Partnership with "United Europe"? Mr. Kennedy wishes it. The author doubts anyone else does, including Europe.

by AMITAI ETZIONI

President Kennedy, in his last Independence Day address—an address that drew far more attention abroad than in this country—called for the establishment of an "Atlantic Partnership" between a United Europe and the United States. It would not only express, he said, the existing cultural, economic, and political ties between the two North Atlantic regions; such a "partnership" would also tighten them. In meetings that preceded and followed the speech, State Department officials have energetically explored the Atlantic Partnership idea, in part because of the historic trend that seeks new forms for the mutual enjoyment of the traditions of Western civilization, in part because they hope an Atlantic Partnership will ease—or solve—several delicate problems of American foreign policy.

The "United Europe" with which the United States might be a partner is of course the Europe of the European Common Market—that modern marvel through which participating countries have increased their mutual trade by 85 per cent in five years; whose economic growth rate has been twice that of the US or Britain; in which two arch-enemies of yesterday, France and Germany, move toward political union; in which, indeed, all six present members bit by bit give over portions of sovereignty to a European executive organ. It is in fact because the European Common Market appears such an incomparable success thus far that an Atlantic Partnership becomes discussible.

If the Administration has not said in precisely what the partnership would consist, it is possible to say what ends it would serve for the United States. They are three.

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First, it is supposed to reduce the dollar crisis. The US is still losing gold continuously, though less than it was two years ago. This is not a consequence of importing more than it exports, but rather a result of the American foreign aid program and of American military commitments around the world; both expenses are intended to benefit the West entire. Yet the US still contributes twice as much to these expenditures as does Germany or France and considerably more than the United Kingdom. To have all of "little Europe" (as the Common Market countries are fondly called) as full partner in these commitments is expected simultaneously to increase the sum of funds available and to reduce the particular share of the United States.

Second among the advantages the Administration expects of an Atlantic Partnership is better trading terms with Europe. Since President Kennedy's notable legislative victory in 1962 in securing passage of the Trade Expansion Act, Administration representatives have been negotiating with the Common Market an exchange of tariff reductions; the US would not like to be locked out, behind the tariff walls of the Common Market, and the Trade Expansion Act permits an ambitious American-European trade agreement.

Finally, Washington is seriously troubled by France's decision to build a nuclear deterrent of its own. Not only is the Administration concerned over the grave dangers involved in the spread of nuclear weapons to any additional countries; it would also like to retain the stature that belongs to the only Western country to possess great nuclear power. Only an ally that is set on a foreign policy different from Washington's would go to the vast expense of an independent nuclear deterrent, the State Department reasons. The US would not like to see France, in close association with Germany in a United Europe, pursuing a foreign policy notably different from the US conception of what is best for the West. Hence, Mr. Kennedy's proposal that this country assume United Europe as a partner "with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality." Moving closer to Europe already, the US has increased its consultation with its European allies in the NATO Council and has offered to put under NATO (that is, American-European command) a fleet of Polaris submarines. It has suggested that the American nuclear deterrent might be shared within the "partnership" arrangement. Washington is also considering a joint NATO intelligence agency; joint planning in the deployment of Western military units in general and nuclear units in particular; and finally, some sort of sharing or responsibility for any nuclear firing order.

All told, the United Europe invited to be America's partner would constitute a power whose population, economic facilities, and military power would approach the American. Evolving from the Common Market, it would include (Washington hopes) not only France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries, but also the United Kingdom and most of the rest of European NATO. Such a "partner" has undoubted attractive attributes. But before further overtures are made, there are serious questions to be raised about both the workableness and the desirability of the policy as a whole. How eager are the Europeans to enter into such a relation with the United States? (Not very, and for reasons we might ponder.) What effect would such a partnership have upon the Communist bloc? (It could aid the bloc more than hinder it.) Last but not least, what will be the effect upon Latin America, Africa, and non-Communist Asia? (Alienating, to say the least.)

Little Europe does not appear to covet American political or economic company with quite the warmth Washington is showing. One European attitude is like that of the junior member of a firm who for many years has been slighted ("governments in France are unstable," "Germany cannot be trusted," etc.), and who has finally opened a shop on his own and is doing very well. When suddenly the top man suggests a merger and offers to make him a full partner, the former junior member may be in no hurry; he enjoys his own new power and status and is quite dubious about dealing either in the old line or with the old shop.

More specifically, the Common Market is neither anxious to accept new members (witness the difficult membership terms put up for Britain) nor eager to lower its economic defenses by granting massive tariff concessions to the US (its agricultural tariffs have already reduced the imports of some American products...
by 25 per cent). The Europeans are increasing their foreign aid, true, but their interests and ties are largely in Africa, where the United States has few commitments. As for assuming part of the military burden, they seem to wish to assume the wrong part, at least by the Pentagon scenario. France, with probably the tacit support of Germany, is moving ahead in the manufacture of atomic weapons and missiles; it is expected to have a full complement of atomic bombs by 1964. State Department officials look somewhat impatiently for De Gaulle's successor, in the hope that he will forego an independent nuclear deterrent, when in fact the French motive in building a home-owned deterrent will probably not disappear with the General. Too many in Europe wonder how much longer the Americans will absolutely promise to deter Russia from any attack upon any part of Europe; for too many strategists, European and American, have publicly raised the question whether the US would and should risk devastation for the sake of one of its smaller and lesser European allies.

Nor do Europe and the United States enjoy a feast of homogenized Western foreign policy: France and Germany favor a "harder" line in Berlin; France did not even send representatives to the disarmament negotiations in Geneva; and Belgium was quite ambivalent about unification of the Congo. Pacifists and activists alike oppose the idea of partnership, the former because they want no nuclear deterrent, the latter because they want their own.

But surely some Europeans favor the partnership? Some do—but most of these expect that the US will put its nuclear forces under the full control of a joint European-American command, giving both sides a grip on the trigger. Here the present American temper comes into play. For the Europeans to control America's fate in a joint nuclear command involves a sacrifice of American national sovereignty—sovereignty over the very death and life of the nation—one that no red-blooded American seems quite willing to make. The London Observer may state in an editorial:

If Europe and the United States could both surrender their independent deterrents to a single Atlantic authority, then neither side could reasonably complain (July 8, 1962).

And Le Monde may point out:

The idea of interdependence could become . . . exalting . . . only if Europeans and Americans really agreed to transform into an equal partnership relations that are now those of clients to protectors (July 6, 1962).

But Walter Lippmann informs his readers that:

After much debate and soul-searching, the Administration decided . . . that within the Western Alliance, the ultimate responsibility in nuclear affairs must be in one capital, not in two or three (Western Unity, p. 36).

Under these circumstances Europeans—at least the French—are quite likely to go ahead and build their own nuclear force. The partnership—an American idea—inspires little economic or military or political enthusiasm on the other side of the Atlantic. The US might feel that its proposition is most appealing; Europe is not even flattered.

It might be supposed that such an economic and military partnership would give discomfort to the Soviet Union; and indeed, the Soviet response to the Common Market alone, and to the limitations it imposes on imports from Communist countries, is one of violent anger. But the Communist bloc could very well make up in consolidation what it will lose in economic favors—in two ways. Just as the Marshall Plan inspired the corresponding Molotov Plan, and the formation of NATO the answering Warsaw Treaty Organization, so the development of the Common Market has already generated major economic net-mending among the various Communist countries in Eastern Europe. In short, the Communists are forming a Common Market of their own, under the auspices of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. If the economic integration of these countries is carried forward—and there is no reason why it could not be—the gains to Communist coun-

* State Department officials and the American and British press tend to blame De Gaulle personally for France's "stubbornness" or independent line. But several public opinion polls show that De Gaulle has wide support for this line; of special interest are the answers given by a sample of French leaders to the question "Will the European community produce a political counter-poise to the USSR? To the USA?" Sixty-nine per cent said it would, to the USSR; 60 per cent—to the USA. That is, many French leaders see the future of Europe as a third force poised against both blocs.
tries from their Common Market will be similar to present European gains from its own; and Europe's losses from exclusion close to theirs.

Simultaneously, the hindrances put in the way of Communist trade with the Common Market chiefly penalize those Communist countries with the most Western trade and the most Western affinity, like Poland, and hurts least those that keep to "their own kind," like Albania. Yugoslavia is simply pushed back into the fold. Trading and administrative ties among the Communist bloc countries become so extensive and tight that breaking away from the bloc involves major losses. Already the Soviet Union relies heavily on such practical bonds to hold her satellites; the Red Army, now unnecessary, has been removed from most of them, including Hungary.

Such deepening of the trade cleavages between the Western and Soviet blocs, such pressures toward the consolidation of each, come at a most inopportune time. One of the more favorable trends of the last few years has been the noticeable loosening of the bloc system. The position of the neutral countries is complained of less, accepted more often; the rift grows between Communist China and the Soviet Union; in the West, the US and Europe agree somewhat less than formerly. This overall loosening of vast rival clubs, whether or not the club managers quite like it, is conducive to stability. It raises the hope of new combinations (US and USSR against China? A neutral "third-force" Europe separating the hostile giants?) which in turn makes violent "solutions" even less attractive. Hence, whatever pressures toward reconciliation of the old blocs reduces the chances of averting "decisive" showdowns.

We arrive finally—but with emphasis—at the effects of an Atlantic Partnership upon the underdeveloped countries and their governments—all 80 of them. Eighteen of these are associated with the Common Market, and all are African countries, most of them ex-French colonies. It is here that African leaders are having their initial experience with Atlantic alliances. As Common Market "associates" (rather than members), these countries may sell their goods into the Market as other members do, but may also impose tariffs on imports from Europe. This benefits them greatly, because about three-quarters of their exports go to Europe, and their infant industries need protection rather badly. In addition, the Market gives most of its foreign aid (that is, $500 million for the next five years) to these African associates, and technical and military assistance comes, too, from the Common Market countries whose colonies they used to be.

But excluded from the Common Market are all the Central and South American Republics, the Asian countries, and several African ones (the ex-British colonies; and Angola; and Guinea, the ex-French colony that refused to remain in the French Union). Until now, the damage from their exclusion was fairly small, for the Market has increased its commerce with outsiders by about 32 per cent. But it has increased commerce among its own members by 85 per cent, and the relative position of the outsiders has deteriorated three-fold—this in the first years of the Market, before most of the tariff walls were up and only half of the intra-Market tariffs removed. Moreover, the Common Market, because of trends in the global economy, is paying less and less for its agricultural imports, while it charges more for its own industrial exports. The relative terms of trade for African associates have deteriorated by 10 to 20 per cent.

From now on, it will be more and more difficult to be an outsider. Anyone who watched Britain dropping out of "the outer seven," anyone who witnessed its readiness to loosen time-honored ties with the Commonwealth countries, and its fiddling and fidgeting in Brussels only "to get in," anyone who observed the mighty US strain and maneuver to obtain access to the Market—will readily realize what effect the Common Market might have on the export economy of a small and underdeveloped country. Several Latin American countries, including Brazil (which is not small) are reported to have lost in one year of deteriorating trade more than they received in five years of foreign aid.

Let there be no surprise, then, when many of the outsiders adopt the Moscow line on the Common Market, viewing it as "imperialistic" (Ghana's word), as a mode of "neo-colonialism" (the Nigerian view), or in the somewhat tempered terms used so far by Tito and Nasser, or the subdued complaints of India and Japan.