "civil society" and "social capital" as integral to democratic performance.¹⁷ Unfortunately, however, appropriate cross-national data are not available for most Latin American nations.

Education and Democratic Progress

Education is widely posited to be an important factor in democratic progress. This paper considers the relationship between both literacy and secondary-school education in 1999 with democratic progress. Surprisingly, the relationships are weak to non-existent. Perhaps a variety of other indicators should be explored.

Figure 3 shows a weak relationship between adult literacy and democratic progress. While literacy is greatest in the nations where democratic progress is “excellent” and next-greatest in the nations where democratic progress is “good,” it is greater in the nations where democratic progress is “poor” than in the nations where democratic progress is “moderate.” One reason for the limited relationship is that by 1999 literacy was widespread in most Latin American nations. Another reason is that literacy was less common in several Central American nations (El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras) where democratic progress is “moderate” than in Paraguay and some Andean nations (Peru, Colombia) where democratic progress is “poor.”

While the relationship between adult literacy and democratic progress is weak, it is non-existent between secondary school enrollment and democratic progress. Figure 3 shows that secondary school enrollment rates are highest in the nations where democratic progress is “good” (and also in Mexico); rates are lowest in the “moderate-to-good” category (Bolivia) and the “moderate” category. The non-existent relationship is in part a reflection of low secondary school enrollment in Costa Rica (48%) and relatively high enrollment in Peru (73%) and Colombia (67%).



Economic Development and Democratic Progress

In previous decades, most social scientists have found a robust positive relationship between levels of economic development and democracy.¹⁸ This paper indicates that this positive relationship continues for Latin America in the 1990s. To a certain extent, this relationship is not surprising—it represents a continuation of the relatively solid economic performance of most of the region’s southern cone nations (Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina) relative to other Latin American nations from the 1960s into the 1990s. Perhaps most interesting is the high GDP per capita and high GDP growth—at least relative to their neighbors--of the two Central American nations (Costa Rica and Panama) that ranked as “excellent” or good” on the democratic progress scale.

Table 3
Education Levels and Democratic Progress, 1999

	Adult Literacy (% of population age 15 and higher)	School Enrollment, Secondary (% of gross)
Argentina	96.7	73.3
Bolivia	85.0	36.6
Brazil	84.9	61.5
Chile	95.6	74.9
Colombia	91.5	66.7
Costa Rica	95.5	48.4
Ecuador	91.0	49.9
El Salvador	78.3	36.8
Guatemala	68.1	25.7
Honduras	74.0	32.4
Mexico	91.1	64.0
Nicaragua	68.2	55.0
Panama	91.7	68.5
Paraguay	93.0	46.8
Peru	89.6	72.5
Uruguay	97.7	85.1
Venezuela	92.3	39.5

* The gross school enrollment measurement is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown.

Source: World Bank

<http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/>

Figure 4 indicates a strong relationship between GDP per capita (the average during the period 1990-99) and democratic progress. GDP per capita was almost twice as high in nations where democratic progress was “excellent” or “good” as in nations where democratic progress was “moderate to good,” “moderate,” or “poor.” Although GDP per capita was not higher in nations where democratic progress was “excellent” than in nations where it was “good,” the difference is slight.





Table 4
GDP Per Capita
(Current U.S. Dollars)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Average, 1990-1999
Argentina	4,346	5,753	6,852	6,990	7,509	7,423	7,730	8,214	8,257	7,735	7,081
Bolivia	741	794	819	812	827	906	974	1,020	1,072	1,027	899
Brazil	3,143	4,011	2,625	2,826	3,476	4,419	4,797	4,912	4,718	3,116	3,804
Chile	2,315	2,601	3,092	3,229	3,639	4,589	4,755	5,148	4,912	4,492	3,877
Colombia	1,341	1,347	1,414	1,598	2,114	2,400	2,473	2,664	2,436	2,081	1,987
Costa Rica	2,355	2,255	2,617	2,845	3,027	3,259	3,205	3,391	3,614	3,866	3,043
Ecuador	1,041	1,119	1,178	1,303	1,480	1,565	1,628	1,656	1,620	1,103	1,369
El Salvador	1,043	1,020	1,122	1,278	1,461	1,675	1,781	1,895	1,984	2,011	1,527
Guatemala	874	1,048	1,133	1,205	1,337	1,469	1,541	1,691	1,754	1,633	1,368
Honduras	625	610	660	657	625	701	701	790	854	853	708
Mexico	3,160	3,706	4,216	4,577	4,691	3,139	3,590	4,258	4,392	4,966	4,069
Nicaragua	581	442	455	471	426	427	434	433	442	459	457
Panama	2,216	2,390	2,666	2,858	2,992	3,005	3,045	3,196	3,304	3,406	2,908
Paraguay	1,248	1,440	1,445	1,501	1,670	1,867	1,943	1,889	1,646	1,445	1,609
Peru	1,572	1,940	1,868	1,811	2,175	2,513	2,545	2,675	2,530	2,300	2,193
Uruguay	2,998	3,588	4,088	4,732	5,472	5,999	6,329	6,647	6,827	6,348	5,303
Venezuela	2,492	2,676	2,955	2,871	2,733	3,543	3,162	3,883	4,088		3,156

Source: Inter-American Development Bank

<http://www.iadb.org/int/sta/ENGLISH/ipaxnet/intgrpnet/ab/b2a.htm>

Figure 5 indicates an even stronger relationship between GDP growth (average annual GDP growth rate between 1990 and 1999) and democratic progress. The average annual growth rate in nations where democratic progress was “excellent” or “good” is about three times as high as in nations where democratic progress was “moderate to good,” “moderate,” or “poor.” As with respect to GDP per capita, growth was not higher in nations where democratic progress was “excellent” than in nations where it was “good,” but the difference is slight.



By the 1990s, most Latin American nations had shifted towards free-market economic policies. The implications of this economic shift for democracy in the region have been controversial; almost all scholars are concerned that free-market policies have tended to be initiated largely by the executive, often against popular preferences, but some are more optimistic than others about the longer-term implications of the shift towards the free market.¹⁹

Table 5											
Average Annual GDP Growth											
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Average, 1990-1999
Argentina	-2.6	8.7	8.6	4.7	4.4	-4.2	4.2	6.7	3.3	-4.2	2.96
Bolivia	2.3	2.8	-0.8	1.8	2.2	2.2	1.9	2.5	3.1	-1.7	1.63
Brazil	-5.8	-1.2	-2.3	2.7	4.5	2.8	1.6	1.6	-1.1	-0.5	0.23
Chile	2.0	6.2	10.4	5.2	4.0	8.9	5.8	5.9	2.0	-2.4	4.80
Colombia	2.3	0.0	2.0	3.4	3.8	3.2	0.1	1.5	-1.4	-6.0	0.89
Costa Rica	0.5	-0.8	5.6	3.0	1.8	1.1	-2.4	3.1	5.4	5.5	2.28
Ecuador	0.8	3.2	1.6	0.5	2.6	0.4	-0.1	1.6	-1.6	-9.9	-0.09
El Salvador	3.0	1.6	5.4	5.1	3.8	4.1	-0.4	2.1	1.4	0.5	2.66
Guatemala	0.5	1.0	2.1	1.2	1.3	2.2	0.3	1.6	2.3	0.9	1.34
Honduras	-2.9	0.2	2.5	3.1	-4.1	1.1	0.7	2.2	0.2	-4.5	-0.15
Mexico	3.2	2.3	1.8	-0.1	2.7	-8.1	3.5	5.2	3.2	2.1	1.58
Nicaragua	-2.5	-2.8	-2.0	-3.3	1.1	1.6	2.3	2.7	1.4	4.3	0.28
Panama	5.4	6.9	5.9	3.2	1.0	0.3	1.1	2.7	2.7	1.7	3.09
Paraguay	0.0	-0.5	-1.2	1.3	0.2	1.8	-1.7	-0.2	-3.1	-2.1	-0.55
Peru	-5.6	1.7	-3.1	4.1	12.5	6.3	0.2	5.6	-1.6	1.0	2.11
Uruguay	-0.4	2.8	7.2	2.0	6.5	-2.2	4.6	4.1	3.9	-3.9	2.46
Venezuela	4.9	7.4	3.7	-1.7	-4.6	1.8	-2.1	4.4	-2.8	-6.0	0.50

Source: Inter-American Development Bank, <http://www.iadb.org/int/sta/ENGLISH/ipaxnet/intgrpnet/ab/b2pch.htm>

To date, there is no measure of free-market reform that is widely used by political scientists. One “general reform index” using data from the Economic Commission for Latin America is valuable, but data are missing for two Latin American nations, Nicaragua and Panama.²⁰ Another index has been developed by the Cato Institute, but it incorporates dimensions such as the quality of a country’s legal system that are not appropriate for the purposes of this paper.²¹ The index that appears to best report the extent of shift towards the free market among the Latin American nations is the “index of economic freedom” published by the Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal.²² In this index for 2000 but published in 1999, nations are ranked from 1 (freest) to 161 (repressed) based on their ratings in ten categories: 1) banking 2) capital flows and foreign investment 3) monetary policy 4) fiscal burden of government 5) trade policy 6) wages and prices 7) government intervention in the economy 8) property rights 9) regulation and 10) black markets.

Figure 6 shows at most a weak relationship between the index of economic freedom published in 1999 and democratic progress. In particular, the degree of economic freedom is very similar in nations whose democratic progress is “excellent” and those whose democratic progress is “poor.” In other words, for nations at these points on the democratic progress scale, economic freedom is not related with democratic progress. On the other hand, the degree of economic freedom is much greater in nations whose democratic progress is “good” than those whose democratic progress is “moderate.” If the “excellent” and “good” categories were pooled and the “moderate” and “poor” categories were pooled, there would be a slight positive correlation between economic freedom and democratic progress. Overall, however, it appears that more scholarly work is necessary prior to a judgment about the relationship between the shift to the free market and democratic progress in Latin America post-1990.

Figure 6
Index of Economic Freedom and Democratic Progress




Table 6		
Index of Economic Freedom		
2000 Rankings (Lower Scores = Freer Markets)		
	2000 Score	Freedom Category
Argentina	17	Mostly Free
Bolivia	44	Mostly Free
Brazil	110	Mostly Unfree
Chile	11	Mostly Free
Colombia	61	Mostly Free
Costa Rica	58	Mostly Free
Ecuador	84	Mostly Unfree
El Salvador	11	Mostly Free
Guatemala	46	Mostly Free
Honduras	99	Mostly Unfree
Mexico	74	Mostly Unfree
Nicaragua	116	Mostly Unfree
Panama	33	Mostly Free
Paraguay	53	Mostly Free
Peru	36	Mostly Free
Uruguay	41	Mostly Free
Venezuela	94	Mostly Unfree

Source: Wall Street Journal, November 30, 1999

Political Institutions and Democratic Progress


In the 1990s, there has been a scholarly re-emphasis on the importance of politics to democratic progress.²³ At the same time, however, the analysis of the relationship between key political variables—namely, constitutional design, political pacts, and political parties—has been difficult in the Latin American context. For reasons that will be discussed below, at the moment there is little empirical evidence that particular kinds of political institutions are strongly related to democratic progress.

The analysis of constitutional design is difficult in the Latin American context because the most important question in the scholarly literature has been the advantages of presidential versus parliamentary systems—but, in Latin America, the option for presidential systems is almost universal and accordingly there is no variation among the Latin American nations. Although there are important variations in Latin American nations' constitutions—for example, provisions for immediate presidential reelection and for a runoff if no candidate wins a certain percentage on the first round—these were often new in the mid-1990s and scholarly judgments are probably premature. With respect to other important variations, such as the system for the election of the legislature or the strength of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive, comprehensive information has not yet been collected.

Political pacts have been advanced by some scholars as a promising strategy for the transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy.²⁴ A political pact has been defined as “an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seek to define (or better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vital interest of those entering into it.”²⁵ Scholarly optimism about political pacts in the Latin American context has, however, based to a considerable degree upon the maintenance of civilian government in two Latin American nations where political pacts were established in the late 1950s—Venezuela and Colombia—at a time when most civilian governments in the region were falling to military coups. As was evident in Table 1, however, in the 1990s democratic progress in both Venezuela and Colombia was inferior to the regional average; now, various scholars have blamed the inferior progress on the nature of the political pacts in the two countries.²⁶ The only other clear case of democratic transition via political pact in Latin America is Brazil, and it was evident in Table 1 that democratic progress was inferior there as well. In short, the available evidence from Latin America as of the 1990s supports the scholarly pessimists who consider political pacts “conservative,” “exclusionary,” and “corporatist.”²⁷ However, this evidence is actually rather limited—a sample of some three political pacts, two of which were established more than forty years ago.

Institutionalized political parties have been advocated as pivotal to democratic progress by many scholars.²⁸ Scott Mainwaring has defined “institutionalized” political parties as those that are stable; that have strong roots in society; that are accorded legitimacy by major political actors; and that have actual party organization.²⁹ As with respect to the conventional wisdom about political pacts, however, the scholarly emphasis on the importance of institutionalized political parties has been shaken by the democratic reversals in Venezuela and Colombia during the 1990s. While in the past, these nations’ institutionalized party system with two dominant political parties had been praised as pivotal to the maintenance of civilian government, now they were criticized as “over-institutionalized” and blamed for the countries’ political problems.³⁰ From an empirical perspective, indicators to differentiate “institutionalization” from “over-institutionalization” are not yet available.

Scholars striving for quantitative measurement of the institutionalization of political parties have often relied on the indicator of the number of political parties in the country. Generally, scholars have suggested that nations where the number of political parties is smaller—two to three rather than four or five—should fare better than nations where the number of political parties is larger.³¹ However, Figure 7 indicates no relationship between the number of political parties and democratic progress in Latin America during the 1990s. Although data for the volatility of political parties were not available throughout Latin America, it is dubious that a significant relationship would have been found; while parties have not been volatile in our democratic stars--Costa Rica and Uruguay--they have not been in two poor performers, Paraguay and Colombia, either.



The weak relationships between political institutions and democratic progress in Latin America do not suggest to this author that these institutions are unimportant. Rather, I believe that intensive scholarly effort is necessary to develop appropriate indicators for the complex phenomena that we call political institutions.

Table 7	
Average Number of Political Parties	
(in 2 most recent presidential elections)	
Country and Years of Presidential Elections	Average Number of Parties
Argentina (1995, 1999)	3.0
Bolivia (1993, 1997)	5.0
Brazil (1994, 1998)	3.0
Chile (1993, 1999)	3.0
Colombia (1994, 1998)	2.5
Costa Rica (1990, 1998)	2.0
Ecuador (1996, 1998)	4.5
El Salvador (1994, 1999)	3.5
Guatemala (1995, 1999)	4.0
Honduras (1993, 1997)	2.0
Mexico (1994, 2000)	3.5
Nicaragua (1990, 1996)	2.5
Panama (1994, 1999)	3.5
Paraguay (1993, 1998)	2.5
Peru (1995, 2001)	3.0
Uruguay (1994, 1999)	3.5
Venezuela (1998, 2000)	2.5

Sources: 1998-2001: The International Foundation for Election Systems, <http://www.ElectionGuide.org>;
prior to 1998: Georgetown University, <http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata>

Civil-Military Relations

Civilian control over the military is widely considered key to democratic progress. Among the possible indicators for civilian control are the purge of disloyal officers from the military after a democratic transition; limitation of the military's role to matters of

national defense; civilian power over appointments in the military, including the appointment of a civilian as minister of defense; and a reduction in the military budget.³²

Among these various indicators, the data that are most readily available are for defense spending as a percentage of total government expenditures. Figure 8 indicates a strong relationship between low percentages of government expenditures for defense and democratic progress in Latin America.




Table 8									
Defense Spending									
(as % of Total Expenditures)									
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Average, 1990-1997
Argentina	16.7	11.5	16.0	12.4	12.2	11.9	11.2	6.3	12.28
Bolivia	18.8	14.0	10.4	8.4	8.1	7.5	7.1	6.7	10.13
Brazil	4.6	4.9	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.9	N/A	N/A	3.92
Chile	15.4	14.0	11.7	16.4	16.3	17.5	15.9	17.8	15.63
Colombia	17.6	17.3	14.7	18.8	17.3	17.9	19.2	19.9	17.84
Costa Rica	6.6	5.5	7.5	7.2	5.3	2.8	2.6	3.1	5.08
Ecuador	20.4	24.6	25.4	21.0	21.8	18.5	15.6	20.3	20.95
El Salvador	31.0	23.8	13.4	10.9	8.6	7.4	6.2	6.7	13.50
Guatemala	14.6	15.5	14.0	14.0	15.0	14.1	15.0	N/A	14.60
Honduras	9.9	9.1	5.5	5.5	5.9	5.6	N/A	N/A	6.92
Mexico	2.5	3.1	3.7	3.8	4.3	3.9	3.5	6.2	3.88
Nicaragua	59.1	10.9	8.1	7.4	6.3	6.1	4.7	4.5	13.39
Panama	6.1	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.4	5.2	4.6	4.8	5.38
Paraguay	13.9	14.3	13.2	10.7	10.9	11.6	10.9	10.5	12.00
Peru	10.8	9.9	11.1	10.8	12.5	10.1	11.5	13.4	11.26
Uruguay	9.1	7.8	8.0	5.6	7.3	5.9	4.6	4.4	6.59
Venezuela	8.4	16.8	11.9	8.7	6.6	9.0	7.1	9.8	9.79

Source: Social Watch

<http://www.socwatch.org>

Conclusion

The premise of this paper is that democratic progress in Latin America from 1990-2000 has varied dramatically among the seventeen nations of the region and that the development of an index for the assessment of this varying tide is essential. Towards this end, three indicators are added to the conventional Freedom House rankings of political rights and civil liberties in this paper for the construction of a four-indicator “index of democratic progress (1990-2000).”

The paper examines the relationships between cultural, economic, and political variables and the index of democratic progress over the last decade. As has been the case in the past, the strongest relationships are between economic variables and democratic progress. Both GDP per capita and annual GDP growth have been considerably higher in nations where democratic progress has been “excellent” or “good” than in the other Latin American nations. At this time, however, the relationship between the degree of free-market reform and democratic progress is not clear.

The paper indicates scant relationships between political institutions and democratic progress on the basis of the data that are available at this time. More scholarly effort is necessary to develop quantifiable indicators for effective political institutions in Latin America. The paper does indicate, however, a strong relationship between civilian control over the military (as measured by low percentages of defense spending) and democratic progress.

The relationships between cultural variables and democratic progress are uneven. On the one hand, the relationship between social trust and democratic progress is weak.

A relationship between democratic values and democratic progress, however, is evident; at the same time, it is likely that citizens' democratic values are affected by the country's democratic progress; as is often the case with cultural variables, causal directions are unclear. The weak to non-existent relationship between education (as measured by literacy and secondary school enrollment) is surprising.

Overall, the pattern of relationships suggests a need to consider additional variables. In particular, democratic progress has been poor among the Andean nations. In my view, there is a need to consider the problem of cocaine production in the Andean nations and its implications for both violent crime within the countries and much more complex relations with the United States.³³ It is also important to consider—although very hard or impossible to quantify--questions of political leadership in these nations.³⁴

Appendix 1

The Construction of the Index of Democratic Progress, 1990-2000

Table 1 shows the index of democratic progress developed for this paper. The index is based on the following four indicators:

- 1) Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties (see www.freedomhouse.org). The scores below are the sums of the country's ratings for both political rights and civil liberties for three years (1998-99, 1999-00, and 2000-01). These scores, placed in the tiers established by the author, are:

<u>Tier</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Score</u>
Top:	Uruguay	8
	Costa Rica	9
Second:	Panama	11
	Bolivia	12
	Chile	13
	Argentina	14
Third:	El Salvador	15
	Ecuador	16
	Nicaragua	17
	Honduras	17
	Mexico	19
Lowest:	Brazil	21
	Guatemala	21
	Paraguay	21
	Venezuela	21

Colombia	23
Peru	24

- 2) Freedom House scores for press freedom worldwide (see www.freedomhouse.org/pfs99/reports/html (and same address but pfs2000 and 2001 for subsequent years). The scores below are the average of the three numerical scores for the country's broadcast rating for 1999, 2000, and 2001 and the country's print rating for two of the three years.

<u>Tier</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Score</u>
Top:	Costa Rica	16, F
	Bolivia	21, F
	Chile	27, F
	Panama	30, F
	Uruguay	30, F
Middle:	Brazil	33, PF
	Venezuela	34, PF
	Argentina	38, PF
	Nicaragua	40, PF
	Ecuador	41, PF
	El Salvador	43, PF
	Honduras	47, PF
Bottom:	Paraguay	50, PF
	Mexico	50, PF
	Guatemala	54, PF
	Colombia	60, PF
	Peru	61, NF

- 3) Satisfaction with democracy (see <http://democracy.stanford.edu/Seminar/Diamond2001.htm>). The scores are the

average percentage for the three years reported at the website (1996, 1998, and 2000); the website's source is Latinobarometro. The percentage is for those who respond that they are "very satisfied" or "satisfied" to the question, "In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?"

<u>Tier</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Top:	Uruguay	63%
	Costa Rica	55%
Second:	Argentina	43%
Third:	Venezuela	40%
	El Salvador	37%
	Panama	36%
	Guatemala	35%
	Honduras	33%
	Chile	31%
	Ecuador	30%
Bottom:	Bolivia	27%
	Peru	23%
	Mexico	23%
	Brazil	22%
	Colombia	22%
	Nicaragua	22%
	Paraguay	19%

- 4) Interruption or threat of interruption to the constitutional order that results in the invocation of OAS Resolution 1080 or the event required by Resolution 1080, a

meeting of the OAS Permanent Council (see text for further explanation). Nations categorized as “Yes” (the bottom tier) are: Peru, Guatemala, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Ecuador. The other Latin American nations are “No” (the top tier).

The author acknowledges that this is a preliminary attempt at the construction of a multi-indicator measurement. In the construction of this index, the author made decisions that can be questioned. These questions, and the author’s responses, include:

Arbitrary thresholds for tiers:

1) Why are there four tiers for the Freedom House indicator for political rights and civil liberties and why is there a cut-off point between Argentina and El Salvador, when there is a difference of only one point in these two nations’ scores? The author would have preferred that there be a difference of two points between these two nations’ scores, as there is for the other tiers. However, if there had not been a division at some point on the continuum, then the large difference between Panama’s 11 points and Mexico’s 19 points would have been disregarded and information lost.

2) If there were four tiers for the Freedom House indicator for political rights and civil liberties, why not for the Freedom House indicator for press freedom? The author would have opted for four tiers except that the print ranking included only a three-point scale; basis of the indicator on the broadcast ranking would have misrepresented the indicator. The thresholds for the three tiers of the print ranking distribute the nations relatively evenly—5 nations across 14 points in the first tier, 7 nations across 13 points in the second, and 5 nations across 11 points in the lowest.

Chronology

Three of the indicators cover dates in the late 1990s, but the indicator for interruption or non-interruption of the constitutional order includes events in the

early 1990s. Ideally, this would not be the case. However, I did not have the data for the early 1990s for the other three indicators but the threats to the constitutional order in the early 1990s were clearly still relevant.

Thresholds for “Excellent,” “Good,” etc.

For the most part, the thresholds were developed primarily on the grounds of common sense. The placement of nations that raised questions (Bolivia, Mexico) were classified separately. The only other nation where classification was difficult was Ecuador (whether it should be classified as “moderate” or “poor.”). It does not appear that classification as “poor” would have changed the pattern of relationships observed in the paper.

¹The concept of the third democratic wave was developed by Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). See also the discussion and critique Renske Doorenspleet, “Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization,” World Politics 52 (April 2000): 384-406.

²See, for example, Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5 (January 1994): 55-69; Jorge I. Domínguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, “Introduction: Constructing Democratic Governance,” in Jorge I. Domínguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal (eds.), Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s—Themes and Issues (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?” Journal of Democracy **GET**, esp. 29-30; Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy 9 (April 1998): 91-107; and Scott Mainwaring, “Latin America’s Imperiled Progress: The Surprising Resilience of Elected Governments,” Journal of Democracy 10, 3 (July 1999), 101-114;.

³Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999); John Peeler, Buidling Democracy in Latin America (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Abraham F. Lowenthal, “Latin America at the Century’s Turn,” Journal of Democracy, 11, no. 2 (April 2000): 41-55.

⁴A similar challenge is noted with respect to African nations by Jeffrey Herbst, “Political Liberalization in Africa after Ten Years,” Comparative Politics 33, no. 3 (April 2001); see also Nancy Thede, “Human Rights and Statistics—some reflections on the no-man’s land between concept and indicator,” Paper on the website of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, www.ichrdd.ca/111/english/commdoc/publications/demDev/statisticsIndicators.html.

⁵Kenneth A. Bollen and Pamela Paxton, “Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy,” Comparative Political Studies, 33, no. 1 (February 2000), 58-86, and Bruce Baker, “The Quality of Democracy in the Developing World: why and how it should be measured,” Paper presented at the 27th ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Mannheim, March 26-31 1999, 3.

⁶Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999,” Working Paper #280, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame (September 2000), 20-22.

⁷In a classification not used in this paper, Brazil is ranked “democratic” rather than “semi-democratic,” also in contrast to the Freedom House ranking. See Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán, “Classifying Political Regimes,” 20.

⁸Bollen and Paxton, "Subjective Measures," 61.

⁹ See www.mori.com/products/latino.shtml or www.latinobarometro.org.

¹⁰ See, for example, "An alarm call for democrats," *The Economist*, July 28, 2001, 37-38.

¹¹ Ruben M. Perina (accent on Ruben), "The Inter-American Democratic Regime: The Role of the OAS," the English version of the chapter

¹² Perina, 10 and 35. The OAS Permanent Council Resolution on the coup attempt in Venezuela was No. 576 (887/92) and its Resolution on the challenge to Mahuad in Ecuador was No. 763 (1220/00).

¹³ For a nuanced discussion of this controversy, see Diamond, Hartlyn, Linz, and Lipset (eds.), *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, 38-43. The primary advocate of political culture as an important explanation for Latin America's historical difficulties with democracy is Howard Wiarda. Among his many works on the topic is Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, *Latin American Politics and Development* (Boulder: Westview, 2000), 12-15.

¹⁴ Marta Lagos, "Latinobarometro Survey Data 1996-2000," Presented at Challenges to Democracy in the Americas, Carter Center, Atlanta, October 16-17, 2000, 3-6.

¹⁵ Lagos, "Latinobarometro Survey," 6.

¹⁶ Lagos, "Latinobarometro Survey," 8.

¹⁷ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). With respect to the Latin American context, see Diamond, Hartlyn, Linz, and Lipset (eds.), *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, 54-57. One thoughtful work that includes empirical cross-national data (the percentage of national employment represented by the non-profit sector in 1995 for Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico in 1995) is Felipe Portocarrero S., Cynthia Sanborn, Hanny Cueva B., Regina List, and Lester M. Salamon, "El tercer sector en el Perú: una aproximación cuantitativa," unpublished paper, Universidad del Pacífico and the Johns Hopkins University, 2000.

¹⁸ Adam Przeworski, Michel E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 78-88; Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49, no. 2 (January 1997), 155-183; and Diamond, Hartlyn, Linz, and Lipset (eds.), *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, 44-48.

¹⁹ Among the relative optimists are Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, "The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (April 1997), 263-283 and Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation," pp. 52-104 in Tom Farer (ed.), *Beyond Sovereignty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); among the relative pessimists are Philip D. Oxhorn and Graciela Ducatenzeiler (eds.), *What Kind of Democracy? What Kind of Market? Latin America in the Age of Neoliberalism* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).

²⁰ Samuel A. Morley, Roberto Machado, and Stefano Pettinato, "Indexes of Structural Reform in Latin America," *Serie Reformas Económicas* 12, Economic Commission for Latin America, January 1999.

²¹ "Chile leads in 'economic freedom,'" *Latin American Weekly Report*, Vol. 2001, no. 16 (April 24, 2001), 189.

²² "Economic Freedom Marches On," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 30, 1999, p. 1.

²³ Among these scholars are Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America," 78-86; Diamond, Hartlyn, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Nations: Latin America*, 23-33; Peeler, *Building Democracy in Latin America*, 165-187; Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) and Frances Hagopian, "Political Development Revisited," *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 6-7 (August-September 2000), 880-911.

²⁴ The seminal work is Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

²⁵ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 36.

²⁶ Jennifer L. McCoy (ed.), *Political Learning and Redemocratization in Latin America: Do Politicians Learn from Political Crises?* (Coral Gables: North-South Center Press, 2000).

²⁷ Frances Hagopian, *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22-23.

²⁸Scott Mainwaring, "Party Systems in the Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 3 (July 1998), 66-81; Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America," 79-81; Diamond, Hartlyn, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Nations: Latin America*, 25-33; Peeler, *Building Democracy in Latin America*, 165-181.

²⁹Mainwaring, "Party Systems in the Third Wave," 66-81.

³⁰Michael Coppedge, *Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Francine Jacome, "Venezuela: Old Successes, New Constraints on Learning," in McCoy, *Political Learning and Redemocratization in Latin America*, 120-122; Mainwaring, "Party Systems in the Third Wave," 69.

³¹Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America," 80-81.

³²Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America," 88-91.

³³On the pattern of problems in the Andean nations, see Lowenthal, "Latin America at Century's Turn," and also the recent section, "High Anxiety in the Andes," *Journal of Democracy*, 12, no. 3 (April 2001), 5-74.

³⁴Scholars who have recently highlighted the importance of leadership (or "agency"), especially in contrast to political parties, include Kurt von Mettenheim and James Malloy (eds.), *Deepening Democracy in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998) and Jorge I. Domínguez, *Democratic Politics in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 10-12.