wealth, an oversight of which Weber himself was seldom guilty.

In my judgment, advances in Weberian sociology lie in the direction of a merger with Marxian ideas to form a unified conflict sociology, not in forcing it back into a functionalist framework with which it has little in common.


Amitai Etzioni

*George Washington University and Center for Policy Research*

Sociologists such as Max Weber and Talcott Parsons have pointed out the inevitable tension between value systems and societal-institutional ones. The value systems tend to be more internally consistent than the societal ones. Value systems can coalesce around one key theme; societal systems must have a multiplicity of functions whose needs are partially incompatible—production and tension management, allocation and cohesion. In revolutionary movements, before they take over, relatively coherent social structures are possible, as the instrumental needs continue to be served (however poorly) by the old regime. However, when the revolution comes, the new regime as a rule soon “compromises,” as it must now attend to instrumental as well as expressive needs. This compromise is disappointing to the true believers and often sows the first seeds of a new revolutionary movement. It also nourishes the utopian quest for a perpetual revolution.

While the tension between value systems and societal systems is inevitable, social scientists tend to choose sides from which to tackle the problem. Those whose bent is more critical use the coherence of the value system to berate the societal system for its laxities and perversions. This is the underlying theme of Robert Michels’s *Political Parties* (New York: Dover, 1959) and Gunnar Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper, 1944). Those who take the other side point to the romantic idealism of the proponents of the value system and speak in defense of the institutional structure. Samuel Huntington is a leader of the second camp.

Without referring to the major sociologists who worked this issue before him, Huntington finds in American history the age-old tension between egalitarian values and the institutional need for authority. (Ideally, people will all share in decision making and legitimate the outcome and comply voluntarily. Practically, power relations are inevitable.) However, Huntington does not see these forces as two legitimate sides of a social-moral dilemma, nor does he find any value in the resulting tension. He views American society as a structure challenged by forces of passion which
endanger the state. He blames the romantic notions of egalitarianism for the fact that the American state is weak, lacking in coherence and streamlined authority; instead we have checks and balances, and a cluster of uncoordinated institutions.

In *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* Huntington analyzes four periods in American history in which "credal passion" broke out to wreak its demagoguery: the Revolutionary prelude of the 1760s and 1770s, the Jacksonian era, the Populist-Progressive age, and the protest movements of the 1960s. Each period presented a demand for greater sharing of power, but greater sharing makes government less tidy and orderly.

Above all, Huntington is troubled by the passion, enthusiasm, and emotionality which mark these periods. Such times are followed by periods of cynicism when the public realizes that ideals and practices cannot be bridged. Maybe, Huntington implies, we would not fall so hard if our dreams were less lofty. Another reviewer preceded me in concluding that Huntington's message is, "If that is what we must expect, then prudence might suggest that we curb our aspirations and settle for achieving what we can" (Andrew Hacker, *New York Times Book Review*, November 15, 1981).

In my judgment, the conclusion reflects a lack of understanding of the value of creative conflict; if we start by acquiescing to a compromise, it will be less rich in ideals, more pragmatic, and perhaps less effective than it might have been. The book is also a thinly veiled attack against the youth of the 1960s as emotional, utopian, and revolutionary and articulates a quite open quest for a more structured and authoritarian America.


Richard H. Ogles
*University of Colorado at Denver*

*Public Values and Private Power in American Politics* consists of eight essays, written by his former students, in honor of Grant McConnell. The topics discussed reflect McConnell's interest in the presidency in particular and in special interest groups and public values in general. But most of the essays are concerned not with explicating McConnell's views but with extending his kind of analysis beyond critical pluralism to the structural analysis of aspects of American politics.

In the first section two different theoretical perspectives are set forth. In one, J. David Greenstone is at pains to disclose the bipolarity of American liberalism and therefore also, supposedly, of American politics. He does plausibly argue for the bipolarity of "empiricist" and "substantive