The Functional Differentiation of Elites in the Kibbutz

Amitai Etzioni

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ABSTRACT

A process of differentiation in the social structure of the communal settlements of Israel (kibbutz) is related to functional differentiation of elites. Expert, managerial, social, and cultural elites emerge. The differentiation first takes place on the role level and later on the personnel level. The processes of differentiation follow predictable lines suggested by Parsons. Once differentiated, a hierarchy of elites tends to develop in which specialized elites are at the bottom, dual elites at the middle level, and collectivity oriented elites at the top.

1. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ELITES

Every social system, perhaps every system of action, is confronted with four basic functional problems. When simple social systems become more complex, when a Gemeinschaft becomes a Gesellschaft, four distinct subsystems emerge, each predominantly devoted to one of the major functions. Thus many processes of change can be analyzed as processes of functional differentiation. These ideas, formulated by Professor Parsons in 1953, have been fruitfully applied in the analysis of a large number of social as well as non-social systems, including the social structures of task-oriented groups, of families, and of economies; the processes of socialization and social control; and the history of culture, especially religion and the structure of the legal system. This paper attempts to show that, after some minor additions, this conceptual scheme can be very helpful in analyzing the social structure and the differentiation of elites. The discussion is based on a study of elites in communal settlements (kibbutzim) in Israel.

The four universal functional problems are: (1) the need of the system to control the environment; (2) gratification of the system's goals; (3) maintenance of solidarity among the system units; and (4) reinforcement of the integrity of the value system and its institutionalization. In the rest of the discussion these functional problems will be referred to as "adaptive," "goal-attainment," "solidaric," and "normative," respectively. Following Parsons' suggestion the adaptive and goal-attainment functions will be labeled "external" and the solidaric and normative "internal." The adaptive and normative will be labeled "instrumental" and the goal-attainment and solidaric functions "consummatory" (see Table 1).


2 Parsons et al., op. cit., pp. 63-268, esp. 111-61.


4 Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956).

5 This paper is based on the author's Ph.D. dissertation, "The Organizational Structure of the Kibbutz" (University of California, Berkeley, 1958). He is indebted to Professors S. M. Lipset and Philip Selznick, and to Professor Talcott Parsons for criticism of an earlier version and especially to Dr. Y. Talmor-Garber. The data were collected at the Israeli Institute of Productivity.


7 Discussions of Professor Parsons in a seminar, Berkeley, spring, 1958.

8 A preliminary report on this study was published in Hebrew (see Ami Itzioni, "The Organizational Structure of the Kibbutz," Nis HaKeves, VI, No. 3 [August, 1957], 412-33, and VI, No. 4 [November, 1957], 658-82).

In every social system at least some social situation, roles, or, in more complex structures, collectivities are devoted mainly to one of the major functions. When the social systems become complex and internally differentiated, we would expect to find in each subsystem some roles or collectivities which specialize in initiating, directing, and/or regulating the activities of each subsystem. We shall refer to these roles and collectivities as "elites." Thus we would expect to find in each complex social system four elites, one for each subsystem.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Instrumental</th>
<th>Consummatory</th>
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</table>
| External | A 
Adaptive | G 
Goal attainment |
| Internal | L 
(Normative) | Solidarity |
|         |              |               |

We suggest calling the adaptive elite—the elite of the specialists or experts, the goal-attainment elite—the politicians or managers (depending on the context); the elite of integrative activities—the social leaders, and the elite of the normative subsystem—the "cultural" (as defined by Parsons) leaders, including philosophers, ideologists, religious leaders, and others. This nomenclature can be justified by showing that the activities of experts, managers, and social and cultural leaders, using these designations approximately as they are generally understood, are cognate with the activities of the four functional subsystems discussed above, if both types of activities are analyzed in terms of pattern variables. The pattern variables of the four subsystems have been specified by Parsons as shown in Table 2.19

We shall turn now to specify the various elite activities in these terms. The experts are adaptive because their activities are specific and universalistic. They deal with

19 Working Papers, p. 182.
the cultural elites seem to be expert orientations (e.g., most academicians). Thus a relatively more sophisticated classification of elites can be achieved only when the analytical scheme is applied at least twice and the predominant as well as the subordinate orientations of elites determined.

II. THE PROCESS OF FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION

In a very simple and uninstitutionalized social system, as, for instance, friendship between two people who have about equal status and similar involvement in the relationship, there may be no elite positions. But in somewhat larger (e.g., experimental groups) or more institutionalized (e.g., the family) systems, specialized roles of initiation and control will tend to develop. At first, or at very low levels of complexity, these elite positions will tend to be multifunctional, that is, the same role-holders will initiate and control action in all major areas of activities. In friendship between a veteran and a recruit, one, say the veteran, may be the “expert” on adapting to the environment (he knows the “ropes”), have a determining influence on the nature of the activities (to go have a beer or watch a movie), and at the same time be the one who maintains the harmony of the relationship (gives in) and reinforces its norms. Thus the veteran has a multifunctional elite position in the friendship system. In some primitive societies the chief and his court, seen as one unit, is such a multifunctional undifferentiated elite.

At somewhat more complex levels elite roles and elite groups become differentiated. The separation of the religious elite from the political-bureaucratic elite is perhaps the most significant and well-known case to the student of modern societies. Industrial sociologists focus on a vital differentiation of line-staff functions (manager-expert functions) which emerges as industrialization develops. The formal-informal leadership distinction, essential to organizational sociology, is a differentiation between managerial-oriented and solidarity-oriented leaders.

We shall turn now to a detailed account of a case study of the process of functional differentiation of the elite of a community. The functional differentiation of the elite will be related to changes in the structure of a community which becomes more and more complex and more and more institutionalized.

III. NATURAL HISTORY OF THE “KIIBUTZ” AND ELITE DIFFERENTIATION

The elites we studied are the elites of the communal settlements in Israel, the kibbutzim. There are about 225 kibbutzim, most of which follow a fundamentally similar life-pattern. The groups which eventually establish kibbutzim are conceived in the youth movements, grow up in the training camps, mature into autonomous young kibbutzim, and settle down to the routine life of an older kibbutz. We shall discuss the nature of the social system at each stage and then relate the process of elite differentiation to the changes in the nature of the social system. We shall attempt to find support for the following hypotheses in the data we collected: (a) with increasing complexity of the social system the elite becomes differentiated, that is, various functions are carried out by separate roles and different people; (b) differentiation is not random but follows a certain predictable pattern, multifunctional elites becoming differentiated according to functional lines; (c) once differentiated, a hierarchy of elites tends to develop, in which specialized (mono-functional) elites are at or near the bottom, dual elites are at the middle levels, and collectivity oriented elites are at the top; and (d) the process through which a new social system is created and gradually gains functional autonomy is analyzed and related to the differentiation of the elites. In the sociologi-

cal literature there are very few discussions of the emergence of new social systems larger than small groups.

A. ELITES IN A PARTIAL SYSTEM

Most new kibbutzes grow out of groups of young people who are recruited from outside the kibbutz movement. Usually these groups crystallize in some collectivistic-oriented social movements like the pioneering youth movements in Israel and some Zionist youth movements in the Diaspora.12 These young people generally live in their parents' homes, study or work during the day, and meet in the evenings and week ends in order to create a social group which later will become a kibbutz.

These youth-movement groups, called garimim,13 are sporadic and partial social systems, dominated by normative and integrative orientations; sporadic, because between periods of activity the whole group becomes latent, and partial because they depend on parents, schools, work places, youth-movement headquarters, and other external institutions for the fulfilment and regulation of some basic functions. Particularly, the external functions of adapting to the environment (e.g., making a livelihood) and allocating the available facilities among the group members are fulfilled for the group by members of outside social systems.

The group is a relatively autonomous system as far as the internal functions are concerned. Activities are mainly of two types: (1) normative—studying the writing of Marx, Lenin, Borkhov, and other European and Israeli socialists and discussing kibbutz literature and Israel's politics; and (2) integrative—dancing, communal singing, and trips and parties. Much emphasis is put on holidays and various Boy Scout-like rituals.

The groups are small, coeducational, and highly homogeneous in terms of age, ethnic, and socio-economic status as well as educational background. This homogeneity, the lack of external functions, and the emphasis on internally oriented activities tend to create highly solidaric groups whose social structure is based almost completely on informal social control.

Elites at this stage are restricted to internal functions. Most external activities are initiated and controlled by elites in other systems. Parents determine when younger members can go to the youth-movement center, how much time they can spend, if they may join a trip, etc. Schools or employers have similar controlling functions. A youth guide nominated by the youth-movement headquarters directs and limits many of the activities conducted by the group. The garim has some "self-government" through two channels: elected committees and informal leadership. But the scope of this self-regulation is very limited. Informal leaders are easily co-opted, and committees tend to become inactive shortly after their election.

There is no elite differentiation at this stage. The youth guide controls both normative and integrative activities. The informal leaders, as far as we can tell, have similar positions in both realms of activity. Many local branches of the youth movements have only one committee which often discusses and decides on issues of both kinds, interchangeably.

B. ELITES IN THE TRANSITORY PERIOD

The second stage in the natural history of the kibbutz begins when the garimim leave their sheltered homes and city life for intensive training, usually after graduation from high school. There are several alternative training arrangements: some training takes place in agricultural colleges which are also boarding schools,14 some in maskavot. Often the training for farm work and kib-

13 Literary, "pits"; also "core." The term is used to designate that these groups are seeds of future kibbutzes.

14 These schools are discussed by Amitai Etzioni, "The Organizational Structure of 'Closed' Educational Institutions in Israel," Harvard Educational Review, XXVII, No. 2 (Spring, 1957), 107-15.
butz life is combined with service in the army. In most cases the training takes place in an older kibbutz. We shall follow the development of the gariim and its elites when this alternative is chosen.

With the transfer to the training place, the gariim becomes a permanent social group called hachshara, which means "training." The group settles in one of the kibbutz quarters. Interaction becomes continuous, and contact among members is very frequent. For the first time the group obtains a common external base. All gariim members work for the same "employer," an older host kibbutz, and are trained by its members. The members obtain all their supplies and accommodations from the communal services of the host kibbutz.

At the same time the hachshara becomes much more autonomous. It gains a high degree of self-control over internal functions and some control over externally oriented activities. The controlling functions of the youth guide are internalized. The group has to initiate and regulate by itself all social and cultural activities. Functionaries of the older kibbutz give some "expert" advice on these issues (e.g., help to obtain a lecturer) and set some limits to self-regulation (e.g., a trip planned for Passover has to be delayed because the hachshara help is needed for an early harvesting). But, in general, the older kibbutz interferes only rarely in the hachshara's internal activities.

Externally oriented activities of the hachshara still take place in systems not under its control. The members work in the host kibbutz farm and services and receive accommodation from it. They are assigned to jobs mainly according to the kibbutz needs and by its work assigner. He usually determines which members will be assigned to what jobs, thus leaving the hachshara little control over the division of labor within it.

The increase in internal control is revealed in the considerable increase in scope and significance of committee activities. In the gariim period most issues were decided through informal group discussions; in the hachshara it is done in the general assembly, which usually meets once a week and decides almost all the issues. It also elects committees which function in its name and report to it about their activities.

There is a cultural committee in charge of normative functions and also of some integrative functions. It organizes lectures, a library, supply of newspapers and political information, etc., as well as parties and rituals on Friday and holiday evenings. There is a members' committee in charge of integrative and some normative activities. It has same judicial functions (e.g., it settles serious conflicts among members). Its representatives hold intimate informal discussions with hachshara members who have "personal" problems, who are suspected of intending to desert the group, and who deviate from this or that kibbutz norm. At this stage the members' committee has only limited control over the allocation of material rewards, which are supplied by the host kibbutz mainly to individuals in the hachshara and not to the hachshara as a group.

There is a work committee which represents the hachshara toward the host kibbutz work assigner. It bargains with him over the ratio of hachshara members assigned to skilled and semiskilled jobs to unskilled workers, reports about members who are sick, on applicants for vacations, etc. Thus at this stage it is a committee with an external-representative function.

The first signs of differentiation can be recognized at this stage. There is a role differentiation among the three or more committees but little differentiation among the elite personnel. While some members are considered as having greater aptitudes for this or that elite role, specialization is not encouraged. Active members are often switched from one committee to another and often are members of two at a time.

As noted, there are some signs of role

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*The committees in the kibbutz are described and discussed in the studies mentioned above (see n. 11) and in Maurice Pearlman, *Collective Adventure* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1938), and Ben-Shalom Avraham, *Deep Furrows* (New York: Hashomer Hatzair Organization, 1957).*
differentiation on the elite level but very little specialization of elite personnel. In earlier stages of differentiation tasks which have heretofore been organized in one role become separated and invested in two or more separate roles. Such role differentiation does not mean that a parallel differentiation of personnel occurs automatically. The same people can go on carrying out the now separate tasks (this happens when the work unit becomes separated from the family unit), or there can be a high turnover among the carriers of the separate roles, so that most people will carry each role for some time, and only little specialization will occur. The young kibbutzim come close to this model for a short period, maintaining considerable differentiation of elite roles with little differentiation of elite personnel.

C. ELITES IN AN AUTONOMOUS COLLECTIVITY

The third step in the natural history of the kibbutz takes place when the training is completed. The hachshara leaves the host kibbutz and establishes a new one. Not all hachsharot (plural of hachshara) reach this stage. Some disintegrate, and some join an existing kibbutz. We shall follow the development of the elites where the hachshara establishes a kibbutz of its own.

The major change from hachshara to kibbutz is the internalization of control over the adaptive and managerial functions. At this stage members work in a farm at services which belong to and are controlled by themselves. The older kibbutzim send often a guide or two to help out during the first months, but they are generally considered strictly experts, sources of advice, and not partners in the structure of control. The general assembly controls production, division of labor, and allocation of material rewards (consumption), as it controlled the social and cultural activities in the hachshara.

The elite, which heretofore consisted of a few committees and informal leaders, expands rapidly and becomes much more elaborated and specialized. A whole organizational structure with a center of decisions (the secretariat), division of tasks and authority as well as some hierarchization, develops. The first full-time functionaries are elected. A large number of new, mainly external-oriented committees are created, following the model of the older kibbutzim.

The most important new committee is the farm committee, which is in control of the externally oriented subsystem, the work system. It is a managerial-expert committee which plans and regulates the allocations of means of production, including labor, machines, other types of equipment, soil, water, fertilizers, technological knowledge, and financial means.

The work committee now distributes the workers according to the needs of their farm and its services as well as their personal needs; thus control over work becomes internalized. The farm committee is helped by various expert committees, including a planning committee for planning of the new kibbutz site, construction, and farm; a crop committee, which works out the details of the agricultural planning, including crop rotation; and some other committees which vary from kibbutz to kibbutz.

An important change takes place in the functions of the members’ committee. In the hachshara days it had only integrative-normative functions (see above); now a new medium of integration is added. The committee determines the allocation of various material rewards and handles the integrative problems emerging from it.

The committees have limited significance compared with the functionaries, who are elected for the first time at this stage. While the committees meet once or twice per week after working hours, the functionaries are part or full-time organizers who devote a considerable part of their working day as well as much of their leisure time to organizational activity. At this stage there are usually five functionaries: the general farm manager, usually also the chairman of the farm committee, who actually directs the work system of the kibbutz; the treasurer, who is the kibbutz representative in the city in financial and marketing matters; the
shopping agent, who makes purchases for the kibbutz in the city; and the secretary, whose role is a combination of the clerk of the kibbutz, its representative to the authorities, and the only functionary active in internal activities. He is often chairman of the members' committee. Most of the new kibbutznim have also part-time work assign-
ers. In others work is assigned by the work committee members in their free time. The last important addition are branch managers. The kibbutznim's farm and communal services (communal kitchen, laundry, children's houses, clothing store, etc.) are organized into work units called "branches." At this stage most branches are established, and branch managers are elected or nominated.

At this point a hierarchy of elites develops for the first time. At the top is the secretariat, to which all other committees are subordinated. Most functionaries are members of the secretariat; otherwise they are subordinated to it as well. The most developed hierarchy is found in the new organizational branch of the external activities. From bottom to top we find the following levels: workers, branch managers, farm committee and the general farm manager, the secretariat, and finally, the general assembly.

By now, there is a considerable differentiation of elites as to role. The strongest differentiation is between the externally and internally oriented elites. On the one hand, we find the cultural committee, members' committee, and the secretary; on the other, the farm committee, other externally oriented committees, as well as four functionaries (all except the secretary) and the branch managers. There is some differentiation along the four functional lines. In the internal wing the cultural committee is predominantly normatively oriented, and the members' committee and the secretary are predominantly integratively oriented. (This differentiation basically existed already in the kibbutz days, but it becomes more emphasized.) In the external branch the farm committee and the general farm manager are predominantly managerially oriented, and the advisory committees (the planning committee, the crop committee, and others) are predominantly expert-oriented. The branch managers of small branches are more expert-oriented; the branch managers of larger branches are managerial-oriented.

D. ELITES IN A COMPLEX SYSTEM

The change from a young kibbutz to an older one is a change from a relatively simple monolithic collectivity to a complex commune. The solidaric ties to the kibbutz as a collectivity are weakened with the increase of the significance of the solidaric ties to the subcollectivities. In earlier stages the kibbutz was mainly a group of young bachelors. By now most of its members have established a family, which becomes a significant unit of activity and loyalty. A second focus of solidarity is often found in the new groups which join kibbutz after the first years. The young kibbutznim are small (forty to eighty members), homogenous groups. But soon the groups are not large enough for the various needs of the kibbutz, mainly for a rational organization of the farm and defense system. New groups join, unlike it in age, educational background, and/or ethnic origin and socioeconomic status. In most cases some social differentiation is maintained along these lines. As the kibbutz becomes older, the children often constitute a social subcollectivity of their own. At last, to close the circle, the kibbutz plays host to a hashekara, which is preparing itself for the day it will establish its own kibbutz. In kibbutznim where there is little differentiation of loyal-

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ties on status bases (e.g., old-timers versus newcomers; ethnic origins) often loyalties are woven along functional lines of work units (called “branches”). But the elites themselves almost never constitute a basis for crystallization of a solidaric group (see below). The organizational structure itself does not change in any basic way, although it becomes considerably larger and more elaborate. At a relatively early stage an educational committee is added which is responsible for the socialization of the children, a normative function. As the number of the children increases, subcommittees for various age groups are introduced. In order to maintain normative primacy of the committee, larger kibbutzim elect special educational subcommittees for administrative and technical tasks. The members’ committee usually establishes an increasing number of subordinated committees which deal with specific allocations like a housing committee, an equipment committee, a health committee, and many others.

The number of functionaries and the time allocated to them are increased, but no new tasks are formed. Functionaries are first released from regular work for an hour a day (known in the kibbutz as an “eight,” i.e., eighth part of the working day). The time allocated for organizational activity is gradually increased. While in the new kibbutz usually only one or two functionaries have a full-time office, in the older kibbutz most functionaries are old full-time officers; in large kibbutzim two full-time functionaries fulfil tasks earlier carried out by one part-time functionary. Thus, in toto, there is mainly an increase in the volume of elite activity but little additional differentiation on the role level. The reason is, we suggest, that basic functional differentiation has already been reached at the earlier stage.

The main change as far as the elite structure is concerned lies now on a different level. Specialization takes place now on the personnel level. Until now we saw a process of increasing differentiation on the role level, while elite members were switched frequently from role to role, although there was some concern about specialization of personnel, as noted earlier. At this last stage members are increasingly specialized in one function, yet elite members frequently hold more than one office, this being less true as the institution ages.

We studied the offices held simultaneously by elite members of two kibbutzim; a young kibbutz, COT, established in 1949 and an older COT and forty-one “additional” offices in BAH. By additional offices we mean the offices a member holds simultaneously with his basic office. From the point of view of the present argument and the statistics supplied, it does not make any difference which role is designated as “base” and which as “additional”; what matters is the number of offices held by one person and the types of combination.

Obviously, the number of cases is too small to allow for a fourfold functional analysis. But if we divide the offices into externally and internally oriented offices (we have suggested that the external-internal differentiation develops earlier), we can see significant differences between the two kibbutzim (see Table 3).

The data support the suggestion made above. In the younger kibbutz there are more members who hold offices in elites of different functional subsystems than in the older; while in the young kibbutz 33 per cent of the combinations of offices are cross-functional, less than 10 per cent are so in the older kibbutz. In support of this conclusion from other kibbutzim, it may be said that in Benjamin, a young kibbutz, the treasurer, who plays an adaptive-dominated role, was also the ideological leader of the kibbutz. In Simon (a young kibbutz) the


general farm manager was at the same time also the chairman of the educational committee. We do not know about any similar combinations in older kibbutsim. Some probably exist, but they seem to be considerably less frequent.

IV. ELITES AND INSTITUTIONALIZED BRIDGES

Differentiated societies have separate subsystems devoted to the major functions. Thus the work system is devoted to adaptation, family and education to socialization (normative dominance), the legal system mainly to integration, and what is often referred to as decision-making can be termed, in the conceptual frame of reference applied here, a managerial subsystem. The activities of these various subsystems have to be integrated if the system is to be maintained and its ability to reach its goals is to be preserved. To some degree this is performed by the regular functioning of the various subsystems, especially the integrative and normative subsystems. To some degree the ties among the various subsystems are maintained by special intersystem (interstitial) sectors. Some professions and many cross-class social groups and voluntary associations seem to have this function.

We would expect interstitial units to lack a dominant unidimensional orientation and their structure to reflect the orientational nature of the subsystems they bridge. Thus, if we see a vocational school as a typical interstitial unit, we would expect it to combine the normative orientation of the family and primary school with the external orientations of the occupational system.

Among the most important categories of interstitial units are certain types of elites. While most are specialized, some are dual-oriented and others collectivity oriented. The dual elites serve two subsystems simultaneously; the collectivity oriented elites serve the whole. By integrating and coordinating differentiated activities, both contribute to the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the system.

We would expect to find specialized elites at the bottom or close to the bottom of organization and stratification structures, dual elites at the middle level, and collectivity oriented at the top level. But while organizational structures almost always have one center of decision (i.e., a top elite), in stratification and political structures of societies it varies considerably. While totalitarian states have a centralized top elite, in feudal societies and some democratic societies, notably the United States, top-level elite structure is much more complicated.20

The kibbutz gives us an opportunity to study a society which has a top collectivity oriented elite which to a large degree coincides with the elites institutionalized in the organizational structure and also to study a dual elite. The work committee in both the young and the older kibbutz is a dual elite; the secretariat is collectivity oriented.

The work committee assigns members to jobs. Two types of considerations impinge equally on the decisions to assign members:

the needs of the farm and services and the needs of the kibbutz as a solidaric unit. In pattern variables the first set of considerations is universalistic, specific, and performance- and neutrality-dominated. The factors taken into consideration are economic, technological, and physical require-
tive system, on the other—a difficult thing, since the conflicting needs of the two sub-systems are considerable. Kibbutz members often refuse to serve on the work committee, especially to be work assigners. While, in general, committee members are elected for one or two years, work assigners

![Diagram](image)

Fig. 1.—Model of the organizational structure of an older kibbutz

ments, aptitudes, managerial expediency, efficiency, and optimal distribution of means of production. The second set of considerations is particularistic, diffuse, quality and affectively oriented. The members' preferences about jobs, team mates, positions in the kibbutz, character, and similar factors are taken into account.

The task of the work committee is to work out solutions which will not undermine the work system, on one hand, and the integra-
are elected for shorter periods, in most kibbutzim for three months.

The interstitial character of the work committee is revealed by the hierarchical nature of the organization (Fig. 1). Most elite roles in the organizational structure of the kibbutz are clearly in one line of authority. Thus the branch managers are subordinated to the general farm managers; the housing, equipment, and health committees to the members' committee; and the mem-
bers of the educational subcommittees to the educational committee. But the work committee and work assigner are not clearly subordinated to any committee and are often directly represented in the top committee, the secretariat (see below). While the work assigner often works in close cooperation with the general farm manager and is under considerable influence from his managerial (universalistic) demands, he is also under pressure of the health committee, members’ committee, and secretary to take into account “human factors.” In some kibbutzim one member of the work committee is an ex-officio representative of the members’ committee. Former members of the work committee seem to be more likely to become active members of internally oriented committees than holders of any externally oriented role, and former members of internal committees seem to be more like work-committee members than do those of any external committee.

Organizational structures are characterized among other things by a single center of direction. The nature of this top unit reflects to some degree the nature of the whole system. Thus, if the system is characterized by a dominancy of the normative function, for instance, we would not be astonished to find a strong representation of normative-oriented actors in the top elite of the system. But, on the other hand, the top elite of any organization cannot be a specialized elite in the dominant function of the organization, because other functions of the organization may be neglected. Since the organization is a social system, its effective functioning and, in the long run, its very existence depend on representation of all major functions—directly or indirectly—at the top level. Thus top management of successful industries includes “managers” as well as experts, engineers as well as salespeople, economists as well as accountants.

The top elite of the organization structure of most kibbutzim is the secretariat. It controls the whole organizational structure and is responsible before the general assembly for the functioning of the various committees and functionaries. In cases of conflict among the various committees, the issue is often decided by the secretariat or by the general assembly, which may act on recommendations submitted by the secretariat.21 The agenda of the general assembly is prepared by the secretariat, and one of its members is the chairman of the general assembly in most kibbutzim. While members of the other committees often develop quite strong loyalties to one realm of activity, the secretariat is considered to be the “cabinet” of the whole kibbutz, and its members are particularly expected to have “the general welfare” of the kibbutz as their primary focus of interest and loyalty.

The secretariat is well adapted to its functions as a top, collectivity oriented elite. All major functions are represented in it. It includes usually the treasurer, the general farm manager, the chairman of the members’ committee, the chairman of the educational committee, and often the work assigner. The secretary is the nominal chairman of the committee. In addition to the functional representatives, one or two members are usually elected to “represent the public.” These are sometimes the most influential members of the secretariat. They are not committed to one function and thus help the secretariat to reach agreed upon policies. Thus, while most committees include only specialists of one or two kinds, the secretariat includes representatives of all major functions and some unspecialized members. It is a multifunctional body which represents the collectivity as a unit versus the various subsystems.

**DISCUSSION**

At every stage of change (especially from the ge’ulim to the hachshara and from the hachshara to a young kibbutz) involves, on the one hand, an expressive crisis for the organization and, on the other hand, en-

hanced ritualistic activity. The crisis is expressed in considerable reorganization and in high turnover of members. The "rituals"—especially when a hachshara reaches maturity and a new kibbutz is established—are highly institutionalized. The analogy between it and the socialization of the child may lead as well to intriguing insights into organizations and institutionalization.

Elites emerge and develop in a patterned process. First there are elite situations (informal discussions which include decision-making in the youth movement), then elite roles emerge. The third step occurs when elite roles differentiate, without a necessary parallel differentiation of the elite personnel taking place. Often a more or less parallel differentiation occurs later on the personnel level; this could be designated as specialization. The last stage, which seems not to have developed in most kibbutzim, occurs when the various elites become subcollectivities (i.e., bases for formation of solidaric ties).

It was pointed out by Parsons that differentiation of social (and non-social) systems do not develop randomly but take place along predictable lines of the fourfold functional scheme. The differentiation of elites seems, at least in our case, to follow along the same lines.

In analyzing the various elite roles and the process of change, we found that certain concepts and patterns of relationships have to be added to the scheme which was our starting point. We found that concurrently with the process of differentiation a process of integration (not a process of merging!) takes place. On the one hand, "primitive," multifunctional, undifferentiated elites give way to a set of specialized elites; on the other hand, interstitial elites emerge which integrate the activities of either two subsystems or of the collectivity as a whole. These elites are placed in the political and stratification structure of the organization and society studied here, so as to allow them, to some degree, to regulate the activities of the specialized elites and thus to integrate the whole system. It remains to be explored if these concepts and suggestions can be usefully applied to the study of elites in different contexts.

Columbia University