Oct. 1, 2002
Why War Now: Historians and Pre-War Frenzies
The Parallels With the War of 1812
By Peter
Hill
Why war now, why not sooner? This question, often put to the Bush Administration
in recent weeks, also troubled the historian Henry Adams who faulted
James Madison for asking Congress to declare war on Great Britain in
June 1812 when it was obvious that British impressment of American seamen
and their seizures of American shipping were no more war-provoking in
1812 than they had been for almost a decade.
Actually, in this instance, Madisons timing had much to recommend
it. As later historians point out, London had given no sign of abating
her maritime offenses, and the President could reasonably count on a
show of hostility to win concessions without too much fighting because
Britain appeared to be more vulnerable in the early summer of 1812 than
ever before. The President could reckon, for example, that if Napoleons
march to the east resulted in Russias defeat, the British would
be left without European markets or allies. If, as well, the French
Emperors strenuous shipbuilding program, recently undertaken,
succeeded in nullifying Britains naval superiority, Americans
could expect to gain at least some of their war aims at the peace table.
In this light, the moment seemed opportune. Still, Adams raises a recurrent
question, and because historians are a contentious lot, they will doubtless
continue to question the timing of war declarations whether they be
against Britons in 1812 or Saddam Hussein in 2002. This sort of controversy
comes with the territory.
But Adamss question of why war now and not sooner?
suggests another contemporary parallel, that of weighing the cumulative
impact of the enemys offenses. Adams wont quite admit that
the president and Congress by 1812 had reached the point of enough
is enough, which they surely had if one is to judge from their
rhetoric. Thus, just as the warhawks(as their enemies called
them) made clear they had had a bellyful of Englands multiple
abuses by 1812, so now the hawks in the Bush White House point to the
many sins of Saddam Hussein. If there is a lesson of history
here, it may be that the more reasons for war, the better.
Or is it? What if, on the brink of war, the enemy makes a major concession?
Do war plans still go forward? As of this writing, the Iraqi leader
has averted direct confrontation by once more agreeing to accept weapons
inspectors. Similarly, in 1812, five days before Congress voted for
war, Lord Castlereagh announced the British ministrys suspension
of its offensive orders-in-council. This retreat left, as a grievance,
only the substantive issue of impressment plus, of course, a strong
urge to stomp the Brits, if we could, for having dissed our proud nationhood.
These, it turned out, were reasons enough to fight on. Query: If Saddam
makes concessions, will we still have reasons enough to pursue him?
In considering the subject of pre-war frenzies, historians also often
remark on the predictable appearance of the demonizing factor.
Before wars are declared, they find the press and public working up
a sweaty hatred of the enemy, whether by buying into the image of a
saber-rattling Kaiser, or a world-threatening Hitler, or in this case,
a terroristic Saddam Hussein. This may be easy today, but consider the
problem the image makers faced in 1812 when our chosen enemies were
the Brits, but Napoleon, also an obvious bad guy, had done almost as
much damage to American shipping. That we became Frances co-belligerent,
not her ally, speaks volumes about the difficulty of choosing the right
enemy. (Saddam or al Qaeda?)
Looking for such historical parallels may be a plaything for the historically
inclined; still, some pre-war phenomena recur often enough to bear watching.
Writing in 1983, for example, historians Ronald Hatzenbueler and Robert
Ivie, published a work on approaches to the War in 1812 whose title
identified leadership, rhetoric, and partisanship as the
essential elements in the decision-making process. All three of these
political elements are so demonstrably present today that some future
historian may put them in the title of his own analysis of this era.
All of this is not to say that history ever quite repeats itself, but
sometimes it burps predictably.
Peter P. Hill is a professor of history (emeritus) and University
Historian
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