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shrinking. To be successful, they will instead have to create an ambiance in which private international activities reflect positively on governments. It is an art which many governments, not only that of the United States, still have to master.

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A New World Order

Anne-Marie Slaughter. Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004. £18.95, 341pp

Anne-Marie Slaughter's new book is a good one to read in these troubled times. It does not pursue the headlines, trying one more time to determine what went wrong on 11 September and since; nor is it written as if the author hoped to be the next Secretary of State or at least be the author of the one book that the president would have time to read and would be keen to heed. It is not even an 'American' book, one that approaches the world from a neo-con or hyper-liberal point of view, focusing on American interests or values. Rather, it is an academic volume in the best sense of the term. It examines a major phenomenon, the rise of a new global architecture, drawing on solid facts and keen analysis, without an ideological slant and a partisan brief. In effect, it could have been written by a scholar in any country – as long as she adopted a global viewpoint rather than a national perspective. The analysis, Slaughter herself emphasises, is not a starry-eyed vision of what ought to be – but rather, what is.

The issue under study, as I see it, is how to gain additional global governing capacity. An increasing number of problems can no longer be handled effectively by national governments and intergovernmental organisations, the famous alphabet soup of UNESCO, the World Trade Organisation, the International Labour Organisation, the World Health Organisation and so on and so on, jointly best referred to as the Old System. National governments cannot cope single-handedly with pandemics, runs on their currencies, drug cartels, computer viruses, pollution and, of course, terrorism. Intergovernmental organisations whose policymaking draws on representatives of the member national governments and the budgets these nations provide, are often ineffectual because to take significant steps they require prior approval from the numerous and often very divergent member states. The fact that transnational problems are swelling and remedial action lags ever more is prima facie evidence that something is profoundly missing. A critic may say that most national governments do not cope with major problems even on the domestic level. But one key reason is that the sources of their problems are in part transnational. Thus Spain has a hard time dealing with the Basques, but its government is even more taxed when it also has to deal with al-Qaeda. And Germany has enough trouble dealing with its own industrial population, but can do little when a Chernobyl meltdown rains radioactive material within its borders.

Some have suggested that a new global civil society is coming to the rescue, by adding to the Old System a whole new and major source of governing capacity without creating any new forms of government. Since 1990 thousands of new international NGOs have sprung up, and they do help tackle some social problems on

a transnational level, from those posed by landmines to the oppression of women. However, their capacities are limited.

Slaughter finds a major new source for global governance without the creation of anything that remotely resembles world government: government networks. These are composed of public servants and officials of different national governments who work on one and the same issue, say, fighting crime, and who exchange information and cooperate with one another in dealing with a given problem, say, transnational mafias. Typically, members of these networks exchange information informally, meeting face to face in transnational conferences or on the Internet, learn from one another and trust each other. Thus, they are able to work together to cope with specific problems – above and beyond what their governments would do if left to their own devices and to formal international representatives. Given that these officials work together over long periods, they provide considerable stability to their endeavours even if the elected governments for which they work come and go.

While many networks are composed of those who work for one executive agency or another (for example, environmental protection agencies) others contain legislators or judges. These are important because they help form transnational norms, consensus and laws. Altogether Slaughter's analysis of these networks provides a major new wing to previous studies of the formation of international institutions of the kind G. John Ikenberry provides in his recently published *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Slaughter does not evade the question to whom these networks are accountable. She holds that they are subject to oversight of the various national governments whose members make up these networks. Here and throughout the book Slaughter fastidiously avoids anything that could look like a supranational authority, not to mention a world government. She may well be right by sensing, as most leading internationalists do, that nations are not yet ready to yield even part of their sovereignty to such bodies.

I differ on this point. As I see it, governing entails reallocation of resources and imposing other forms of sacrifice. As long as no loyalty is transferred to bodies more encompassing than nations, there will be no bodies with the legitimate ability to act on significant matters in ways that favour the world at large (say dealing with global warming) but impose costs on many specific nations or favour some regions over others. I grant that the judicial and legislative networks that Slaughter aptly depicts can fulfil some of these needs, but in the longer run some supranational entities will be needed. Indeed, I see some attempts to form supranational bodies (for example, the European Union) and institutions (such as the International Criminal Court) and even governance (the UN Security Council). Government networks are an important component of the new global architecture, and we are indebted to Slaughter for pointing out their scope, capacity and promise. However, participation in networks is voluntary and they are non-hierarchical. The world needs, and we see in the US-led global anti terrorism and de-proliferation drive (especially via the Proliferation Security Initiative), a new kind of worldwide police agency that is more forceful than networks yet not illegitimate. It is a cardinal building block of the new global order, in addition to existing networks. Just do not call it world government.

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