Anatomy
of an incident

By AMITAI ETZIONI

The familiar voice of the WQXR radio announcer opened the 8 a.m. news on January 30, 1964, with a statement that the United States was charging that Soviet aircraft had brutally shot down an unarmed American jet training plane over East Germany on January 29, causing the death of three officers.

The State Department, the announcer intoned, had protested to the Soviet Union. The American note referred to the incident as "a careless and inexcusably brutal act of violence against an unarmed aircraft that accidentally strayed over the demarcation line between West and East Germany."

As a researcher interested in the psychological aspects of the Cold War, I found the plane incident of particular interest. In January, 1964, we were in the seventh month of a variable thaw that had been initiated in June by President Kennedy. How would it be affected now by this incident?

The front page of The New York Times on January 30— and the editorial page—forcefully reminded me of the role played by the daily press in the Cold War. The press is bound to influence public response to a détente — and to incidents that threaten to shatter it.

According to the Times, on January 28 at 8:55 a.m. (EST), an unarmed, swept-wing, two-engine T-39 Sabreliner trainer jet, a version of the fighter used by UN forces in Korea, had crossed into the air space of the German Democratic Republic in the area of Diedorf (near Eisenach and 170 miles southwest of Berlin). Soviet interceptors, believed by informed officials to be MIG-21's, had shot down the plane. The three officers aboard were believed to have been killed.

On its editorial page, the Times was indignant: "There can be no possible excuse for the act of Soviet violence over East Germany that has taken the lives of three American airmen," the editorial began.

The situation, as the editorial saw it, was clear: "The American training plane, at jet speed, was only minutes off course when it was downed by Soviet fighters. Unarmed, alone, and hundreds of miles from the Russian border, it constituted no threat to the Soviet Union. Its profile— and the American radio efforts to notify the crew of their navigational error—must have made that clear to the Soviet air defense command."

The State Department protest, the Times felt, did not suffice. "It is dangerous irresponsibility if, as Moscow has stated, standing instructions require Soviet fighters to attack in such circumstances. Washington's strong protest should be followed by a firm demand that Soviet air defense procedures be revised to prevent similar incidents in the future."

The Times concluded: "No such hair-trigger response can be justified, particularly at a time when both sides are seeking to achieve a necessary détente in the cold war." The Times appeared to say: We favor the détente, but we will not forgive brutal acts just because we favor peace.

Comments in the Times of January 30 related the incident to the thaw in the Cold War. The paper's Pentagon reporter, Jack Raymond, commented that "It was not immediately clear whether the...incident...would seriously damage the current Moscow-Washington entente." Three paragraphs were devoted to comments of our representatives who shared what the reporter termed "a sense of outrage...evident in the capital."

A glimmer of additional fact came from the Soviet note printed in full by the Times on the same day (an attention very rarely accorded to American communications in the Soviet press). As is customary in the Times, the note was cited extensively in the story.

Calculating from data in the story and Soviet note, I found that the American jet was flying eleven minutes off course at least seven minutes in East Germany when it was shot down.

The Soviet note claimed that the American plane had been warned: the intercepting planes had dipped their wings, the traditional signal for an immediate landing. But, the Soviets said, the American jet had continued. Then, the Russians said, they had fired warning shots, which also failed to alter the course of the plane. Finally, "the fighter plane was forced to undertake measures envisaged by instructions on the protections of airspace, which are known to the American command."

The Soviet note, like the American one, linked the incident to the prevailing thaw. "The Soviet
Government cannot regard this intrusion otherwise than a gross provocation by the American military authorities, aimed at aggravating the situation in Central Europe. Such violations of the G.D.R. airspace lead only to unnecessary incidents and complications, entail senseless human losses."

According to the Times, the Soviet representative in Washington who received the note told the reporters, "We have all grounds to believe that this was not an error or mistake. One would not imagine that an airplane is flying 100 kilometers deep beyond a border and then not submit to orders to descend."

Raymond prefaced this with: "The Soviet diplomat was apparently insinuating that the plane was on a reconnaissance mission of some sort." The editorial writer of the Times gave no credence to this possibility.

Like other Times readers, I had no real evidence to go on. There was only the word of the United States against that of the Soviet Union, and the verdict of my newspaper had been pronounced.

The next day, January 31, brought little illumination. The Russians developed the spy theme, possibly trying to revive memories of the U-2. The United States, the Times reported, denied the charges. With respect to the warning signals and shots that the Soviet note claimed were given, the Air Force officials "did not concede that such signals had been 'given or recognized.'"

On the second day after the incident, on its editorial page next to the unsigned editorial comments, the Times carried a column by Arthur Krock, entitled "Of Men and Mice and Their Plans." The flavor of the long column can be gleaned from the following:

The East-West disarmament negotiations just resumed at Geneva have been brutally interrupted by the latest Soviet mockery of their concept — the gunfire which destroyed a strayed, unarmed United States training plane and killed its crew. And this incident presages a continuation of the sterile record of these consultations, broken only by a nuclear test-ban treaty which already appears to ban the use of atomic power even for the peaceful purpose of excavating a new, lower-cost Isthmian canal.

On the third day, a Saturday, all changed. The Times's headline of February 1, 1964, read: "U.S. Eases Stand on Downed Plane; Investigation Finds Russians Warned Crew Repeatedly." The opening paragraph of a Washington story by Max Frankel began: "An investigation by the United States has indicated that the Russians could have demonstrated more patience before shooting down an American airplane in East Germany Tuesday, but that they do not bear primary responsibility for the incident.

"Soviet and United States aircraft tried to warn the three man crew of the jet trainer that it was off course. Russian interceptors tried to force it to land in East Germany and intentionally fired over it before shooting it down.

"Soviet MIG interceptors dipped their wings at the plane, giving the traditional demand for immediate landing. Their first shots were clearly wide of the mark. The crew ignored these warnings as well.

"...the Administration, uncertain whether it could guarantee greater restraint against a similarly errant Soviet plane over West Germany, has closed the case. It is felt that Moscow cannot properly be accused of a provocation.

"The belief here is that the incident will have no effect on relations between the Soviet Union and the United States."

The Times, like the State Department, closed the book. It ran no editorials after the initial one, which stands as its only editorial comment on the incident. On the next day, in "News of the Week in Review" of Sunday, February 2, the Times came close to a revised comment, when it reviewed the story under the heading "Errant Plane."

One could have admiration for the Times's coverage of facts and regret that the editorial was "trigger happy." I wondered what other New York dailies made of the incident, and decided to have a look.

The first surprise was that the New York Herald Tribune, although trying to be different, treated the plane incident very much as the Times did. It reported the facts with the same State Department coloring, although it was more agitated than the Times on the first two days, and less mollified on the third. The most marked difference between the Times and Tribune treatment of the jet-trainer downing was in their style of presentation.

On the first day, the Tribune ran the same basic facts as the Times, but the Tribune's headline was: "Lost Jet: We Lash At Reds."

The Tribune was quicker than the Times in telling readers that the Soviets claimed they had warned the plane and it did not heed their warning.

When it examined the impact of the day's events on the thaw, the Tribune felt more sure than the Times of the answer: "It appeared certain the death
of the three Americans would strengthen the hands of those in Congress who oppose closer relations with Russians.

A great difference was evident in the closing notes of the two parallel news stories. The Times closed its Washington story with a quotation of the Russian explanation of what had happened, followed by reports from Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin. The Tribune closed with the following: "Rep. Frank Becker (R., N.Y.) said 'No American should load a single grain of blood-stained wheat for Soviet Russia after this brutal murder.'" This story was followed by biographical sketches of the officers who were lost.

The Tribune's only editorial on the incident, which appeared on January 30, took the same stand as that of the Times. It also found it "obvious" that our "relatively slow plane, completely defenseless, would not wander into a Soviet hornet's nest, filled with the swiftest Soviet fighters, except by mistake. . . . Even the brain-washed Communist reader will find it difficult to swallow the Soviet charge that our Air Force sent a plane across the East German border for the purpose of 'gross provocation'."

Here the Tribune slightly rearranged the Soviet note. The Soviets referred to the very intrusion of a foreign military plane into their airspace—not its alleged mission—as a "gross provocation." This arrangement allowed the Tribune to flex American muscle: "If that were our intent, he and everybody else knows that we have something that packs a much more powerful punch than an unarmed jet trainer."

On the second day, the Tribune again followed in the footsteps of the Times, though again its imprints were a shade heavier. The Day after the incident, the Times story was on page three. On the Tribune's front page it was listed as one of four under many. It sandwiched into the story the following line: "Conclusion: the Soviets did not signal the plane to land."

The headline for the story on the recovery of the bodies and the wreckage of the jet, read, "Reds Relent—Bodies, Plane Coming Back." It was not clear from the story what the "relenting" referred to; there was no reason to believe that the Soviet would not return the bodies or the remainder of the plane. Like the Times, the Tribune carried stories from Geneva indicating that both nations sought to play down the incident.

On the third day after the incident, the Tribune carried the new word from Washington which, as the Tribune put it, "confirmed part of the Russian version of the incident." There was no retracting editorial or comment.

The New York Daily News and the New York Journal-American navigated a quite different course. They simply never told their readers about the correcting facts that Washington released three days after the incident.

The News carried, on January 30, on the front page, a large picture of the widow of one of the lost pilots, hugging her child in her arms. The text of the caption opened on the same note: "Mrs. Betty Millard holds daughter, Darcy Grant, 3, after being told that . . . ." The News did report, like the other newspapers, the Russians' claim that they had warned the plane.

The News continued to devote considerable space to the plane story in the following days. On February 1, 1964, the front page contained a picture of "slain fliers returned." There was not one word to
let its readers know that not all they had learned on January 30 was still true on February 2, or that the first official Washington account—which made the Russians seem outright brutes and liars—was not still the official version.

The afternoon Journal-American carried rather similar material, from United Press International, but its original front-page story carried the cautious headline, "The Reds ' Probably Shot Down' Jet." This headline appeared in its editions of January 29, when the notes had not yet been delivered. Thus, the Journal was early to break the original story, but was late, the following day, with the news of the official word from the United States and the U.S.S.R. When the Journal was faced with the newly released facts of the third day, it gave them exactly the same space the News did—i.e., none.

Both newspapers commented editorially. The News, referring to the plane incident in an editorial treating "Wars and Rumors of Wars" pointed to the unity of theme underlying the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia, the tensions in Cyprus, hostilities in South Vietnam, and, briefly, in Panama and Cuba, concluding: "Isn’t it about time for Washington to call our delegates home from Geneva, and to stiffen our official attitude toward our enemies large and small, before the world in general concludes that we’ve gone irredeemably soft and can be pushed around by anybody and everybody?" The News readers, it is fair to say, are used to their newspaper, and are probably less alarmed by "wars and rumors of wars" than someone who just happens upon its editorial page.

The Journal-American took a quite different track, but arrived at about the same terminal. The plane, it said, either lost its way due to a "navigational error," instrumental failure, bad weather or a combination of these—or, "On the other hand, the plane may have been on reconnaissance mission." The latter possibility did not enter into the editorials of the Times and Herald Tribune. The Journal-American, on the other hand, seems to be unembarrassed about reconnaissance flights. For the Journal-American there is an uninterrupted Cold War: "The crewmen join the honored rolls of the Americans who died in the secret, deadly war of intelligence, waged without success behind the facade of the cold war." Fully prepared for continued hostilities, the Journal-American found no reason to refrain from speculation about this possibility.

The New York Post, January 30, ran the same picture of the Air Force widow hugging her child, but emphasized that the facts were not yet all in, "U.S. Waits for Moscow to Tell Full Plane Story," read the headline. It carried news from The Associated Press, interrupted with a Reuters story from Geneva, in heavier print and a blacker headline: "REGRETTABLE." In this story, Tsarapkin, the Soviet delegate, called the affair "a regrettable incident." The Post paraphrased his statement that "possibly the shooting was ordered by some subordinate officer," something that escaped all the other papers (although the Times, too, receives the Reuters Service).

The Post’s editorial on February 1, was headlined simply, "The Plane Story." The State Department protest, described by the department itself as "in the strongest terms," was considered "pointed but restrained" by the Post. The Post went so far as to suggest that the T-39 might have been on a reconnaissance flight, but then made the following comment: "There is no dispute that the plane was over East Germany, apparently through navigational error,' the State Department asserts."

The Post was not easy on Moscow: "It is admittedly hard to reconcile this trigger-happy treatment of a plane that lost its way with Moscow’s professed desire for improved relations." But the Post abandoned this approach after one sentence, coming to what it saw as the point which was to be stressed:

But there are powerful forces in both camps spoiling for a fight, eager to provoke an incident or seize upon an accident to proclaim: "You see, there’s no getting along with them."

This is a moment for calmness and responsibility—not for exuberant "Remember the Maine" war whoops. It is also a cruel reminder that the casualty list of even "cold" war steadily rises."

With this exception, the daily New York newspapers I reviewed seemed trigger happy. They saw events through lenses ground in earlier days, thus projecting Cold War stereotypes on new news, editorializing—in and out of editorial columns—before the facts were in. The elite papers took their cue from the Department of State; the others, from their pre-trial verdicts. The net effect was to make more dangerous an incident that endangered the thaw, and to play down facts that would have helped American-Soviet understanding.
On self-encapsulating conflicts

AMITAI ETZIONI
Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University

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AMITAI ETZIONI
Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University

The advocate of general and complete disarmament can find little support for his stand in human history, political science, or contemporary international relations. Still, he has more to draw upon than just the fear of thermonuclear war and the promise of utopian fruits awaiting a warless world. His best case lies in the qualities of socio-political conflicts that are self-encapsulating. East-West relations may now be undergoing such a transformation.

I.
The thoughtful disarmer is quick to realize that he deals not merely, or even mainly, with arms but with a complex of political, social, economic, and psychological factors. The question is not what to do about weapons but what to do about a global power conflict between two superpowers and the disarrayed camps they lead; and it is not so much a question of what to do about it (a question that assumes too much human rationality and self-control) but rather of determining the direction in which this global conflict is evolving and to what degree its course can be affected. The disarmer suggests in effect that the USSR-US conflict is undergoing encapsulation, though the shift is by no means "inevitable" and might be helped along.

Encapsulation refers to the process by which conflicts are modified in such a way that they become limited by rules (the "capsule"). The rules exclude some modes of conflict that were practiced earlier (or at least not ruled out), while they legitimize other modes. Conflicts that are "encapsulated" are not solved in the sense that the parties become pacified. But the use of arms, or some usages of arms, are effectively ruled out. Hence the special interest of this process to the student of international affairs. Most observers do not expect the Communist and the capitalist views to become reconciled and hence suggest that the political basis for disarmament is lacking. They see only two alternatives: two (or more) powers that are basically either hostile or friendly. Encapsulated conflicts point to a third kind of relationship. Here feelings of hostility, differences of belief or interests, and a mutually aggressive orientation might well continue, only the sides rule out some means and some modes of conflict. In this sense encapsulation is...
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less demanding than pacification, since it does not require that the conflict be resolved or extinguished but only that the range of its expression be curbed; hostile parties are more readily "encapsulated" than pacified.

At the same time encapsulation tends to provide a more lasting solution than does pacification. When pacified, the parties remain independent units that, after a period of time, might again find their differences of viewpoint or interest provoked, leading to new conflicts or renewal of the old one. Once encapsulated, the parties lose some of their independence by being tied and limited by the capsule that has evolved; it is this capsule that limits future conflicts, though the possibility of breaking a capsule—i.e., undermining the rules and bonds formed—can by no means be ruled out.

Capsules differ considerably in their scope and hence in their strength. Some minimal rules govern even the most unrestrained conflicts, such as the use of the white flag, the avoidance of poison gas, and the treatment of prisoners of war. In the present context these minimal capsules are of little interest since by themselves they obviously do not provide a basis on which an international community capable of significantly curbing inter bloc conflict can grow. The following discussion is concerned not with capsules strong enough to rule out certain kinds of wars (e.g., all-out nuclear wars), the concern of strategists of limited war (Halperin, 1963), but with capsules that might be able to rule out war altogether—the disarmer's hope.2

The most difficult requirement the disarmer's prescription has to meet is for the process of encapsulation to be self-propelling. Once a third superior authority is assumed, the rabbit is put into the hat and all the fascination that remains is limited to the particular way it is going to be pulled out. Once a world government or a powerful United Nations police force is introduced, an authority is assumed that can impose rules on the contending parties and thus keep their conflicts limited to those expressions allowed by the particular capsule. But the unavoidable fact is that such universal superior authority is not available, and hence the analysis must turn to conflicts that curb themselves, in which, through the very process of conflict, the participants, without assuming neutral referees, work out a self-imposed limitation on the means and modes of strife.

II.

Combing history for a precedent, scanning the sociological treasures for an illustration, the patient disarmer finds several imperfect cases: three are imperfect in that encapsulation was not fully self-propelled, and the fourth was not fully encapsulated. Still, they do provide some insight into the dynamics of self-encapsulation. It is not our purpose here to do justice to any of these cases, but to describe their basic features for illustrative purposes.

Shortly after Uruguay gained its independence in 1830, the country was torn by civil strife between two gaucho armies, named after the color of their insignia Colorado (red) and Blanco (white). The first president of Uruguay was Rivera, the head of Colorado; his army-party held the upper hand for most of the years that followed. But the Colorado was never able to defeat decisively the Blanco; this kept the country in the torment of war that flared up

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2The relationship between the reduction of armed conflicts and the growth of global community is explored in Part III of Etzioni (1962).
sporadically over the next two generations, as the two neighboring powers of Argentina and Brazil were feeding the fire. Various limitations on warring were introduced over the years, such as limiting the arena (excepting the cities) and the means of war, under the pressure of business groups, professional groups, and ranchers, whose losses were heavy and who were tired of the continuous strife. At the turn of the century the government turned civilian and, pressed by a dissenting Colorado wing, allowed the Blanco to participate in the elections. These were initially quite fraudulent and led to a short but bloody clash between the sides in 1904. Though the election was won by the Colorado, it was followed by several reforms that allowed more genuine participation in political life for all sides and much advanced the shift of the conflict between various societal groups to political-constitutional channels. Armed confrontation between the sides disappeared. Now the Colorado and the Blanco (renamed Nationals) are two parties which fight each other with ballots, leaflets, campaign promises, and the like, but not with arms. Encapsulation first limited the warfare and now rules it out (Fitzgibbon, 1854).

Labor-management relations in most modern capitalist societies knew an earlier period of considerable violence which was gradually ruled out and is today practically excluded. In the United States, for instance, in the first half of the nineteenth century, labor organizations were viewed as conspiracies and fought with all the instruments management could marshal, including the local police, militia, armed strike-breakers, professional spies, and the like. The workers, in turn, did not refrain from resorting to dynamite and other means of sabotage nor from beating the strike-breakers. The Haymarket riot of 1886 and the Homestead strike of 1892 are probably the most often cited battlegrounds of American management and labor. At the end of the 19th century labor gradually won some rights of organization and collective bargaining, though the process of ruling out violence, on both sides, continued well into the nineteen-thirties. While sporadic violence still erupts, by and large the power of the sides in a conflict is assessed without resort to force, and the means of conflict are largely limited to peaceful strikes, public relations campaigns, appeals to government agencies, and so on. The typical representative of the side is a lawyer or someone coached by a lawyer, not a strongarm man or an agitator. While there never was a state of all-out war between American labor and management, there is no question but that over the last two generations their means and modes of conflict have become much more institutionalized and constitutional, and violence as a means of conflict has largely been excluded (Perlman, 1957).

These two cases, different in practically every aspect, have one characteristic in common: both occurred within a national society, and hence could to some degree draw on it; in both, the sides were under some pressure from the society to curb their conflict. In this sense encapsulation was not self-propelling and provides a poor analogue for the study of intersocietal conflicts. Actually the limitation is not as severe as it might first seem, since initially labor was not a recognized part of society; the relations between the industrial and the working classes were referred to as those between "two nations." Part of the process of encapsulation was indeed the integration of labor into the American society, and the relationship between man-
agreement and labor in the industrial context benefited from the evolution of the bond between them as classes in the realm of the national society. For instance, it made it possible for both sides to work out some of their differences by turning to the legislature, which was initially responsive only to one of them.

The same point can be made about Uruguay. It is not as if a full-fledged national society existed to begin with; actually it evolved in part out of the process of encapsulation and in the effort to contain the conflict between the Whites and the Reds. In this sense encapsulation here was more self-propelling than in the case of labor-management relations. In capitalist societies it was a question of admitting into the national community a new social group; in the case of Uruguay it was more a question of creating such a community.

The encapsulation case most often cited is that of the religious wars, which seems more relevant since it was “international,” transgressing the boundaries of any one society. The history of the religious wars, waged in Europe between the Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is a highly complex one. Its main feature, though, is that somehow the contest was transformed from a war of armies to a competition between churches. Missionaries replaced knights, orders replaced the columns of warriors, and persuasion replaced violence. The transition, to be sure, was gradual. First, some areas were excepted; Richelieu, for instance, allowed the Huguenots to pursue their Protestant religion in their part of Catholic France. The rule of cuius regio eius religio also limited the extent of violence for a while, though a fuller limitation of the conflict followed only when tolerance evolved for both religions in each territory.

Encapsulation here was self-propelling, since there was hardly an encompassing society that could impose limitations on conflict between Catholic and Protestant states; initially the conflict was universal, in terms of the then relevant universe, and the limitations on it—whose evolutions (in particular the role of nationalism) have yet to be studied—must have grown largely out of the conflict itself. Still, even this analogue is less than completely satisfying, not only because it took many years of violence to tire the parties to the extent that they became ready for encapsulation, but also because their mutual tolerance seems to have grown only as secular conflicts, those of nationalism, replaced the religious ones. The parties were rearranged and war continued under different flags. In this sense, the European encapsulation did not advance enough to provide a helpful analogue.

III.

To close this long quest for a model, I find by far the most rewarding analogue in quite a different area; namely, in the avoidance of price wars in certain industries. To obviate the necessity of discussing a multitude of irrelevant details, a hypothetical case will have to suffice. Imagine two superfirms competing over the car market; one firm seeks to capture a larger and larger share of the market; the other firm is trying to hold on to its share. The competition is waged (let us assume, in order not to complicate matters unnecessarily) through changes in quality and in prices; that is, the expanding company attempts to cut into the market of the other one by offering automobiles of higher quality for lower prices. The defensive firm counters by matching the offers of the
expanding firm. Both companies realize that an all-out price war might well be ruinous for both sides, and the small price markdowns might easily lead one side or the other to offer larger ones, soon passing the point at which cars are sold above cost and thereby undermining the economic viability of both firms. Quality contests, in which each firm tries to excel over the other, are also expensive; but for reasons that are not completely clear, quality contests are much more self-limiting and much less likely to ruin the companies.

For these reasons it is more "rational" all around to limit the interfirm competition to quality contests; indeed, years pass without a price war; the companies seem to have implicitly “agreed” not to resort to this devastating means of conflict. But any day a price war might erupt. The expansionist firm, set on gaining a larger share of the market, any day might turn to a price war if it finds that it is making no progress in the quality contests. The defensive firm, on the other hand, attempting to make the other firm accept a duopolistic sharing of the market, feels it must not allow even a small fraction of the market to shift to the other one; even a small encroachment would reward and thus encourage expansionist efforts. The defensive firm, it is hard to deny, might have to initiate a price war to counter encroachments on its share of the market. Both firms realize that by resorting to price war they might undermine their own viability, but both hope that the price war will be limited and that they will be able to use it to show their determined commitment to whatever policy they favor, be it expansionist or duopolistic. Theoretically there are several ways out of this tense and potentially ruinous situation; in practice it seems the range is much more limited.

The solution advocated by the defensive firm is to formalize and legalize the existing allocation of the market; each firm will hold on to its part, and thus both price and quality contests, the conflict in toto, would be stopped once and for all. The expansionist firm finds it difficult to accept this duopolistic solution; such freezing of markets provides no outlet for its ambition and it feels that some buyers, given a free choice, would prefer its product. Whether its ambitions are justified or its feelings valid does not matter; in either event it refuses to accept the duopolistic settlement and there is danger that the implicit curbs on the conflict will be eroded.

The tension thus generated—either firm might suddenly find that a price war has begun—has led several executives on both sides to consider an all-out price war to drive the other firm to bankruptcy; but this, the cooler heads on both sides point out, requires taking some rather forbidding risks, actually endangering the very survival of the firm. Economics is not enough of a science, and the information about the resources of the other firm is not adequate, to provide any assurance about the outcome of such a showdown. In short, while this alternative is constantly considered, it has been avoided so far because it is believed to be too risky.

Still another approach, favored only by a few, is to form a monopoly by merging the two superfirms. But practically everybody realizes that the two firms could never agree who the president of the merged corporation should be, what it should produce, how to share the profits, etc. This solution may not be dangerous but it seems unfeasible.

Finally, the existing precarious "encapsulation" might be extended not by imposing new arrangements but by building an
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extension of existing relations between the two firms. This would involve making an explicit agreement to avoid price wars and setting up limited machinery to enforce the agreement, while allowing—within very broad limits—free competition through quality. The goal here would be to formalize an implicit accommodation toward which the firms have moved by themselves; to provide both sides with reliable assurances that there will be no regressions; to relieve the psychological strains and the economic cost of fear. Unlike the duopolistic approach, encapsulation does not rule out continuation of the competition: while some means of conflict (price wars) are ruled out, others (quality improvements) are legitimized. It should be emphasized that this conflict-under-rules, or competition, is not far removed from the existing relationship between the firms, which was in effect limited to quality contests and avoidance of price wars but which involved no explicit agreement. The question is not whether the conflict is or is not imposing limits on itself, i.e. encapsulating, but whether the capsule formed is to remain implicit or to be further strengthened by being made explicit.

Among the conditions under which the firms are likely to be willing to shift to explicit curbs on conflict are the following: both firms have to realize that (a) their chances of driving the other into bankruptcy (winning a total victory) are minimal; (b) unless explicitly and effectively ruled out, price wars may occur and would very probably be ruinous to both—that is, implicit encapsulation is too weak; (c) the expansionist firm has to accept the limited outlet for its ambition provided by competition in quality, on the assumption that trying to satisfy greater ambitions is too dangerous and that the only other alternative offered is a duopoly in which there would be no safe outlet at all; (d) the defensive firm has to be willing to forego its desire to frustrate completely the drive of the other firm, because it realizes that in the long run such an effort is unlikely to succeed, if only because buyers like to shift; and the other firm would probably not agree to pacification through a duopolistic division of the market. At the same time, the defensive firm has to feel able and be able to compete in quality; to feel that losses of buyers will be at worst limited, probably temporary, with some real possibility of regaining customers lost earlier. Thus competition will jeopardize the defensive firm's control of its present share of the market, but it will also open the door to potential gains.

IV.

The international analogues to the inter-firm model are too obvious to need spelling out. The Western response to the Communist challenge is largely dominated by the sharp distinction between parties in conflict and parties in peace. East and West are in conflict; resolution through the formation of a world government or all-out war are seen as either unfeasible or immoral, or both. The main Western approaches are "protracted conflict" and a search for pacification. The first approach foresees no accommodation with the Communist system and hence prepares for many years of conflict. The other approach implies a hope of full resolution as the Communist system mellows. A third alternative—open competition in some spheres coupled with a prohibition of conflict in others, through effective international machinery—is not now being viewed as a realistic goal or as the direction in
which East-West relations are actually shifting.

The fusion of containment and deterrence, policies that still form the essence of contemporary American strategy, reflects this conception. For the advocates of "protracted conflict" it means holding the line, buying time, though it is never quite clear for what this time is to be used. For the advocates of pacification, this strategy offers a solution reminiscent of the stalemate of the Anglo-French conflict over Africa in the 1890s. It suggests, in effect, a duopoly dividing the world into two spheres of influence along the containment line; each side is deterred from challenging the other's sphere by nuclear, conventional, and subconventional arms. If such an arrangement were acceptable to the expansionist camp, according to this view, then both sides could live happily ever after in a state of peaceful coexistence.

Duopoly, in this as in other cases, is a stance favored by the challenged side which seeks to preserve its sphere of influence; it is one of the least attractive alternatives for the expansionist side, requiring it to give up its ambitions and its drive and settle for whatever it had gained before the agreement. The central question is whether there is any other approach which the United States could advocate that would be more attractive to the USSR and still be in line with the basic values and objectives of the West. The disarmer's answer is encapsulation of the interbloc conflict so as to allow full and open competition in unarmed capabilities and effectively to rule out armed competition.

There is an important psychological difference between duopoly and encapsulation. Duopoly seeks to extinguish the expansionist drive by frustration: if the Soviets are confronted with an "unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world" (Kissinger, 1947), they will gain nothing and sooner or later stop trying. Encapsulation, by contrast, draws upon both negative sanctions and positive rewards. Violations of the rules must be frustrated, but the use of "allowed" means of conflict is rewarded. This approach provides a legitimate outlet for ambition. In this sense encapsulation builds on sublimation, not on extinction.

This difference in psychological quality has some significance for the West, too. The combination of containment and deterrence is not only hindering the Communist efforts but also frustrating the West. Ever since Korea this policy has faced domestic political difficulties because it offers no accommodation except protracted conflict or because the expected accommodation—peaceful coexistence—has not yet been achieved, half a generation after the policy was initiated. Our state of continuous half-mobilization is alien to democracies in general and to the American tradition in particular; the psychological pressure is toward either a rush strike or appeasement, though effective leadership has so far countered both. Encapsulation would allow an end to the psychological state of war and, in peaceful competition, provide an outlet for Western drives as well, since unarmed efforts would have no geographical limits. Trade with Poland, cultural exchange with Outer Mongolia, etc., might be forerunners of broader efforts.

Encapsulation requires drawing a sharp line between permissible and nonpermissible means, but where the line is to be drawn is a different question altogether. Theoretically it can be drawn between all-out and limited wars, nuclear and conventional wars, inner and outer space, and
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the like. There are considerations of political feasibility, inspection technology, and the assessment of the dangers of escalation of permissible into nonpermissible conflicts. Such questions cannot be explored within the limits of this article. Here we will explore the characteristics of an encapsulated conflict where the line falls between armed and unarmed means, where war is tabooed but competition in aid, trade, and ideas is fully accepted. One may ask whether the East and the West do not already, in effect, rule out nuclear war and most other kinds, and focus their sparring on a space race and a development race, i.e., unarmed competition.

In effect they do, but the analogue of the two rival firms highlights the difference between an implicit and unenforced limitation on conflict and an explicit and enforced one. The present interbloc accommodation is of the first type. Whatever limitations have been introduced are based on expedient and probably transient considerations. There is little in the present system to prevent either party from exploiting some major technological breakthrough (e.g., in the field of anti-missile defense) by means of an all-out blow against the other. Secondly, since the existing limitations on the conflict are self-imposed and have never been explicitly negotiated and agreed upon, they are vague and ambiguous. Khrushchev, for instance, may not have anticipated the American reaction to his Cuban missiles; yet the US saw them as a major violation of the status quo which it thought the USSR had gradually come to accept. Thus violations might be quite unintentional and still trigger the spiral of responses and counter-responses that would split open the capsule of implicit limitations.

Thirdly, since there is no effective machinery for adjusting the implicit curbs on conflict, the main way of seeking to reduce or extend their scope is to commit violations; these efforts are highly volatile and endanger the whole capsule. The lack of effective machinery also means that arbitration procedures are worked out each time on an ad hoc basis. Lastly, practically no machinery is evolved for validation and enforcement of the rules. The sides rely almost completely on their partisan reporting for validation and on the threat of retaliation for enforcement. Thus they always hover only one step away from unlimited conflict. (Among the exceptions are the mutual inspection privileges included in the Antarctica agreement and the 1963 treaty for partial cessation of nuclear tests.)

V.

There are two factors, one obvious and one less obvious, that exert pressure on both the US and the USSR to move toward a higher international order, toward a more explicit and enforceable limitation of interbloc conflict. One lies in the technology of weapons, the other in the change in bloc solidarity.

When the basis of our current "duopolistic" strategy was formulated in 1946-47 there were only four atomic devices in the world, while by 1964 the United States alone commanded more than 40,000 atomic and nuclear weapons. Their dangers have often been listed, including unintentional nuclear war growing out of mechanical accident, unauthorized behavior, miscalculation, escalation, technological breakthrough, and the spread of nuclear capabilities to other countries (Kahn, 1960). These dangers weigh heavily on both the American and the Soviet leadership. In themselves they do not suffice to produce a
movement toward a new international system, but they do constitute a background factor that keeps alive—if not active—an interest in ways of curbing the conflict.

Less often discussed in this context is the impact of the disarray of the two camps, which is still often viewed as transient. Actually it seems that neither the USSR nor the US will reestablish in the foreseeable future the kind of superpower hegemony they enjoyed during the 1950s. The rising power and foreign-policy independence of France, of Communist China (which makes up with resolve for part of its lack of resources), of Britain to a degree, and soon of West Germany make for changes in the basic international constellation, and these changes tend to favor more effective and far-reaching encapsulation.

In the more nearly bipolar world of the 1950s the rules of the game could be left implicit and much reliance could be placed on the fact that the blocs were stalemating each other. As long as there were only two camps the room for maneuvering was small and the moves highly predictable.

The rebellion of bloc-lieutenants opens the international arena to many new combinations. The Germans, French, and Chinese fear an American–Russian deal at their expense; the US fears a German, or French, or German–French deal with Russia. France recognized Communist China; Britain was refused a hookup on the American–Soviet "hot line"; Canada and Britain broke the policy of economic isolation of Cuba, etc.

Both superpowers are now challenged by junior competitors and threatened by the prospect of nuclear anarchy. Unable to solve these problems on their own, they resort increasingly to the joint imposition of universal rules. The direct communication line between the White House and the Kremlin, completed in September 1963, is one measure. Its heralded function is to prevent accidental war, but it may also allow the US, or the USSR to dissociate itself from a provocation by one of its allies. Thus it warns the other powers to heed the big two and respect the order they establish—or else be left out on a limb. The limited ban on nuclear testing is another rule set by the big two for global adherence. If this trend continues, the order-by-blocs may be in part replaced by regulation through universal rules backed by the two superpowers (and smaller powers). American and Russian support of India against China, US curbs on Cuban exiles, and Russian curbs on Castro agents in Latin America—all these fit the new mold.

VI.

If both sides should continue to seek joint or coordinated acts and encapsulation continued to advance, to what areas might the attention of the superpowers turn next? The disarmer's way of putting the same question would be this: assuming an "optimistic scenario"—that is, under the best circumstances that can realistically be expected—in what ways might the presently limited encapsulation be extended? There seem to be three major areas: (a) the reduction of armed capacities, without which little credence can be given to conflict curbs in other areas; (b) expansion of unarmed capacities as these become, even more than before, the center of the global competition; and (c) strengthening the line that separates the unarmed conflicts from the armed ones, thus making unarmed competition less volatile.

The following discussion spells out some of these possibilities. It may seem very much like a trip into a never-never land unless the reader keeps in mind that it represents the optimistic limit of the range...
of possible developments and that measures which seem impossible one day are often implemented the next day.

Reduction of arms. In the last decade and a half, both sides have tried to increase their strategic force by qualitative and quantitative improvements. Each side has responded to the achievements of the other by fresh efforts of its own. But as both sides acquire fully protected second-strike (retaliatory) forces, which will make any additional build-up unjustifiable, this upward arms spiral is expected to slow down and even halt (McNamara, 1963). American production of nuclear bombs and long-range bombers has slowed down already; the production of missiles is expected to be curtailed later on (ibid.). If the USSR does likewise, once having protected its strategic forces, the strategic arms race may for the first time find a plateau—especially if there is no major technological breakthrough.

An effective ban on deployment of weapons in outer space, which can be comparatively readily verified, would be a natural correlate; it would prevent the arms race from spilling over into a virtually limitless area. This has been recommended by the UN but still needs to be backed up by the sides, a point elaborated in chapter 7 of Etzioni (1964a).

Many experts believe that some reduction of strategic forces could be initiated at this stage, to be verified without inspection—through intelligence, destruction of weapons at a neutral spot, and other devices (Institute for Defense Analyses, 1962). Additional reductions would require considerable inspection of the member countries by outsiders and are, in my judgment, not to be expected in the near future. But reduced forces geared for retaliation would suffice to provide a much more congenial environment for encapsulation.

The need to reduce conventional and subconventional forces (those used for subversion and counter-subversion) is usually underplayed, but it seems to me of the utmost importance. All the armed clashes in the last fifteen years involved conventional arms and took place in the large underdeveloped territory, or "third world," which has become the focus of the interbloc contest. It is here that the pattern for unarmed competition is molded, as both the US and the USSR are sending aid, technical assistance, cultural missions, and the like to the same group of countries (e.g. Indonesia, India, Egypt). Claims of superiority for their respective technologies, economies, methods of administration, industrialization, etc., can thus be tested according to the degree and quality of help offered to the underdeveloped nations. This is the kind of competition that any fair-minded observer cannot help but bless.

The problem is, though, that the limits of this unarmed contest are neither fixed nor guarded; it constantly threatens to spill over into limited armed confrontations, brush-fire wars, that both hinder encapsulation and threaten to escalate.

A step toward understanding between the two camps would be to treat the whole underdeveloped world as a big Austria out of which both sides would keep their armed forces, both overt and covert. Such a multicontinental embargo on the shipment of forces and arms, if it could be effected, would have the following virtues: (a) it would avoid the dangers of escalation by keeping the superpowers out of local conflicts; (b) it would enhance encapsulation by providing a large arena in which the two blocs could compete peacefully to their heart's desire; (c) it would allow
revolutionary forces in these countries to run their course without big-power intervention—in other words, the fate of governments would be decided by the people of those countries rather than by "big brothers." There is good reason to believe that this would encourage governments that are more development-oriented and responsive to their people than are the present ones; and this in turn is probably the best way to forward their commitment to freedom and social justice.

Under most circumstances, such an extension of the "Austrian" system to scores of countries will not be feasible. It is likely only if the dangers of unintentional war and nuclear anarchy are more fully recognized, if the rebellion of the bloc-lieutenants continues, and if the US-USSR experience with limited agreements continues to be positive. Even under these favorable circumstances, certain safeguards will be required.

Such safeguards might include remote deterrence forces against armed intervention in the third area. As both sides withdrew their forces, as they did from Austria in 1955, they could be expected to hold these forces in high readiness outside the area to deter or counter any violation by the other side. Furthermore, some machinery would be necessary to investigate alleged violations of the embargo. The Communist bloc has often provided indigenous troops with arms, as was the case in Greece in 1946-47 and in Indochina in 1953-54, without initially arousing much public attention. On the other hand the Western press has often accused indigenous forces, such as the Moslem rebels in Lebanon in 1958, of receiving armed help from the Communist bloc when this was not the case. All this is hardly avoidable in the Cold War context but it could be highly detrimental to the "arms-out" agreement.

The task of validating the embargo rules might well turn out to be less forbidding than is generally expected. While it is almost impossible to prevent the actual flow of arms across borders, practically all secret shipments of arms in significant quantities have become known within weeks after they occurred, whether it was to Egypt, Cuba, Guatemala, or Palestine.

The presence of a United Nations observer force on the boundaries of the third area, ready to move to places where violations are reported or anticipated, could also assist in validating the embargo. Such a force would be equipped, not with weapons, but with inspection tools such as searchlights, infrared instruments, helicopters, and jeeps. The embargo agreement should entitle each side to ask for the deployment of this force without any right of veto. A refusal to admit the UN observer force to take positions on a border—say, between the USSR and Afghanistan—would in itself constitute sufficient evidence that the embargo had been violated, and would leave the other side free to take counter-measures. It is not implied that such an observer force would be completely reliable, but it would serve as an important addition to the remote deterrence forces and partisan sources of information (e.g., intelligence reports). All together—under the favorable conditions of our "optimistic scenario"—these measures might suffice.

Unarmed capacities. The willingness of the sides to limit their confrontation to an unarmed contest is determined only in part by their fears of an armed one; in part it is determined by their confidence in their nonmilitary capacities. From this view, by far the most encouraging sign for the dis-
armen is the secular trend, in both camps, to build up these capacities. The Soviets increased their foreign aid from $13 million in 1955 to $403 million in 1959; their number of technical assistants from 4,500 in 1958 to 8,400 by 1962; their propaganda effort was also greatly expanded. At the same time, they reduced the ratio of foreign aid devoted to military assistance by two-thirds and increased accordingly that devoted to economic aid. In a long struggle within the Communist parties of Malaya, Indonesia, India, Japan, the Philippines, and scores of other countries, the new Soviet line that favors progress through nonviolent means over those of terror and insurrection has won, according to Western observers (Morris, 1962). Some observers are quick to add that this is merely a change of tactics, and that the Soviets believe that such constitutional means will serve their expansionist goals better than the violent ones. This is quite true, and for those who seek a full pacification of the interbloc conflict, such a change of tactics might seem of little value. But for encapsulation it is of much interest, since here the continuation of Soviet ambitions is fully expected and accepted, and the question of means used to forward these goals is all-important. No extinction of Soviet goals is hoped for, demanded, or necessary for this form of accommodation. If the Soviets are willing to limit their campaign to peaceful means, this satisfies the conditions under which encapsulation can progress. The Western stand in the limited conflict will then depend on its unarmed capacities.

The West seems increasingly ready to engage fully in such a contest; it has built up unarmed capacities over recent years. The ratio of economic over military foreign aid was greatly increased, the Peace Corps was added, technical assistance was extended, efficacy of information services was improved, association with anti-colonial causes increased, and the Alliance for Progress was initiated. While there are many imperfections in most of these efforts, it must also be pointed out that the claims made about the efficacy of the opponent's efforts are often grossly exaggerated. There is little doubt that if the Western concern and effort in this area were intensified, it could fully compete in the unarmed area.

It is here that the mistaken zero-sum notion often comes to haunt the strategist. Either East or West is likely to have the upper hand in the development race, it is said, and the loser will be under much pressure to broaden the means of conflict employed in an effort to restore his position. Thus any limitation of the conflict, it is said, will be temporary. This view overlooks the important consequence of the vagueness of the measuring rods of the development race. For the last fifteen years, each side claims to be doing better in developing countries in its sphere of influence; in Asia, for instance, both China and India have been watched for more than a decade as test cases for the Communist and the democratic ways of modernization, but no evidence of a "victory" is in sight. Who is doing better, India or China?

Second, the nonaligned countries tend more and more to receive aid from both sides; they trade with both sides, invite their technical assistance, visit their capitals, without joining either bloc; gains in the "sympathies" of these countries are transient, with Pakistan one day more inclined to the West, the next day flirting with Communist China; Egypt, Iraq, Guinea, and many other nonaligned countries
"move" somewhat to the East and somewhat to the West, but the total stock of floating votes, which both blocs court, is not depleted. Gradually the two blocs may realize that neither will be victorious in this race, but both will benefit as the "have-not" countries' standard of living rises, as their prospects brighten, and as their stakes in world order are enhanced.

Machinery. The need for a more potent international machinery has often been spelled out. Its value in providing peaceful channels for settlement of differences of interest and viewpoint has often been indicated; its neutralizing role in conflict, its arbitrator function, its service as a neutral meeting ground, have all been told. Much less often discussed are the conditions under which this machinery is likely to evolve. This is a major subject in itself, but in the present context the following points stand out:

(1) The international machinery—be it the UN, the International Court, or a new world disarmament agency—is most likely to evolve significantly if the major powers see it as enhancing their interests. The rebellion of the bloc-lieutenants and the threat of nuclear anarchy seem to involve such interests. In 1964, for the first time, the Soviets recognized a need for a supranational government as an element in disarmament, and the US State Department initiated motions aimed at strengthening the UN.

(2) The need to service the encapsulation process, for instance with an observer force, is another factor that makes the expansion of international machinery more determined by than determining interbloc relations.

(3) In the short run, no major strengthening of international institutions can be expected; the veto in the Security Council is likely to continue and no effective UN police force is likely to be charged with global security. Yet such developments are not necessary for a significant extension of the encapsulation process, for a considerable broadening of interbloc accommodation. If events do follow our "optimistic scenario" of arms reductions, increased reliance on unarmed capacities, and some extension of the power and use of international institutions, a whole vista of new modes of accommodation and world order will open up—modes which can hardly be realistically assessed at this initial stage.

The utopias of a totally disarmed world have been worked out in great detail; now the paths that lead there need to be charted, explored, and cautiously but persistently travelled. The disarmer's best case rests on identifying and enhancing the forces that advance encapsulation.

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