

A grand design? a review

Joseph Kraft, *The Grand Design*
 Walter Lippmann, *Western Unity and the Common Market*

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A renewed interest in the Atlantic Union, reflected in two speeches by President Kennedy,¹ debates in the European press,² and the publication of two new books on the subject (Kraft, 1962; Lippmann, 1962), revives the vision of closer ties between the United States and West Europe, and stimulates hope of an adjustment to new power realities through a shift from American hegemony of the Western alliance to a genuine partnership of the two Atlantic regions. Kennedy stated that we could view a united Europe "as a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality."³ *Le Monde* talks about a move "to transform into an equal partnership relations that are now those of clients to protectors" (July 6, 1962).

Tightening the alliance and upgrading West Europe to the status of a full partner would foreseeably serve several purposes. In the economic realm, the international commitments of the West could be allocated

more equally. The United States is still spending a considerably higher percentage of her national income on defense, foreign aid, and the United Nations than are the West European nations. The shifting of some of these burdens to Europe would allow the United States to eliminate the deficit of its balance of trade and thus terminate the dollar crisis. Greater European contributions would also allow for an increase in Western foreign aid and a strengthening of its defenses.

In the political sphere, sharing the leadership is expected—by Lippmann, Kraft, and many others—to prevent Europe from going into business on its own. The stronger and more integrated Western Europe grows, the closer France and Germany grow, the more plausible become independent national or European nuclear deterrents. The more concerned the Europeans become over the firmness of the United States' commitments to defend them in case of a nuclear war, the more interested they become in a foreign policy which is not contingent upon that of the United States. The proposal of an equal partnership is viewed as an offer to the Europeans to give up aspirations for a national or EEC independent European nuclear deterrent—a deterrent that is said to be inadequate and prohibi-

¹ Presidential Address, July 4, 1962, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, reported in the *New York Times*, July 5, 1962. See also Kennedy's speech before the National Association of Manufacturers on December 6, 1961.

² See André Fontaine (*Le Monde*, June 3-4, 1962); also (*Le Monde*, July 6, 8, 1962).

³ See (*New York Times*, July 5, 1962).

tively expensive—and to share instead the control of some of the American force in an Atlantic partnership. Such a partnership would firmly seal the bond between West Europe and the United States, a bond built on a common cultural tradition, commitment to the defense of freedom, and Atlantic institutions such as NATO and the OECD. The 1962 American Trade Bill opened the door to a US-EEC agreement on mutual reductions in tariffs imposed, now under negotiation. This might in turn, lead to the eventual formation of an Atlantic confederation. In short, at least to a degree, the evolution of the EEC is expected to repeat itself, spelled large, on the Atlantic level.

Both Lippmann and Kraft view these developments from a strictly American standpoint, and from that perspective give full endorsement to the position of the Administration, which they—particularly Kraft—regard with even greater optimism than does the Administration itself. Viewed more critically, the vision of an Atlantic partnership or union raises several problems: (a) Will the integration among the members of the EEC continue to grow? (b) What will be the orientation of the resulting United States of Europe (or *Europa*) to the United States and the suggested partnership? (c) What will be the effect of the Atlantic partnership on the less developed countries, or (d) on the Communist bloc and the UN? Finally, what implications does such a union have in terms of the relations among domestic political forces?

Most of these questions are touched upon by one or both of the aforementioned authors. In each case, they expect history to take the course most favorable to the United States, to follow the "Grand Design." Such unqualified optimism requires this reviewer to point to the range of possible developments neglected by the authors,

calling special attention to certain eventualities less favorable to the United States.

1. *The United States of Europe*

It is generally assumed that the Atlantic Union requires a United Europe. Kennedy refers to "United Europe" as a "partner,"⁴ and Kraft talks about "two separate but equal entities" (p. 22). It is also widely assumed that the EEC will develop in this direction: it will first include more members, probably all of the European members of NATO. Then, as the Common Market grows, it will "spill over" into a political union. What exact institutional form it will take is insignificant; in practice it is expected to act like one federation.

While such evolution is surely possible, it is necessary to take into account the following possibilities: (a) De Gaulle, who is concerned with French leadership of *Europa* and suspicious of the special ties of the United Kingdom to the United States, might put so many hurdles in the way of a United Kingdom application for membership in the EEC, and drag on the negotiations for so long, that enough public opinion would build up in Britain to make impossible its acceptance of the membership terms. Britain would then probably revive talks about a common market with the United States, older Commonwealth countries, and possibly some or all of the Nordic Council countries, to serve as one leg of the Atlantic Union, with a French-German-centered *Europa* (to include some new members, such as Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, possibly Austria) forming the other leg. (Another possibility is a three-leg union: EEC, United States, Nordic [including UK], plus some other countries.)

(b) If Britain and six other countries join the EEC, this might increase the hetero-

⁴ See (*New York Times*, July 5, 1962).

geneity of its membership to a degree that effective political and economic unification would be prevented. Particular strain would be imposed on the political unification of the EEC by Britain's special ties to the Commonwealth countries and the United States, its long tradition of unilateral action, and its "ex-big-power" sensitivities. Full economic integration might well be impossible without political integration (Triffin, 1961, pp. 131-45). Hence, in case of low or no political integration the EEC will have to freeze on a low level of economic integration; it will be chiefly a glorified tariff union, not an integrated economy.

Those who visit and study the EEC are much impressed with its momentum and the myth of success built around it, which provide much support for its development.⁵ But this, it should be noted, is a fragile mood. A series of conflicts, let us say with new member Britain; a few serious delays in reaching agreements on fiscal policy or labor mobility; would break this mood and eliminate its beneficial effects.

Finally, the EEC evolution was until now cushioned by a general prosperity and rapid economic growth. These are often attributed to the very formation of the EEC. Many economists, however, wonder how much credit this really deserves. The German and Benelux prosperity preceded the formation of the EEC; French prosperity is in part a consequence of the special planning devices and the devaluation of the franc. Moreover, to the degree that the formation of the EEC led to the closing of inefficient business and a more rational arrangement of means of production, these are nonrecurrent factors. While both Kraft and Lippmann note the rapid economic growth of the EEC, they fail to mention the

rapid decline in this rate. It was 14 per cent in 1959, 8 per cent in 1960, 6 per cent in 1961, and 5 per cent in 1962. There is now some reason to believe that the European prosperity is petering out. How the EEC will withstand even a mild recession remains to be seen. It might lead to an accelerated build-up of supranational controls; but then it might also make mutual concessions much more difficult and lead to regression to national controls, as the 1958 coal glut affected the then equally successful European Coal and Steel Community.

An American policy, based on the full range of possibilities rather than the most optimistic ones, might still proceed with plans for an Atlantic Union, even if Europe does not unite as much as expected, or before unification is completed. Europe can increase its contributions to underdeveloped countries, to NATO, and to the UN, without being highly integrated; mutual consultations can be further intensified, though having thirteen partners makes it more awkward than having one; tariff reductions can be traded in GATT, in which the EEC already speaks in one voice, although it is far from politically integrated. True, high political unification is a prerequisite of the political-military plans of the Atlantic Union; because so long as it is not attained, each major European country might be tempted to follow a foreign policy of its own. And having fifteen governments, each with a finger on the nuclear trigger, is quite impractical. But, we shall see, the military unification of the Atlantic Union is most unlikely to take place, even if the *Europa* would fully unite, actually, it is particularly unlikely in this case.

2. *Europa and the United States*

A loose Atlantic Union already exists in NATO, OECD, sporadic meetings of heads

⁵ Lippmann (p. 18) talks about "a very large popular momentum."

of states, shared commitments to "counter the expansion of Communism" and "to forward freedom," etc. The United States-Europe ties have already been strengthened with the increase in mutual consultations in the NATO Council since 1957; with the full membership of the United States in the reorganization of the OEEC into the OECD in 1960; and with the 1962 steps toward mutual tariff reductions. Surely additional build-up of cohesion is possible, perhaps along the lines suggested by Buchan, who stressed increased exchange of information, shared planning, and mutual consultation (Buchan, 1959, ch. 4). But the central political-military question is whether there will be independent European or national nuclear deterrents, and whether independence in foreign policy will be followed.

Lippmann and Kraft most adequately present the American position and fail to communicate the European positions. The United States suggests that the American nuclear deterrent become a shared, Atlantic deterrent. In this way, Europeans would save the huge resources needed to build and maintain a nuclear military power; these resources could then be used to build up conventional arms, thus making the Union's defenses more balanced and reduce the danger of an all-out war. The United States further maintains that a European deterrent could not in any case be sustained without American nuclear protection; and that the Europeans need not fear that Americans would not protect them since they would now share its nuclear deterrent in the Atlantic Union.

The European position, as expressed by such authorities as Franz J. Strauss and Pierre Gallois, differs from this in several respects. They maintain that France, surely *Europa*, has the resources needed for an independent deterrent, especially for the minimum deterrent in which many Euro-

pean strategists believe. Furthermore, conventional arms are expensive, especially in manpower, which their full-employment economies can hardly spare. In addition, a build-up of conventional arms assumes a kind of warfare at which the Russians have an advantage, and which would allow limited wars rather than deter them. (European strategists tend to believe in the absolute deterrence power of nuclear arms.) And ultimately, the Europeans, especially De Gaulle's France, seek the big-power glory and independence of foreign policy that appears innate in nuclear power.⁶ Moreover, most Europeans do not have complete faith in the United States commitments to fight an all-out nuclear war for Europe's defense, especially not as "early" as Germany might wish.

There are forces in West Europe and even more in Britain that would accept the Atlantic partnership in its deeper and fuller sense, that of committing themselves fully to the shared United States-*Europa* foreign policy implied in giving up plans for an independent nuclear deterrent. This they would consider if the American deterrent would be put at the command of an Atlantic

⁶ State Department officials are fond of emphasizing this point, and draw from this the conclusion that France does not need an independent deterrent, since its foreign policy could not be "that" different from the American one. The question is how different it need be before the interest in an independent deterrent is justified by the traditional standards of national interest to which both the United States and France adhere. It seems to the French that even if their only desire is to assure their protection from a nuclear attack and their right to trigger, they need the bombs; even if otherwise they would follow exactly the same foreign policy as the United States. And this is, of course, not the case; actually France seems set on following an independent policy on many secondary issues, e.g., Berlin; if not on the majority of Cold War questions.

Command, a superpower in which *Europa* and the United States would equally share the control. It is here that I found, in talks with European leaders in eight countries, the same amazing communication gap Lippmann and Kraft report. Looking at phrases used by Kennedy and his staff, such as "treating Europe as 'a partner' to be treated in 'full equality,'" those Europeans who favor a full political-military Atlantic Union expect to truly share the control of the nuclear arms of the Union. *Le Monde*, as quoted before, asserts that "The idea of interdependence could become . . . exalting . . . *only* if Europeans and Americans *really* agreed to transform into an equal partnership relations that are now those of clients to protectors." The London *Observer* points out that "If Europe and the United States could both surrender their independent deterrents to a single Atlantic authority, then neither side could reasonably complain" (July 8, 1962). But this would require the United States to give a *Europa* representative the right to trigger a nuclear war at any time that Europeans would feel it vital to their interests, even if the United States did not concur. Otherwise, European fear over lack of firmness in the American commitment to Europe's defense would not be allayed, and the United States would maintain hegemony on this most critical power of the Union.

The United States, as both authors make abundantly clear, has no intention of sharing the control of the nuclear trigger. The United States might be willing to allow the Europeans to participate in the strategic planning and to be consulted, etc., but not to share the firing command. Lippmann states emphatically:

. . . within the Western Alliance the ultimate responsibility in nuclear affairs must be in one capital, not in two or three. For the United States the predicament would be intolerable if

the key to the use of our strategic nuclear forces were not in Washington. . . . We cannot allow this power to be set in motion by others [p. 36].

Actually, even if a true sharing of the nuclear power would be offered, it is unlikely that a full Atlantic Union could ever be accepted by Europe. Many Europeans mistrust the wisdom of American foreign policy and of the American processes of decision-making (Gelber, 1961), and the European desire to follow an independent foreign policy is high. Others see in the Atlantic Union a force that will retard the federation of *Europa*, which is dear to them (Spinelli, 1962). And finally, there is the opposition of the democratic-left, which views the Atlantic Union as strengthening the conservative forces within *Europa*. In addition, there is a sizable left that favors a neutral Europe, not tied to any bloc. In any case, without being offered a true sharing of the nuclear command, France, and in the long run, West Germany are quite unlikely to give up aspirations for a nuclear deterrent of their own.

Could the United States, at some later date, as the economic and other partial Atlantic unifications spill over, as they did in the EEC, come to accept a fully shared trigger? This is by no means inconceivable; but the rapid build-up of European deterrence and the slow pace at which Atlantic unification proceeds—a pace that cannot be much hurried—poses a major obstacle to such acceptance. That is, France is likely to have a first generation of atomic bombs by 1964; if it will continue to develop its nuclear force, especially with the economic support of West Germany, *Europa* is likely to possess a minimum deterrence force before 1968. On the other hand, unification on the Atlantic level seems unlikely to proceed at a pace that would build up American commitments to the union before the

mid-seventies to the level required for Americans to treat an attack on Greece or Denmark as if it were an attack on New Jersey, a level that has to be reached if the trigger is to be really shared.

Kraft and to an even greater extent, Lippmann, put much of the blame for European trends to follow an independent foreign policy on De Gaulle and hence look anxiously and with hope to his successor. Adenauer is suspect because of his close ties to De Gaulle, and because a pro-American orientation of his successor is not guaranteed. Nobody can, of course, predict who will succeed these two men, but the historical forces that pull *Europa*—its power restored, its suspicions of United States protection aroused, the gleam of superpower in its eyes—in the “third force” direction are surely not small and are likely to outlive both the General and the Chancellor.

Again, United States foreign policy must not be tied to a limited range of possibilities. The choice must not be limited to a full Atlantic Union with American nuclear monopoly on the one hand; or the alternative of a “third-force” *Europa* that follows a completely independent course, making deals with the Russians to obtain German unification and France release from the Cold War.⁷ The third force might be an ally of the United States, following an independent course on many issues and still sharing with the United States the countering of Communist expansion on the North Atlantic front (to the degree that such threat exists), and in the modernization of less developed countries (mainly in Africa). A two-nuclear-power Atlantic Union is not very appealing to the United States as compared to a monopoly of one, but it will later seem much more acceptable than no union at all.

⁷ See (Lippmann, pp. 25 ff.) on Russo-German “deals.”

3. *The EEC, Atlantic Union, and the Southern Continents*

The development of the EEC and the expected evolution of the Atlantic Union will have far-reaching effects on the Southern Continents. Lippmann does not deal with them in his small book; Kraft seems to see no hitches in this direction. Like Kennedy, he expects the Atlantic Union to be the “core” of the Free World, to be “outward” oriented, to use part of the increased affluence obtained through economic integration to increase foreign aid. Actually the envisioned Union raises severe questions in this context which need at least to be realized.⁸ On the economic side, being excluded from the enormous Atlantic market by its tariff walls could easily cause more economic losses, through diversion of trade, than increase in foreign aid would compensate for. Some Latin American countries are reported to have lost more in one year because of tariffs imposed by EEC on coffee than they have “gained” from the five years of foreign aid (Kissinger, 1962, p. 89). On the other hand, tariff concessions to the fifty-odd underdeveloped countries would be almost tantamount to abolishing the external walls altogether, which would make Keynesian control of the Atlantic economy extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Even more severe might be the political consequences of forming an exclusive union of white, ex-imperial, “have” countries, leaving out the racially mixed ex-colonies, the “have not” countries. The alienation this would produce in the Southern Continents has already focused on the EEC,

⁸ For an outline of change in the Grand Design that would overcome these difficulties, see my “Atlantic Union, the Southern Continents and the U.N.,” Report of Summer Institute of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. (Forthcoming.)

labeled "imperialistic" by Ghana, Egypt, and Brazil, to the delight of Moscow who is on record in favor of a universal free market.⁹ Tariff concessions and foreign aid would not erase the fact that these countries are not members in the Atlantic Union, have no seat in its councils, and are not privy to decisions that affect their fate; in direct contrast to two effective precedents, that of the Marshall Plan and that of the British Commonwealth, in which the recipient countries were included and consulted.

4. *The Atlantic Union, the Communist Bloc, and the UN*

The political decisions implicit in the commitment to form an Atlantic union include: a preference for arms control (which can be based on interbloc agreements, unlike complete and general disarmament which requires the strengthening of global organizations); and a commitment to a specific American and Western foreign policy that cannot be discussed in the limits of a review article. Three limited points more directly related to the material at hand should, however, be made:

(a) The exclusion of Communist countries from Western trade systems penalizes in particular those countries that are most "liberal," especially Poland and Yugoslavia, and forces them to increase their depen-

⁹ Fears and bitterness were expressed in a meeting of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in Tokyo in March 1962 (*New York Times*, March 8, 1962); by Latin American countries in a meeting about coffee prices in the UN in New York (*Time*, August 13, 1962); by Tito and Nasser in a statement in Cairo, in February, 1962 (*New York Times*, February 12, 1962); by Nehru and other leaders of the British Commonwealth during the Conference of Prime Ministers (*New York Times*, September 9, 1962).

dency on and integration into the Communist bloc.

(b) If the Grand Design should fail, there might be three or more blocs (United States, *Europa*, Soviet, Chinese, and one or more neutral blocs); or two blocs with considerable internal divisions and neutrals. This is probably not desirable from a narrow American and possibly Western viewpoint, but might stabilize the nonwar state of the world. Polarization, which a highly successful Atlantic Union is likely to foster, has often been shown to be highly unstabilizing (Kaplan, 1957, *passim*; Hoffmann, 1962, pp. 670 ff.).

(c) The relationships of the envisioned union to the UN are not explored by the two authors. The range of possibilities is particularly large. Some authors see the Atlantic Union as an outright substitute for the UN, and would have the United States quit the UN once the Union is firmly established as the core of the "Community of the Free," a plan Hoover seems to favor.¹⁰ Others would keep the Atlantic countries in the UN but freeze its powers and functions more or less on the present level, a position Fulbright has expressed (Fulbright, 1961, p. 1). A quite different position is to view regional and bloc unifications as a process in which a middle plateau is established for further upward transfer of functions, powers, and loyalties to a viable global organization.¹¹

5. *The Atlantic Union and Domestic Politics*

Lippmann, a Republican, avoids completely the internal implications of his internationalist enthusiasm. Kraft, a Kennedy Democrat, faces them squarely, making

¹⁰ *Time*, August 17, 1962.

¹¹ I spelled out this position in *The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy* (Etzioni, 1962, ch. 8).

here his most interesting observations. Kraft sees the American foreign policy pointed in the right direction, supported by a "positive majority" which includes "a loose collection of eminent business executives, lawyers, government officials, churchmen and intellectuals" (Kraft, p. 117). The wide support given in Congress to the 1962 Trade Expansion Act is evidence of this favorable majority. On the domestic front, he sees the "negative majority" that blocks the liberal measures which the country badly needs. The difference between the two majorities exists because some of those that support the "liberal" foreign policy support a conservative domestic policy. This Kraft finds detrimental not only because he favors a liberal domestic policy but also because he feels that accelerated economic growth, desegregation, and welfare statism are vital for the United States to maintain its global leadership and "liberal" foreign policy. Moreover, he sees in the Atlantic Union a force that will break the "negative majority" in domestic affairs since it will push men and capital from obsolete into growing industries, thus undermining the "negative" groups: the subsidized farmers, the featherbedded unions, and the protection-hungry industries.

Kraft should be praised for not neglecting to analyze the domestic bases of foreign policy and for his keen account of the effects international developments are likely to have on intra-societal ones—effects that are all too often overlooked. But again, his limitless optimism prevents him from presenting the range of courses the future might take. The present semistalemate in the American government reflects rather authentically that of the society in which a narrow liberal majority is struggling with a very sizable conservative camp over the future of the nation. The Executive is somewhat closer to the liberal side, the

Legislature—to the conservative one. Kraft expects the liberal majority to gain a majority in Congress, mainly because of the refreshing air of increased foreign competition. Since the whole import-export sector of the American economy amounts to about 4.5 per cent of the GNP, I doubt that expected changes in international trade could have that much effect. The recent Supreme Court decision on reappropriation, and the drive to protect Negroes who register and vote, if successful, could make Kraft the right prophet for the wrong reasons. Then, however, the American society would be confronted with the major dilemma which France and Germany have faced before. As the conservative camp loses control of the Congress, and consequently desegregation accelerates, the welfare state expands, farm subsidies are reduced, and the global social revolution—defined by conservatives as the "decline of the West"—continues, this camp is going to be more and more frustrated and, at the same time, have less and less institutionalized outlets for its alienation. It is, of course, quite possible that the conservatives will release their frustration in election campaigns, TV debates, pamphleteering and other legitimate actions. However, one must take into account the possibility of less orderly development in any appraisal and reappraisal of the domestic correlates of foreign policy, and in planning for the implementation of that policy.

If we continue to assume that history will follow our most optimistic estimates, our Grand Designs are going to be of little use. Only when our critical analysis uncovers the range of possible, and points to the more likely—although not necessarily the most desired—developments will our designs be realistic and able to serve as guides to history rather than expressions of aspirations.

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