
Review Author[s]:
Amitai Etzioni


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In his social profile of the professional soldier Janowitz develops the basic distinction between "absolutist" and "pragmatist" approaches. Warfare—actual or potential—is the basis of international relations and "total victory" is the goal of wars, according to the "absolute" American military doctrine. Warfare is only one of three tools of international relations; the other two are economic and ideological; and international objectives are political, and are best realized by various combinations of the three elementary tools, states the "pragmatic" school. The absolute school stresses pre-emptive or retaliatory war. The pragmatic school emphasizes the need to be prepared for limited wars.

Janowitz analyzes the substantive differences between the two schools, especially in their orientations toward banning nuclear tests and toward various types of new weapons and in their evaluation of allies. He traces the changes in the relative influence of the two schools on the political-military policy of the United States since 1945, suggesting that the absolute school was predominant in this period, especially since it gained the support of President Eisenhower, formerly a "pragmatist." Still, important segments of each of the three services are pragmatist; moreover, in recent years the pragmatists have gained in power. However, the balance has not shifted to their side.

The supporters of the absolute school are closer in their orientation to the classic and popularly supported model of bureaucracy; they view their job as professional, limited to the development of the means best suited to carry out a goal set by the civilian. The pragmatic school strives for participation both in setting the political goals and in developing the appropriate balance between the use of violence and the use of economic and ideological weapons. In this case the bureaucratic and democratic ideals coincide; civilians should set the goals, the military profession should supply the means. But Janowitz's volume suggests that this formula is dangerous, and all too simple as well. It leads to a doctrine of absolute warfare and further reduces the limited coordination between the military and civilian authorities in charge of American international relations.

Janowitz's analysis consistently moves on two levels; he analyzes military doctrines and their sociological bases. Absolutist tendencies are frequently manifested by officers who served in the Far East and were frustrated by the limited warfare policy
in Korea and the “loss” of China; pragmatism is often revealed by officers who served in Europe. Officers of the two schools also differ in personal alliances; the absolutists, for instance, saw MacArthur as their leader; the pragmatists found their man in Marshall. Frequently they also differ in age and level of education, although they share a basic military orientation and social background. Only five per cent of the officers interviewed were liberals, the rest defining themselves as conservatives. They all share a sense of “military honor”; and they tend to be native born, Protestants, Anglo-Saxons, and from rural background.

Absolutism and pragmatism are more than two philosophies rooted in social cliques and alliances. They are two ideologies which serve in fighting for appropriations before Congress and in answering to its investigations; they serve as guiding lines for public relations in the United States, or with allies abroad, and for efforts to influence the “enemy”; they serve for internal consumption. The American military, Janowitz shows, is undergoing an organizational revolution. It is changing from an authoritarian, domineering discipline structure to one which stresses leadership, unit-“climate,” and psychological understanding between ranks, something like the human-relations emphasis in industrial corporations. This increases the need for ideology to explain and justify what is no longer forced.

Janowitz, professor of sociology as well as consultant to the Department of Defense, maintains a high level of objectivity throughout the volume, though his well-checked sympathy for the pragmatist school shows from time to time, especially in his evaluation of the scope of the military forces employed in the Lebanon incident (p. 338). The book is readable and devoid of the formalism widespread in sociological writing. The author is well informed. There is hardly a statement in the book which is not supported by a report of one or more incidents or by data from one source or another. Whenever possible Janowitz draws on interviews he conducted with 113 officers, on re-analysis of questionnaires submitted by Masland and Radway, and on a study of the biographies of 760 generals and admirals. While this is a study of the American professional soldier, and should have been called so, its scope is enlarged by comments on parallel problems in other military organizations.

It is only in the epilogue that the author’s speculative power is set free, to suggest—on the basis of contemporary trends—the nature of the future military establishment, which “becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable inter-
national relations rather than victory” (p. 418). It is constabulary in the sense that a no-peace no-war situation is expected to last, hence military preparedness—like that of the police—is a constant, not a “seasonal,” feature of future society. The military of the future is closely related to civilian society, shares its goal setting and coördinating processes, hence the de-emphasis on force, and is oriented to a state of no-war rather than to total victory. In short, Janowitz sees the future as leading to a military based on a pragmatic doctrine.

The worth of The Professional Soldier is not confined to its treatment of the American military profession or military organizations. It also makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the forces which underlie the American orientation to and treatment of international relations.

Amitai Etzioni

Columbia University

ANNOUNCEMENT

To the Members:

In accordance with the provisions of the By-laws, notice is hereby given that the Board of Directors has fixed the date, Monday, January 16, 1961, on which the Annual Corporate Meeting of the Academy will be held in the office of the Academy of Political Science, Room 411, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York City, at 4 P.M. promptly.

This is the annual meeting for the transaction of all business of the Academy. The President's Annual Report will be presented at this time.

John A. Kroul, Secretary

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This will be the only notice of the Annual Corporate Meeting.