260. "Moral Dialogues: A Communitarian Core Element," Debating Democracy's Discontent: Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy, Anita L. Allen and Milton C. Regan, Jr., editors (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 183-192.


Communitarians argue that democratic societies require a core of shared values; that if democracy is merely a procedure that allows individuals who have different ultimate normative commitments to settle differences, then that polity will lack in legitimacy. I turn to discuss first the reasons such shared values are required and then the processes that help formulate such values when they have eroded.

Shared Values: Are They Needed?

Democratic societies require a voluntary compliance with the core set of do's and don'ts the society formulates that guide the behavior of its members. That is, most members of the society most of the time must be willing to engage in pro-social behavior because they believe in the rightness of conducting themselves in this way, rather than because they fear public authorities. While there is room, even in democratic societies, for politicians to appeal to voters in terms of specific goods that they promise to deliver, public support is also to a significant extent lost and won on the basis of normative stands such as the proper role of the state in helping the poor and minorities, the proper methods of combatting crime and drug abuse, not to mention abortion and prayer in public schools.(2) To put it more starkly: Democratic societies must win a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of their members. Paying the members of society or making them behave are both costly and alienating sources of compliance. Legitimacy in turn means that the main collective acts must be morally compelling. Hence, the key role of shared core values: by showing that collective acts advance these values, these acts can be deemed to have been morally accounted for, can be legitimated. When there are no shared values, only particularistic formulations of the good, acts that are legitimate in some eyes are not in others, as our debate about abortion highlights. Hence, there is little the government can do in this area that will be considered legitimate by all the major segments of the American people. Fortunately for the American democracy the country is not as divided on many other normative issues. The core of share values has thinned out, needs restoring, but one does not have to start from ground zero.

Deliberations and Culture Wars versus Moral Dialogues

How does a community formulate shared values, expand the core of such values when it has been diminished, and reformulate its shared values when this is called for?

The literature on the subject is deeply influenced by the liberal way of thinking both in the academic and opinion leading circles. Liberals argue that the methods by which a community (or society) may sort out changes in its normative guidance is for an aggregate of individuals to assemble, and dispassionately discuss the facts of the situation, explore their logical implications, examine the policy alternatives that are available, and choose the one that is the most attractive as determined on the basis of empirical evidence and logical conclusions. The process is often referred to as one of deliberation.(3) The liberal view of deliberation draws directly on the Enlightenment notion that reason will free people from the clutches of superstition and ignorance. The process is one in which reasoned people exchange views and negotiate a new course. The overarching image that prevails in this way of thinking, is itself highly charged with positive, affective {overtones}: the image of a New England town meeting or of the ancient Greek polis.(4)

James Kuklinski and his associates put it well, "From Kant to Rawls, intellectuals have unabashedly placed a high premium on deliberative, rational thought and by implication, rejected emotions and feelings as legitimate (although unavoidable) elements of politics."(5) Two other political scientists, Jack Knight and James Johnson, write, "Democratic legitimacy accrues to political outcomes insofar as they survive a process of reasoned debate sustained by fair procedures."(6) They elaborate, "We view deliberation as an idealized process consisting of fair procedures within which political actors engage in reasoned argument for the purpose of resolving political conflict."(7) And, they say:

Deliberation involves reasoned argument. Proposals must be defended or criticized with reasons. The objective is to frame pressing problems, to identify attractive, feasible solutions to them, and to persuade rather than compel those who may be otherwise inclined to recognize their attractiveness and feasibility. Here the crucial point is that parties to deliberation rely only on what Habermas calls the "force of the better argument;" other forms of influence are explicitly excluded so that interlocutors are free to remain unconvinced so long as they withhold agreement with reasons.(8)

Joshua Cohen joins with:

Deliberation is reasoned in that the parties to it are required to state their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them or criticizing them. They give reasons with the expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, their power) will settle the fate of their proposal.(9)

Philip Selznick explains, "If deliberation is taken seriously as a guiding principle, it is bound to check populist impulses. Deliberation is an appeal to reason rather than will, including popular will."(10)

Deliberation and civility (or democratic polity) are often closely associated. A civil society is one that deals with its problems in a deliberative manner. As James Kuklinski and his associates sum up this view:

In a democratic society, reasonable decisions are preferable to unreasonable ones; considered thought leads to the former, emotions to the latter; therefore deliberation is preferable to visceral reaction as a basis for democratic decision making. The preceding words summarize a normative view that has dominated thinking at least since the Enlightenment. It prescribes that citizens are to approach the subject of politics with temperate consideration and objective analysis, that is, to use their heads when making judgement about public affairs. Conversely, people are not to react emotionally to political phenomena. A democracy in which citizens evaluate politics affectively, to use the current language of social psychology, presumably leaves much to be desired.(11)

Benjamin R. Barber states:

As I understand it, the public voice is nothing other than the voice of civil society, the voice of what one might call an American civic forum.... The public voice is deliberative, which means it is critically reflective as well as self-aware; it must be able to withstand reiteration, critical cross-examination and the test of time--which guarantees a certain distance and dispassion and requires a certain provisionality that precludes final closure.(12)

To round off the picture, deliberations are contrasted with an irrational, harmful, if not dangerous, way of attempting to chart a new course. As James Q. Wilson writes, "The belief in deliberation is implied not only by the argument for an extended republic but also by the contrast Madison draws between opinions and passion, since opinion implies a belief amenable to reason whereas passion implies a disposition beyond reason's reach."(13)

And Kuklinski and his associates say:

In the realm of public affairs, prescriptions for a deliberative citizenry have dominated writing at least since the Enlightenment.... Gut-level reactions will not do, and a democracy in which citizens evaluate politics with their hearts instead of their minds leaves much to be desired.(14)

Elizabeth Theiss-Morse and her associates state further:

What, then, ought one to conclude about the classic debate over the role of emotion and reason in political life? It seems clear that to ignore the powerful role of emotion is to negate much of what motivates political thought and action.(15)

Deliberations are contrasted with culture wars, a term used to suggest that the public is divided on the core values that ought to guide a society and the segments of the public confront one another in unproductive manners in dealing with the issues at hand.(16) In recent years in America, main fault lines have been between the Religious Right and the liberals;(17) in Israel, between secular and religious groups; in Europe, between socialists and laissez-faire conservative ideologies.

Culture wars occur when two or more groups of members of the same community or society confront each other in a highly charged way, demonizing one another, turning differences into total opposition. As James Hunter points out, the term culture war is associated with "implications of stridency, polarization, mobilization of resources, etc....."(18)

Such culture wars tend to make reaching a shared course more difficult. At worst, they invite violence (bombing of abortion clinics or Lebanon-like violence). James Hunter writes that:

Culture wars always precede shooting wars.... Indeed, the last time this country "debated" the issues of human life, personhood, liberty, and the rights of citizenship all together, the result was the bloodiest war ever to take place on this continent, the Civil War.(19)

Given such sharp contrast between reason and passion, deliberations and culture wars, amicable resolutions versus emotional deadlock or wild decisions, there is little surprise that even those who have no libertarian bone in their body tend to favor the deliberative model. But what is really working here, again, is the course of relying on false dichotomies. The trouble is that deliberations of the relatively pure kind favored are almost impossible to achieve or even to approximate under most circumstances. The examination of actual processes of sorting out values to guide a society, or even small community, shows that rather different processes are taking place.(20)

There are at least three powerful, profound reasons this is the case: (a) participants in communal dialogues are not two-legged computers, stuffed with information and analytic software: they are members of the community who must earn a living, attend to their children, and so on, studying matters of public policy in their rather limited free time. Moreover, even if each deliberant came equipped with a mind full of information and statistical techniques, the information needed and the analytic capacity required for rational decisions would not be available even to a supercomputer, a problem widely recognized by the champions of artificial intelligence, not to mention the human one. It is common to point out that it is impossible to decide in a chess game what the best (most rational) move is because the permutations are too numerous. But compared to real-life decisions, chess is a very simple choice space. In chess, there are only two players, immutable rules, all the needed information is right in front of the actors, power relations among the pieces are fixed, and the rules of engagement are fully established. In communities and societies, the number of players is large and changing, rules are modified as the action unfolds, information is always much more meager than what is needed, relative power of those involved and those affected is changing, and the rules of engagement are in flux. As a result, participating in all dialogues and decision-making are forced to rely on a much humbler sorting out process than the rational decision-making school, at the heart of deliberation model, assumes.(21)

(b) The participants in many values/talks are not individuals but subgroups, either outright representatives or individuals whose thinking and choices largely reflect their membership in various subgroups and communities. Thus, a dialogue between social conservatives and laissez-faire conservatives in the GOP platform committee regarding what position to take on abortion, or between New Democrats and liberals in the Democratic Party, reflects to a large extent their subgroups' values and mainly not thought that they had developed individually.

Understanding of the internal processes of these groups facilitates comprehension of the dialogues among the group's representatives or even regular members. These internal processes are affected by many factors from the competition for power within a given group to efforts to counter centrifugal forces that affect the particular subgroup rather than the community at large.

When I interviewed staff members of the Christian Coalition, asking about the reasons Pat Robertson's speeches and above all in-house communications have been so abusive to minorities and women, among others, the staff argued that Robertson had to keep up the hate drums to raise the money his operation required. The same explanation was provided when an ACLU staffer was asked why that organization keeps issuing clearly exaggerated alarms about dangers to our liberties. In a membership drive letter after the 1994 mid-term elections, the ACLU states:

A firestorm is sweeping across the country that threatens us all. Now that the Radical Right has won political power in Congress and in state legislatures across the country...newly empowered extremist groups in nearly every state are fanning the flames of intolerance and bigotry, igniting fierce legal battles and triggering explosive social conflicts...These are your rights under fire.(22)

(c) Most important, the issues that are subjects of discussion are to a significant extent normative and not empirical or logical matters. This fact is often overlooked or its importance is diminished, under the influence of the rationalistic-deliberative model. To push the point I suggest that even consideration of many issues that seem technical are often deeply influenced by normative factors. For instance, the question of whether or not to put fluoride into a town's water main brings into play values of those who oppose government "paternalism";(23) the importation of tomatoes from Mexico evokes values associated with questions such as the extent to which we should absorb real or imaginary health risks for the sake of free trade and better neighbor relations; and questions concerning the best way to teach English to immigrant children raises values issues concerning the commitment to one nation. There seem to be no norm-free decisions of any significance.

When it comes to taking a position concerning major policy issues, however, sorting of values is particularly paramount. For example, a consideration of specific environmental measures is deeply affected by the extent to which various members and subgroups within a given community share a commitment to the value of stewardship, our responsibility to leave the environment to our children in no worse condition than we found it. Arguments that if we continue to dump pollutants into the air, lakes, or groundwater, we will damage our future, carry much less weight for those who are preoccupied with their well-being or have strong value commitments to other causes than with those who are strong environmentalists.

Note that under the influence of libertarian thinking and libertarian segments of social science there is a tendency to explain actions driven by values as if they were largely driven outright by self-interest or at least by enlightened self-interest. But this should be considered a combination of a libertarian blinder and mannerism rather than a reading of the sociological reality of policy-making.

Take a policy issue that was hotly debated for decades, and in many countries: the extent to which the deficit governments carry in their budget should be cut. The issue is often put in economic terms and self-interest: if the deficit is cut, interest will decline, inflation will be avoided, competition with other countries will be made easier, or some such. But, from a sheerly scientific viewpoint, the level at which deficits cause damage is far from clearly established. Japan, for instance, did rather well in years its deficit was much higher than that of the USA. Similarly, in the period 1990-1995, countries whose GNP grew much more rapidly than that of the major Western economies, often referred to as emerging markets, had significantly higher deficits and higher rates of inflation and of interest rates than the USA. Actually, the debate about the deficit is often couched in normative terms: is it "decent" to eat our heritage and rob our children? As President Reagan often argued, a country is like a family; it should not spend more than it earns. Many economists are fully aware of the difference between the ways families and nations are financed and affected by deficits, but this did not detract from the moral force of the way Reagan put it.

I am not arguing that in the community-based and national debates about policy issues, information and reason play no role. I am pointing out that they play a much smaller role than is often believed, and because some other factor plays a much larger role: namely, an appeal to values. A better understanding of values/talk, or moral dialogues, will both enable one to better understand the processing of values-sorting, and ask the question: how may these be improved? All this presupposes that we largely forego the hopelessly utopian model of rational deliberations.

Values/Talk: The Core Processes

The preceding discussion does not imply that a communitarian society should yield to emotionalism, replace town meetings with screaming matches, or national policy-making with a culture war, but that one must recognize that values/talk or moral dialogues have their own procedures distinct from the deliberative model.(24) The more democratic and communitarian a society, the more it applies these, and the more it applies these, the more democratic and communitarian it becomes. Those who are anxious not to give up on the seeming rationality of the deliberative model, refer to vales/talk as "substantive rationality" but recognize that the processes of these rationalities are fundamentally different from those of the technical or instrumental rationality.

One often-used procedure in moral dialogues is to appeal to an overarching value the various parties to the sorting our process share. Robert Goodin in effect is using this rule when he seeks to pave the road for a community that must sort out a course between the rights of non-smokers and those of smokers.(25) At first, this may seem as a typical clash between two values: the rights of one group versus those of another. However, Goodin points out the both groups are committed to the value that one's liberty does not allow that person to violate the "space" of the other. In popular terms, my right to extend my arm stops when my fist reaches your nose. (Actually, quite a bit before that.) Goodin points out that because non-smokers, in their non-smoking, do not penetrate the smokers' space, while smokers do violate non-smokers' space in public places, non-smoker rights should take priority. When such arrangements that employ an overarching value to help sort out conflicts between two or more "lower" level values, is used in a town meeting, we witness one procedure used by communities to sort out their values, to determine normative guidance for their policy making and endorsement.

While the particular way Goodin developed his argument may not be employed often, it is more often used in another form. Members of communities frequently argue that this or that measure under consideration is not compatible with a free society, a self-respecting society, or a caring people. These, as a rule, are not empirical arguments; for instance, that there is evidence that if a community will engage in a given measure, liberty will be seriously endangered. It is a way of arguing that if the community will proceed in a given manner, this is incompatible with an important value it seeks to uphold. I suggest that an empirical examination of values-sorting will show that in communitarian societies much of this sorting takes place following the procedures of involving super-ordinate values to sort out the ranking among others.

Another course is to bring a third value into play when two diverge or clash. For instance, those who seek to restore the black-Jewish coalition of the 1960s in the USA, argue that both groups share a commitment to liberal causes. An attempt to create an interfaith coalition pointed to the shared commitment to religion, as the participants struggled to work out a joint statement.(26)

In effect, most of the considerations ethics bring to bear are discussions of the relative merit of various values rather than conflicts between the good and its corresponding evil. Values/talk is not constituted of various people coming and declaring their values the way some individuals state that they do not like broccoli without the need or inclination to explain their taste. (De gustibus non est disputandum.) Values require an accounting. And those accounts can be examined and challenged, for instance, by arguments that they are inconsistent with other values the party holds or lead to normative conclusions the party could not possibly seek, and so on.

Rules of Engagement for Values/Talk

To protect values/talks from deteriorating into culture wars, rules of engagement can and are being applied. They basically reflect a tenet that one should act on the recognition that the conflicting parties are members of one and the same community and hence should fight with one hand tied behind their back rather than go at it whole-hog. This issue has been much discussed in recent years around the notion of what makes for a civil dialogue.

It is widely agreed that the contesting parties should not "demonize" one another, that they should refrain from depicting the other side's values as completely negative, as when they are characterized as "satanic" (Iran) or as a betrayal of the nation (Israel). For instance, after the GOP won the 1994 elections in a landslide, the ebullient new Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, referred to his side being supported by "God-fearing" Americans faced with an opposition of "Godless" people.(27) This and other such exclamations were widely regarded as a violation of a civil values/talk, and not only by Democrats. They were one factor leading to a high negative rating of the Speaker in public opinion polls.(28) The Speaker used such phrases less often in the following months, thus bowing to the norms of values/talks. In Israel, it was widely believed that the comparison of Prime Minister Rabin to Hitler and the characterization of him as a traitor by several religious groups egged on those who assassinated him. It has also fed the culture war between extreme religious groups and secular ones.

Another rule of moral dialogues is not to affront the deepest moral commitments of the other groups. The assumption is that each group is committed to some particular values that are especially sacrosanct to the group and that each group has some dark moments in its history upon which members would rather not dwell. Thus, to throw into the face of a German, whenever one discusses a specific normative difference, the horror of the Holocaust, or to tell Jews that it did not happen, hinders values/talk; refraining from doing so enhances values/talk.

Closely related is drawing a line between one's legal right to free speech, which allows one to say most things, however offensive, and the merit of not voicing whatever offensive thoughts come to mind.(29) Several of the leading hosts of radio call-in shows were blamed for ignoring this distinction and undermining values discourse as a result.

More generally, communitarian and Harvard law professor Mary Ann Glendon, makes a strong case that using less the language of rights and more that of needs, wants, and even interests, would assist in making dialogues more conducive to truly shared resolutions. As Glendon puts it, "For in its simplest American form, the language of rights is the language of no compromise. The winner takes all and the loser has to get out of town. The conversation is over."(30) She adds:

The most distinctive features of our American rights dialect [are] its penchant for absolute, extravagant formulations, its near-aphasia concerning responsibilities, its excessive homage to individual independence and self-sufficiency, its habitual concentration on the individual and the state at the expense of the intermediate groups of civil society, and its unapologetic insularity...each of these traits make it difficult to give voice to common sense or moral political discourse....(31)

I do not attempt to develop a full list of rules of engagement, but only to illustrate that just because values/talk does not proceed by the same canon as science (at least that which science is said to follow or is normatively expected to heed), does not mean that it does not have a canon.

Understanding the ways moral dialogues take place and can be enhanced is a subject of great importance to democratic societies because such dialogue sustains one of the key elements required for the social order. It is a subject that requires much more study and is likely to intensify once the mirage of deliberations is set aside and the importance of values/talk as distinct from culture wars is more widely recognized.

1. In preparing this article, I have relied on work in progress: Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule: Morality in a Democratic Society (New York: Basic Books, 1997). In drafting the article, I greatly benefitted from the research assistance of Ryan J. Hagemann and David E. Carney.

2. H.H. Hyman, "The Psychology of Status," Archives of Psychology, no. 269 (1942). Richard G. Hall, Phillip E. Varca, and Terri D. Fisher, "The Effect of Reference Groups, Opinion Polls, and Attitude Polarization on Attitude of Formation and Change" in Political Psychology, ed. R.S. Woodworth, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 309-321. Todd Mason, "American vs. Its Union: Double Trouble." Business Week, 23 February 1987, 45. Arie Kaptyn and Tom Wansbeek, "Empirical Evidence on Preferable Formation," Journal of Economic Psychology 2 (1982): 137-154. Moses Abramowits, "Economic Growth and Its Discontents" in Economics and Human Welfare, ed. Michael J. Boskin (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 3-21. Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

3. For a particularly cogent discussion of the role of reason in deliberations of ends and not just means, see Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1992), especially 524-6.

4. Dennis Wrong illustrates the tendency toward reason in stating:

Many sociologists confine themselves, implicitly at least, to the cognitive rather than the motivational or emotional aspects of interaction, often making tacit assumptions about the latter or simply taking them for granted. Berger and Luckmann explicitly call their vivid account of how actors construct an objective social world that then confronts and constrains them a contribution to the "society of knowledge."

Although Wrong speaks directly of sociology, the affinity for the rational applies to many disciplines. (Dennis Wrong, The Problem of Order [New York: The Free Press, 1994], p. 60.)

5. James Kuklinski, et. al., "The Cognitive and Affective Bases of Political Tolerance Judgments," American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 1 (1991): 22.

6. Jack Knight and James Johnson, "Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy," Political Theory 22, no. 2 (1994): 289.

7. Ibid., p. 285

8. Ibid., p. 286

9. Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy" in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, eds. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 22.

10. Philip Selznick, "Defining Democracy Up," The Public Interest 119 (Spring 1995): 106-7.

11. James Kuklinski, "Bases of Tolerance," p. 1

12. Benjamin R. Barber, "An American Civic Forum: Civil Society Between Market, Individuals, and the Political Community," (prepared for the SPPC Conference on "Community, Individual, and the State." Palo Alto, CA, October 1994.), 14, 16.

13. James Q. Wilson, "Interests and Deliberation in the American Republic, or Why James Madison Would Have Never Received the James Madison Award," PS: Political Science and Politics (December 1990): 559.

14. James Kuklinski, et. al., "Thinking about Political Tolerance, More or Less, with More or Less Information" in Reconsidering the Democratic Public, eds. Russell Hanson and George E. Marcus (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p. 227.

15. Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, et. al., "Passion and Reason in Political Life" in Reconsidering the Democratic Public, eds. Russell Hanson and George E. Marcus (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p. 269.

16. James Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: BasicBooks, 1991).

17. William Buckley alludes to the character of the rhetoric of the Religious Right when he states, "What frightens people most about the Religious Right is the rhetoric that is sometimes used. There ought to be some thought given, for example, as to how you formulate your antihomosexual position: it should be more pastoral than vitriolic." (Michael Cromartie, "Listening to Mr. Right," Christianity Today [2 October 1995]: 36.)

18. James Hunter, Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy in America's Culture War (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. viii.

19. Ibid., 4-5.

20. Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983). See Chapter 5, "The Town Meeting," pp. 47-58.

21. For further discussion, see Amitai Etzioni, The Moral Dimension (New York: The Free Press), pp. 136-150; Charles Lindbolm, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1965); Kenneth E. Boulding, "Review of A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation and as a Social Process," American Sociological Review 29 (1962): 930-1.

22. ACLU Membership Drive Letter, no date given. Emphasis in the original.

23. Bette Hileman, "Fluoridation of Water," Chemical and Engineering News 66, no. 31 (1988): 26, 27, 42.

24. Jürgen Habermas speaks to this is his book Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge: MIT, 1993). In discussing the "discursive redeemability" of dialogue, Habermas outlines characteristics of dialogue that can facilitate the course to shared core values. He states, "Obligations to act flow directly from the meaning of an expressive speech act in that the speaker specifies what it is that this behavior does not contradict and will not contradict in the future." (p. 59) The relationship future action and community dialogue have represent the "procedures" necessary to move to the realization of shared core values. Bruce Ackerman also contributes to the understanding of the meaning of discussion and conversation when he outlines the importance of "mutual intelligibility", although he does indeed agree that facts and values cannot be completely separated, and like Habermas, sees different conversations. Please also see Bruce Ackerman, "Political Liberalisms," Journal of Philosophy 91, no. 7 (1994): 364-386. Bruce Ackerman, "Why Dialogue?" Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 1 (1989): 5-22.

25. Robert E. Goodin, No Smoking: The Ethical Issues (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989)

26. See Michael Lerner and Cornel West, Jews and Blacks: Let the Healing Begin (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995).

27. Sidney Blumenthal, "The Newt Testament," The New Yorker, 21 November 1994, 7.

28. "...the more people see and hear Mr. Gingrich, the more some seem uncomfortable with him. The share of Americans holding a negative impression of him is up to 41%, compared with 27% who report positive feelings." (Michael K. Frisby, "Politics and Policy: Americans, Polled on GOP and 'Contract,' Like Big Picture But Have Trouble With the Small Print," The Wall Street Journal, 9 March 1995, A20.)

29. See William Galston, "Rights Do Not Equal Rightness," The Responsive Community 1, no. 4 (1991): 7-8. See also Amitai Etzioni, Spirit of Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), pp. 192-206, especially pp. 201-4.

30. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 9.

31. Ibid., p. 14.

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