The struggle for national independence is often led by a charismatic movement. Once independence has been gained, such movements tend, to use Max Weber's terminology, to become "routinized" by developing either "traditional" or "bureaucratic" structures. The outcome of the conflict between these two tendencies to a large extent determines the degree of political stability, the extent of civil rights, and the economic viability of the young nations. In the case of Israel, the bureaucratic elements are rapidly gaining over the traditional ones. An examination of this process as it is occurring there casts some light on the process of bureaucratization in other newly independent nations.

The pre-independence nationalist movements manifest the elements typical of charismatic movements in general. First, they are led by potent leaders such as Gandhi, Nkrumah, and Ben-Gurion. Second, their mass membership is drawn from the disintegrating traditional structures, whether they be the village in India, the tribe in Ghana, or the traditional Jewish community in the Diaspora. The traditional bonds are usually broken at least in part by some ecological dislocation. This often takes the form of migration from the country to the emerging cities, though in the Israeli case it was an emigration from the cities in the Diaspora to the country-side of Palestine. Third, like other charismatic movements, movements for national independence command intense ideological commitments: they are anti-colonial, nationalist, and radical—that is, they subscribe to some social reform or revolutionary doctrine of a Socialist character. Finally, as in other charismatic movements, there is little interest in economic, administrative, or scientific activities; neither are there available to the movement the social instruments which these activities require. Rarely do the independence movements have elaborate administrative apparatuses or stable economic resources and income of their own (e.g., their activities tend to be financed by contribution rather than by taxation).

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Routinization begins either with the gaining of independence or shortly before it. With independence—when the movement's charismatic leader becomes the first premier or president and the members become citizens—the movement has to take charge of whatever economic and administrative machinery already exists and thus the process of routinization begins or is greatly accelerated. The degree to which routinization is begun before the gaining of political independence depends on the length of the struggle preceding it, the degree to which the colonial power allowed the independence movement gradually to assume responsibilities, and the degree to which the movement developed autonomous administrative and economic organizations. In the case of the Jewish community in Palestine, all of the foregoing conditions were met to a relatively high degree: hence, pre-independence routinization was comparatively advanced, and the transition to statehood smooth.

As previously indicated, routinization may take one of two courses: the charismatic movement may give birth either to a highly bureaucratic or to a traditional social structure. In the first case, the powers of the charismatic leadership are transferred to the state's elite. The old leader becomes the recognized head of the young state; other leaders gain positions as members of cabinets or parliament, heads of administrative agencies, etc. The followers transfer their commitments from the movement to the state, from rebellion to loyalty, from support of the particular norms of a subgroup (the movement) to the universal norms of the legal system of the state.

In the second case, a political "fixation" occurs. The central power continues to reside outside the government in the person of tribal chiefs, village heads, union or party leaders. The followers' loyalty remains primarily committed to the traditional units (e.g., tribes) or to those created by the independence movement, but are not transferred to the state. The situation in the Congo, 1961, provides an extreme illustration.

Here it may be well to provide a brief conceptual note. Weber referred to the two products of the routinization of charisma as "bureaucratic" and "traditional." The latter is a particularly inadequate concept for our purposes since we must be concerned not only with such local traditional units as tribes and villages, but also with recently created foci of loyalty such as the independence movement itself or various political units (such as parties or labor unions) which might withhold loyalty and power from the state after independence. Following Parsons, we will designate as universalistic those units which uphold norms that apply without discrimination to all citizens (this being both the essence and
the prerequisite of a true bureaucratic structure) and as particularistic those units, either traditional or new, which are committed to norms limited only to certain sub-populations.

Highly particularistic political systems have been referred to as neo-feudal. The various political organizations which, unlike the state agencies, encompass only parts of the population, are reminiscent of barons; as in a feudal state, there are no true citizens, but only vassals and sub-vassals. These provide the "baron" with political support (votes) in exchange for which he supplies services which may range from employment opportunities (or patronage) to a rich variety of welfare services. The political machines of some American cities approached a neo-feudal structure, since each ethnic group had its own "boss" or overlord to whom it was bound by reciprocal obligations and loyalty and showed little normative commitment or political loyalty either to the city government itself or to its laws.

It is important to stress that the universalism-particularism distinction is not a sharp dichotomy but rather a continuum. For no political system (or any society) is either completely universalistic or wholly particularistic; each contains some of both elements, though they differ greatly in the proportions and the ways in which they are combined.

Extreme universalism is characteristic of totalitarian states in which the particularistic units have been disintegrated or subordinated to a single over-riding political unit. In such totalitarian systems the autonomous intermediary bodies between the citizen and the state (or the party) are very few and weak. On the other hand, in confederations particularism is predominant, intermediary bodies are strong, and universalistic governmental agencies are limited and weak.

It is crucial to realize that the optimal structure for the implementation of many social values is not—as numerous students of bureaucracy were wont to assume in the past—a highly universalistic one. Minority rights and to a considerable degree civil liberties often depend upon the existence of relatively strong particularistic units and sentiments. These are also the basis for the emotional stability of the average citizen which is, in turn, the foundation of his ability to accept universalistic norms and to engage in politically responsible behavior. A viable democracy, for example, requires not only identification with the Constitution, the President, and the Supreme Court—all universalistic institutions—but also with some particularistic political party. Public administration, economies, and professionalism, however, can tolerate and even benefit from higher degrees of universalism.
We shall now examine the development of particularism (or neo-feudalism) in Israel. There during the period of British rule and before the establishment of the state of Israel, neo-feudalism was powerful. Since independence, however, neo-feudalism has been constantly declining while bureaucratization — and with it increased stress on universalistic norms — has been progressing rapidly.

The Emergence of Neo-Feudalism

The "barons" of the Jewish community in Palestine were not village heads, tribal chiefs or landlords, but political parties. The Palestinian Jewish community was established mainly by the process of immigration, and as a result the traditional units were left behind and new social bonds were formed. These new bonds took the form of numerous small, highly solidary political bodies which organized immigration to Palestine and subsequent settlement there. Joining a political party often even before immigrating to Palestine (for party emissaries travelled through the Diaspora to recruit settlers) provided the potential immigrant quite frequently with the financial backing for his trip, the assurance of a reception in the new country, training for his new way of life, and — as the parties increased in size, power, and financial resources — with all the major services, including health, welfare, housing, schooling, and employment.

In exchange, the immigrant owed the party "baron" his allegiance. But unlike the rather commercial and sometimes coercive relationship between the political machine and the immigrant in some American cities, in the case of the Jewish community in Palestine, the close social relationship between the immigrant and the political leader and the intense ideological commitment to the party platform made political allegiance natural and easily enforced. The "vassal" had to give much more than his vote; he had to be willing to serve the emerging political collectivity in ways specified by the party, from drying the swamps ("pioneering") to serving as a soldier of the underground units. Lacking a framework of a Jewish state and rejecting the colonial one, the parties, and some inter-parties organizations, carried out the various state-type political functions.

As in the typical feudal social structure, a second layer of "lords" developed over and above the political parties. In 1920, the Histadrut or the General Federation of Labor was established. It was founded by a number of parties of the Left and of the labor unions. Gradually it took over some of the financial and administrative activities of its component parts, eventually developing a
large number of functions of its own. But, as in a genuine feudal structure, the ultimate loyalty of each vassal was to his immediate lord rather than to this over-lord. The parties remained the focus of identification and the predominant power centers.

Not all parties were equal in power. As in many developing countries, in the Jewish community of Palestine the political bodies on the Left were considerably more powerful than those of the Right and of the Center. The existence of the Histadrut, as the "over-organization" of the Left, without an equivalent in the other political wings, was an indication of its power and further contributed to its strength. Other factors leading to more powerful parties of the Left were their larger membership and the higher legitimation enjoyed by them compared with parties of the Right and of the Center.

The latter point is of much importance. Most observers of developing countries are accustomed to think in terms of the Western model of industrialization in which the bourgeois, free-enterprise, liberal middle class emerged first and gained both power and legitimation, and in which the working class, labor parties and unions came later. The Left had to fight for recognition in a society dominated by middle class values and powers. On the other hand, in practically all newly independent nations the process is reversed. Because of the close association of the middle classes (merchants, white collar employees) with the colonial power, and the tendency of the independence movement to be led by left-wing groups, the newly independent nations tend to have parties in office which are left of center, and to grant more legitimacy to left-wing ideologies than to right-wing ones. Here middle class representatives and ideas have to struggle for position and recognition, rather than the other way around. This is crucial to keep in mind when we come to analyze the role of the left-wing parties and Histadrut in the process of routinization in Israel.

The Decline of Neo-Feudalism

With the establishment of the State of Israel, the role and power of the political parties and other political associations declined; many of their functions were transferred to the state as was a good measure of the loyalties of their followers. Party members acquired a new role, that of a citizen. The parallel growth of universalism is of much interest to the student of bureaucratization, and hence deserves some detailed reporting. For that purpose it may be well to focus upon its progress in a number of different institutional spheres. Such an examination re-
reveals that the process develops unevenly within these different spheres. Thus, in the case of Israel, the process is completely successful in one sphere, almost completely successful in another, highly successful in a third, moderately successful in a fourth, and has hardly begun in the last. The process is continuing more markedly in the bureaucratic direction.

1. Completely Successful: The Judicial System. During the Palestinian or Mandate period, the courts of what is now Israel were run under what was mostly British law with an admixture of some Ottoman legal traditions from the earlier rulers of Palestine (prior to 1917). The Jewish community, in its efforts to develop its own political institutions, put considerable pressure on its members to refrain from using the British courts, and to use instead informal courts provided by various Jewish organizations. Nevertheless, in most criminal and many civil matters Jews did turn to British courts, though there was an effort to minimize litigation in general. Large segments of the law - such as those which restricted the use of weapons by Jews, their immigration to Palestine, and their purchase of land there - were strictly particularistic, explicitly oriented against one group, the Jews, and by this very token favoring the Arab group.

With the establishment of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, a new court system was instituted. The law upon which it is based is a mixture of traditional Jewish law, British and Ottoman legal traditions, and a considerable amount of new legislation. The system utilizes appointed judges; there are no juries. It is extremely universalistic. The same laws, with the exception of those which are based on religious preference of the citizens (ten per cent of Israel's citizens are Arabs, the majority of whom are Moslems), apply to all groups of the population. The impartiality of the judges and of the courts is accorded the highest respect. Throughout the State's existence, the courts have been the only institutions against which the charge of political favoritism was never seriously raised. Judges are appointed by the President (who, unlike that of the United States, is a non-political figure) on the recommendation of a Nominating Committee which includes members of the Knesset (House of Representatives), a Supreme Court judge, the Minister of Justice, and members of the Bar Association. Their appointments are based upon merit and they enjoy permanent tenure. The impartiality of the Supreme Court is especially respected. That the majority of its judges are either members of the Mapai (Labor Party) or the Progressives (Liberals) is hardly known and seems to have no effect upon the discharge of their duties.

2. Almost Completely Successful: The Military. The anti-
British underground of the Jews in Palestine, like the various undergrounds in France and other European countries during World War II, had strong political affiliations. The largest underground organization, the Haganah, was long split into two groups or factions, known simply as A (left-wing) and B (right-wing). Moreover, the Commando units of Haganah, known as the Pal-Mach, which were established in 1941, drew about eighty percent of their members and practically all of their officers from one left-wing political party (Achdut Ha'Avoda). Similarly, the Irgun, a dissenting underground force, recruited many of its officers and obtained much of its financial support from the Revisionists (today the Herut of the Right). At least in one instance, the Pal-Mach came to the aid of strikers at a factory, while the Irgun helped the strike-breakers.

Before 1948, Haganah A and B merged to form a more universalistic organization, directly under the control of the Jewish National Committee, a weak super-political organization representing the political parties of the Palestinian Jewish community. The Pal-Mach or the Commando units were subordinated to the united Haganah, while the Irgun continued throughout most of this period in its independent dissenting course.

When the State of Israel was established, an Israeli Defense Army, basically grafted onto the Haganah, was officially proclaimed. At this point came one of the most crucial tests of universalism of the new state: would the various politically bound particularistic armies join the united defense force created by the state or would they insist of maintaining their "private" force? In July, 1948, the Irgun and Pal-Mach still maintained their own military organizations and fought on separate fronts in the War of Independence. In the same month, a thirty-day armistice was signed under the supervision of the United Nations. It included a provision forbidding arms to be imported by either Israel or the Arabs. When the Irgun landed a ship carrying weapons close to United Nations headquarters on the Tel Aviv Beach, thus violating, in a highly visible manner, the commitment of the Israeli government, the government ordered the ship destroyed and disbanded the Irgun. A half year later, the Pal-Mach was also disbanded.

At present, Israeli military units are strictly apolitical. None is known to have any political affiliations or commitments. Officers and enlisted men alike are forbidden to be active politically either in the army or in the civilian society though all have the right to vote.

With the continuing sensitivity to security matters and the residue of the conflicts which accompanied the disbanding of the
Irgun and the Pal-Mach, it would seem that the Israeli government still must pay considerable attention to the political backgrounds of the higher-echelon officers. All six Israeli Chiefs of Staff either have had no political affiliation or were members of the Mapai (Labor Party), the central power within the government and national political life. None of the senior officers is known to be a member of opposition parties of the extreme Left or the extreme Right. The loyalty of the military to the state and conformity to its orders seems to be highly assured not only because of its neutral universalistic character of the army as a whole, but also because its key leaders support the particular party in power. That some elements of particularism are maintained is, therefore, at least functional for the stability of the political structure.

3. Highly Successful: The Depoliticization of Schools. Since the English government in Palestine neither financed nor organized a school system for the Jewish population, and since the municipal governments were financially weak, various political associations assumed the task of developing the schools. In the pre-state period, each major political body financed its own school system, trained its teachers, supervised the quality of education, printed textbooks, etc. Although there were only three major systems—labor, religious, and "general" (right-wing)—considerable subdivisions existed to allow for the expression of more subtle political differences. (The extreme left-wing Hashomer Hatzair, for instance, had its own sub-system, tied to its Kibbutz movement.)

Shortly after the establishment of the state considerable attention was given to the depoliticization of the schools. In 1950, appropriate laws were passed in the Israeli parliament despite strong objection from extremely religious groups and from much of the Left, which had by far the strongest educational system. The law leaves place for the needs of particularistic groups. It decrees that 75 per cent of all studies be uniform in all schools, to be determined by the Ministry of Education and to be taught by textbooks approved and often issued by it and by teachers trained under its supervision, but the remaining 25 per cent of the curriculum is to be determined by the local school in accordance with the parents' preferences. The law recognizes only two types of schools—state education (the standard 75 per cent plus various other secular studies, e.g., handicrafts for the other 25 per cent) and state-religious education (the standard 75 per cent plus religious studies for the other 25 per cent). The various leftist Kibbutz (communal settlements) movements de facto use the 25 per cent clause to introduce their Socialist education. Teachers
for the "twenty-five per cent" are often trained in separate teaching institutions of the various particularistic groups though their standards are under State supervision.

In 1950 it was widely believed that the law nationalizing the schools, to a large degree, remain a piece of paper with teachers and parents combining to assure the kind of education they would like. But in a few years the old system all but disappeared. The particularistic preferences of parents and teachers find adequate expression in the 25 per cent clause. The issuing of new textbooks, the transfer of teachers and principals which reduced the political homogeneity of a school's staff, the reorganization of the teacher colleges by the Ministry of Education, and above all, the opening of many new schools to absorb the mass of immigrant children, all made for surprisingly rapid universalism of schools.

4. Moderately Successful: Welfare and the Civil Service. Universalization has been more limited in its success in the diverse areas of labor exchanges, housing, welfare, and in the development of the civil service.

"Labor Exchanges" or employment agencies serve to supply workers with jobs and employers with workers. In the period before independence, these exchanges were to a very large degree controlled by the Histadrut, the Federation of Jewish Labor. Considerably smaller and less powerful exchanges were run by the right-wing Revisionist parties and by a religious-labor party, HaPoel HaMizrachi.

The Exchanges were a source of much political power; it was widely known that a "note" from the local secretary of a party could go a long way in getting a job. The system operated more or less smoothly on what was known as the "key system" by which various parties obtained a number of representatives on the exchange staff and a number of jobs roughly proportional to their national and local power as reflected in election results. Obviously, the parties were very reluctant to give up this strategic power.

It was ten years after the nationalization of the army and of the schools that the major law was passed regulating the Labor Exchanges. The law nationalized the Labor Exchanges so that they are now agencies of the Ministry of Labor. According to the law their clerks are appointed and salaried by the State and promotions are based upon merit and upon examinations. The State determines the regulations according to which work is allocated. In actuality, the State has been only gradually gaining control over the exchanges primarily because the old staff, which carries over much of the earlier traditions, still remains. (Only three years
have passed since the law was enacted.) Nonetheless, the direction of the change is unmistakably in the general universalistic direction.

Welfare, which was previously supplied by the parties and various "over-organizations," is now to an increasing degree administered by a host of non-political voluntary associations, by the Ministry of Welfare, and through various municipal programs. While there is some overlapping, with the various agencies penetrating each others' spheres, a division of labor of sorts has developed. The State focuses on relief and social security, which include in Israel old age pensions, survivors' insurance, industrial accident insurance, and maternity benefits. The voluntary associations tend to focus on specific problems such as rehabilitation or homes for the aged. The parties and especially the Histadrut, while conducting some of each of these activities, often augmenting the sums allotted by the State, concentrate on needs which are not met by the government, such as nursery schools and re-training programs. In those allocations particularistic criteria prevail. That is, services are restricted to members.

The situation in housing is rather similar. While a great deal—and an ever increasing amount—of construction in the development areas (e.g., the Negev desert) is conducted by the State, and in the developed areas such as Tel Aviv by private construction firms, the parties still continue to build projects for their members as they did in the period prior to independence. Typically the allocation of housing constructed by the State is governed by a host of highly universalistic principles which rigidly allocate apartments according to age, size of family, length of stay in the country, etc., while parties allocate houses built under their auspices—with clear preference to their adherents, functionaries, etc.

The development of universalism in the civil service is of much interest. Some of the employees were on the staff of the pre-independence British civil service, and some on the staffs of various Jewish institutions, in particular the Jewish Agency. But both contributed together only 13 per cent of the present Civil Service. The large majority of employees joined the Service after the state was established.

Over the years, many kinds of regulations were developed which are typical of modern civil services in other countries, particularly the English. Regulations require that workers for the lower unskilled positions be recruited through the state-controlled Labor Exchange (that is, according to its universalistic rules which attempt to assure an even distribution of work among the unemployed, taking into account differences in the size of
family, etc.). All other positions, with the exception of a few top ones, are recruited on the basis of examinations after public announcement of open positions. Promotions are based on merit; there is a certain minimum length of service required for advancement and seniority is given consideration. Many ranks require specific training and degrees. Salaries are standardized by ranks, training, etc. With the exception of standardization of salaries, which is generally enforced, all other regulations are quite frequently circumvented or violated. The extent of such particularism is hard to establish, but informed observers seem to agree that it is declining.

Particularism still exists on all levels of the civil service. The State is run chiefly by sixteen Ministries (the number changes). The ministers in charge are political appointees and constitute the Cabinet. But since the Israeli government is a multi-party coalition, the Cabinet is composed of representatives of various parties. This means that with a change in the composition of the coalition, the parties in charge of various ministries change. But the change is far from random. As pointed out in some detail elsewhere, the nine central ministries have always been in the hands of the Mapai (Labor Party). Other ministries have traditionally though not always drawn their heads from one party or another; for instance, Development was often the province of a left party, Welfare of a religious party, and Justice of the liberal Progressive Party. Hence a good way of testing the degree to which the civil service is universalistic is by checking the party affiliations of the employees of the various ministries. There are no direct data to support the following contention, but those familiar with the situation seem to agree that while members of most parties will be found in most ministries, there is considerable over-representation within a ministry of the party in charge which increases the longer the party is in control and the higher the level of rank examined.

Universalization occurs through the expansion of the examination system as the basis for recruitment and promotion. This limits the degree to which particularism can prevail, e.g., each party has to recruit from among those of its members which can pass the various tests. Moreover, since many employees are hired when fairly young and unions make dismissal practically impossible, even with a change in the party holding office, a certain amount of mixture of party affiliates occurs in many ministries. This is true especially in those ministries in which the party in charge tends to change with changes in the composition of the coalition government. In addition training develops a certain amount of civil service esprit-de-corps which itself builds
up resistance to particularism. Still, in toto, the civil service is only moderately universalistic.

5. Highly Particularistic: The Health Services. Health services, such as welfare, housing, schools, etc., were not sufficiently supplied to the Jewish population by the British government; therefore, the various Jewish political bodies organized their own health plans. The Histadrut health service serves the Left and most independents; there is a much smaller right-wing medical service, and another one organized by the religious-labor party. Thus doctors, nurses and patients were divided by their political affiliations.

The Histadrut health service (the Workers' Sick Fund) whose budget is almost today twice that of the State's service, is especially successful. It includes a vast network of hospitals, clinics, medical training institutions, etc., serving about seventy per cent of the population. The service is paid for out of the members' union-dues; as a rule one cannot enjoy its benefits without being a union member, nor can one be a union member without having to pay the service. Its health plan is widely believed to be the most powerful hold the Histadrut has over its members.

Since the establishment of the State, the government has developed some health services, primarily by taking over the few hospitals left by the British. In addition, it supervises medical standards in the clinics and hospitals run by the various political units. Compared to universalization and nationalization in other areas, however, little has been done here.

There are several reasons for this. First, health happened to remain the last major item on the list of services rendered particularistically, and thus the Histadrut used all of its great political power to protect this hold it had over its members. Second, the health operation is much more extensive than the others. It is estimated that were the government to nationalize the health service and compensate the Histadrut for the property involved, it would have to divert all of its development budget for the next ten years to this purpose alone. (Nationalization without due compensation was never practiced in Israel.) Finally, the government does not relish the large increases in both taxes and staff which would be required to maintain these services.

In sum, out of the eight institutional areas examined (which include all the important ones), in three universalization has progressed to a high degree, in four it has been fairly successful, and only in one has it just begun.

Some General Comments on Universalization

First of all, it is crucial to realize that the transfer of functions, responsibilities, and budgets from particularistic units
(the political parties; the Histadrut) to the State involves a relocation of power. The State, which had little, is gaining power while the various political units are losing it. This in turn is surely one factor accounting for the increase in the floating vote in Israel; as the power of the parties declines, more people "dare" to change sides. This further decreases the power of each single party. Hence, the parties, especially those successful in providing services to their members, are naturally, at best, ambivalent about turning these functions over to the State. Since the Left has been more powerful in the neo-feudal period, naturally it is more resistant to the universalization process, though without its consent—however reluctant and ambivalent it may be—the process could not be carried out. The fact that Mapai (Labor party) heads the government as well as the Histadrut is, of course, extremely helpful to the process.

Nationalization of functions does not necessarily mean universalization. For instance, transferring the management of the Labor Exchanges from the Histadrut, whose Executive Committee has a majority of Mapai members, to the Ministry of Labor, which now runs the Exchanges and which is in the hands of a Mapai minister, involves some universalization but less than one would expect from the sheer fact of nationalization. Thus, as long as the particularistic elements are still powerful in the civil service, nationalization will bring about only a decline in particularism but will not eliminate it.

Not only does nationalization not spell automatic universalization, but not every lessening of particularism is achieved by transferring functions and powers to the State. a) To a small degree it is attained by the development of the apolitical, non-governmental sector (e.g., voluntary associations such as Hadassah, which set up and ran T.B. hospitals). b) More important, the rapid growth of population (which more than doubled in the past thirteen years) requires constant development of new units of all services. These can be rather freely developed along the more universalistic lines even when the old units are left relatively intact. c) Once the universalism of the new units is well established transfers between them and the older ones allow the extension of the new spirit, although they may sometimes provide an opening for the old one to sneak in. d) Much progress is attained by imposing new universalistic standards of supervision on old units.

Finally, as we have pointed out above, completely universalistic systems are by no means the most effective or desirable ones. Thus, for example, the fact that none of the Israeli generals and chiefs of staff is of the extreme Left or Right introduces an element of particularism, but one which is not necessarily dysfunctional. That only 75 per cent of the school program is
universalistic allows various sub-groups to fulfill their own educational needs, while still assuring that all children will acquire a large set of universally shared values and knowledge. The failure to nationalize the health services may be detrimental to universalization in other areas because it leaves important power in the hands of the political bodies, especially the Histadrut; but in a state in which the population is very highly taxed, allowing one major service to be financed by voluntary payments may be highly functional, at least from the economic viewpoint. The fact that no one is forced to use any particular service (there are at least three health services, while the State cares for relief cases, and, of course, there is private health care) somewhat reduces possible undesirable side-effects of a particularistic health plan. State supervision of the standards of the health services provided by the political units for their members is another way in which the universalistic and particularistic structures penetrate each other.

Future Trends

Further universalization is almost unavoidable. First, past universalization breeds that of the future. As the number of individuals who were educated in State schools, served in the unified national army, obtained their jobs through the State-controlled Labor Exchanges, etc., continues to grow, the number of young voters who are considerably less party oriented than their elders also will continue to increase. As the power of the parties continues to decline and that of the State to increase, even the party allegiances of the older generation will diminish.

The increasing role of apolitical voluntary associations, especially charitable and professional organizations, creates a non-governmental universalistic type of competition for the particularistic units and further reduces their impact. The same is true of the increasing size of the private enterprise economy.

The absorption and education of immigrants, especially of the less educated types, as occurred in the U.S., will surely reduce their propensity for accepting particularistic bonds.

The intellectual assaults on neo-feudalism, common in the last decade, will also continue to aid in building up an ideology of anti-particularism and pro-universalism.

Thus, while particularism or neo-feudalism is far from dead in Israel, it has declined very markedly and will in all likelihood continue to decline in the near future. Its complete elimination, we suggest, is undesirable from the viewpoint the values to which most citizens, parties, and the State are all committed.
NOTES

1. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the Council for Social Research of Columbia University in conducting this study.

2. This is enhanced by the fact that the same party Mapai dominated all Israeli governments and always held the office of the Defense Ministry.


4. This becomes especially apparent in the case of the Post Office which was for long periods in the hands of the religious parties, and hence the percentage of its staff which follows the orthodox Jewish custom of covering the head with a skullcap is visibly higher than, let us say, in the Mapai-dominated Treasury.