There is room for unilateral action to improve international relations in areas other than nuclear test bans, the cessation of bomb production, or general disarmament. One such area—the subject of this article—concerns the effects of international competition for prestige on peaceful coexistence.

The significance of unilateral action is that it does not require the international cooperation presupposed by many other proposals to improve these relations. Multilateral action is blocked by a vicious circle: inter-bloc co-operation is not forthcoming unless tension is somewhat reduced; tension cannot be reduced until a higher degree of co-operation is attained. Hence the special significance of unilateral action: in addition to whatever improvement it produces in itself, it also opens the way to multilateral action.

Objection to most unilateral programs is based on the belief that they engender a sacrifice to the initiator which will not be matched by the other side. The nature of the unilateral action to be suggested here is such that if it is carried out adequately it will give an advantage not only to the state of international affairs but also to the party which initiates it. The other party can reduce the advantage of the initiator only by joining the activity, and thus adding to the improvement of international relations.

This is not to imply that there has been found a major key to the solution of international problems. The present analysis focuses on one and only one factor: the effect of international competition for prestige on the probability of war. Many other factors affect this probability; some are more important or more immediate in their effect than the nature of the international status-seeking. I choose to focus on prestige, both because it seems to be a factor which can be tackled by unilateral action without risk, and because it is rarely examined in this context. First, the determinants of international prestige are considered; then the character of the prestige contest

in itself is examined from the viewpoint of its effects on international tension. Finally I discuss the ways in which this contest can be modified, both to reduce its present inflammatory nature and to enable it to enhance peaceful coexistence.

I. The Determinants of International Prestige.

Prestige and Aggression.

Members of nations see in the state more than an agency to which they pay taxes and which supplies them with security, welfare, and other services; they identify with it and its fate. Most citizens derive symbolic gratifications and deprivations from changes in the international status of their nation. But it is easy to grossly exaggerate the emotional significance of prestige, of the relative standing a person, group, or nation has in the eyes of others. It is chiefly under two conditions that national prestige does become a major factor: when loss of prestige adds to a severe crisis brought about by other things, and when national leaders fan the limited concern citizens normally hope for the standing of their nation abroad into a prestige-obsession.

Loss of prestige, like other frustrations, might generate a large variety of responses, from withdrawal to enhanced efforts. But it seems that when a large and rapid loss of prestige is added to economic insecurity (generated by a sharp depression or wild inflation) and to deprivations of emotional satisfaction resulting from loss of family and community ties (e.g., long bombardments; husbands at front), intensive and widespread feelings of aggression are likely to be aroused. Thus, the humiliation of Germany in World War I is frequently listed as a contributory factor in the 1917 revolution and the foundation of the Weimar Republic; the prestige-deprivation inflicted by the Versailles treaty is commonly seen as a factor contributing to the emergence of Nazism, a movement obsessed with national status. The 1905 and 1917 defeats of Tsarist Russia, which came on top of wide alienation of the rigidly oppressed industrial classes, triggered the Soviet revolution. In periods of peace, stable economies and integrated social relations, frustrations of national prestige rarely lead to aggressive behavior except student demonstrations before the embassies of the countries which inflict the prestige loss. Britain lost much of its empire, the United
States its post-World War II position as the superior power, without any marked increase in internal or external aggression.

Prestige decline which does not lead to aggressive behavior of the masses, may nevertheless lead to popular demand for a more aggressive foreign policy. The attitudes of Americans toward Cuba and toward the Communist bloc in general are cases in point. But so long as no agitation occurs, the aggressive tone of the public tends to decline with time; other events attract its attention.

There is one way, though, in which even in stable societies international status can become a permanent salient factor in determining the public attitudes; this is if the leadership of a country itself consistently makes the national standing of the country a central political issue. While we agree with Schumpeter that the political elites—even in democracies—shape the public opinion more than public opinion shapes the politicians’ course (a 1957 study by Samuel Lubell showed that American citizens viewed the missile race just the way President Eisenhower viewed it), still it should be pointed out that once public feeling has been aroused, let us say national prestige has been staked on two small forsaken islands, even skilled politicians find it difficult to change the country’s stand (1). The American attitude toward Communist China is probably the best recent illustration of this tendency.

It is hence crucial to realize that building up excessive public concern with the status of a country may be detrimental to the improvement of international relations. For once, the analogue to individual behavior seems justified. A certain amount of concern with the image one creates in the eyes of others is both unavoidable and desirable. It makes for responsiveness to the public opinion of other countries and, in a sense, to world public opinion. But excessive concern with one’s standing in the eyes of others heightens frustration generated by minute prestige fluctuations. Those might express themselves in various irrational responses including aggression. Countries which constantly brood over their status, which change the allocation of their labor force, public budget and educational system in part to improve their “international status” are as irrational as individuals who keep rearranging their

(1) "Dulles made it his first order of business to secure for his person and policies the support of the Congress and of public opinion at large; in this endeavor, he was eminently successful. But as a result something happened to him that had never happened to Mr. Acheson: he became the prisoner of a public opinion—in good measure created by his own words and deeds which limited his freedom of action...” Hans J. Morgenthau, Prospect for a New Foreign Policy, Commentary (Feb. 1961), p. 107.
lives to suit the latest pattern advocated by the proverbial Joneses'.
In short, one has to distinguish between normal responsiveness to
others and status-obsession.

Prestige Constants and Prestige Variables.

The danger of excessive concern with status is rather obvious; what is less evident, to judge from the amount of investment in prestige-building activities, is the limited effect of many of these activities. The prestige of a person, a social group, or a nation is a product of a) basic characteristics; b) the values of the others who grant prestige; c) short run activities partly governed by prestige considerations; and d) activities chiefly governed by such considerations. Only the latter two are subject to manipulation.

The prestige of a country rests first of all on its basic characteristics, including the nature of its political structure (democratic or authoritarian), its economy (rich or poor), its “culture” (how many great writers, poets, and painters has it given the world in the course of history?), the general level of its technology, its basic military potential, and the like. The essential quality of these assets is that they have accumulated over generations, or are a basic element of the structure of the society. They change slowly and gradually; they cannot be adjusted to affect the contemporary international prestige contest. It is these constants which limit the fluctuations of prestige. Whatever, for instance, the United States does, it still is a democratic, rich, highly industrialized, technologically advanced country. It is still the country of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln. Much of its international standing is based on that. People may add an ounce for a successful space program, deduct half an ounce for a U-2, but the basic stock is hardly affected. To truly affect the status of a country requires an accumulation of such short-run activities and incidents much longer and larger than is often realized.

Not less crucial are the values of the persons, groups, or nations which grant prestige. Prestige is a judgment about the relative standing of one party made by other parties. This judgment depends not only on what a country is, but also on the standards by which the country is evaluated. Thus, for example, the question is not only, does the United States have a more effective technology than Soviet Russia or the other way around, but, how much prestige does India grant technological achievements?
A country anxious to improve its prestige may wish to affect these values so that its existing assets will be more highly regarded. Hence countries whose income per capita is high, stress the value of a high standard of living. Countries whose income per capita is low but rapidly increasing, emphasize the value of economic growth. But the fact is that the values and beliefs of nations change slowly; and the degree to which another nation can affect these values, despite all the modern means of mass communication and persuasion, appears to be quite limited. We know from studies of advertising and other uses of mass communication that they are most effective when the information supplied fits into an existing cognitive and normative frame of reference; conversely, the greater the cultural differences, the less effective cross-cultural communication becomes. Hence cross-cultural propaganda and related efforts seem to have considerably less effect on the standing of a country than is often believed. Thus, in addition to limits imposed on prestige-variability by basic characteristics, there are limits imposed by the basic values of the prestige-granting societies.

It is only within the limits established by the characteristics of the society which is evaluated and the values of those doing the evaluating, that action can be undertaken to affect the international status of a country. This may be attained either by introducing prestige as one consideration in directing short-run, manipulatable activities, or by allowing prestige-considerations to be the chief determinant of a course of action. To illustrate the distinction on a personal level, when a person considers buying a car, one factor which might affect his decision is that owning a car has a prestige value; but many other factors, such as the availability of convenient and unexpensive transportation, are to be considered. Whether to buy a Ford or a Cadillac is, on the other hand, predominantly a question of prestige. Similarly, while building missiles and developing their guidance systems has a clear, “real” military value, the frequency with they are fired into outer space (where they are difficult to observe) and the dates at which they are fired (on the eve of Khrushchev’s visit to the United States; on the eve of Eisenhower’s planned visit to Japan) are governed by prestige considerations. In particular, sending a man to the moon is chiefly a prestige-oriented activity. It is extremely expensive; it would cost at least 30 billion dollars (New York Times, Feb. 5, 1961), but at the same time has little value in any area other than prestige. Dr Vannevar Bush, a leading figure among natural scientists, termed this endeavor a “stunt” in his 1960 testimony before the House.
Committee on Science and Astronautics. Many other scientists expressed a similar position. From the military and scientific viewpoint, a robot will do as well and from many viewpoints considerably better than an astronaut. A robot’s life is not endangered by radiation; he does not have to be retrieved; he does not become unconscious, nervous, or homesick. Dr Harlow Shapeley, Director of the Harvard Observatory, is reported to have stated that a “man up there would be a hindrance”. Similar statements have been made by Alvin M. Weinberg (director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory for nuclear research), and number of other outstanding and responsible scholars (quoted in an article by Stuart H. Loory, Reporter, April 27, 1961). But from a public relations viewpoint, a man is more effective; his flight is more appealing to the imagination of the masses.

We have already pointed out the limited degree to which a nation’s status can be affected by any short run, deliberate activity. What has to be added is that the international political consequences of changes in prestige are even smaller. Columnists and politicians constantly allude to the effect a country’s international prestige has on its international standing in matters other than prestige, let us say its power position. But actually the power and international strategy of any one country like that of its allies or of “uncommitted” countries is to a very large degree determined by its geopolitical position, its basic military might, its economic structure, its manpower, and by the positions of other countries. Thus the same factors which limit the fluctuation of prestige limit the effects of these fluctuations; therefore not only is prestige hard to change, its variability does not count for much.

In summary, the problem is not to abolish concern with international prestige. Some such concern makes for responsiveness to world public opinion; it is sometimes even credited with being one of the reasons nations avoid a preventive nuclear war (2). The problem is to limit involvement in the prestige contest, to keep the sense of proportion and reality-testing, to realize the limits in which changes in status can be induced, and to keep in mind the limited effect of prestige on international politics. Not only is obsession with prestige costly; it might lead to rigidity, to an unaccommodating international policy.

We turn now to examine the intrinsic characteristics of the international prestige contest, to see under what conditions it is likely to cause a prestige obsession and thus be one factor contributing to a worsening of international relations. The examination suggests action which would change the contest so that it can support rather than undermine peaceful coexistence.

2. The Prestige Contest and Peaceful Coexistence.

Two factors are invariably listed as conditions for non-violent competition: a) shared values between the competing parties, especially values which forbid the use of violence (though other shared values are also significant because they tend to support the norms which directly limit the conflict); b) the existence of a superior force, which neutrally imposes restricting norms on the contending parties. Thus, bowling matches are controlled not only by sports regulations and belief in fair play, but also by referees (and by the police); and competition among democratic parties is regulated not only by parliamentary procedures and belief in the constitution, but also by the police (and by military forces).

While these two conditions for peaceful competition are of the first importance, they are more helpful to writers of international utopias than to the student of international relations and to those concerned with their improvement in the near future. There is hardly a better way to characterize East-West relations than to state that they lack precisely these two conditions; the sharing of ultimate values and the existence of a superior neutral force. Suggestions to improve international relations by creating these conditions, by forming a global community of shared values, to enact a universal law and a world government with an international army to enforce it, is to beg the question. The issue is how to get them, not to show that once you have them the likelihood of violent international conflict is greatly reduced.

And so long as we do not have world-wide shared beliefs and an effective international police force, the pertinent question is, what other factors reduce the probability of international conflict? What less stringent but more attainable conditions will have containing effects?

In particular, under what conditions does the “peaceful” prestige contest build up tensions which might help set off a war, and
under what conditions does seeking prestige maintain a harmless character?

A gang-model.

The following analysis, like many studies of conflict, draws on a model which serves both as an analogue—allowing the illustration of somewhat abstract ideas—and as a small scale case in which generalizations can be readily examined and tested. Like many students of conflict I use games as the source of this model. But this sociological-psychological analysis differs from much game theory in that it assumes neither that the opponents act rationally nor that they observe the rules of the game; both conditions which are often lacking in international relations. Actually, what many studies assume is exactly what this study is intended to establish: under what conditions are conflicts contained within the limits set by the rules of the games? and under what conditions are the limits violated? In particular, what role does prestige play in turning contests into lawless violence?

I have chosen a sports festival in a slum area as a model suitable for the purposes of both illustration and testing. Assume that a sports festival is being conducted in the slum area of any metropolitan area, in which several teenage gangs are competing. These gangs have in the past been involved in violent fights, they share few values, and the police, for one reason or another, is not available. The question is, what pattern of organization of the sports contest will make it least likely that the contest will “escalate” into a fight?

a) One-Event Versus Multi-Event Contests. Probably the most elementary question is: is the competition limited to one type of sport, let us say football, or are there several kinds of competitions going on simultaneously? Drawing on our sociological and psychological knowledge, it seems that providing a larger number of contests rather than focusing on one will be less predisposing to violence. In such sports festivals each team’s status in the gang world is at stake. Having only one sphere of competition channels all the involvement of each group’s members into one race. All the spectators watch one game; losing the one race means losing all. On the other hand, having many concomitant matches makes for a distribution of ego-involvement; it reduces the emotional investment and prestige
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stake in each competition. The lower the emotional stake, the less the temptation to resort to violence when the game seems sure to be lost, or when one contender is close to victory and suddenly the other is improving his score and seems likely to win.

b) Ranking of Contests. The success of a multi-event contest requires that no one contest be considered crucial and all others marginal. If the outcome of football is considered all important, and nobody—even on the losing team—cares who wins in any one of the various field and track races, the situation approaches that of a single-event contest. A feeling that the team’s standing in several contests is significant is hence another factor contributing to the observation of the rules.

The nature of the international competition has changed from these two viewpoints over recent years. Since 1957 it has become more and more exclusively focused on space achievements. Other spheres have not disappeared; countries still compare their standards of living (or income per capita), their rate of economic growth, rate of literacy, aid given to developing countries, success in combating disease, number of Nobel prize winners, Olympic medals and so on. But these areas have lost a good part of their prestige-best-owing power; space has taken the center of the stage.

Since gangs, to return to our analogue, usually differ from each other at least in terms of some skills and capacities, most teams will have some “relative advantage” in one game or another. Hence a multi-event competition—especially when there are many games and variability is high—is likely to lead to some victories for each gang. This makes the loss of other events much more tolerable. No longer is there one winner and one loser; there is a winner in games a, b, and c, and a winner in games d and e. Moreover, since findings of various psychological and sociological studies suggest that each party will tend to consider the games it wins the most important ones, the total amount of prestige-ambitions frustrated will be comparatively small. Such face saving can hardly be attained when there is only one event, or only one event is considered important.

Consensus on Ranking.

A competition in which one side sets the criteria for evaluation of the relative import of various events is more likely to become violent
than one in which there are no agreed criteria. Each side tends, of course, to favor a monolithic evaluation of the events based on those in which it has an advantage. To the degree that one team is successful in imposing its criteria on the spectators and on other teams, the value of multi-event competition is greatly reduced. It follows that while communication among the teams about procedures and the rules of the game, including of course those concerning scoring, contribute to peaceful competition, too much communication and increasing consensus over the comparative evaluation of the scores is not conducive to non-violent competition, in particular as long as one side succeeds in making the spheres in which it is most likely to excel, the most valued ones.

In recent years there seems to have been a rapid increase in consensus over the evaluation of the outcome of international races. Earlier differences of evaluation have not completely disappeared: the West still emphasizes its higher standards of living, the East its greater economic growth, though the tendency has been to accept economic growth as more “relevant”. The amount of support given to developing countries, the extent to which atomic power is converted to peaceful uses, were stressed not long ago. But since the first Soviet satellite broadcast its dramatic beeps, projects such as that of ploughing Alaska or watering the Sahara have hardly been heard of. Outer space, a Russian specialty, has become the contest which commands the center of attention and an ever increasing amount of resources. To a considerable degree the West has accepted the East’s evaluation of the relative import of various races, evaluations which are closely associated to the relative advantages of the East (3). This is not only to the disadvantage of the West, but reduces the chances that the competition over status will continue without major frustrations and in peace.

When the nature of the games and the pressures of the spectators is such that one game, let us say football, is considered by far more important than the others, and all efforts for a more even distribution of attention and prestige staking are unsuccessful, it is still possible to realize that there is more than one criterion by which to judge the standing and outcome of this one race. There is not only the question of score, but also the questions of who showed

(3) This in part the case because the two camps had some shared values to begin with, such as the stress on technological and scientific achievement. But this does not necessitate or explain the acceptance of specific evaluations of the other, e.g. which particular technological achievement is “higher”.

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best teamwork, had the best individual player, etc. It is possible
that a team which lost on score did well by any one of the other
standards. While doing well on these secondary criteria is rarely
if ever a substitute for victory by score, obviously the more highly
these secondary criteria are valued the more soothing effect doing
well by them has.

Of special import are the cases in which the observance of the
non-violent character of the game is in itself a criterion (e.g., which
team had fewer fouls), because this makes the inhibition of violence
a source of prestige in itself).

As these lines are written, space is undoubtedly the “football”
of the international prestige contest. At least in the present atmo-
sphere there are too many status-stakes in this area for the two
super-powers to completely give it up. But it should be noted
that while the Russians have succeeded in shooting heavier
objects deeper into space, the Americans have shot considerably
more objects into orbit (at least eight times as many), have had
a larger payload of instruments per satellite, and per pound, were
the first to have a reconnaissance satellite, and have been the first
and only ones to shoot rockets from under water. The tendency
to focus on distance and weight instead of number and payload
has little objective foundation on either scientific or military
grounds. It has consequences similar to those of focusing on one
race and to letting one party determine the criteria for evaluating
the competition (4).

Scope of Victory.

Even when the contest includes many events and status-stakes
are not concentrated in a single contest, an intensive quest for total
victory, for victory in each and every race, is similarly detrimental
to non-violent competition. It makes the games almost as mono-
lithic as if there were only one race, one score.

A pursuit of total victory seems to be not uncommon in the

(4) The same point holds in intra-politi-
cal systems. The most stable coalition
governments are composed of parties which
attach different significance to various policy
spheres, for instance, religious and secular
parties. This allows each party to make
concessions in matters which are less impor-
tant to it and of much importance to the
other party, and demand in exchange
concessions in those matters of greater
import to it than to the other coalition
partners. When there is consensus on the
saliency of the various policy spheres such
concessions are impossible. This point is
spelled out in the author's “Kulturkampf
or Coalition: The Case of Israel".

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West. It explains in part the acceptance of each and every challenge of the East. When the Russians do better in any significant Olympic game, the West feels deeply embarrassed. When the Russians orbited a satellite in October 1957, the American orbited one in 1958. When the Russians shot a capsule to the vicinity of the moon, the Americans did too. When the Russians shot two dogs into orbit, the Americans followed with a monkey. A few days after the space trip of Gagarin came the space jump of Shepard. As in the popular song, “anything you can do, I can do better”; the Americans have tried to match the Russians in every single act and activity initiated by the Russians, from weight lifting to target shooting.

The roots of this tendency are worth exploring. After World War II there was one major power on the global scene, one international might never defeated, its country undamaged, its military power intact, the only possessor of atomic bombs. In the subsequent fifteen years a second power has gained first rank. This required the acceptance of another bloc as a full-fledged contender, one who is likely to win some races. The effort for victory in every single match and in all of them, the striving for a total status advantage, reflects and expresses a rejection of the existence of other first class powers and in a way that of peaceful coexistence. Because a recognition that the other side both has right to exist and is “big” implies that in some activities it is going to excel. Hence, acceptance of peaceful coexistence and the desire for total victory are contradictory positions. A contestant who seeks total victory undermines the continuation of the games.

Means of Competition.

The means used in the sports festival are of crucial import to our problem. “Instruments” used by the contenders differ in the degree to which they can be turned into means of violence. Obviously swimming, running, and jumping matches are safer than boxing, hockey, or target shooting.

Space constitutes a shooting gallery where the two contestants, using high thrust missiles, play an old game: I hit the mark, your turn next. The game has one big virtue, that instead of using each others cities as targets to demonstrate might, the contenders use stars or marks. But everybody who reads his Robin Hood knows that the contesting knights might easily turn their arrows
on each other, in particular when one continuously hits the target and the other consistently misses, or thinks he does. It has been suggested that the space race constitutes the "moral equivalent of war”, that it supplies a peaceful way for the two sides to demonstrate their relative power. It is hence crucial to realize what frame of reference is applied when one evaluates the space race. Since peace is preferred to war and space exploration is a peaceful activity, it is obviously preferable to international violence; but so are many other peaceful activities (5). The problem is to compare various non-violent lines of action with regard to the likelihood that they will lead to war. From this viewpoint a contest which is conducted with missiles is less "safe” than one conducted by most other means. Competition over the sums granted to under-developed countries, the number of bona fide teachers of technicians, or doctors supplied, the schools or roads, or dams built, are all considerably more conducive to peace than space exploration. (This is especially apt when each bloc develops "its" under-developed countries, rather than trying to use development as a means for advancing or blocking.) Most activities have some indirect military significance. Schools improve the army of an ally; dams increase his economic potential. But activities differ in the degree to which means used or produced can be directly turned into weapons. In contrast to missiles, schools and dams, I dare say, are quite safe.

Number of Contenders.

The number of gangs which participate in a sports festival is also relevant to the probability that the peaceful character of the competition will be maintained. If participation is limited to two gangs, tension will be highest; it is in a way like having only one event. Participation of many reduces the psychological investment in any single event, even if there are only two major contenders for first place.

When the nature of the contest requires that only two gangs compete at one time, as in basketball, the presence of other gangs as spectators contributes to the observation of the non-violent

(5) Not all non-violent activities enhance place. For instance a disarmament competition is not necessarily a highly desirable one. Russia and the United States "competed" for a while over size of cuts of military manpower, but this led only to a greater reliance on nuclear bombs in war plans.
character of the contest so long as the spectators grant or withdraw prestige on this ground. In a contest in which many teams play concomitently, let us say a relay match, the larger number allows a mitigation of status of status problems. There is only one "absolute" winner and one "absolute" loser; all the others are in between. Victory or loss becomes a question of degree, not a dichotomous state.

This is not to imply that the largest possible number of gangs is the best one. When the number is very large, let us say one hundred teams, it becomes rather hard to observe the behavior of the various parties, to assure conformity to the rules, and even more important, it becomes rather difficult to reach an agreement on anything, from allocation of the fields to scoring procedures, from the timing of inspection of the contenders to the timing of intervals. Obviously, the ideal contest avoids both extremes.

In the international competition the number of the teams is in part dependent on the two super-powers' tolerance of all kinds of neutrals: neutrals close to one side, neutrals close to the other side, and "neutral-neutrals". In general, neutral countries put a premium on moderate behavior of the two leading contenders. A contender who takes extreme positions is likely to lose the support of neutral-neutrals; endanger the commitment of "his" neutrals; and build up the commitment of the other side's neutrals to his bloc. The neutral countries have the same function that the floating vote has in intranational political systems. If there is no floating vote, the smaller party feels it has no chance of ever gaining power in a legitimate way. On the other hand, if there is a bonus for moderation in terms of gains from the floating vote, there is greater incentive to limit the competition to legitimate means.

Neutrals shift their support in the United Nations and other international organizations according to the merit of the positions each bloc presents. Alger points out that countries' votes in the seven U.N. committees split differentially according to the committee and the issue:

In the political committee the United States and the Soviet Union are the main protagonists, with their political allies aligning on the appropriate side and primarily some Afro-Asian nations playing a mediating role[...]. But in the economic committee it is the haves against the have-nots, with the Latin-Americans joining the Afro-Asians in a drive for an increase in multi-lateral economic programs[...]. On the trusteeship and non-self-governing territories committee the colonial nations and the newly independent countries are the main protagonists. On matters before the legal committee related to ocean shipping, the maritime nations are lined up against non-maritime members. Finally, on the budgetary committee the lines of conflict are sometimes drawn with virtually all member nations on one
The flexibility of the neutral vote thus couples the major blocs to take relevant and flexible rather than ideological and totalistic positions and makes mutual concessions and compromises more likely.

That neutrals' flexibility has beneficial effects does not mean however, that blocs and alliances have only negative effects, that, a system of a hundred isolated nations would be the most peaceful one. The same points which hold for consensus-formation on the national level may apply on the international level, even if we are concerned only with working consensus and not with consensus over ultimate values. As long as each major interest group is represented on the top level of decision making, a state approached by the French Fourth Republic, the ability to reach a compromise and an agreed-upon course of action is severely limited. Too many different positions have to be reconciled at once. Effective political systems have two, frequently more, consensus-formation levels. First, various interest groups workout a compromise policy on the party level; then the parties arrive at their compromise on the national level (6). International alliances, especially supra-national communities, work as such first order consensus-formation bodies, of a small group of nations (7). Then, in the U.N. or G.A.T.T. or O.C.E.D. or other inter-governmental bodies, bloc (and sometimes global) consensus is worked out.

Time Perspective.

Every captain concerned with sustaining a peaceful competition will emphasize to his team that whatever the outcome of the present round of games, there is always another year, another round, another occasion to excel, as long as the institutions of peaceful competition are not undermined. Political parties are much more likely to become violent when they feel that if a certain election

(6) This is attained in bi-partisan foreign policy; in cases in which the legislature is controlled by the majority of a party other than that which holds the executive power; through coalition governments; and through the very change of the party in office.

(7) In particular in cases they have a shared or coordinated representation such as those E.E.C. has in the Wester Union; the Nordic Council ins. G.A.T.T.; or the West often has in the General Assembly or political committees of the U.N.
is lost, their cause is lost forever (as when the vote concerns the independence or position of a country like Algeria or the Cameroons, or when it concerns constitutional matters which have or seem to have only one “round”), than when a defeat in a particular election can be turned into a victory in the next. Similarly, full recognition that international contests continue in the space, economic, cultural, and many other spheres every day, keeping the following rounds in the mind, can reduce the psychological investment in the outcome of each round. It may often seem that the success of the one side in a particular round threatens the very existence of the other side. History shows that this is rarely the case. For most nations there is always another day.

3. Unilateral action in the Prestige Contest.

The conclusion suggested by the two preceding parts of this discussion is that it is in the interest of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and of continued peaceful coexistence to reduce the emotional investments in international prestige contests, both by realizing the limited significance of success in this area and the large costs and dangers involved in obsessive efforts to maximize international status, and by remaking the nature of the international competition.

The question arises, can one party change the nature of the international prestige contest, or is the co-operation of both sides required? Can the captain of a team, even a major one, change the nature of the contest? The answer is a resounding “yes”, though the various steps actually to be taken depend to a large degree on the responses of the other captains to each step taken. In the following paragraphs we focus on the Western team as the initiator of such a change. This focus is chosen both because most of the readers of this article are likely to be members of Western nations, and because it seems that the West has suffered in recent years from over-involvement in the prestige contest and can gain considerably from some disengagement. The following simple example illustrates how such a modification of the international status-seeking can be obtained. There are probably many other, possibly more effective ways to apply the principles suggested above, to make the international contest less predisposed to prestige obsession and hence to rigidity, frustration, and possibly violence. The major concern here is to illustrate the ways in which the
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contest needs can be remodeled, not to develop detailed programs.

A change in administration, a new inauguration of a re-elected president or a change of a secretary of state, supplies a legitimation for a change of policy and hence reduces the usual accusations about “succumbing to pressure” or “weakness” which follow changes of policy in the present rigid state of the contest. Assume that a new policy maker were to issue a declaration to the effect that the United States and its allies were pulling out of the “man to the moon” race. No more government funds would be spent on it. Other activities in outer space would also be sharply curtailed. Sums earlier allocated to such programs would be diverted to increase aid to under-developed countries.

The declaration would place heavy emphasis on the difference between outer and inner space. It is widely agreed that outer space has little if any military or economic value (8). The great gains to be realized by various space activities such as weather forecast and control, surveillance and communication, are all best served not by moon-shots or trips to Venus but by activities in inner space, where distances are measured in hundreds of miles rather than in light years. Now the prestige element of outer space activities is high, their “real” value low, hence they rather than the less prestigious, more valuable inner space explorations would be the natural candidate for termination.

The financial basis for the change of policy would also be clearly stated. Extensive expenditure on exploration of outer space is justified in terms of human curiosity and man’s limitless desire to know (9). But man’s curiosity is not confined to outer space; there are numerous subjects which can and do arouse his explorative urge. Why focus on a high expense, low-yield area? Why not satisfy first our “curiosity” about the causes of cancer, mental ill-

(8) The editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, summarizing the opinions of 18 scientists participating in a special issue on space explorations [April 1961] stated: “The talk of ‘dominating Earth by dominating space’, of military Moon bases, of the strategic importance of Mars and Venus, not to speak of the colonization of other planets [...] has little or no relation to the realities of military balance of power in the foreseeable future [...] The Soviet spaceships as well as the great variety of miniaturized American satellites should be looked upon entirely as feats of scientific exploration whose only non-scientific implications are in accretions to national prestige” (170). A similar position was taken by Dr Jerome B. Wiesner, now chief science adviser to President Kennedy, in a report to President Eisenhower.

(9) Ralph E. LAPP suggests that a moon trip will yield a pinch of moondust which would be an “astronomical rosetta stone”; evidence of life in space would have philosophical repercussions as profound as those which followed Copernicus’ and Galileo’s conclusions that the earth was not the center of the universe (Man and Space, New York, Harper, 1961).
ness or the common cold? or the sources of sociological and psychological resistance to social progress, and the ways to overcome it? Surely the much more promising exploration of the oceans or the depths of the earth are not less intriguing than new maps of the moon. Stress would be laid on a point often neglected in this context: among the numerous subjects of man's interest and exploration there are only a few which taxpayers subsidize to any extensive degree. If private foundations or some university professors wish to continue to satisfy their own and the common human desire to know about outer space, fine. But can the public spend 30 billion dollars—the amount required to send one man to the moon—to answer some questions about the shape of the moon? Are we that curious, when the same amount of money would serve to develop entire India (10)?

It would be freely admitted that the Russians are ahead in the outer space contest, at least when it comes to weight lifting. They might well be invited to supply a United Nations scientific program of outer space exploration with the heavy rockets (the U.S. would contribute its already developed, high yield payloads). On the other hand, the United States would announce that it sees the major contest in a development race; that is, in "hard" contributions to backward countries, such as investment funds, and providing of bona fide experts and teachers to accelerate development. To underscore the peaceful nature of the race, each bloc might choose one or more countries clearly in its sphere of influence, to demonstrate its superior ability to construct dams, water deserts, dry swamps, and more important, to develop an economy to a state where it can go on and develop itself without continued outside aid. It will be stated from the outset that in this new contest no empty gestures, no prestige stunts, will be matched.

If the Russians should choose to invest comparatively less but in big conspicuous projects such as over-sized steel mills or dams, the United States would not try to match them. It would patiently point out to the developing countries that the amount of the aid and the rationality of its distribution are what count, not its visibility.

Shifting from the man-to-the-moon race to the development

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(10) "It would be insane for Britain to devote any considerable part of her resources to such an adventure, while our people remain so largely uneducated, our slums so great a national disgrace and our contribution to the welfare of the underdeveloped nations so miserably inadequate"; Kingsley Martin, Reflections on Outer Space, New Statesman, Aug. 27, 1960.
race could be undertaken unilaterally without causing a loss. It would quite likely render a gain to the initiator of such shift, and to international relations *whatever* the other side did in response. One way this can be demonstrated is by applying the seven criteria suggested above for evaluation of the potential predisposition to violence of such contests.

If the East were to continue to insist that prestige should be derived chiefly from success in outer space, United States change in policy would result in a more *diversified* international prestige contest, even if only part of the world public were to validate her claim for prestige to be based on aid to developing countries rather than on shooting objects into outer space. The dangerous situation in which one side monopolistically sets the criteria for the evaluation of the outcome of the international prestige contest would be broken. The sense that *victory in all* spheres is necessary would be changed by the free and deliberate admission that in one sphere the Soviets are ahead.

If, on the other hand, the Russians were to accept the challenge and see in contributions to under-developed countries the chief yard stick of international competition, a shift to “safer” means of contest would be obtained. True, shooting cameras, Geiger-counters, and mice around the moon is a harmless activity compared to shooting anything at the other camp. But since obviously all no-war contests are “safer” than international violence this can be hardly seen as a virtue of the space contest. When the relative safety of space exploration and development are compared from this viewpoint, it is evidently much easier to directly convert means of space exploration to means of warfare than investments in development. While in the long run development increases the military potential of a country, space exploration requires an immediate and constant improvement of the most dangerous modern fire arms, long range missiles. (Typically most disarmament programs require cessation of production of missiles as their very first stage). Comparatively speaking, the value of dams, plowed deserts, and schools to military might lies in the distant future and is highly indirect. In addition, nobody ever argued that space trips could as much as approach the increase in human happiness generated by development. As emotional as it might sound, this is truly a question of investment in feeding starving children as against improving the maps of Van Allen belts, of suppressing ignorance and disease on earth as against finding new moons in the skies.
A major advantage of a development race over an outer space contest is that the comparative success of development—especially of different countries, in particular when not only economic but also cultural and social development are pursued—is much more difficult to determine. There are so many and unagreed upon criteria to judge development, that a clear-cut scoring is impossible, and with it a sharp failure or victory inconceivable.

Following the criteria derived from our gang model and common sense, development should be supported in all backward countries according to the degree help is needed, not their willingness to join various bloc alliances, especially military ones. Recognizing and legitimating neutrality, among other things by maintaining, not cutting, economic and technological aid, will make for more contenders and keep or increase the international "floating vote". This supplies an essential reward for peaceful competition and moderate contenders, that of winning the respect—possibly the valuable voluntary support—of uncommitted nations.

As a long range process, development allows for practically endless future "rounds"; no failure can be interpreted as ultimate or as hopelessly undermining the status of an aid-granting power. Next year's development budget and administration might well not only make up for past failures, but surpass last and present years achievements of the other side.

It is often suggested that it is more difficult to secure psychological investment in a development race because its outcome is less visible, harder to score, and takes longer to develop than that of a space race and the race itself is less dramatic. Following the general line of our analysis, we would suggest that this is to the better; some reduction in involvement is highly desirable. But it should be pointed out that development might well steal the limelight from space since a) there is place for rather dramatic and visible operations in development, such as using one big atomic blast to divert rivers into arid deserts, opening warm water harbors for ice bound countries, and opening huge mines for surface exploitation; and b) while space exploration appeals to man's curiosity, his desire to know, that is, to relatively "cool" values, economic development appeals to values which are much more emotionally laden, such as international equality, help to the poor, hungry, and ignorant—in short, to humanitarianism.

The suggested unilateral activity illustrates that one side can initiate a change in the international prestige contest so as to reduce involvement in it, to break the prestige-obsession, and thus con-
tribute to peaceful coexistence. A development race is preferable to a space race, since while both supply a non-violent contest area, the development race contributes more to central human values and is inherently less volatile than the space race (*).

* This article was written while the author was on the staff of the Institute of War and Peace Studies.