Beyond Integration, Toward Guidability

AMITAI ETZIONI

INTRODUCTION

INTEGRATION OF POPULATION and development policies is a sound idea, but it provides insufficient basis for devising relevant public policies. Missing, first and foremost, is a systematic concern with the structures and

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processes necessary to achieve the desired outcome: a higher quality of life both for the people of the world today and for future generations.

The following analysis indicates that integration is well supported by all we know about the nature of societal systems, but that we need to concern ourselves (1) with the transmitting processes which link population programs, including family planning with developmental activities; (2) with distinct, separate institutionalization (or embodiment) of population program activities within the development context; and (3) with the quantity and quality of knowledge produced, which serves policymakers in this area. Furthermore, population policies must be linked with development policies in a comprehensive way, including those concerning mortality and morbidity, the ecological distribution of population, the composition of populations, the quality of the population, and the future of the family. Without such a linkage the expected quality-of-life benefits may elude the world's populace.

To state this differently: study of the relevant literature, interviews with key officials, visits in the field, and prior sociological training, knowledge, and experience all suggest that the time is ripe to move beyond the 1974 Bucharest consensus—not to replace it, but to build upon it. For reasons delineated below, the concept of integration provides a valid but limited guideline for action; and it is necessary to enrich it with additional guiding principles, both to reduce its philosophical vagueness and to secure a wider, deeper basis for relevant public policies.

INTEGRATION: SOUND SYSTEM THEORY

Integration: The Concept

The evolution of the often-cited concept of integration is well known to those active in the population field. It is briefly and schematically reviewed here for those not working in this field, and as a backdrop for the following analysis. Attention is first focused on family planning because, apart from fact-gathering activities in census and sample survey operations, family planning has been, up to this point, the major area of population policy and program.

Out of a background of inattention to family planning, there arose in the late fifties and early sixties a concern with the "population explosion." While some indications of the early interest came from developing nations, most of the drive, funds, and action were initiated by private groups and governments of the West. Third World countries and socialist republics tended to focus on the need for economic development and often
rejected the notion of family planning. Crudely summarized, family planners sought to improve the quality of life by having fewer people put demands on scarce resources, while the developers' route to the same result was to increase the available resources. In economic terms, one group was concerned with demand, the other with supply. The "great debate" between these positions, which has many subtle aspects and asides, has been admirably reviewed by Bernard Berelson¹ and need not be repeated here.

The idea of integration, supported by a worldwide conference of governments in Bucharest in 1974, had two main levels: on a value level, it recognized the need to move on both fronts—family planning and economic development—although it tended to stress more the developmental context with which population policies were to be integrated. It signified a greater Western commitment to economic development and a greater willingness of Third World and socialist countries to recognize the need for family planning—although the limited consensus reflected in the conference document refers to "population policies" rather than "family planning" (let alone "birth control"), and stresses the primacy of socio-economic development: "The explicit aim of the World Population Plan of Action is to help coordinate population trends and the trends of economic and social development. The basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above all, socioeconomic transformation."²

A similar debate—and partial consensus ("reduction of dissensus" might be more accurate)—seems to have taken place within the social science community.³ Before Bucharest, some social scientists openly argued for family planning exclusively. Indeed, they suggested that better distribution of modern contraceptives would go a long way toward resolving the population problem and toward the related quality-of-life issue, and programs were evolved on that assumption. However, slow progress in implementing family planning, along with the "great debate," has led a growing number of social scientists to question the role of other societal changes in effecting family planning. The family-planning approach was called inadequate, for example, in an often-cited 1967 article by Kingsley Davis, because it "does not undertake to influence most of the determinants of human reproduction."⁴ Family-planning programs as they have been

constituted, according to Davis, can only reduce births to the extent that unwanted births exceed wanted births because they neglect those factors which affect the motivation to have smaller families. Since factors affecting the birth rate (such as a woman's age at marriage) are chiefly influenced by social and economic conditions, Davis argued that family-planning programs "must be supplemented with equal or greater investments in research and experimentation to determine the required socioeconomic measures." This position has gained in influence since Bucharest, to the extent that even those who previously dealt with family planning almost exclusively now pay at least some homage to it. It should be noted, however, that despite the reduced dissensus, there continued significant differences of emphasis on development versus family planning, both intellectually and in program orientation. There are still those who stress socioeconomic development as the most important avenue to improved quality of life and the best way to curb population (if such a goal is desired) and those who view family planning (coordinated with socioeconomic development) as an activity worthy of nurturing in its own right and a most effective contribution to socioeconomic development. Members of both camps, and those who define themselves as in between, point to the wide latitude the concept of integration contains (i.e., its limited specificity and hence weak guiding capacity), both philosophically and as to which lines policymakers are to follow.

Integration and Sociological Theory

From the viewpoint of sociological theory and research, the limited consensus implied in the concept of integration is well founded. Sociological system theory (not to be equated with general system theory) has evolved a view of society as a semiorganic, or systemic, being. This contrasts sharply with the psychological stimuli-response and the anthropological diffusion theories.

According to sociological system theory, the effects of a new input—whether they be due to a change in the available resources, a new technology, or a new birth control technique—are determined, only in part, by the nature (or attributes) of the input. They are, however, significantly, if not largely, shaped by the internal structure and processes of the social system into which the input is introduced. For instance, the effects of the level and nature of foreign aid given to a society are largely determined

5. Ibid., p. 739.
6. For the views up to Bucharest, see Michael S. Teitelbaum, "Population and Development: Is a Consensus Possible?" Foreign Affairs 52 (4) (July 1974):742–60.
by the structural condition of the recipient society rather than by the donor society.

System theory contrasts sharply with the stimulus-response theory, which derives its core image from the Pavlovian experiments: the bell rings; the dog’s saliva flows. Or, take away the toys of a group of children and they all become aggressive with each other. According to this theory, specific stimuli elicit specific responses. System theory, in contrast, expects the same stimulus to produce different responses. In the last example, for instance (here the system being the children's personalities or the small group), the same stimulus—removal of the toys—would produce rather different behavior (aggress or regress, attack or cry, act individually or in unison—or even ignore the stimulus), depending on the children’s personalities and relationships.

Similarly, diffusion theory is greatly interested in the intersocietal flow of technologies, techniques, ideas. Where did tobacco, the plow, or whatever come from? Is it imported or native? The image behind this is often that of the white missionary or trader bringing a new culture to the “primitives,” although it also deals with diffusion among preliterate societies. System theory, in contrast, suggests that the item's origin (e.g., foreign) is less significant than whether it is adopted or rejected by the system and, if accepted, how it is internalized. (Most Latin American republics, for example, theoretically copied the constitution of the United States, but its pragmatic meaning in those countries reflects their own politics, so it is quite different from that of the U.S.)

Applying this notion to the field of socioeconomic development and population policies, whether large shipments of rice from overseas are used to conserve a nation’s resources, to evolve its infrastructure, to further enrich the elite, or to feed the poor, is largely determined by the socio-political-economic structure of the recipient country—not by the amount or quality of rice, or by the attributes of its senders. This is not to suggest that the rice shipments and the conditions under which they are provided have no effect, but that the effect is, to a considerable extent, determined


BEYOND INTEGRATION

internally. The underlying reason for this view of societies, of great consequence for this study, is contained in the notion that societies are "integrated"—that they typically have mechanisms which keep their parts related to each other, and which seek to maintain the internal format of these relationships, i.e., the structure of the system.

System theory has been criticized for assuming excessive integration and, indeed, it must be recognized that some societies are only poorly integrated.¹⁰ System theory has also been criticized for focusing on the wrong system unit—tribes, regions, ethnic groups, or classes—rather than on the national society which is said to be the integrated unit¹¹ (e.g., on "French Canada" and "English Canada," rather than on "Canada").¹²

The concept of societal integration on the national level is useful, especially when treated as an hypothesis. In other words, it is not necessary to assume a priori that societal integration is high and that the relevant unit of analysis is the nation. For each social system, one must determine the extent of its integration empirically and know what the relevant units of integration are. At the same time, past studies suggest that for many contemporary social systems, the level of integration of nation-societies is sufficiently high to expect that changes in one sector will interact with changes in other sectors and that the net or ultimate change which results will be significantly affected by this internal interaction. Thus the basic underlying notion of integration is fully supported by sociological analyses and studies, and one cannot prudently proceed with family planning or other population programs without taking into account the linkages which the impacted sector has with other societal sectors. The conditions in, and processes of, other sectors—from health services to income to educational structure, from public administration to local/metropolitan relations—will affect population program efforts. Those conditions and processes may hinder, support, or sidetrack the population program efforts, but they are never irrelevant.

An integrated policy, which seeks to take these intersector linkages into account and, when necessary, to move other sectors simultaneously with (or even prior to) making advances in family planning or other population programs, should be more effective in the long run than non-integrated, isolated population policies which ignore these linkages, the bases of societal integration. Or, to put it differently, the reality of societal

integration favors the concept of policy integration for those who seek to change one or more societal facets.

It also follows that, since the linkages are basically internal, external inputs (such as importation of birth control techniques and technologies or subsidies of family-planning programs) particularly need to be designed with the internal structure in mind. This is especially so because initiators of such inputs are not typically subject to the impacted society's interacting processes and are hence more likely to try to ignore them.

Main Qualifications

While the integration of population and development policies is basically supported by the system view of society, sociological analysis also points to three main caveats, ignored in at least some of the formulations of the integration position.

1. Societal integration, while commonly found, varies significantly in its level and intensity. The support or the "drag" (constraints) provided by factors and sectors of a society other than the one impacted will be high only in highly integrated societies, lower in poorly integrated ones. It is erroneous to assume a priori that integration is high in all societies. The level is to be determined empirically, and the implications of whatever level is found must be taken into account. For example, one would generally expect a higher level of integration in many traditional villages and clans than in urban slums. (Although here, too, significant differences are to be expected among levels of integration for a given type of social unit. Edward Banfield, for instance, reported on a poorly integrated village.14) In introducing contraceptives to a well-integrated village, one would expect to make good progress if the village system and structure are favorable (as they are reported to be in contemporary Bali15), and to do rather poorly if such programs are incompatible, as they are, say, in some traditional Catholic countries.16 In contrast, a typical poorly integrated slum

will offer both much less support and much less resistance because it is socially more neutral. Thus while it is sociologically supported that integration is relevant, it should not be assumed that it is unfavorable to population programs including family planning. Integration is a powerful mechanism which can propel or retard, depending on its reaction to the substance of the policy.16

Greep et al. made this point in respect of family planning (without referring to its analytical basis) in urging that a wide variety of contraceptive technologies and techniques be developed and promoted to suit the specific sociocultural needs of various people.17 Several of the individuals interviewed favored “customized,” rather than global or regional, population policies, adapted to a particular nation’s character, conditions, and level of integration. In some nations, for example, working only with the national central government may be sufficient, while in others, which are highly fragmented and less politically intensive, working with nongovernment organizations, multisectors, and geographical areas may be essential for success.

2. System theory, which stresses intersectrallinkages, would lead one to expect that the effects will be interactional rather than monodirectional. In the literature on integration, however, many more references are made to the effects of socioeconomic development on population policies and programs than to the contributions of population policies and programs to socioeconomic development.

While slower population growth is often expected to increase the quality of life, it is less often recognized as directly affecting development (which is defined here as an increasing productive capacity of whatever adjective—economic, social, or political—goes with development). This may reflect the fact that scores of factors are subsumed under the concept of development, but only a few under population programs including family planning. Consequently, it may be natural to expect that more effect will flow from development to population management than vice versa. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that effects flow both ways—that not only does development enhance population programs including family planning, but population programs also enhance development. For example, family planning—to the extent that it frees women to work (where


there is no labor surplus) and to the extent that it reduces the consumption of resources—frees resources for development quite directly.  

3. While integration may be high or low and while its actual level, in a specific society in a specific historical period, must be determined empirically, scores of studies of interfactor linkages strongly suggest that, at each point in time, there tends to be considerable intersector “play” and lag. That is, granted the integration (or interaction) assumption, under many conditions, it is to be expected that varying degrees of progress can be made by changing one facet without working on the others. This will either be due to the fact that societal sectors are often loosely, rather than tightly linked, i.e., that there is a measure of “play” among connected facets; or that some have moved previously and hence the factor one is working on is lagging, and can be made to catch up without working on the others. The significance of these two concepts for the present discussion will be considered next.

Intervariable play exists, for instance, in goodwill. If one introduces a high level of austerity (e.g., price and wage control) into a society where there is a good labor-management relationship based on many years of working together and economic growth, the new policy often may initially produce very few strikes, discernible side effects on productivity, or other indications of disturbed industrial relations. If, on the other hand, the same austerity policy is introduced into a situation of growing labor disaffection and unrest, it may raise the level of labor-management conflict quickly and severely. Even where goodwill is high, a prolonged wage freeze accompanied by rising prices (due to imports, for example) will sooner or later exhaust it, and the expected consequences will follow. Goodwill here defines the extent of intervariable play.

Economists use a similar concept in the term “slack,” which refers to unemployed resources or unused capacity. It suggests that as long as there are idle resources, higher output can be generated without new inputs or system changes. If there is no slack, or once it is exhausted, this is no longer the case.

The same phenomenon of play is recognized in studies of population programs such as family planning, although it is occasionally ignored in the more rigid and abstract discussions of integration. There are reports of significant progress in family planning, which is not accompanied, or even


BEYOND INTEGRATION

preceded, by economic development. In some instances, this even occurs following economic retreat or underdevelopment (e.g., Sri Lanka, in recent years). This is sometimes attributed to simultaneous, or antecedent, development in some sector other than the economic one (e.g., increase in literacy). But as long as such other development is not shown to be the responsible factor, its attribution is more an indication of willingness to give population programs such as family planning any room for independent action than it is evidence of social linkages. To acknowledge play is not to assume policy stance built upon it. Play only suggests that some progress can be made in one area without working on the other societal facets. Providing people with the means to avoid unwanted pregnancies is a case in point. Meeting unmet demands is another expression of the same idea. Whether the scope of such play is trivial or considerable is a point which will be further considered in a moment—but first, let us consider a related idea, that of intervariable lag.

Lag is said to exist when one factor, or set of factors, is advanced, while one or more others stay behind. These lagging factors can then catch up, without further advancing the others. Lag will occur when, for example, work opportunities for women, family income, and literacy (factors believed to correlate with acceptance of birth control) have gradually increased, but little or no increase in acceptance of birth control has yet occurred. When a birth control program is now launched, it is expected to make relatively rapid progress without working on these factors and still benefit from the progress they have already made.

Both concepts—play and lag—suggest a measure of flexibility within the interaction-integration view of society and lead to the same basic policy implications: (1) under some circumstances, progress can be made while working only on population programs, such as family planning, and (2) once the play or lag is exhausted, the other factors will have to be advanced before additional progress can be made. Both suggest that progress in population programs without simultaneous development in other areas does not disprove the integration thesis but that such progress does agitate against the rigid assumption that nothing will be gained unless prior or simultaneous development is achieved.

The scope of play and lag becomes a rather crucial issue here. If it


is small, the issue is largely one of mere theoretical interest; but if it is considerable (and under certain circumstances, such as low societal integration, it may be quite large), the policy implications for population programs including family planning are very significant. This is because population programs tend to be less demanding in terms of resources, funds, work force, managerial attention, and time than many programs of socioeconomic development. (Reference here is not being made to, for instance, one plant versus one family-planning clinic, but to the industrialization of a country versus the modernization of family planning or implementation of other population programs such as those relating to population distribution.) Consequently, if the scope of progress which can be made in population programs is considerable, at least under certain circumstances, then it is cost-effective to do so.

Before addressing the question of whether play and lag are ever substantial and to what extent, it may be useful to explore a general underlying posture. The significance of play and lag is not determined solely by the size of the unmet demand (which in some societies may encompass 20 to 30 percent, or even more, of what is needed to bring population growth, or distribution, to the desired level). Their significance is equally affected by how voluntaristic one is in viewing societal change. If one is highly voluntaristic and, as such, socioeconomic development can be attained rather readily, at least under favorable conditions (e.g., high level of Western contribution to new international trade arrangements), then the size of unmet demand is relatively unimportant. If one assumes, as does the voluntarist, that the other factors (e.g., economic and educational) can be moved—and that they can be moved rather quickly—and if those factors are recognized as both valuable in their own right and necessary for full implementation of family planning or other population programs, at least in the long run, then why concern oneself with the difference between, for instance, 3 percent and 30 percent of unmet demand? Indeed, as one leading family-planning policy researcher put it: “People want to have sex and children; unless their views of these are changed, no improvement in contraceptive techniques, technology, or delivery system will solve the problem of developing nations.”

The key phrase here is “will solve the problem of developing nations,” which is, of course, highly voluntaristic. A less voluntaristic observer would assume that no policy available during the foreseeable future “will solve the problem of development,” and hence that any significant progress, wherever it is achieved, and whether it be on one or more fronts, is of great interest. People who desire light bulbs which

23. Private communication.
utilize electricity only to produce light, but to waste no energy on heat, will find of very little interest the difference between bulbs which are 4.5 percent effective and those which are 5.5 percent effective. In contrast, people who see the total variance available for the foreseeable future as ranging between 4.5 and 5.5 percent will be greatly interested in the 5.5 percent bulbs. Berelson made a similar point when he wrote: "Would an anti-TB campaign be regarded as a failure if 'only' one-third of the decline in TB could be attributed to the campaign efforts? I would judge it a smashing success."24

The author sides with those who are less voluntaristic.25 Socioeconomic development is perceived as a highly desirable purpose—but not one that is readily achieved for most nations under most circumstances. Out of commitment to the quality of life goal, one must have great interest in any front on which significant progress can be made, expending resources for that area as cost effectively as possible. This might mean using up some play here, exhausting some lag there—rather than first focusing on the conditions which require simultaneous (and coordinated) attack on numerous fronts.

What is the size of the unmet (or ready-made) demand for family planning? No universal answer to this question can be given because unmet demand differs from society to society and over time. There are indications, however, that, under some circumstances at least, it seems to be sizable. For example, about 20 percent of all births to married couples in the United States between 1960 and 1965 were unwanted, according to an estimate by Bumpass and Westoff.26 (It seems safe to assume that if unmarried women were also included, the proportion would be higher, especially in view of the high pregnancy rates among teenagers.) Using world fertility survey data, Westoff also examined unmet demand in Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Thailand. Defining unmet demand as the proportion of women who were currently married and exposed to the risk of conception and who said they did not want more children but were not practicing contraception, Westoff estimated the range of unmet demand to be between 21 and 32 percent across the five countries.27 To the less voluntaristic observer, this suggests that family planning should be

25. For additional discussion, see Etzioni, The Active Society, Ch. 4.
stressed in these situations and greater emphasis made on an integrated approach where the unmet demand is much smaller—rather than integration policy being mechanically applied in the same manner under all circumstances. Similar considerations could be involved if population policy and programs were generated in relation to population distribution or to improvement of population quality as considered in Chapters 9 and 10.

THE ROLE OF SPECIALIZED TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS

Up to this point, an effort has been made to show that: (1) integration as a policy stance is basically a sound idea since society acts as an integrated entity, but that (2) the level of integration varies from society to society and varies over time, hence—because of play and lag—may allow for substantial progress on any one front without simultaneous progress on the others. It may now be suggested that public policy must concern itself with the transmitting mechanisms—even when the societal level of integration is high and there is little play and no lag. The transmitting mechanisms are those specialized processes which either transmit progress in one area to progress in another or put pressure on that other area to catch up. Such transmittal, as a general rule, is never fully automatic, and the more public policy can contribute to the improvement of these mechanisms, the more progress will be achieved in related areas and the more benefits will be derived out of integration. Thus, for example, while a general rise in level of education will enhance a nation's industrialization, the industrialization efforts will benefit substantially more if the procedures for hiring employees are also changed—drawing more on those with better education and training while reducing nepotism, tribalism, and corruption. This would not, of course, automatically result from increasing the level of education. (The specialized transmitting mechanisms here—operating between the educated people and the industrial labor force—are the hiring procedures.)

This concept may usefully be applied to development and population programs. There is a widely held assumption—often more implicit than explicit—that progress in socioeconomic development by itself will lead to the desired population results. Ozzie G. Simmons and Lyle Saunders summarize this viewpoint well in respect of fertility: “One approach to the problem of excessive fertility that has enjoyed substantial popularity is the notion that employment of policy measures to promote economic and social development and modernization will surely bring in their wake fertility decline. In short, it is argued, development policy is fertility policy.”

BEYOND INTEGRATION

551

go on to cite Paul Demeny: "One version of this position advocates exclusive concentration on development policy as narrowly defined, that is without any direct attention to fertility effects as such."\textsuperscript{29}

In contrast, the author agrees with those who expect only some of such benefits to follow automatically, and who maintain that the rest must be helped along—that those benefits which would take place without specialized transmitting mechanisms would do so more rapidly if encouraged. Hence one of the main recommendations made in this chapter is that the conceptual and experimental development of transmitting mechanisms, from socioeconomic development to population action programs, be one of the major tasks of agencies concerned with such programs, so that these concepts become available to public policymakers.\textsuperscript{30}

An example based on family planning might serve to illustrate this idea. Many people allegedly desire a greater number of children than population programs wish they would, both as insurance against loss of children due to death and to secure economic and social support prior to and throughout old age.\textsuperscript{31} Assume that a new health program reduced the infant mortality rate in a given country. Without explicit and effective efforts to point out the implication of the lower death rate achieved by the new health programs for contraceptive behavior, it might take a decade or more for a community to become aware of the changing death rate (which is, after all, very gradual and most noticeable only in statistical aggregates), much less to draw the "proper" conclusion from it.\textsuperscript{32} It will take still more time, education, and resources for the changed preference regarding desired number of children to be reflected in learning about the use of birth control techniques and technologies and to gain access to such technologies, i.e., implementation of, or change in, the delivery system.

In discussing with population experts the need to formulate and test ways in which the family planning payoff of new socioeconomic development could be increased, two major viewpoints were encountered: enthusiastic endorsement by some and the assertion of two important counter-


\textsuperscript{32} For a review of the relevant literature and insights into the problems of the "learning curve" following improvements in child health, see Peter Kunstadter, "Interactions of Child Mortality with Maternal Parity," unpublished paper, June 1978.
points by others. One of these counterpoints concerns the relationship between motivation and action; the other, the value of information, education, and communication.

Proponents of the first point claim that, once people no longer want more children, "they know what to do"—that they proved, long before massive programs of modern contraceptives were available, that they know how to have fewer babies.23

There are three steps to this argument. The first concerns the link between socioeconomic development and preference for children—and, consequently, motivation to employ family planning; the second, willingness to use modern contraceptive methods; and the third, availability of relevant technologies.

The issue regarding the first step is an empirical one, subject to the verdict of data rather than argument. The author subscribes to the hypothesis that socioeconomic development, if not aided by education explicitly aimed at promoting a changed norm in the desired number of children, will be significantly more gradual in leading to a reduction in that norm than when explicit educational efforts accompany or follow the socioeconomic development. The reason for expecting that education would be valuable here is that there is no necessary link between higher level of income, education, or health and having fewer children. The link, therefore, must be forged via changed views concerning the value of additional offspring. How much education could do here to contribute to this process is an empirical question.

The importance of the second and third steps can be shown on the basis of logic and requires little new research. Consider first the role of modern contraception. The argument that "if people want it badly enough they know what to do" exemplifies a common misunderstanding about the interaction between motivation and action. (Similar arguments are made about the alcoholic's will to stop drinking, or the addict's to stop using drugs, overeating and so on.)24 Implicitly, it is assumed that, if motivation is present, the proper action will follow; but if not, action cannot be expected until motivation is generated. It is further pointed out that, even if people are somehow convinced to use contraceptives, if there is no real motivation they soon stop using them—hence the high dropout rates.25

35. High dropout rates were reported in sample studies of oral contraceptives
While the basic argument here is quite valid, it proceeds on a level of thinking which treats motivation as a dichotomous variable: either present or absent. Motivation (and most other variables) is better treated as a continuous variable (which, of course, researchers—but not many conceptualizers—tend to do). It follows that there is, for any given population (or subpopulation) at any given point in time, a certain level of motivation to regulate future births, ranging from aversion to disinterest to highest possible interest. Large segments of the world’s people seem to be somewhere between the extreme poles. It is for them that the specific motivation requirement of each technology is expected to make a significant difference. Thus, for instance, given a low level of interest, a technology which is easily available and not demanding would be more widely used by people with a “middling” level of motivation than a technology which is costly, difficult to obtain, demanding, and full of side effects.

Thus, all other things being equal, variations in technologies and in their availability make a difference in the frequency and continuity of family planning. Indeed, it seems impossible to speak about the size of the unmet demand without making reference to a specific mix of technologies, costs, and delivery systems. The basic reason for this is that no two technologies are equal in their human, economic, and administrative costs. For example, if, given the same population in terms of age, education, income, health, and motivation, a shift is made from a technology which is costly, difficult to obtain, and socially taboo (e.g., birth control pills in an orthodox Catholic country, available only by prescription) to the opposite situation (free birth control pills in an approving culture, dispensed without prescription although with a medical history and checklist), a greater utilization—or unmet demand—can be expected. To state this differently, the population motivation profile varies from smaller to larger, depending on the nature of the technology and access to it. Some of the relevant variables which influence motivation are cost, distance to supply points, legitimacy, need for repeated decisions, fear of side effects, and actual side effects.

(The connection between the nature and availability of a technology and motivation was made vivid during a visit to a Philippine village in which women line up for a contraceptive injection which they prefer over the Pill or IUD because they fear its side effects less, consider injections to

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in a number of countries. Within one year after initiating use of the contraceptive, the percentage of dropouts was 88 in Bangladesh, 60.7 percent in a survey of urban centers in India, 53 percent in Colombia, and 41.8 percent in Hong Kong. Philip Kreager, Family Planning Drop-Outs Reconsidered (London: International Planned Parenthood Federation, 1977), p. 90.
be akin to health treatments, and believe the injections to be more potent than ingested or inserted matter.

Out of the attributes which affect motivation, one can derive the profile of an appropriate technology which maximizes unmet demand without making other changes. This would result from a method which would be available at little or no cost, without the need to travel for resupplies (i.e., it would be available at points visited regularly, such as the well or village store), to which no stigma is attached, and which is culturally welcomed. It would also be a method which could be applied for a long period of time—preferably until conception is desired—but which could be easily reversed. Finally, it would have no undesirable side effects on either health or sexual relations.

Hence the author sides with those who favor additional research and development effects on contraceptives and is against those who see such efforts as no longer needed, and with the Ford Foundation panel, headed by Roy O. Greep, which concluded that: "A variety of safe and effective methods of fertility regulation beyond those now available is urgently needed. . . . Two decades of experience with oral contraceptives and intra-uterine devices have made it evident that these methods have significant limitations. New methods that have fewer health hazards than existing methods, that are more acceptable and convenient for individual couples, and that are simpler to distribute are needed."36

(A similar position was taken by the president of the Population Council, George Zeidenstein, in a May 16, 1978, address to the Symposium on Contraceptive Technology, sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences. The head of the Population Office at the Ford Foundation, Oscar Harkavy, also advanced this position in testimony before the Select Committee on Population in April 1978, as did a hereto unpublished report by the National Research Council's Panel on Population, Health, and Nutrition.)

This position is supported not because dramatic breakthroughs can be confidently expected but because in any significant progress there will be a potential for increased demand—a demand which can be satisfied relatively cost effectively. (In other words, the costs of the improved technologies can be expected to be lower per user than, for instance, educating potential users—although education, of course, is of value in its own right, whereas technological progress has no such secondary value.)

It is further argued that, while differences in technology and access (or delivery) may increase unmet demand, they will not "make or break" the population problem, and hence are basically insignificant.

Here one position regarding voluntarism is pivotal. If one seeks to "solve the population problem," and develops scores of nations, (some of which have few prerequisites in terms of resources, infrastructure, or cybernetic capacities) both to raise the quality of life and to gain the bonus of fertility reduction, and does so on relatively short order, then the achievements of technological improvements in contraceptives and other family-planning activities may indeed seem small by comparison. If, on the other hand, one recognizes that problems of such magnitude are rarely "solved"—that most development plans achieve fewer gains in development than birth control plans achieve in fertility reduction; and that progress, when achieved, although high in some countries, averages out over the years for most countries—then one realizes that the impact of technological and delivery system improvements, while small in absolute terms, may be quite considerable when compared to those of other programs and efforts. Indeed, the less optimistic one is about guidability (without, however, despairing), and the more conscious one is of scarcity, the more is one concerned with where practical results can be obtained, especially at relatively low costs and relatively quickly.

Finally, resources for other efforts (such as development) are freed by attending first to whatever unmet demand already exists—or is generated by improved technology and delivery—because, with this approach, fewer resources are used up for maternity and child care or by outright consumption. In Indonesia, for instance, it has been suggested that the cost of the rice which would be consumed if the births averted by family planning were not averted, would by itself exceed the costs of the family-planning program—and perhaps even exceed the cost of the rice imported by Indonesia.38

Turning now to the second point, IEC (information, education, communication), again the criticism seems to be well taken—but not its implication. That slogans, placards, and commercials often do little to enhance family planning and that they are not cost effective—especially when they seek to change attitudes rather than to inform (e.g., about


relative merits of various contraceptives)—is well supported by sociological work in other areas.39

The data strongly suggest that formal communication, as a rule, is a weak agent of social change. This does not hold for other means of education, however, which basically seek to mobilize the emotive and normative power of small groups. Some family planners may base their model on the tightly knit, single purpose groups. For example, the birth control program in Java is said to form groups specifically around contraceptive use.40 Others mobilize existing social groups for family planning, as is said to work in Bali.41 Groups may also be composed for other purposes, such as teaching or sewing, with birth control promoted as only one of its activities, which reportedly has been done in Bangladesh.42

In all these situations the main force is not the literature on contraception, the official outside input, or other formal communication provided by birth control agencies and outreach workers. These are, it is true, the mobilizing agents which link the local natural or newly composed groups to the desired program; but the education bite comes from the power of these groups, through which individuals are deeply bonded. They thus provide an example of an effective transmitting mechanism. They might not work, in the long run, if other forces are not supportive, but they can accelerate, magnify, and provide greater family-planning outcomes for development inputs than would be obtained without such transmitting mechanisms. Hence the recommendation follows that those concerned with integration study and help evolve these transmitting mechanisms, so that policymakers as well as mobilized citizens can increase the interaction effects (or payoffs) of family planning and other population programs for development.

SECTOR RANKING

The concept of intersector linkages and of transmitting mechanisms raises an additional question: Are all intersector bridges equally achievable and


41. Private communication.

42. Private communication with Mrs. Rodriguez.
equally productive? If not, which are more productive for the purposes at hand—or can be made to be so? This issue may be of little interest to the hypervoluntarist. After all, if one assumes that a society can readily be guided toward higher levels of activity and achievement on all or most facets encompassed by development, one need not be concerned with the relative power of various linkages or the effectiveness of various transmitting mechanisms. On the other hand, the more one sees the difficulties involved in guidability and is concerned with making it more effective, the more relevant these questions become.

Concretely, the questions of where and how to integrate are raised on numerous levels: local services, regional and national administrations, planning and public policy, and even international agencies. In Indonesia, for example, the question is raised of whether family planning outreach workers should also provide health and nutritional advice in order to “give the villages something they want.” In the Philippines, an attempt is made to package family planning as part of a four-item program, “Project Compassion,” in which health, nutrition, new modes of gardening, and environmental protection are contained together with birth control.

The author is not aware of any definitive data, either from population studies or other investigations, which would allow one to rank the various sectoral combinations. We cannot decide a priori that the integration of family planning with health services, let us say, is a more effective pairing for all or most societies than, for instance, family planning with new employment opportunities or increased educational or other efforts. Obviously, numerous factors could affect the relative success of various combinations. Nor are these combinations limited to two sectors at a time—which further increases the possible permutations and the complexity of the issue. Influencing factors include the relative lag versus the advanced state of the various sectors, the relative legitimation of intervention in these respective sectors (e.g., in the United States, federal intervention in securing jobs is somewhat more acceptable than in sex education), power relations among the agencies involved (e.g., health versus welfare, where they are separate institutions), and numerous others.

Few general observations based on sociological analysis can, however, be made on this subject. All other things being equal:

1. The wider the sectoral reach of the integration policy and the more encompassing the scope of planning and coordination in terms of the sectors involved, the more unlikely is progress—but, if progress is accomplished, the more effective it will be. The reason for this suggestion is that coordination is a highly taxing task; but the system, at the same time,

43. Private communication with Dr. Terence H. Hull, Population Institute, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
is anchored at numerous points, and hence all those points must eventually be moved if it is to change in a significant way. This can be accomplished either: (a) by planning ahead and working on all fronts at once; or (b) by advancing some sectors, in the process exerting pressure on the others to progress, even if their progress is not planned a priori or secured simultaneously.

2. Activities which have relatively clear and measurable outcomes may lose out when integrated with those whose outcomes are less obvious. The basic reason for this is that evaluation and supervision, difficult under the best of circumstances, becomes even more difficult when outcomes are vague—and efficient program management is rare, of course, without effective evaluation and supervision. Hence, integrating family planning (which has relatively clear measures of “process,” e.g., number and proportion of “acceptors,” or continuity of use and of outcome, e.g., reduction in births) with, for instance, general education (whose measures of outcome are comparatively less clear and whose tasks, while more ambitious, are also more amorphous) contrasts with integrating family planning with, let us say, specific health services (such as vaccination) or with providing jobs to the unemployed.

These questions, and many others, arise when attempts are made to integrate family planning into a general development program concretely on either the service, management, or planning level. One issue, that of the independent institutionalization of family planning and, more generally, of population policies, programs, and activities, seems to be so pivotal that it deserves special attention.

INSTITUTIONAL EMBODIMENT OF POPULATION

The issue is under what structural conditions will an integrated program of development and population programs make the highest degree of combined progress? By combined progress is meant advancement both of the goals of development and of the population program objectives either


45. For excellent discussions of some of the programs see William Paul McGreevey and Associates, “Population and Development,” assistance to USAID, un-
because this is assumed to be a necessary part of a development program or in itself a direct way to advance quality of life. In this sense, not only development, but also the population program becomes an instrument or ultimate goal of integration.

Logically, using the family-planning example, the alternatives are:

1. Complete fusion of family planning into some developmental activities, such as health services. (It has already been indicated why it is held that specific family-planning activities are necessary and that sheer reliance on fallout effects of other programs would retard both family planning and development.)

2. Complete institutional embodiment in a segregated administrative hierarchy, reaching all the way into the village and subvillage, drawing on a separate family-planning agency involving outreach workers and volunteers. Here family planning has its own authority and communication lines, budget, labor force, and ministry. Coordination and integration occur, as with other separate agencies (e.g., education and health), in local interagency committees, planning boards and informal contacts, regional and national planning, coordination committees and informal contacts, and the leadership of village heads, mayors, governors, and national authorities (such as the president or prime minister).

3. Various mixes in which family planning has some, but not all, of the above characteristics. For example, it may have its own commission and access routes to the national government, governors, and mayors, but as “staff” rather than “line” authority, providing advisory and promotional authority but not decision-making power.

Thus under most circumstances, independent, “line,” institutionalization seems more productive for population programs—and for integration—than the other arrangements. The reason for supporting this position and a review of some of the counterarguments and exceptions to the rule follow.

On the basis of general organizational analysis and experience, one must note that independent institutionalization, to one degree or another, is extremely common. Few activities are combined into a general or specialized category of action without at least some segregated institutional-


ization. Thus manufacturing corporations have separate departments for production, marketing, and labor relations—each with its own hierarchy, labor force, and budget—because each set of activities is considered to benefit from such separate institutionalization. Hospitals, universities, armies, and practically all other organizations are internally differentiated in the same manner.

Moreover, historically, whenever it was desired to secure budget, attention, and impact to a new line of activities or programs, those activities and programs received distinct institutional embodiment. Thus English received its own department at Harvard when the significance of modern language next to Latin and ancient Greek was recognized. Social sciences were set apart from humanities once their importance in academia was established. On the national level, for instance, as economic policy was considered of greater value in the United States, the president was given a Council of Economic Advisors rather than continue to rely on his general staff for assistance in this matter. The same was true for science and technology with the 1962 formation of the Office of Science and Technology in the White House. The United States Air Force, once a branch of the army, was given departmental status in 1947; space activities were given an agency of their own (NASA) after Sputnik; and the National Science Foundation (NSF) was established once it was felt that basic research was being neglected.

In reviewing those activities which receive no separate institutionalization, one quickly realizes that these are few and far between. From accounting to physical education to acquiring supplies, all are secured by separate institutionalization on both corporate and national levels, although some activities receive higher levels of institutionalization than others (e.g., in the U.S. national government, "education" is presently an agency within a department, whereas "labor" has departmental status).

Activities left completely uninstitutionalized, or on a low level of institutionalization, tend to be weak in the sense of being poorly legitimated, vulnerable, and low in budget, labor force, and managerial attention, with their low level of institutionalization either reflecting or exacerbating their weakness. Thus in U.S. public schools, attention to ethics and character development is supposed to be "everyone's" business, meshed in with other teaching or course-related activities, but in reality is rather neglected. (In

some societies, homeroom teachers or clergy faculty are given primary responsibility for this area. In the United States, assigning character development to the coach, whose principal duty is another activity, often results in preoccupation with physical education—from development of the body to the desire to win—and in neglect of character development in any other respect—from playing by the rules to being sensitive to others.) On the national level, social sciences in the United States, once destined for a separate agency and presidential council, were kept as a division within the National Science Foundation, with no White House representative, which reflected and augmented their weakness.  

If one compares most of the countries in which family planning has no distinct embodiment to those in which it has, family planning is observed to be less legitimate, active, endowed, and effective in those countries in which it is submerged than in those where it is distinctly embodied.  

Here, too, where family planning is particularly weak (e.g., in coun-

50. The National Foundation for the Social Sciences Act of 1966, proposed by Sen. Fred Harris (D-Okla.), supported creation of a National Foundation for the Social Sciences, to be similar to but separate from the National Science Foundation. The purpose of the bill was to encourage and support research in the social and behavioral sciences.  

The following year, Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.) introduced legislation to establish a Council of Social Advisers, comparable to the Council of Economic Advisers, which would report directly to the president.  

Some of the major criticisms concerning both bills focused on lack of intellectual strength of the social sciences and an inadequate supply of top-level researchers. Testifying at Senate hearings on the proposed Council of Social Advisers, Lewis Butler, then Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at HEW, questioned the utility of such a council because of "limitations in our theoretical knowledge and understanding of the social system, limitations which are greater and which extend to more subject areas than faced the Council of Economic Advisers." Lewis Butler, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Government Research of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, on S.636 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1970), p. 151.  

Hearings on the National Social Science Foundation produced criticism from Robert A. Levine, then Assistant Director for Research Plans, Programs and Evaluations, Office of Economic Opportunity. Levine argued that institutionalizing disciplines with "limited availability of first class social research manpower" would not increment the quantity or quality of productive research, but would create a "resource bottleneck—the funds being applied to obtain a product the supply of which is limited by the absence of a key input." Robert A. Levine, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Government Research of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, on S.836 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1970), pp. 25-26.  

51. For a list of countries which include family planning in their national plans and which do not, see B. Maxwell Stamper, Population and Planning in Developing Nations (New York: Population Council, 1977), pp. 72-73.
tries whose religion agitates against it), keeping family planning low in embodiment—for instance, by presenting it as a health service—may actually serve to protect it. Nevertheless, the necessity of maintaining such a low profile obviously reflects weakness. Also, when distinctly embodied, the relative clout, status, budget, and line versus staff authority, all other things being equal, are expected to correlate with impact. (As there seems to be no systematic study of this point, it should, of course, be viewed as a hypothesis rather than an established fact until it can be empirically validated. Note, also, that one must take into account that other differences between any two countries could obviate the differences at hand. For example, if country A has a separate and well-endowed family-planning agency but a poorer civil service and greater villager opposition to national guidance than country B, country A may well have a less effective family planning program.) Hence, comparisons are easier for program changes within the same country than from one country to another. (Here, too, other factors may impinge on progress, e.g., the country’s development may slow down as the family planning is separately institutionalized, which would affect the overall results. But such changes seem easier to take into account than numerous cross-country differences. The same point holds true for analyzing changes within the same part of a country versus comparison of parts.)

All other things being equal, the author supports the hypothesis that, aside from situations in which family planning must “hide,” separate institutionalization will generally enhance progress by providing family planning with its own volunteers, outreach workers, and local services (although some legitimate secondary activities may aid this progress when they are treated as instrumental rather than competitive). This hypothesis applies to all levels: national, regional, state, and local for planning, administrative organization, and delivery of services. The same point was already made with reference to international agencies.52

The main exception to this hypothesis is a situation in which the whole national program, a major agency, or a program other than family planning, makes family planning its first priority, or at least one of its core projects. Singapore is said to have approximated this model nationally in recent years.53 There, it is reported, the “whole government” made family


planning its high priority, with the national leadership highlighting the
virtue of small families by offering tax incentives, other economic rewards,
and education privileges to those who planned their families. For
example, choice school attendance was granted to those women who had
tubal ligations after two children.) In Thailand, the public health pro-
gram is reported to have granted such a priority to family planning that
Thailand's annual population growth fell from a rate of 2.3 percent in
1966, to 1.3 percent in 1976—without the aid of specialized family-plan-
ing agencies.

While the author has not studied these two countries, their family
planning achievements are very impressive and seem to have been made in
defiance of the thesis of the impact of separate institutionalized embodiment
for family planning. Nevertheless, these situations may be exceptions which
prove the rule. The reason is as elementary as it is compelling: no country
or program whose prime purpose is not family planning can in the long run
maintain family planning as its first priority. This is possible only for a
limited period. Otherwise, its other goals would be neglected or it would
turn into a family-planning agency! And once the priorities shift, it may be
hypothesized that family planning will require its own institution to main-
tain momentum or it will become relatively weak.

Questions have been raised regarding the implications of the institu-
tionalization thesis for the labor force. It is said that, while such a thesis
may hold for the United States and other modern countries with large
managerial labor pools, how can nations with little such talent and
capability "afford" such specialized agencies? Where the managerial labor
force is scarce, specialized institutions may not be possible, but this is not
to suggest that development effort, such as family planning will not suffer
as a result. It might be necessary to defer or avoid specialization, but that
as a rule is likely to result in less family planning. It is difficult to imagine
family planning being as well attended to as part of a long list of duties, as
when it is a prime duty and responsibility locally, regionally, nationally,
and internationally.

54. On the success of the Thai program using existing health personnel and
clinics, see Yawarat Porpakkan, Peter J. Donaldson, and Thavisak Svelszen, "Thai-
lan'd's Field-Worker Evaluation Project," Studies in Family Planning 6 (7) (July
1975):201-204; Ronald Freedman and Bernard Berelson, "The Record of Family
Planning Programs," Studies in Family Planning (New York: The Population Council,
UNFPA), pp. 14-15, 33-34; and The Survey of Fertility in Thailand: Country Re-
port, vol. 1 (Bangkok, Thailand: Institute of Population Studies, Chulalongkorn
The production of knowledge relevant to population programs, especially for policy research, is mentioned briefly here because of its relevance and significance, but its scope requires separate study. At issue here is integration, not on the level of local services or national administrations, but in policy formation and planning—a task which is part "intellectual" or knowledge making and part cybernetic, providing relevant inputs to policymakers. Briefly, to the extent that integration proceeds on service and administrative levels, effective policy research would be based on the best knowledge available rather than on trial and error, uneducated "hunches," misinformation, and ideologies. To the extent that integration is not forthcoming, policy research can substitute for it in part, at least, by securing the coordination of programs which are separate in the field on the conceptual and perhaps planning levels.

In the literature on both population and development, the value of policy research is often underscored, but there is little concern with the specific prerequisites needed to make policy research effective. There seems to be a considerable degree of optimism about the ability to provide it (indeed, in some countries it was promised as "forthcoming" not only on the national level but in each district as well) but less than full realization of how taxing this mission is and how scarce the necessary workers or the required access to policymakers are.\textsuperscript{55}

CONCLUSION

Integration of population policies and programs and development policies is judged to be a solid concept because it builds on linkages found in society. In its present state, however, it provides insufficient guidance for the relevant public policies concerning the articulation of family planning and other population programs and development. To provide such guidance it is necessary to know not only that a society is integrated but at what level it is integrated. (Where integration is weak, the opportunity for building on societal linkages may be rather limited.) It is also necessary to take into account the degree of intersectoral play and lag—which may allow for significant progress in family planning or other population pro-

\textsuperscript{55} For additional discussion, see Amitai Etzioni, "Policy Research," \textit{The American Sociologist} 6, Supplementary Issue (June 1971):8–12.
grams without simultaneously working on development. Above all, we must maximize the population program interaction effects of development by better understanding and developing those socioeconomic activities which have the greatest interaction benefits for population programs and vice versa. Here the importance of properly institutionalizing population programs stands out (not to violate the concept of integration, but to secure the place of the program within the integrated context). By pursuing these recommendations, population policy researchers and population policymakers might be more assured that their work is indeed in the service of quality of life for the world’s present and future generations.