The Organizational Structure of "Closed" Educational Institutions in Israel

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The theory of organization is concerned with the universal organizational principles underlying various organizational structures in different historical periods and different societies. These principles are, necessarily, abstract and general; in order to be used, in a more limited and specific context, and to be applied to everyday life, they have to be adapted to the given field.

In this paper an attempt will be made to apply these general principles to the organizational structure of educational institutions. As such institutions differ greatly among themselves—each type calling for a separate analysis—our discussion will be confined to one particular group, namely, the "closed" educational institutions (boarding schools), which endeavors to provide for most of the physical and psychological needs of its pupils. The discussion will be essentially theoretical and the particular situation in Israel will serve merely to illustrate the more general problems and to emphasize certain points.

Our discussion will focus on four main subjects: (a) The normative definition of an educational institution; (b) the place of the institution in society and within wider organizational frameworks (e.g. the governmental administration); (c) the integration of social groups within the organizational structure (relations between the school management, the staff, and the pupils, and their influence on the organization); (d) institutional problems of the organizational structure (division of labour, structure of the board, etc.).

A. Normative Definition: The Institutionalized Goal

An organizational structure is an executive structure serving a definite goal. This goal, usually clear and explicit, provides not only an aim to be attained but also a source of legitimation for the organization for its members and for society. Organizations may thus be examined and classified according to their goals, and according to the extent to which these proclaimed goals are indeed served and attained.

1 This paper was written when I was a graduate student and research assistant at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel. I wish to thank Dr. J. Garber-Talmon for her remarks and suggestions which have been of great help to me in writing this paper.

The explicit—and legitimate—goal of a private economic firm which, in many respects, may serve as a prototype of a rational organizational structure, is economic—namely, increased profits through production or exchange. An educational institution, on the other hand, is oriented towards the inculcation of knowledge, skills and values. Its ultimate goal is thus non-economic and the economic considerations which operate in every organization are here of secondary importance; they merely participate in determining the means necessary for the achievement of the primary, expressly stated, goal. An educational institution which reverses this principle and subordinates its educational activities to profit-making, distorts its express goal and its accepted definition in society, thus striking at the source of the legitimacy of its existence and activities.

B. **The Integration of Educational Institutions in Society**

1. **Financing and supervision as sources of social control**

We must inquire into the factors which protect educational institutions from deviating from their express goals. What are these factors? Are they adequate for this purpose? What are the advantages and the disadvantages of the different kinds of control? Are there differences in this respect among various types of educational institutions?

There exist two principal sources of social control over educational institutions: (a) financing sources; (b) public control frameworks. Educational institutions are usually financed by (1) the “sale” of their services to their clientele (the pupils and their families); (2) private and public contributions; (3) subsidies from tax-supported bodies; (4) the sale of the products of their workshops or agricultural farms in which pupils constitute the majority of workers.

We shall deal with the influence of the clientele in a later part of this paper. There is a considerable difference between contributions and subsidies as regards the methods of their procurement, the assurance of their regularity, etc. In this context, however, the most important consideration is whether the single or regular grants are made conditional upon the right to exercise control over the institution. Subsidizing bodies usually tend to attach this condition to their grants more often than do the donating ones. The latter, however, may also in certain circumstances attach this condition to their contributions, sometimes even stipulating the right of quite close control. Income from sale of products is usually not subject to organized social supervision. In Israel educational institutions are financed chiefly from two sources: (a) Youth Aliyah, a national institution affiliated with the Jewish Agency, whose income is derived chiefly from contributions of Jews in the Diaspora; (b) various government

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3 Youth Aliyah engages in bringing Jewish children to Israel and providing for their needs. Lately this institution has also undertaken the care of immigrant children already in the country as well as of underprivileged Israeli children. It finances and supervises only those institutions which include the 9/11 categories of children altogether about a half of the 106 schools of this type existing in Israel, comprising 11,788 children (1/7/1950).
mental ministries, mainly the Ministry of Education and Culture (which, together with the local authorities, finances compulsory education), the Ministry of Agriculture (which is interested in the agricultural training of the pupils) and the Ministry of Social Welfare (which undertakes to provide placement for social cases).

Both these sources exercise control over the recipients of their grants. Other financial sources are private and public contributions; grants of this kind are usually devoted to the establishment or enlargement of institutions rather than to the supplementation of their current budgets. Smaller contributions are also obtained from municipal bodies and private clients. Income from produce is, in most cases, very limited.

Control is thus exercised primarily by the financing institutions. There exists, however, also public supervision of another kind, not related to any financial transactions. The Ministry of Education and Culture inspects the educational standards of institutions also for those age groups which are outside the compulsory education law. The Ministry of Health inspects the hygienic and sanitary facilities, all this over and above the specific supervision exercised by the financing agencies mentioned above — i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture over vocational training and Youth Aliyah over the general educational setting.

In order to estimate the influence of financing and supervision on educational institutions and to examine the advantages and the drawbacks of the various financing and supervisory systems, we must draw a distinction between two types of schools: private and public. A “private institution” is one whose expenses are met chiefly by clients or private donors and whose ownership lies in private hands. It is necessary to stress that reference is here made to private institutions in the full meaning of the term, namely schools managed by the owners, to whom all the profits accrue. There exist also private institutions of a different type, which resemble limited liability companies (in contrast to the first, which are close to being partnerships or singly owned. These schools are owned by shareholders' companies or non-profit associations; their management is hired and thus motivated differently than the owners-managers). Such an institution, however, is not typical (i.e., is not a pure type) as it has elements which approximate it to a public one. For the sake of clarity we shall concentrate on the two pure types only. Such discussion will, of course, be far from complete. In Israel, however, most of the closed institutions are public; a minority is privately owned; while the intermediate type occurs in a few cases only.

A public institution is one whose expenses are covered by public organizations, e.g., the Government, and not by the clients. It is run by directors who are appointed by the organizations concerned and administratively responsible to them. In Israel, the majority of the closed institutions belong to this type.

Public supervision exists in both types, though with great differences
in scope and intensity, in the sanctions applied, and in the influence exercised over the life and organization of the schools. The public control over private institutions is in its nature minimalistic. Its purpose is to prevent gross abuses and disasters. The function of control is here to supervise fire-fighting equipment, sanitary arrangements, medical services, etc. As long as the pupils satisfactorily meet the requirements of governmental examinations (such as secondary-school certificates) there is very little inspection of the actual teaching. There is little interference in the educational methods employed, in the supplementary education provided, etc. As school inspection in Israel, and perhaps also in other countries, is divided among many authorities—each of which is in charge of a specific field—it is limited.

Recently, an inter-ministerial committee for the coordination of school inspection has been established in Israel and, as a result, a definite improvement is being felt. Actual inspection, however, still consists of sporadic visits in the institutions. As the schools are scattered all over the country, the inspectors have to be constantly on the move; they have to depend on the hospitality of the institutions they visit or cut their stay short in order to reach their home before nightfall. Neither alternative is conducive to strict supervision. As long as the institution does not appeal for public funds and "manages" on its own, the tendency is not to interfere too much in its activities, its budgetary appropriations, and staff functions. This is what we have called minimalistic control.

The public supervisory authority does not usually represent the reference group of the private institution, which is mostly concerned with satisfying its clientele and with acquiring a "good name" for itself among potential "customers." Often there also exist personal reference groups for the staff, which is interested in maintaining the school's reputation in teachers' or other professional circles.

In public institutions supervision is wider and much more intensive. The dependence of such schools on the inspecting organizations is greater because some of these organizations combine financing with control, and are thus able to apply stronger and more numerous sanctions. The public authorities have a twofold responsibility to the citizen: as a taxpayer and as a relative of the pupil, and this results in greater and stricter control on their part. Whole fields which are not subject to inspection in the private institutions are supervised in the public ones. Inspection of public institutions, too, is handicapped by distances, division of authority, etc., but the inspector's authority is here greatly strengthened by the school's dependence on his recommendations in respect to staff and allocations, and particularly in respect of any increase in either. To sum up, control over public institutions is much more comprehensive than over private ones.

However, two limitations of public ownership and financing of educational institutions must be noted: In one respect, this system solves one problem while giving rise to another.

In the private sphere, the goal of educational institutions is to achieve the social norm set by their pupils' parents. The parents consider the educational goal and of practical guarantees over their children if these schools are not given values over those of the connection will be lower.

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problem while creating a new one; in another respect it gives rise to a
serious difficulty which does not exist in the private school.

In the private institution there may arise a split between the professed
goal of education and the private goal of the owners, i.e., profit-making.
This split is by no means inevitable; and many owners have internalized
the social norms of the teaching profession: they cherish the success of
their pupils in sporting events and of their graduates in the outside world;
they consider the cultivation of the school as a source of spiritual justifica-
tion and of prestige rather than of profit. However, no organizational
guarantees over and above the psychological and valutative ones exist in
these schools in order to safeguard the dominance of the educational
values over those of profit. (The weakness of the school's clientele in this
connection will be discussed below.)

The public institution has solved this problem. Its hired directors,
nominated as they are by a public authority, interested in spending
money on the school and not in making profits out of it, are not subject
to this temptation. There is here, however, another opposite problem: the
economic considerations instead of becoming predominant, are in danger
of becoming neglected. It is usually easier for a public institution to
get an increase of subsidy from the public bodies (especially when the
subsidy does not come from local sources and is not immediately reflected
in taxes) than to introduce and keep up a regime of strict efficiency and
economy. The allocations granted to a public institution may be influ-
enced by the personal and political connections of the director and of the
public committee behind the school, by its political affiliations and its "general" reputation, rather than by its way of using the available
funds. This phenomenon is even more pronounced in institutions
financed by donations, especially from abroad. There are in Israel "rich"
and "poor" schools (as regards equipment, buildings, staff, etc.) and the
differences among them can often be attributed to the nature of their
directors' connections in the a/m spheres. Increasing allocations from
public funds, usually seems easier than economy. Thus the public institu-
tion has "solved" one problem but created a new one.

Public financing and supervision give rise to a great difficulty which
does not exist, to the same extent at least, in the private schools. This
difficulty is connected with the considerations which guide the activities
of the public organizations and authorities. Supervision constitutes a
guarantee of conformity to legitimate norms and of activity relevant to
the express goal. However, quis custodiet ipsos custodes? There is a
danger that the financing and supervising authorities will act out of con-
siderations which are relevant neither to their own express goals nor to
those of the educational institution. The nature of the supervision may
be influenced by the division of power within the public authorities.
Such an approach, which can sometimes emerge, may be characterized as
follows: firstly, the public organizations—including the governmental ad-

* Gibbun: an agricultural cooperative in Israel.
administration—sometimes regard positions in the public institutions as akin to civil service jobs whose allocation in Israel is still to some extent governed by political party considerations. Secondly, maintenance of a pupil in a public institution costs his family either nothing or much less than the actual expense incurred by the school. Thus acceptance to the institution is clearly in the nature of a reward, to be sometimes allotted according to political and personal connections. There exists another type of interference, often considered to be even graver: the great majority of the public educational institutions in Israel, especially those for “normal” children, bring their pupils up in a definite ideology. Some schools are religious, running the whole gamut of orthodoxy, others are free; there are many shades of socialist institutions, as well as anti- and non-socialist ones. Supervision is thus aimed, to a considerable degree, at safeguarding the specific value orientations of the various schools. There is a large degree of correspondence between the value orientations of a given institution and the value and political orientations of the particular public organization which finances and supervises it. As a result, the commendation of a certain school and the allocation of funds to it may, to some extent, be governed by considerations which are irrelevant to the express goals of the educational institution. In other countries this phenomenon is less pronounced than in Israel; however, when supervision is exercised over the contents of the educational activity and not only over the educational “techniques” and the administrative and technical arrangements, this problem of the value orientation of the inspector and of the public organization behind him will always arise.

2. The Clients as a Source of Social Control

It is usually said that the primary force which drives a private enterprise to keep its normative standards in relation to its clients (e.g. to provide them with fair value for their money) are the clients themselves. It is said that each sum spent by a client is a vote cast in favour of commodity A (firm A) or against commodity B (firm B). The validity of this description has been challenged, especially in respect to an economy of limited competition, monopolies, huge corporations, etc. The question here is what is the power of the clients to control “closed” educational institutions. In order to answer this question a distinction between private and public institutions must again be drawn. In the private school satisfaction of the clients is undoubtedly an important factor. In flagrant cases of negligence, bad teaching, lack of responsibility, etc., the parents will transfer their children to other schools. When, however, no such extreme cases occur, it is doubtful whether the clients are or can be guided by a rational examination of facts. Firstly, they are not “experts” in respect of the service they are receiving. A housewife buying groceries is usually, after a certain period of usage, able to judge

4 See J. K. Galbraith: American Capitalism, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 195
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of their quality. Such is not the case of parents sending their children to an educational institution. In most cases they are in no position to examine the quality of the school in a rational manner; they have, like the person choosing a doctor, to make their selection on the basis of hearsay and the "good" name of the school. The reputation of an institution, however, is not necessarily a simple and direct result of its quality. Often the good name may be based on past success while the recent decline of the school is as yet unknown to the public; or, conversely, a formerly mediocre institution may not yet have been able to acquire a good reputation in spite of genuine improvement in its quality. A school's reputation is often based on external factors, such as its gardens, imposing buildings, successes in sporting events, etc. Schools may offer "conspicuous education," similar to Veblen's conspicuous consumption. This type of education is designed to dazzle the clients and their social groups. As these are no "experts" in the field, the "conspicuous education" has good chances of being a success with them. Lastly, children placed in "closed" institutions often come from families not greatly interested in the quality of the school. Children of divorced or widowed parents, orphans, children of parents spending long periods abroad, children considered to be "difficult"—all these form a considerable part of the pupils in closed institutions. To sum up the influence of the clients on private schools is limited for three reasons: the clients are not "experts" on the service they buy; they are susceptible of being deceived by a school's "reputation" and "conspicuous education"; they are not always concerned with the quality of the education provided. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the school is very sensitive to pressure and afraid of scandals; it is thus possible to find, side by side with considerable immunity to clientele supervision, a disproportionately large consideration in special cases or for special, influential clients (journalists, legislature members, municipal councillors, etc.).

Two types of public institutions may be distinguished in respect of client's influence: schools whose pupils come from "normal" families and schools whose pupils come from "other" families. In Israel there are many institutions of the first type, in which agricultural or vocational training is provided together with secondary education. Urban and rural children enrol in these schools after graduating from the elementary ones and they often use the boarding facilities just because of the great distance from their homes. The influence of the clients is here similar to that exercised by them in the private schools, weakened, however, by additional factors which operate in this case. First of all, frequently the child has to be sent to an institution which offers scholarships or at least fee reductions obtained on the strength of connections. Secondly, the parents tend to trust the supervision exercised by the public organizations. Thirdly, and most important of all, institutions which do not
depend upon the parents financially, and for which the clients do not constitute a reference group, are not greatly influenced by their clientele's pressure.

In the institutions of the second type, which include delinquents, backward and disturbed children, as well as children from families of low educational level, the possibilities of investigating the school, of exerting pressure, and readiness to act, are still smaller. The fact that in these institutions the supply of pupils by far exceeds the number of available places, combined with the fact that the families do not participate at all in expenses, often eliminates client control almost entirely, while outside control is vested in the public organization.

The public organizations are sometimes regarded as the clients of the public institution, especially of those of the second type. The Ministry of Social Welfare has to find suitable placement for its social cases; it pays the school which takes care of the children, as if the service were one supplied to the Ministry. It seems, however, that this approach is unsound from the point of view of the theory of organization. A client is the person who directly enjoys the product or the service. In some cases he pays for this service, while in others the financing is not done through a transaction with him (paying money for the product), but in all cases it is the children and their families who use the services of the public institutions, while the public organization only finances them. By designating the financing factor as a client, an important problem is obscured: in a private enterprise a correspondence exists between the client and the authority which controls and inspects the firm (see above, the theory of the voting significance of money spent). In all other organizations—universities, churches, charity organizations, etc.—there arises the problem of the relationship between those who receive the service and those who finance and control it; the possibility of a clash of interests between them and of lack of adequate communication is always present. It is important to look for organized ways of bridging this gap. The problem itself, however, must not be obscured. The analysis of educational institutions shows indeed a weakness in this connection and thus demonstrates the need for a solution to this important problem. In the next paragraph we shall discuss one of the attempts to solve this problem.

3. The Parents' Committee

From the point of view of the theory of organization, great importance must be attached to the organized clientele (e.g., consumers' associations) as one of the effective methods of countervailing the power of producers' organizations, in this context represented by the educational institution in its quality of supplier of services. In general, an organization of consumers is difficult to achieve because of their great numbers, ecological dispersion, and limited influence. However, the clientele institution of the child—of many other commodities—organize so as to be in a position to rely on the public authorities and to be able to apply to institutions controlling the use of the services those few institutions in which they share the control. The problem of effective management in both public and private enterprises must also be considered. The problem of effective management in both public and private enterprises must be solved.

C. The "Total" Aspect

In the foregoing we have seen that the influence of the school's internal structure on the relationships between the staff and the pupils is great. Not so, however, in a "class" and the staff usual segregation. Because of

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6 On cooperation see: Reader pp. 135-140. "Cooperation: A Me
dispersion, and limited involvement. As regards educational institutions, however, the clientele is relatively small and the services supplied—education of the child—of great emotional importance as compared with many other commodities or services. One would expect the parents to organize so as to be in a position to supervise the activities of the school and to be able to apply pressure on its management and on the public institutions controlling it. Such an organization would seem natural, at least in social groups of high organizational potential in other spheres. However, the same factors which weaken unorganized supervision by parents also handicap the attempt to become organized: the involvement of parents is, in some cases, small; there is a conspicuous tendency to rely on the public authorities and the "reputation" of the school; the difficulty of putting pressure on institutions, especially the public ones, is in itself an obstruction. Objective factors which make organization difficult must also be taken into account: the pupils normally come from different places distant from each other as well as from the school. In those few institutions in which "public committees" or "parents committees" do exist, they have, in most cases been created by the initiative of the school itself and are activated by its management. Their real purpose is to solicit donations from the parents, the public or the various organizations; to increase the reputation of the school by means of an imposing board of trustees; and to promote satisfaction among parents through fictitious cooptation without any real power. It seems that a voluntary consumers' association has, in most cases, but little power against the professional bureaucracy of the "producers."

The problem of effective communication between clients and school management in both private and public institutions remains thus an open one, practically as well as theoretically.

C. MANAGEMENT AND STAFF

1. The "Total" Aspect of the Institution as an Organization Problem

In the foregoing we have discussed external organizational factors which influence the school's internal affairs. We shall now turn to the internal structure of a "closed" educational institution. The boarding school structure creates many problems. It brings the directors, the staff and the pupils together, almost uninterruptedly and almost without any segregation. In an ordinary firm the management and the workers are together during the working hours only, after which they disperse to their respective families, friends, and neighbourhoods. In other words: their working relations penetrate only to a small extent into their other social relations. Not so in a "closed" educational institution. Here the management and the staff usually live on the premises, there is little room for segregation. Because of the great responsibility carried by the school,
there is often little distinction for the staff between working and off-duty hours, and seldom any period of the day is immune from the demands of the management. Tensions which arise during working hours between the management and the staff or between members of the staff can find no outlet in the evening because the people concerned continue to meet (here it must be borne in mind that many of these institutions constitute separate settlements, unattached to any village or town). On the contrary—conflicts or differences of opinion relating to the work tend to be invested with a total significance and transferred to the over-all social relations.

An important result of this situation is that the principal of such a school must have an unusually understanding approach to his subordinates. The problems of human relations are here more important and more sharply defined than in an ordinary school. The constant and intimate contact requires all the office holders in the formal hierarchy to possess personal authority in a high degree. It is especially difficult here to hide behind formal authority and to rely on the formal function alone. Appeals to persons of "real" authority over the heads of those in nominal command seem to be more frequent in such a structure than in an office or an industrial plant. It is, therefore, most important here to assign persons endowed with adequate personal authority to each given function.

The almost complete lack of segregation affects also the relations between staff and pupils. The pupils have a special status in the organizational structure—they are not clients in the usual sense of the term (such are rather their parents or relatives). In most enterprises contact with clients is maintained by a small part of the total staff, over limited periods of time. The school staff, on the other hand, including teachers, instructors, and most of the services personnel (kitchen, clothes store, etc.) is in constant contact with the pupils during all the working hours, and also afterwards. The pupil may demand attention during any hour of the evening or any period of the day off; he may invade the room of the teacher in charge of his group or of the responsible instructor with various requests or complaints: "I have a headache," "I have been pushed," appeals which sometimes represent objective needs and sometimes are only a subjective need for attention. Because of its comprehensive responsibility for its pupils, a "closed" institution cannot strictly adhere to a system of working hours. This responsibility and the necessity for taking care of the pupils is far reaching and resembles that of parents in relation to their children. This relationship is very different from the formal and transient one which exists in a shop, even when the clients are old and steady customers. Responsibility assumed as regards such customers is at the most a specific one, limited to particular matters, while the duty of the school is all-embracing. This duty is even more comprehensive—though not more intensive—than the duty of the physi-
cian or the nurse, to move in their care. The usual customers are outside the organization, especially when buying commodities. Clients buying services come to the institution concerned often, but their stay is of a limited duration. The pupils, on the other hand, are always there; they live in the school and thus present a permanent organizational problem. They form a part of all the activities of the organization and do not just appear at the last point of the process of production, i.e., the sale.

The totalizing aspect of the school affects the private lives of the staff in yet another respect: there is no escape or privacy from the prying eyes and the criticism of the pupils. A teacher in such an institution—even during his free time, even in the bosom of his family, engaged in leisure time activities, in a hobby—is still subject to keen and sustained criticism on the part of his pupils and is thus under constant tension. Such a teacher, therefore, is required—much more than the ordinary one—besides possessing professional knowledge and pedagogical ability, also to be an "educational personality" both as regards his psychological traits and his identification with the values inculcated in the institution.

As a reaction to this lack of objective segregation, an artificial one is sometimes attempted. Efforts are made to emphasize the formal boundaries of duty, to institutionalize channels of approach on the basis of function and authority and to foster "distance" between the management and the staff (calls only during reception hours, only in the office, and in a formal way). There is a strong tendency towards an ecological segregation of living quarters and social cliques, corresponding to the various levels of the organizational structure, are created. A similar segregation sometimes arises between the staff and the pupils. In particular there is a tendency to concentrate the living quarters, the after-work activities and the social life of the staff, in a separate part of the institution. The pupils are sometimes forbidden to go there and the responsibility for emergencies is put upon a duty instructor who stays in the children's part of the school. The problems created by exaggerated segregation and formalization are obvious. Good relations between the management and staff cannot be built upon symbolization and the emphasis of the distance between them. A sharp cleavage between the educational staff and the pupils fails to create that intimate relationship so necessary to educating. At the same time it is doubtful whether it would be always desirable to try to abolish these phenomena.

2. The Pupils as Workers

The pupils are not clients in the usual sense of the term not only because of the reasons discussed above, but also because in the organizational structure of the school they are also considered as workers. In some institutions they take a strictly limited part in the maintenance services

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only (bed-making, dormitory or classroom cleaning, dishwashing) in others they work in workshops, both for general educational and vocational training purposes and for the needs of the school. In many institutions in Israel they participate, as part of their agricultural training, in the operation of large farms. The working hours depend on the age of the pupils; however, since work is considered to be educationally valuable, even the youngest age groups (first primary grade), take part in some work. Pupils in the secondary school age group (14-18) usually work 3 to 4 hours, six days a week.

The work of the pupils constitutes a special organizational problem. In an ordinary enterprise only a limited number of persons are required to possess educational skill, those whose job it is to induct and train new workers, and only a small number of persons—the administrators—have to be skilled and trained in human relations. Workers who work with materials and tools but not people, and workers at the lowest levels who have no subordinates, do not usually need to possess any special educational or administrative skill or ability. In an educational institution, however, in which the pupils are also workers, all the members of the staff, from the professional to the lowest technical workers—are expected to: (a) teach their skills besides performing their jobs; (b) organize their work so as to make the inclusion of pupils in possible. In other words, all the school staff are required to have an educational and an administrative approach, in addition to the "educational personality" we have mentioned above, which is necessitated by the pupils' strong critical and imitative sense. It would indeed seem that in this respect there is no place in an educational institution for a lowest-level, non-skilled worker at all. Every one works, or may be called upon to work with pupils; every one has "subordinates" and not ordinary subordinates but pupils who have to be educated and taught through work.

Thus, organizing the pupils' work in an educational institution requires special skill and effort. Some schools which have recognized the importance of this principle, maintain a special committee and create a special function (the so-called "work-organizer") to deal with this problem. We shall outline it in its most essential aspects only: Every institution must find the ways and the system which will help strike the right balance between the usefulness of the pupils' work on the one hand, and its educational value on the other.

There are in Israel a few institutions which have the reputation of covering a considerable part of their expenses from their pupils' products. It is undoubtedly an economic achievement, but each such case should be examined in order to determine whether too much hard work has not been imposed on the pupils, and whether too many of them had not been transferred from educationally important work to other branches (such as services) for reasons of economy. Instances of schools in which the pupils feel themselves "exploited" are known. The psychological
sources of this feeling are many and not always based on objective facts (though visitors from the outside tend sometimes to accept the pupils' testimony in this respect): the very existence of such feelings, however, destroys the desirable relationship between the vocational instructor and the pupil—a relationship which is conditio sine qua non for the inculcation of the values of the work. To sum up: the economic considerations should not be allowed to become the main criterion of the pupils' work arrangements.

On the other hand, a system which only recognizes educational work, work which creates no economic values, also fails to attain its goal. The work in the school is intended to prepare the pupils for their future life of work as adults, that is for work which is productive and responsible. The essentially sterile and irresponsible play system should not be adopted in the sphere of educational work. In one school, for instance, the pupils' finished product is stored in a huge wall cupboard in the carpenter's shop. The pupils do not receive it, neither does anybody else enjoy it; thus work loses most of its flavour. A different institution—which also serves as a community centre—enables its pupils to acquire their products at a minimal price which represents the cost of the materials and at the same time serves an educational aim. It seems that this system is more justified as well as more effective from the educational point of view.

The achievement of the right balance between the economic and the educational aims requires constant effort. Ability and readiness to assume this responsibility should be an important criterion for the selection of the staff. All the same, the solution of this problem should not be the province of some one staff member's who may be guided by random considerations. The need is felt for an organizational setting which would take care of the educational tools required by the vocational instructors and other workers responsible for the work-program, and which will guide and supervise them. A special committee for vocational training could serve as such a framework.

In some institutions work organizers have adopted the important principle of avoiding a division of work into "exclusively" staff versus pupil occupations. It is a "natural" tendency of the staff member to allot the "low" and unpleasant jobs (such as cleaning and garbage disposal) to the pupils and to perform the skilled work himself. (Anyone acquainted with these institutions is familiar with the well known figure of the worker in charge of sanitation strolling in the yard while a pupil cleans out the installations.) This situation still persists in some institutions; it seems that it would be better if every worker was required to participate in the work he was in charge of, even if only partially or symbolically.

Conversely, the pupils should have a share in the majority of the "skilled" jobs, with due consideration given to the limitations of age. It is, of course, possible to exclude the younger age groups from the more
complex and responsible jobs, but they should see that their older comrades do participate in most of them. Organization and segregation of work with this need in mind requires great patience from the worker and sometimes imposes additional expenses on the school, for damage done to tools and materials. It would, however, seem that this price is well worth paying for the educational results achieved. A more equal division of work between staff and pupils in the various spheres also brings about a fuller knowledge of the tasks themselves (work in the services is much better done when the worker in charge is with the pupils and sets an example; in the skilled jobs, participation in all stages of production is highly conducive to a deeper grasp of the whole process), and stronger identification with the instructor is also thereby created—a condition necessary for inculcating work-values, besides techniques and vocational skills.

D. Internal Organizational Structure

1. The Structure of Internal Supervision

In the foregoing we have dealt with the valuative (the problem of the goal) and the organizational integration of schools in the society in which they are set; we then analyzed the relations between the main social groups in the institutions (management, staff and pupils). We must now turn to a discussion of some problems of the internal organizational structure.

First, it must be stressed that the administrative system appropriate to an educational institution is one of functional division of authority, (in which every worker is subordinate to a number of superiors, to each of them in respect of a different matter or function), and not a system of staff-line supervision (in which every worker has one superior to whom he refers all matters). The reason for this lies in the fact that administrative and professional matters interpenetrate on the lowest levels and they need separate organizers on the highest ones.

The educational institution is actually composed of four spheres of activity: (1) the school, which is close to an ordinary school; (2) the "boarding house" as an educational setting—the instructors who take care of the children in educational groups outside study and work hours. This activity is very wide: it usually covers whole evenings, from 7 to 10 p.m., as well as Saturdays and holidays. It includes singing, dancing, trips, talks, games, scouting activities, reading, special activity groups, etc. A large part of this program, which in ordinary schools is included in extra-curricular occupations and youth movement activities, is here undertaken by the instructors. (3) Services— including dining room, staff, laundry, clothes store, etc. (4) Workshops or agricultural farm (the organization of pupils' work provides for instructors in various trades such as carpenters, gardeners, etc.)

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9 See:
In the school, studies are clearly dominant. The teacher is first and foremost concerned with imparting knowledge. He also develops the right attitudes towards learning in his pupils, endeavours to foster certain character traits and instills certain values through the medium of study (for instance, love of country through the study of geography; national identification through the study of history). However, the formation of personality and the imparting of a certain ideology—a task which, in a usual school, is shared among teachers (especially in the extracurricular framework), parents, youth movements and non-institutionalized local age groups—is, in a "closed" institution, the province of the instructor and the social groups of the pupils themselves. The latter groups do not, in many cases, correspond in their composition to the school class. It is thus legitimate to say that the existence of a separate educational framework enables the schools in these institutions to concern themselves to a larger extent, with "pure" teaching functions as the expense of the more "educational" ones. This division seems to be functional in many respects: (a) The pupil-teacher relationship is more formal, neutral and specific than the youth-instructor one. The extent of identification necessary for acquiring knowledge (imparted by the teacher) is smaller than that required for character formation and value inculcation, (which is chiefly the sphere of the instructor). Thus the youth-instructor relationship should, functionally, be more intimate, warm and close than the pupil-teacher relationship. This functional division between teaching and educating is never complete, of course, for all teachers are also educators and "education" is, ipso facto, necessary for the assimilation of knowledge and the values which go with it. But an ordinary teacher finds it difficult to perform both at once. To sum up: as the "boarding house" assumes many of the educational functions, the school proper is here able to devote itself even more than the ordinary one to the teaching function.

In addition to their educational problems, the school and the "boarding house" also face administrative and economic ones: buildings have to be maintained; equipment acquired and distributed, etc. Obviously, however, these are but secondary functions. Not so in the services, on the farm and in the workshops, where the technical and administrative problems loom larger. The workers in these branches are usually first and foremost professionals, while their educational training and ability constitute a secondary qualification. It follows that a suitable system of supervision should be based on functions and not on spheres of activity. The educational director should be responsible for all the educational aspects of the institution, including those of the skilled staff of the services, the farm and the workshops; the administrative director, on the other hand, is concerned with business and technical problems, with teaching and the workshop situation.

9 See *From Generation to Generation*, S. N. Eisenstadt, Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1956.

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penters, smiths, motor-mechanics, dairymen, poultrymen, vegetable-gardners, etc.).
hand, should deal with all the economic, administrative and technical problems, both in the school and in the “boarding house.” In a large institution there will usually be a “departmental” head for each of the four branches (the school principal; the boarding house director; the person in charge of services; and the farm and workshop manager), as well as the two “functional” general directors.

The study of the nature of internal supervision in the “closed” educational institution brings us to a consideration of the structure of the management and its characteristics. Before we attempt to analyze this further problem, we must emphasize that not all “closed” institutions in Israel follow the pattern described above and adhere rigidly to a clear and balanced division between school and “boarding house.” In a number of places—due to historical reasons, or reasons rooted in the director’s personality—the institution is conceived of as a school with “appendages.” Here, the instructors of the boarding house are teachers—either because they need additional work, or because they are not fully employed in day-time lessons. Educational activity is viewed as similar to the extra curricular program of usual schools, somewhat broadened to include evening activities of the pupils. The workshops and the farm are regarded as part of the school proper, just as laboratories and handicraft lessons are regarded in ordinary schools. The same applies to services. In places of this type the school principal is also the director of all the branches of the institution.

The problem outlined above is far from simple as regards the first type of structure, which is more common and, it seems to us, also the more “functional.” Who should be the head of the institution here—the educational or the administrative director? In an ordinary enterprise it is considered functional to have an administrator and not a specialist in a particular field at the head. The chief executive is expected to be able to settle matters of policy, to coordinate, and to handle and lead men. He is oriented towards the attainment of the main goal, i.e., increase in production and profits. The specialist, on the other hand, usually deals with materials; he is an expert in a limited sphere and his considerations are specific, “technical.” He should thus be subordinate to the administrator. Thus is the intelligence officer (the expert) subordinate to the unit C.O.; the chemist to the president of the chemical industry, etc. The “closed” educational institution, however, (as well as similar organizations such as the ordinary schools, the colleges, the universities, and perhaps also hospitals) belongs in this respect to a different type of organizational structure. Whereas in an ordinary enterprise (industrial plant, office) the experts serve the main goal (production, profit) by selecting the right means to its attainment, here the “expertness” itself—namely education (the imparting of values and knowledge) is the aim. Here the management mobilizes the means which will serve the “professional” goal. It follows that in the organizational structure of the “closed”
In an educational institution, identification with the head may become stronger than in other organizations such as industrial plants or offices. The comprehensiveness of the "closed" institution, the close proximity of its inhabitants to each other, and the preoccupation with values, all contribute to the intensity of the identification. Some principals of "closed" educational institutions in Israel have indeed become central identification figures for pupils, graduates, and even many adults who have never even visited the institutions in question. A director of this type is, of course, an important educational asset to his institution. Parents tend to send their children there to be moulded by his teaching and personality; teachers and instructors are inspired and rewarded by working close to him. In some places, however, it is precisely these directors who have become sources of organizational and educational difficulties. In Israel there is actually no fixed retirement age; renowned directors continue in their office past the age of seventy. The more known they are to the public, the stronger their hold on the organization of the institutions. This is especially the case in institutions financed by donations or by allocations from public organizations. In the institution itself, however, the director cannot rest on his laurels, as he can outside it; the directors, many of whom are founders of their institutions, lose their aptitude for live and intimate contact with the staff and the pupils as they grow older; they lose their ability to adapt to and to assimilate the innovations in educational theory and ideology. They continue to be an asset to the institution in the outside world, but inside the institution they may well become a liability.

Gifted individuals from the younger generations, grown impatient with waiting for their "heritage," may resign; in the special conditions of
Israel, where the growth of the population, particularly owing to immigration, is quick, they easily find directorial posts in the many new institutions established in recent years. As a result, when a belated dismissal or resignation of the aged director does occur there is usually no suitable successor within the institution. Some places exist, indeed, without a permanent educational director; others are headed by the administrator or a management with no principal.

In order to ease this problem organizationally, the deputy director often takes over the actual management of the institution. This frequently gives to duplication and friction between the two principals. The problem of the "heir," a classical one in the theory of organization, has thus not found an institutionalized, tension-free solution in this case either.

2. The Extent of Centralization: The Problem of Services

In the sphere of services (kitchen, dining hall, clothes store, etc.) two contradictory approaches concerning both educational and administrative aspects, exist. One school advocates the greatest possible correspondence of services with educational groups, i.e. a decentralization of services. The other would like to centralize them for the whole institution.  

The first system is the more expensive of the two: the same process is repeated over and over again in parallel frameworks (e.g., each group is separately engaged in washing dishes, a procedure which requires special installations, etc.; food stuffs and clothes are distributed among many groups); to sum up, the advantages of specialization have to be given up (e.g., it is usually possible to have one expert cook for the whole institution, but to find enough of them to assign one to every group is extremely difficult). The second system, on the other hand, though economically cheaper is more expensive "educationally." Working in the services for one's comrades is educationally more valuable than working in an "anonymous" setting, in the service of the whole institution. Where there is a group clothes store, a girl may be required to iron her own, or her friend's blouse; she serves her group and is subject to the informal criticism of its members. When the same girl, however, has to iron a blouse in the central clothes store, she usually does not even know whose blouse it is. Services for an anonymous public, who give no rewards, is a difficult task for all. It thus seems that, in a setting which uses work as an educational factor, and in which most pupils require considerable reassurance, it is better—educationally speaking—to supervise a pupil through his group than through the direct control of the instructor, unsupported by the educational group.

The significance of both systems for the organizational structure is obvious: there are many differences not only as regards the organization
of the area, internal transport, etc., but also in respect to the division of work among the staff. In the decentralized system (no institution is fully decentralized, but many have gone a long way in this direction), the instructor is assisted by the housemother, who is the groups services' coordinator. She is not a specialist in any particular service but is expected to have a working knowledge of all. She has but little time to engage in "pure" educational activity, as the burden of organizing the services properly takes up most of her time. In the centralized system the services are run by specialists (kitchen and store managers, etc.); the instructor is assisted by a woman-instructor who is not too busy with the services and is thus free to engage in educational activity, especially among the girls. Both are thus better able to devote their time to individual care of the pupils. It seems that an institution which adopts the system of decentralization because of its educational values must, in one way or another, increase the weight of its educational staff.

Further study and research are necessary to establish the advantages and disadvantages of both systems, and of the various "hybrids." Here we have only outlined the essential elements of the problem: there is the question of the cost of services per pupil in each system; there is the socio-educational question in respect to the influence of the educational group on the work of the children in the services; and there is also the question of the skill and ability of the service workers to undertake educational work. These three problems must be related to another one, which would repay investigation, namely the problem of the optimal size of pupil groups in various ages and different types of educational institutions.

Further study is also necessary as regards the other problems discussed in this paper; up till now only a limited amount of research has been done. It is hoped that the present paper has shown the need for research on problems of educational organization, in theory as well as in practice.

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