

Union and spent four months studying the schools, including a month in Central Asia. She consequently has an exceptional command of the Russian language, a resource which most visitors to the Soviet Union do not possess.

Soviet Education Today is unquestionably a very important contribution to the understanding of a difficult and complicated subject. The present reviewer is acquainted with no other book which presents so many details regarding the actual operation of the Soviet school below the level of higher education. It embraces nursery and kindergarten, primary, secondary, and special schools, curricula and syllabi, methods of teaching, rewards and punishments, out-of-school activities, Pioneer and Komsomol organizations, the role of holidays, patterns of organization and administration, and the work, training, and rewards of teachers. It also gives an interesting and informative account of education in the many national minorities found in the Soviet Union. Of special significance is Miss Levin's description of the activities and responsibilities of The Academy of Pedagogical Sciences—without doubt one of the most important educational agencies in the country. A major value of the book is the detailed and extended reports of observations made in actual visits to schools, classrooms, Pioneer palaces, vacation camps, and many other institutions.

In spite of its many virtues, however, *Soviet Education Today* leaves a good deal to be desired. It tends to convey the impression that education in the Soviet Union is entirely embraced by the system of people's schools, with certain subsidiary agencies serving the younger generation. There is no reference to the other systems and institutions designed to train officers for the armed forces, the elite of the Communist Party, and leaders of communism in other countries. Nor is there any suggestion that the total educational program embraces the whole cultural apparatus, all the agencies for the informing and the moulding of the minds of both young and old—the entire press, the library, the bookstore, the radio,

television, the cinema, the theatre, and so on. Also one can read this book from cover to cover and never realize that the guiding and directing force in Soviet education from bottom to top and from center to circumference is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. One also wonders whether the author ever read the long and authoritative editorial in the issue of *Pravda* for 6 July, 1956, which contains the following declaration: "As for our country, the Communist Party has been, is, and will be the sole master of the minds, the voice of the thoughts and hopes, the leader and organizer of the people in their entire struggle for Communism." All of this gives to Soviet education a degree of seriousness never approached in the United States of America.

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Voss, E. H. *Nuclear Ambush: The Test-Ban Trap*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963. Pp. 612. \$6.50.

If you cannot read more than one book which shows how the Cold War looks to minds infected by its poison, read this volume. It is not the kind of crude anti-communist tirade that comes out of the headquarters of Dr. Fred Schwartz or the John Birch Society. It is a study with all the trimmings: references, dates, and figures. Supported by a foundation and introduced by Dr. Willard F. Libby of the University of California, *Nuclear Ambush* is structured chronologically and follows the history of the negotiations towards a test-ban treaty. But behind this facade of scholarship and objectivity lies a vicious tract which, by ignoring the importance of several key facts, presents a most paranoid view of East-West relations in the test-ban area.

The central thesis of the book is that we are constantly being fooled by the Soviet Union, and not about trifling matters. The Soviet Union is continuously springing nu-

clear traps on us, and we regularly walk into them. The central case in point, with which journalist Voss of the Washington *Sunday Star* is concerned, is the abrupt and arbitrary resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union in 1961 after three years of a moratorium. We were caught short, unprepared, trapped, he emphasizes.

First of all, let me make it clear that I do not favor nuclear testing by any country; fallout is dangerous whatever its source. Nor can I see any excuse for the sudden and unilateral resumption of tests by the Soviet Union. But the resumption of tests is not the main point on which Mr. Voss bases his arguments. He maintains that the Soviet Union cheated by *preparing* such tests when it was committed not to and that, consequently, neither the 1963 treaty nor any other agreement that may reasonably be effected is to be trusted. The first key fact that Mr. Voss neatly works his way around is that the USSR never committed itself—by treaty, pronouncement, UN speech, or even word of mouth—to discontinue the development of nuclear weapons short of testing. Actually, the American military insisted on similar preparations, pointing out that such procedures were in line with the moratorium. The immediate reason such preparations were not made on our side was that the Eisenhower administration was very budget-conscious, and eliminating such preparations was one of its economies. To see in American attempts at economy a deliberate communist trap just borders on accusing Eisenhower of playing the other side.

But the more important reason why Eisenhower felt safe in economizing, and why all the terrible things that are supposed to happen to us as we habitually walk into Soviet nuclear traps did *not* happen, is that we have at least five times as many nuclear bombs and a greater capacity for delivery than the USSR. (We also tested twice as often before the 1958 moratorium.) Whatever the Russians did achieve in their 1961 tests did not bring them even close to par with the American force in terms of sheer

number of weapons or technical development and refinement. The only advantage they have, the 100 megaton bomb, is one we, as a matter of policy, decided to forego (because *our* strategy, as determined by the President and the Secretary of Defense and their staffs, calls for a graduated response, and since we have many smaller bombs that can more accurately do the job of devastation than the big ones).

But though the Russians have not yet caught up with us, if they continue to build more and better bombs, will they not soon surpass us and then close the trap? Mr. Voss raises this spectre on page after page. But herein lies his gravest disregard of the facts. Most experts, with the exception of a few known fanatics, agree that once both sides have major nuclear forces, they checkmate each other. They still might stumble into nuclear annihilation because of accident, unauthorized action, miscalculation, and the like (factors I discussed at some length in my *The Hard Way to Peace*). But there is no room for strategic advantage which will allow either side to build up a force large enough to give it anything like an acceptable assurance that it would survive as a functioning society following a nuclear exchange of fire. Hence, whatever the USSR might build secretly, and it is not believed that much can be built without our spies finding out or without testing which would be visible to our electronic eyes that scan the USSR, it cannot affect significantly the balance of nuclear power. The fears that Voss raises by the use of such hysterical terms as "trap" and "ambush" have little basis in fact according to the estimates not only of peace-movement partisans, but of Department of Defense experts, RAND, and even Herman Kahn himself. (A typical example of the Voss approach is the reference to the missile build-up in Cuba in 1962 as an attempt to checkmate American nuclear power. We would be in poor shape indeed if 40-odd exposed missiles could checkmate our 500 protected missiles, not to mention our approximately 2,000-bomber striking force.)

This disregard of the deterrent power of our gigantic nuclear force allows Voss to represent our negotiations with the Soviet Union on cessation of tests as attempts to find ways and formulas to indulge in what he sees as our favorite illusion—trusting the communists. But actually 99.9 per cent of our security rests on our deterrent force; 0.1 per cent is based on inspection systems in orbit and on earth. No trust is involved. The administration has proven again and again to skeptical Congressmen that even if the Soviets were to cheat, the violation would have to be very minor in scope for us not to notice; and even if it were larger, it still would not matter, because we are so much ahead. Further, even if, by secret testing, the Soviets were able to whittle down the four-to-one lead we hold over them in nuclear weapons (which is simply inconceivable), they still could not attack us with any chance of survival.

Most of all, Voss is anxious that we take every precaution to maintain our nuclear lead. He is unwilling for us to take any step that might cause us to reduce our margin of superiority by even a few megatons, no matter how remote that possibility. But he has very little to say about the dangers inherent in maintaining such an arsenal. He is perfectly willing for all of us to risk our lives every day to avoid facing the one-in-a-thousand chance of losing our freedom, but is not willing to take any risks at all to move toward a world of stable and just peace, of disarmament and world law. He is not willing to accept a test-ban treaty unless he is, in effect, free to inspect every closet in the USSR (which he realizes cannot be done), but he is willing to live in the shadow of the bomb—theirs and ours—under a system which he seems to think is fail-safe but is actually only fool-safe. This is not to suggest that this book is without value. It does offer a refined example of the way the Cold War poisons—more than the atmosphere.

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Horne, Joicey. *Young Artists*. Toronto: Longmans, and New York: David McKay, 1961. Pp. ix + 274. \$7.50.

In North America, more books dealing with art in the elementary grades have appeared during the last 10 years than in the preceding 25. Art educators have been spurred into writing by the emphasis on the self-contained classroom and the necessity for getting into the hands of classroom teachers materials which would help them to improve a less-than-satisfactory situation. They have also responded to the increased interest in art on a culture-wide basis, and have become more vigorous in expressing the values of their field and its contribution to education.

Miss Horne's book, then, is part of a considerable activity in this area. Although she is a Canadian, the school situations for which she writes are not too different from those found here, so that the strengths and weaknesses of the book can be assessed in relation to its usefulness in this country. American readers may be puzzled a bit by such terms as senior kindergarten and junior grades, but they quickly understand and adjust to the few differences in terminology which occur. The book deals with art teaching from kindergarten through grade eight. Although the title suggests that it is directed also towards parents, there are no discussions on art activities outside the schools.

Writing a book on the teaching of art for classroom teachers presents formidable problems, for these teachers typically have little education in art. In writing for them, to be sure that he is providing the necessary broad basis for intelligent teaching, an art educator is tempted to include material on art, on art activities suitable for school use, on child development in art, and on teaching methods. To do all of these with any completeness would require a larger book than a publisher would accept, or probably than a classroom teacher would read.

Miss Horne has attempted to cover all these areas. The book is divided into three parts, each printed on differently colored paper: Art in the Modern School (with

chapters on child development in art, art in education and teaching methods); Art Forms Used in Schools (mostly dealing with materials and processes but with some general art information and discussion of teaching methods); and Suggestions for Art Activities (with recommended activities listed and briefly described in relation to grade levels and with the various types of activities keyed to the middle section).

In her general point of view, Miss Horne is clearly on the side of the angels. She looks at art broadly; she finds in it values necessary to general education; she decries copying; she places a premium on creativity. Her philosophical presentations are intelligently footnoted; she includes a selected bibliography with each chapter, and she avoids narrow criteria for performance of children at any age level.

Yet, somehow, the book comes off less than well. The first section is so general that one wonders how meaningful it can be to a novice. The statement is made that "There is little real difficulty in making provision for children who differ from each other mentally and in other ways," but the reader is not given specifics on how this crucial procedure may be undertaken. Planning is briefly discussed, but only the most general guides are suggested. Differences among representational, abstract, and nonobjective paintings are discussed in three paragraphs—with no examples or references to examples.

Continual reference is made to the development of creativity, but the reader wonders if Miss Horne is interested in encouraging it. In planning group work, for example, we are told that the teacher chooses the broad topic to be used and the suitable and available materials. She goes on,

If the children are familiar with different ways of doing the work, they sometimes suggest an activity for themselves. If the suggestion fits the teacher's general plan and it is popular with other children, it will be accepted. More generally, the teacher decides upon some activity as a desirable culmination for a unit of work, then brings the children around to it in their thinking so that they accept the ideas as their own.

The nurture of creative ideas demands, above all else, an encouragement of individual statement and an atmosphere of acceptance. One suspects that Miss Horne, for all her philosophizing, does not trust the creative ideas of students but, instead, really believes in authoritarian practices masked only lightly with a kind of academic hide-and-seek. Other statements also appear which underline her mistrust of creative ideas of students.

What is most lacking here, however, is much that is convincing on the dynamics of art and the human experience of it. Because art is so endlessly varied, because it lends itself to individual statement, because the experience of it involves discovery and fresh insights into oneself and the world, it has validity only if it is taught as a creative and dynamic subject. Little of this comes off the pages of Miss Horne's book. Although a teacher may find in it ideas for class or individual projects, the means for putting these to educationally valid use must come from their creative development in a learning situation, not from *Young Artists*.

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Bergethon, B., & Boardman, Eunice. *Musical Growth in the Elementary School*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 1963. Pp. vii + 276. \$4.50.

The authors address themselves to the proposition that the first requisite for ensuring children's musical growth is a teacher who knows his subject and who understands children and how they grow musically. To this end, this book is designed as a text for future music teachers, future classroom teachers who have studied music fundamentals, and in-service classes in elementary schools. Part One consists of a rationale for planning the content of the elementary music curriculum. Part Two offers a sampling of the music curriculum, including songs and instrumental compositions for each grade. Each composition is followed by suggestions for focusing attention upon musical elements that are conspicuous in