



## **International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries.**

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culties, for then the castes of kinsmen fifteen miles apart become two different (but partially overlapping) structures; technically they are not members of the *same* caste. If we use Bailey's formulation, then the question of whether villagers  $x$ ,  $y$ , and  $z$  are or are not all members of the same caste depends on whether we are looking at caste from  $x$ 's,  $y$ 's, or  $z$ 's perspective. Is Bailey's formulation an improvement upon the more general "caste" and "subcaste" distinctions?

The second question has to do with Bailey's categorizations of political parties. He begins chapter vi with a series of analytic distinctions—between "python" parties and "representation" parties. Within the "representation" parties he further distinguishes between those organized as "machines" and those organized as "movements." However, having done this, he does not remain consistent with his own definitions, and comes up with such difficult-to-interpret statements as "Congress ceased to be a movement and became a party" (p. 206). Chapter ix suffers especially from inconsistent use of key terms. This in turn weakens his concluding chapter, where he attempts to provide a single conceptual framework for the three parts of his book.

These are, however, but minor weaknesses in an otherwise valuable book. Bailey is at his best when dealing with the people of Bisipara. The analytic distinctions he uses in comparing Bisipara with Mohanpur allow for meaningful comparisons with political activities in other parts of India as well as in other newly democratized nations.

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*International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries.* By GUSTAVO LAGOS. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963. Pp. xviii+302. \$7.50.

This is a truly pioneering work. In the third line of the book, Professor Lagos refers to "the problem of human inequality, of social stratification—to use a concept of sociological theory." The whole volume is characterized by a constant interweaving of sociological theory and social analysis, by a thorough awareness of the societal issues behind the conceptual variables. Marx and Weber, Par-

sons and Merton, all are marching hand-in-hand.

The units under analysis are nations and classes in context of the world, viewed as "a great social system composed of different groups interacting and . . . these national groups occupy various positions within the social system. These positions can be ranked in terms of economic stature, power, and prestige, and they constitute the status of the nation." Such a macroscopic approach is pure poetry to the ear of a sociologist anxious to see the concepts and tools developed in the study of small groups of Sophomores applied to the study of larger units and greater problems.

Of course, we have had in the past writings that deal with civilization, life-cycles of societies, and the universe. But unlike these largely pre-empirical works, Lagos' is—bless his heart—concerned with facts. He uses such statistics as gross national product, population, word distribution of income, defense budgets, and the like to establish the relative status of nations, in terms of wealth and income and military power. Prestige is determined qualitatively.

Such enterprises are far too few, and the reviewer is much tempted to stop here on a congratulatory note. But enthusiasm for this approach cannot blind us to the other aspects which reveal the trailblazing quality of this work. It might be too early to expect major new insights or validated propositions to come from such works. At least Lagos does not provide many. Although a great deal of time is spent placing various nations on various scales, the Lagos model yields comparatively little. The potentially promising line of examining the consequences of status inconsistency, of a country rich but weak, poor but honest, etc., is not sufficiently developed. The observations Lagos makes are no better than a first-rate journalist would make without benefit of such a model, and many of them are quite a bit less sophisticated. The titles of two of Lagos' headings illustrate the somewhat flat nature of his observations: "A Policy of Prestige Corresponding to the Real Status of the Nation: The Case of India" and "A Policy of Prestige Not Conforming to the Real Status of the Nation: The Case of Peronist Argentina" ("real status" refers to the position of a nation in the international stratification sys-

tem, as compared to the formal, legalistic one according to which all independent nations are equal).

The basic problem seems to be that Lagos seeks to explain concrete policies by a small number of analytical variables, largely excluding domestic processes. While the ultimate test of a theory is such an application, the model which Lagos has begun so effectively to construct cannot yet carry such a load. Lagos' discussion of a model for economic development and its sociological concomitants again does not go much beyond that widely held in the development literature before the Lagos model was constructed.

Nor is Lagos as consistent in application of his terms as he ought to be. While he starts on a Weberian note, offering three independent sources of status, he ends on a more Marxist note, implying that "in the long run" the economic status determines the two others. This is unfortunate because it deprives his model of its major dynamic force, the consideration of the strains resulting from status inconsistency.

Still, the student of the sociology of international relations, a young field, can hardly afford to skip this book; the aim is inspiring, the basic approach valid, and the task—im-mense.

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*Brazil on the Move.* By JOHN DOS PASSOS. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubeday & Co., 1963. Pp. 205. \$3.95.

*Brazil: People and Institutions.* By T. LYNN SMITH. Rev. ed. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963. Pp. xx+667. \$12.50.

These two books on Brazil both appeared in the fall of 1963 and represent high competence in journalism and sociology respectively. Dos Passos gives us a travelogue of his three visits there in 1948, 1956, and 1962, the important people he met, and the good or harm he thought they were doing the country. Lynn Smith provides us with an even greater bulk than in the earlier edition of statistical and other factual data on the population, its agricultural practices, and its marriage, educational, religious, and other institutions. The two

have in common their references to the tolerance of Brazil for the alien in religion, in race, and in culture; the difference between Brazil and Spanish America; the vast energy of contemporary urban Brazil and the listlessness of so much of the countryside.

Lynn Smith has drawn not only on his own observation of Brazil, but on writers of the present and the past. The works of foreign visitors—Richard F. Burton, Roger Bastide, Giorgio Mortara—and of local writers—Josué de Castro, Gilberto Freyre, Teixeira de Freitas—have been combed to insure that whatever genuine knowledge of Brazil is to be had will be included somewhere in his pages. If the result is a book that few will read from beginning to end, it is also one which no one interested in Brazil can avoid examining with some care.

The only point on which John Dos Passos is better than Lynn Smith is in giving the flavor of the Vargas dictatorship and some of the governments subsequent to it. For Lynn Smith, Vargas was notable chiefly for having changed the constitution in the direction of more power to the central government. Vargas made ample use of the South American practice of appointing intervenors in place of the governors of the provinces, and of having each of these control the province as firmly as the force at his disposal permitted. But in fact he represented much more than centralism. Dos Passos shows us how, like Peron in Argentina, Vargas was a mighty agent of social change. He rested his drive for power on the urban masses rather than the oligarchy, and with every measure which he took to climb to the top and then to stay there, he left an imprint on political and social life. Vargas was demagoguery combined with force, intrigue, and even some elements of progressive social legislation. To speak of him as being left or right makes no sense; at times he resembled Stalin, at other times Mussolini, and when the Axis seemed to be losing the war he tried to identify himself with Franklin Roosevelt. He was thoroughly totalitarian in his intolerance of opposition; but evidently Brazilian society, more open than that of Europe, could not be unified and co-ordinated in the *Estado Novo*. In particular, the Army and the Navy remained in opposition to one another and, ultimately, to Vargas. But the deception worked by Vargas, his lying appeals to that hunger for