JAPAN: DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY
JOSHUA M. ARNESTAD
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of WW II, Japan and the
United States began an exceptionally close relationship spanning
political, economic and military realms. As the US-Japanese relationship
and the global security environment have evolved, so has Japan's national
security policy. The political situation in and around the Pacific Rim has
remained unstable during the post-war period. This instability has its
roots in the conflicting interests of nations with democratic ideals and
those with communist/socialist ideals. The Soviet Union's close proximity
and the repercussions of its collapse further troubled the region. The
instability of the successor states, and the incomplete nature of their
democratic transitions, has served to raise the likelihood of weapons
proliferation. Today, Japan faces several possible regional threats.
Japan's likely reaction to a hostile event in the Pacific Rim depends on a
number of factors. To understand Japan's geopolitical and economic
environment, one must examine the political structure's ability to call
for the use of force, what that force would look like and the historical
events shaping current policy. Japan's current situation is shaped by its
historical experience, its current economic strength, and its
international position. All these factors shape how Japan might enlist
dual-use space technologies if faced with a major conflict.
JAPANAN INTRODUCTION
Today, Japan is a constitutional monarchy,
with Emperor Akihito as the symbolic head of state. Japan's political
system is a representative democracy consisting of a national legislature,
a prime minister, and a judicial system. These three components closely
resemble the US legislative, executive, and judicial branches
respectively. The National Legislature consists of a Bicameral Diet
comprised of a 500 member House of Representatives and a 252 member House
of Councilors. The next election will be held in July 2001.
The Prime Minister is elected directly by
the Diet and must appoint a majority of the cabinet members from the Diet.
Policy formulation, administration of the various government organizations
and the coordination of government affairs are the joint responsibility of
both the cabinet and the prime minister's office. Through this
arrangement, Japan has attempted to retain a central governing capability
without placing too much power in the hands of any single entity.
CURRENT POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
Russia: The close proximity of
Japan and Russia led to a certain rivalry and a degree of mistrust between
the two nations. This rivalry was especially evident during the first half
of the 20th century, when the two nations were rivals for power in the
Pacific Rim. Russia and Japan clashed between 1904 and 1905 in the
Russo-Japanese War. Japan's victory in the war cemented its control of
Korea and led Russia to cede partial control of Sakhalin Island to Japan.
Japan's relations with the USSR were also
less than harmonious. "In 1938 and 1939 Soviet and Japanese armies tested
each other in two full-scale battles along the border of Manchukuo. But in
April 1941, a neutrality pact was signed with the Soviet Union, with
German acting as an intermediary." 1 As a result of the allied victory in World
War II, the USSR seized Sakhalin Islands and the Kuril Islands. Japan and
the USSR re-established diplomatic relations in 1956, but relations
between the two nations were cool at best. During the Cold War, Japan's
dependence on the United States, and its role as a staging point for the
Korean War and other demonstrations of US influence hindered the
development of Soviet-Japanese relations. The USSR and Japan never
formally concluded a peace treaty resolving World War II.
Since the dissolution of the USSR,
Russian-Japanese relations have improved to a degree. The unresolved
nature of the Kuril Islands has proved a hindrance to closer relations
between Japan and Russia. However, Russia (unlike the USSR) has proved
willing to discuss the status of the far northern territories with Japan.
"Recent summits in 1997 and 1998 between former PM Hashimoto and [former]
President Yeltsin have accelerated work on a peace treaty which would
settle the northern territories dispute and normalize bilateral
relations." 2
Japan has also increased aid to Russia to enhance Russian reforms and
nonproliferation efforts. Since the fall of communism in the early 1990's,
Japan has been more concerned about the Russian contribution to global
arms trade and nuclear proliferation than about a direct Russian military
attack.
South Korea: South Korea and Japan
have a long, historically contentious relationship. Japan's historic role
in the Asia-Pacific included its occupation of Korea in the early 20th
century. After World War II, Japan and South Korea were pushed together by
their mutual dependence on the United States. South Korea and Japan
engaged in intermittent negotiations starting in 1951. The last round of
negotiations resulted in the June 1965 establishment of diplomatic
relations between South Korea and Japan. Since then, South Korea and Japan
have not had a close relationship, but have found each other to be useful
regional partners. The nations' close ties to the United States, both
economically and militarily, led to a certain convergence in interests.
In the last ten years, South Korea and
Japan have moved toward improving their relationship. Japan and South
Korea are increasingly important trading partners. Japan trades over $30
billion per year with South Korea and maintains a positive trade balance.
The Japanese also contribute significant amounts of foreign direct
investments to South Korea. Strong ties in trade have begun to be
supplemented by broader patterns of cooperation. In 1998 South Korea and
Japan established a Korea-Japan Security Consultative Meeting to "promote
mutual understanding and trust in the area of national security" and
pledged to "actively cooperate for the stable development of the world
economy through international organizations." 3
In 1995, the United States, Japan and
South Korea established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO), which works with North Korea to replace its current
nuclear reactors with types of nuclear reactors that could not be used to
produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Stable and peaceful relations
between the two Koreas are very important to Japan's interests. Any
outbreak between the two countries would draw in US forces stationed in
Japan, presenting political and possible security problems for the nation.
North Korea: North Korea's
isolationism, and its anti-US stance have led to minimal, but antagonistic
relations between Japan and North Korea. In recent years, North Korea's
attempts to develop nuclear weapons and missile technology, especially
coupled with its close geographic proximity to Japan, are of great concern
to Japanese strategists. North Korea has launched negative media attacks
on Japan, and has proved unreliable in paying back debts owed to Japanese
industry. In response to these acts, as well as North Korean terrorism
against South Korea in the 1980s, Japan levied economic sanctions on North
Korea. Tensions between Japan and North Korea increased following North
Korea's 1998 launch of a Taepo-Dong missile over Japan. Concern over North
Korea's actions and its other developments in missile technology have led
some in Japan to believe in the necessity of enhancing Japan's self
defense force.
In recent years, relations between Japan and North Korea have improved
slightly. North Korea's need for foreign aid has led it to tone down its
anti-Japanese rhetoric to some degree. Japanese and North Korean
negotiators held several meetings in fall 2000. "Negotiations between
Japan and North Korea have been stalled for a decade over the charge that
North Korea kidnapped at least 10 Japanese citizens during espionage
forays on the Japanese coast between 1977 and 1980." 4 North Korea has
a strong motivation to improve its relations with Japan, for that is "the
country that may be most crucial to North Korea's future because it holds
the key to the bank." 5 Japan is already one of the main providers
of humanitarian aid to North Korea. Improved relations with North Korea
would enhance Japanese security by lessening the threat posed by that
nation.
China: China and Japan share a
long and often contentious history. The Chinese are still mindful of
Japan's military hegemony and brutal conduct during World War Two. Japan's
security relationship with the United States helped make China and Japan
Cold War enemies. The continued close relationship between the United
States and Japan ensures a US military presence in China's back yard.
Japan's policy toward China since World
War II has been closely linked to US policy. Until 1971, Japan, like the
United States, recognized Taiwan, not the PRC. China and Japan established
formal relations in 1972. "Japanese government leaders indicated a
willingness to compromise ties with Taiwan in favor of a closer
relationship with Peking." 6 Since the establishment of formal relations
Japan and China have become important trading partners. The two nations
signed a peace treaty in 1978, and Japan has invested in Chinese
modernization projects. "Both trade and cultural contacts between Japan
and China have expanded dramatically...and in the early 1990s China became
Japan's second largest trading partner, surpassed only by the United
States." 7
Despite their increasing economic
interdependence, the Chinese-Japanese relationship remains troubled by
differing stances on issues of defense and security. Chinese leaders have
been disturbed by indications that recent events may cause Japan to take a
more active military role in the region- including Japanese encouragement
of US deployment of Theater Missile Defense. China does not likely present
a direct military threat to Japan, but internal unrest or conflicts with
its neighbors could impact security and trade and possibly draw in US
forces just as in the Korean War. Although China possesses a nuclear force
capable of striking Japan and commands both a large army and navy, its
forces are geared mainly for mainland defense. The steady call for Taiwan
unification by Chinese government officials has kept Japan on edge, as a
conflict between the two countries would likely affect its shipping lanes
and fishing industry. If US relations with China deteriorate
substantially, Japan may be forced to choose between the necessity of US
security guarantees, and the economic benefits of continued trade with
China.
Taiwan: Taiwan and Japan share a
contentious mutual history. The island of Taiwan was under Japanese
control during the first half of the 20th Century, and throughout World
War II. Since the founding of the modern nation of Taiwan, however, Japan
and Taiwan have developed a better relationship with each other. Both
nations are close allies with the United States, and have faced many of
the same regional security issues, factors that nudged them into a closer
relationship.
As stated above, until the 1970s, Japan,
like the United States, recognized the Republic of China (i.e., Taiwan),
not the PRC, as the legitimate nation of China. Even after the truncation
of formal relations, "Japan has maintained economic but not diplomatic
relations with Taiwan, where a strong bilateral trade relationship
thrives." 8 As
both nations' economies developed, Japan became one of Taiwan's most
important trading partners. Japan has worked to deepen its ties with
Taiwan, as well as other newly industrializing nations in Asia.
While Japan has been careful not to
provoke the PRC in its dealings with Taiwan, Japan has indicated an
understanding of Taiwan's security dilemma vis-à-vis China, and a certain
sympathy for the fate of one of the few other stable Asian democracies. At
the same time, Japan's first priority is to safeguard its own security.
Japan has stressed the necessity of a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan
situation. MILITARY -STRUCTURE, DOCTRINE AND TECHNOLOGIES
Japan's defense agency heads the four
staff offices. These offices oversee the daily operations of the Ground
Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) and the
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), collectively called the Self-Defense
Force (SDF). The SDF is a modest force commanding a budget of no more than
1% of Japan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and is designed mainly to ward
off attack until the United States can send reinforcements or to aid its
domestic counterparts in responding to natural disasters. In the case of a
national emergency, the Prime Minister as head of the Defense Agency, must
obtain the approval of the Diet before authorizing Japan's Self Defense
Forces into action. The following table lists the major decisions and
policy formulations since the end of WWII regarding the SDF.
Historical Events in Japanese Defense Programs
1945- Allied forces occupy Japan.
1947- Article 9 of the Constitution ratified on May 3 precludes
offensive forces through a "war renunciation Clause."
1952- Mutual Security Assistance Pact ratified. The US agrees to
target external aggression and allow Japan to deal with both internal
threats and natural disasters.
- Armaments production resumes, in large
part to repair and maintain US equipment.
1954- Self-Defense Forces Law enabled the creation of the GSDF,
MSDF and ASDF under civilian control.
- Domestic defense industry began to arm
the newly formed SDF.
1956- National Defense Council organized to advise the cabinet on
defense related matters.
- The Basic Atomic Energy Law limits the
research, development and utilization of nuclear power for peaceful
purposes.
- National policy dictates that Japan will
not possess, manufacture or traffic in nuclear weapons.
1957- The Basic Policy for National Defense is set. Japan agrees to
support the UN, promote international cooperation, stabilize domestic
affairs, enhance public welfare, gradually develop a self-defense force
and deal with external aggression in conjunction with the United States.
1960- Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United
States is approved. Either party can revoke the treaty with one year's
notice.
1970- Defense Agency director Yasuhiro establishes five objectives
for the SDF: (1) maintain Japan's industrial base for national security;
(2) acquire equipment from domestic R&D and production efforts; (3) use
civilian industries for domestic arms production; (4) set long term goals
for R&D and production; and (5) introduce competition into defense
production.
1976- The National Defense Program Outline was adopted by the
cabinet. The outline clearly defined the defensive role and specified the
mission of the SDF. The SDF budget was limited to 1% of GDP and exports of
weapons and weapons technology were banned.
- Japan accedes to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as a non-nuclear state, underscoring
its 1956 policies on nuclear weapons.
1980s- Ships in the MSDF were armed with live torpedoes for more
effective deterrence of aggression.
- The Joint Staff Council was enlarged,
and a central command and communications system was established,
connecting all tactical and HQ based defense units.
1986- The FY 1986 - 1990 Midterm Defense Estimate targeted upgrades
to air defense, interceptor-fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles,
antisubmarine warfare capability, the destroyer fleet, patrol aircraft and
intelligence, reconnaissance, command, control and communications
- The Defense Council was dissolved, and
the National Security Council under the prime minister's control.
1987- The 1% ceiling on defense expenditures was lifted.
- SDF communication systems were upgraded
to a microwave network with a communications satellite relay.
- Japanese government reviews ways to help allies
protect shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf, including the benign activity
of deploying minesweepers. The government funds the installation of radio
navigation guides for gulf shipping.
1992- The National Diet passed the UN Peacekeeping Cooperation Law,
permitting the SDF to participate in UN medical assistance, refugee aid,
transportation, infrastructure repair, and election monitoring and
policing operations under limited conditions.
1993- 600 SDF personnel were deployed to Cambodia for UN
engineering and election monitoring projects.
-53 SDF personnel were deployed to
Mozambique to participate in peacekeeping operations.
As the above chronology suggests, Japan has been slowly upgrading its
self-defense capabilities and has developed a limited ability to
contribute to international peacekeeping efforts. It has also taken more
responsibility in funding the US installations on its territory. Japan now
spends about 10% of its total defense budget to support US forces, and has
assumed all responsibility for utilities and building maintenance costs
associated with US bases.
In 1990, Japan's government raised its defense R&D spending from 2% to 5%
of the total defense budget. In order to boost domestic defense
production, lower the procurement of equipment from foreign nations, and
build a more robust industrial base for its defense contractors, Japan has
recently lifted some export bans on defense technology. This action has
allowed economies of scale to emerge in some sectors, and has improved
efficiency. Dual-use electronic sub-components, vehicles, and transport
and communications equipment are now exported to the United States and
selected other countries.
The structure in figure 1 was implemented
following WW II, and was intended to prevent the concentration of power
seen in Japan's pre-war system. The structure also ensures civilian
oversight of the military, via the Prime Minister and six internal
bureaus. The Prime Minister and these bureaus are charged with drafting
policy, training, education, personnel, financial and equipment
requirements for the SDF. Civilian control and separation of powers across
the forces has resulted in problems with inter-service coordination.
However, recent command and communication upgrades have helped unify the
forces.
Figure 1: The Command Structure of the Japanese Self Defense
force. The Prime Minister, the civilian commander, is, in extreme
emergencies, authorized to use the force without consulting with the
national Diet. The heads of the three services, and of the Joint Staff
Council, are of equal power, and report to the director general of
defense.
Japanese forces provide a deterrent to any potential adversary. In a
conflict, Japan's forces would quickly be supplemented by US forces and
weapons. Japan's military is often enlisted by civil authorities to aid in
disaster relief. Public sentiment in Japan is still highly averse to
offensive capability. The following brief description of the forces will
allow a better understanding of the high-technology, and
defense-orientated focus of Japan's military. Maps detailing the locations
of the military bases and installations can be found in Appendix A.
Air Self-Defense ForceThe mission of Japan's Air Self-Defense
Force (ASDF) is to defend Japan from seaborne and airborne attack,
maintain constant alert status, and deter invasion. Other responsibilities
include providing air support to the Ground Self-Defense Force and
Maritime Self-Defense Force. The ASDF consists of three ground attack
squadrons, nine fighter squadrons, one reconnaissance squadron, and five
transport squadrons. Total manpower numbers 46,000. The ASDF has 330
combat aircraft, including the F15-J. Airlift Capabilities include the
C-1, C-130H and YS-11 Aircraft, and ground systems include Basic Air
Defense Ground Environment, an integrated network of radar installations
and air defense direction centers.
The weaknesses of this force include: the
low levels of precision guided munitions, little open water flight
training, and a poor base defense capability. Additional Units include the
Airborne Early Warning Group (Misawa), Tactical Reconnaissance Group
(Hyakuri), Air Support Command, Air Development Test Command, and the Air
Material Command.
Maritime Self-Defense ForceThe mission of the Maritime
Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is to defend Japan from maritime invasion and
secure the safety of maritime traffic around Japan. This last is
essential, since 90% of all imports are delivered through sea routes.
Operations include patrol, escort, and defense of key ports and straits.
Formations consist of five district units, the fleet guard, and five
district headquarters. The MSDF's capabilities include Anti Submarine
warfare, Anti Air warfare, Anti Surface warfare, Mine warfare, Electronic
warfare, Surveillance, Transport, and Rescue. Total manpower numbers
44,000. The Maritime Self-Defense Force also has aviation capabilities
consisting of 205 total fixed wing aircraft, as well as EP-3 multipurpose
aircraft, used primarily for electronic warfare. Electronic warfare
includes electronic detection and missile alarm, electronic jamming, chaff
rocket launches and radar evasion. Other aviation capabilities include
amphibious rescue planes, helicopters, and the SH-60J for conducting
submarine searches. Sea power includes 13 submarines, 43 mine warfare
ships, 11 patrol craft, and 6 amphibious ships. The maritime force is
exceptionally well trained. All recruits learn patrol, gunnery, mine
sweeping, convoy and transport techniques. The weaknesses of the Maritime
Self-Defense Force include reliance on the ASDF for air cover, limited
resources to conduct extended patrols, an absence of aircraft carriers,
low levels of long-range surface to air missiles and close-range weapons,
few replenishment ships, and a low level of logistical support.
the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is
to deter attack, repulse a small invasion, and provide a holding action
until reinforced by US forces.
Formations include of five regional
armies consisting of one armored division, 12 infantry divisions, one
airborne brigade, two combined brigades, one artillery brigade, two air
defense brigades, one helicopter brigade and antitank helicopter platoons.
Manpower totals 156,000. Aircraft include CH-47J carrier helicopters,
UH-1J Utility helicopters and AH-1 Antitank Helicopters.
Ground equipment includes Surface-to-Ship
Missile Launchers, Multiple Rocket Systems, Antitank / Antiaircraft
Missile Launchers, Tanks, Type 89 Fighting Vehicles and Type 93
Surface-to-Air Missiles. The weaknesses of this force are that the number
of personnel is insufficient to enable an immediate shift onto emergency
footing. The ratio of enlisted to officer personnel is high, requiring
augmentation by minimally trained reserves and volunteers during crisis.
Because of a high population density, live fire training opportunities are
limited, resulting in less than optimal combat training conditions and low
troop morale.
SPACE TECHNOLOGIES AND APPLICATIONS
THE JAPANESE SPACE PROGRAM
Japan is one of the few nations worldwide
with indigenous launch capability. Japan's government funded space
activities are principally the responsibility of the National Space
Development Agency of Japan (NASDA). NASDA reports directly to the prime
minister's office. Mission success and cooperation are NASDA's guiding
principles. The agency has received increased funding and levels of
personnel without exception since its inception in 1969. NSDA was
established explicitly for peaceful principles, and reflects Japan's view
of outer space as the haven for the future of humanity. NASDA commands an
extensive infrastructure of both ground based and space based assets,
including 13 separate facilities, and seven operational satellites. Major
missions include monitoring the earth for environmental conditions,
conducting communication satellite experiments, and demonstrating
technologies for future space operations. Through these activities, NASDA
has also developed an extensive data management capability.
Since 1969 NASDA has managed 24
successful launches, using four booster types, and three classes of
satellites. It consistently seeks cooperation with other nations in almost
all its endeavors and has current ongoing projects with NASA, the European
Space Agency, French Space Agency and the German Aerospace Center. A major
effort is underway to provide the Japanese Experiment Module for the
International Space Station Project. This module, named Kibo, is slated to
be launched in 2004. Kibo will be assembled in orbit after its launch.
Through cooperation and partnerships, Japan has been able to develop an
overarching national context for space, in which space contributes to both
its economic and military stability.
Japan's space program reflects the
overwhelmingly peaceful orientation of the nation. However, given Japan's
space capabilities, if Japan is ever seriously threatened, it could enlist
the services of its own space-based assets and use its civil ground
infrastructure to aid in a defensive stand. Additionally, its high level
of space related knowledge could be leveraged by allied nations operating
their own space platforms. The expertise represented by NASDA's 11,000+
workforce is also a substantial asset. Japan has an impressive capability
to verify and integrate commercial satellite capabilities or information
into defense plans. Because launch technologies for boosters and
long-range missiles are similar and Japan relies heavily on electronic
warfare, creative solutions to evade enemy missile attack could also be
employed.
NASDA GROUND FACILITIES
Tsukuba Space Center
(TKSC)Approximately 4,000 people work at TKSC, a consolidated
operations center. TKSC serves as the central command and control hub for
the entire network of stations in the tracking and control network. Main
functions include continuous orbital tracking, telemetry analysis, and
evaluating the health of all spacecraft. In addition to operations, the
center is responsible for the identification and development of new
facilities, technologies and software necessary to operate future space
systems. Other capabilities include spacecraft integration and test
facilities, vacuum chamber test facilities, and a computing center.
Tanegashima Space Center
(TNSC)The TNSC is NASDA's largest facility. It performs a wide
range of functions, including spacecraft testing and assembly, booster
integration, launch for both the J-I and H-II boosters, and post-launch
tracking. Also at the center are engine test facilities, the range control
room, two radar stations, an optical observation facility and a space
museum.
Kakuda Propulsion Center
(KPC) The KPC is the prime facility for the development of new
rocket-propulsion systems. KPC's facilities include a High Altitude Test
Firing Stand for performing test firings of upper stage rockets in a
simulated space environment. Additional functions include the testing of
liquid hydrogen and oxygen systems, high vacuum simulations for thermal
modeling, solar environment replication and data analysis.
Katsuura / Masuda / Okinawa / Kiruna
Tracking and Communication Stations These four facilities
complete the tracking and control systems coordinated by the TKSC. NASDA's
remaining facilities are devoted to management, research and data
management, and do not contribute to the daily operations of space assets.
(See Appendix 1 for facilities.)
SPACE LAUNCH
Two indigenously developed launch
vehicles are currently available to Japan. The first is the H-II, a
two-stage launch vehicle, capable of launching a two-ton satellite into
geostationary orbit. Since the beginning of its operation in 1993, this
launch vehicle has successfully been used to launch 11 satellites into
orbit. Its second stage is liquid fueled and contains an inertial guidance
system. Japan's second indigenous launch vehicle is the J-1 three stage
solid launch vehicle capable of lifting a one ton satellite into
geostationary orbit. The J-1 combines the upper stage of the H-II with the
upper stage of the MU-3S II, a rocket developed by Japan's Institute of
Space and Astronautical Science. The J-1 is intended to enable rapid
launch capability and lower the cost of launch site operations. The
integration of these two boosters demonstrates Japan's progress in making
space technologies more interoperable and is a testament to the Japanese
ability to integrate existing complex technologies. This capability and
technological expertise could be leveraged in a crisis, and could enable
the application of civil capabilities to warfighting.
EARTH OBSERVATION SATELLITES
Japan's earth observation experience
dates to the 1987 launch of the Marine Observation Satellite. Japan then
launched the Japanese Earth Resource Satellite and the Advanced Earth
Observation Satellite (ADEOS), which failed prematurely. ADEOS II is
scheduled to launch in late 2001 and will carry two 250 meters resolution
sensors. ADEOS II designed to monitor the oceans, the ozone layer, the
atmosphere, the weather, and rain forest conditions, and will carry a
suite of near infrared, synthetic aperture radar, microwave,
electro-optical and multi-spectral imagers.
The Advanced Land Observing Satellite and
two Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) are scheduled to be launched in
2002. They will add substantial flexibility and resolution to imaging
operations by improving resolution to 2.5 meters and 1 meter respectively.
One IGS satellites will be electro-optical and the other will be a
synthetic aperture radar satellite, enabling imaging operations under any
weather condition. In addition, four satellites are being planned to
replace ADEOS II in order to better monitor global environmental
changes.
FIGURE 2: THE REMOTE SENSING SYSTEM IN JAPAN: Organizations in
blue are Incorporated Foundations, private sector foundations that perform
non-profit activities in support of public interest. The structure is
complex and seeks to satisfy the requirements of both government and
industry. This bureaucracy yields closer relationships across industry and
government, and an integrated system capable of using both commercial and
government data.
Space Advisory Council (SAC)
--Conducts inter-ministerial coordination.
User Ministries
--Provide remote sensing requirements to responsible organizations.
Science and Technology Agency
(STA)
--Overall responsibility for space policy,
technological development and international standards
Remote Sensing Technology Center of
Japan (RESTEC)
--Supervised by both STA and NASDA,
RESTEC is an incorporated foundation founded in 1975 to support
public interest. Distributes data for
commercial use.
National Space Development Agency of
Japan (NASDA)
--NASDA initiates and implements most
spacecraft developments.
Office of Earth Observation
Systems
--Responsible for policy, planning,
design, research and development of all remote sensing satellites
Earth Observation Center (EOC)
--Established in 1978, the EOC receives,
processes and stores data from Japanese and foreign
satellites (LANDSAT, SPOT and ERS)
Earth Observation Research Center
(EORC)
--Established in 1995, the EORC focuses
on data utilization and is developing map production, land
use, resource exploration and disaster
monitoring capabilities. Distributes data for public use
Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI)
--Responsible for payload developments
and commercialization of both technology and data
Earth Remote Sensing Data Analysis
Center (ERSDAC)
--Incorporated foundation to promote
technological development and data analysis for
non-commercial use
Japan Resource Observation System Org.
(JAROS)
--Payload development for non-commercial
use
COMMUNICATION SATELLITES
The only communications satellite
currently operated by NASDA is the Communications and Broadcasting
Engineering Test Satellite. This satellite operates in geostationary
orbit, and, although a test satellite, relays data to Japan's ground
stations. The next two communication satellites, both planned for launch
in early 2001, will be able to transmit and receive laser signals,
enabling tracking and control of spacecraft from other space platforms,
and development of space communications networks.
In addition to earth observation and
communication satellite technology development, NASDA is testing and
verifying a variety of technologies. These technologies will enable less
expensive and more readily available access to space, as well as the
operation of both larger satellite infrastructures, and smaller, more
capable, satellites. They will focus on studying the environment around
the moon, in order to lay the groundwork for possible future habitation
and commercial development.
IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE ACTIVITIES
THE SDF AND NASDA AS CRITICAL NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Both the Japanese Defense Agencies'
Self-Defense Force (SDF) and the National Space Development Agency of
Japan (NASDA) are integral to Japan's space power structure. The SDF's
inclusion is essential, as its mandate is to be the main line of Japan's
defense against external threats. NASDA's inclusion is appropriate because
the organization represents Japan's economic strength, technological
prowess, peaceful approach, and the bulk of its space capability.
Figure 3: Japan's political structure responsible for the research,
development and operation of capabilities to enable national defense and
space development. Although strictly segregated, both functions are
managed jointly through the Prime Minister and the cabinet.
The chart in figure 3 presents the main decision-making chain for
research, development and operational issues pertaining to both
organizations. It also serves to highlight the joint control shared by the
prime minister and the cabinet in areas of both space and defense. With
joint purview over both the space and defense sectors it becomes an
inherently collective effort to balance national security concerns with a
broader vision for space use and associated economic benefits. Such
collective oversight leaves the door open for the dual-use of
technological capability.
Japan is a technologically advanced nation
with a highly educated workforce. Despite Japan's peaceful orientation, it
is possible that in a conflict, the SDF would call on civil or even
commercial space organization and their vast institutional knowledge for
assistance. The close geographical proximity of SDF and NASDA facilities
suggests that the relationships to allow use of civil space assets for
defense support may already be in place. While the technical potential for
Japan's space assets to become dual-use exists, it is difficult to imagine
a situation where the strict borders between Japan's military and its
civilian and commercial structures would be broken down in this way. In
fact, it is widely acknowledged that there exists no plan to support the
SDF with civilian aircraft or merchant fleets in times of crisis, and no
cooperative contingency planning has been acknowledged with any other
civilian agency.
Japan's mainland is not rich in natural
resources; thus, Japan relies heavily on the Middle East for its energy
needs. The Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca, and South China Sea are all
important to Japanese trade. In any regional conflict Japan would require
US naval aid to guide and escort its ships safely through disputed areas.
This arrangement is necessary because of the MSDF's prohibition from
active participation in military conflicts unless Japan has been directly
attacked. The MSDF could, however, provide surveillance, intelligence and
search-and-rescue assistance to US operations. Under these conditions
space-based remote sensing systems and communication capabilities could be
useful, even though they were developed for environmental purposes. The
high concentration of MSDF and NASDA facilities in and around Tokyo could
aid in the rapid utilization of these capabilities.
Certain characteristics of Japan's space
systems also make them potentially useful in a conflict situation. For
example, in addition to the sensors aboard the planned ALOS and IGS
spacecraft outlined above, the suite of sensors on the ADEOS II satellites
could be used to provide moderate resolution intelligence data during war.
As well, NASDA'S Communications and Broadcasting Engineering Test
Satellite could become highly integral to a regional conflict. This
geostationary satellite has constant visibility of one half of the earth
radiating out from Japan. NASDA's Earth Observation and Earth Observation
Research Center could in a crisis, enhance Japan's intelligence gathering
and capabilities. Japan's advanced civil and commercial communications
grid could also prove a potential asset.
US POLICY CONSIDERATIONS- JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC RIM
Defeat in World War II led Japan to adopt a defensive and non-aggressive
military stance. In 1952, the Mutual Security Pact between the US and
Japan was ratified. In 1960, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
further increased the bond between the two countries. Japan and the US now
collaborate on $250 million of joint research and development activities
that include upgrades to ammunition, engine development, laser technology
and work on ballistic missile defense systems. President Bush is seeking
to strengthen ties with the island nation, because of Japan's strategic
location and its close proximity to both Russia and China.
Japan and the United States share a common
interest in maintaining peace in the Asian theatre. Post-WWII ties between
the two nations have remained strong and further integration of activities
is not only beneficial to the two nations' mutual security, but necessary
to maintain peace in the international system. Japan currently operates
100 P-3C's which are used to perform surveillance missions within 1,000
nautical miles of its coastline. The US Navy maintains 251 of the same
aircraft to perform a broad array of missions, including surveillance and
anti-submarine warfare. Officials from both countries have stated that
they have a strong desire to ensure interoperability of the replacement
platform chosen for both nations' aircraft, which are slated for
replacement by 2010. Talks are currently underway for possible cooperative
development of the successor platform. Even if joint development does not
come to fruition, both countries desire joint surveillance capabilities.
Of the $250 million spent on joint
research and development activities with the US, about $10 million of it
is on missile defense. This issue is especially sensitive to Japanese
policymakers because Japan's constitution prohibits them from acting
collectively with other militaries. If a national missile defense system
were deployed jointly by Japan and the US, Japan would conceivably be
violating its own constitution. Additional complications arise from the
fact that missile defense would target primarily nuclear weapons and
potentially violate Japan's non-nuclear policies. A decision to implement
national missile defense would also appear to imply an expansion of
Japan's military capability, a move that might cause public opposition
within Japan.
The barriers to full cooperation between
the US and Japan in purely military matters are sidestepped by the joint
development and interoperability of surveillance and intelligence systems.
Japan's independent development of the Information Gathering Satellites
shows a commitment to advancing indigenous remote sensing capabilities and
decreasing their reliance on the United States for monitoring activities
in Asia. Despite their path toward increased independence, the Japanese
intend to maintain intelligence systems that are interoperable with US
systems, as is shown by discussions with the US about the P-3C successor
plane. Given current close links between US and Japanese intelligence
sector, perhaps, the logical next step for the two nations is not to push
for joint deployment of a national missile defense system, but first to
approach the issue from a perspective centered on cooperation in
space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. After the
Information Gathering Satellites are launched, the US and Japan can
investigate ways to collaboratively gather information as is already done
for surveillance aircraft. Such an arrangement would not violate Japan's
constitution and would allow the two nations to explore and determine how
space systems can be independent, but synergistically employed.
CONCLUSIONS
As is evident throughout this paper, Japan is technically adept and has a
rich history of space system development and operations. The lingering
memory of World War II has helped make today's Japan an advocate for peace
and stability. The Japanese government has demonstrated its commitment to
the peaceful utilization of space through participation in the
International Space Station. Thanks to the trend of increasing military
autonomy and the close proximity of military and space facilities, there
is little question that Japan can utilize aspects of space systems to
augment its military if required. The launch and initialization of its IGS
satellites will only strengthen this capability. The US should respect
Japan's rich history and benign tendencies and seek to engage Japan in
interoperable efforts to enhance security in and through space. US-Japan
cooperation has been very successful on Earth and should be expanded to
encompass space security missions in a matter that will not counter
national principles.
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APPENDIX A- JAPAN'S SELF DEFENSE FORCE- MAPS AND FIGURES
The following force breakouts are intended to provide a brief glimpse
of Japan's defense capability. Although not all divisions and units are
displayed, the basic geographical spread of each force is accurate. The
high concentration of MSDF assets around Tokyo is a testament to the
importance placed on protecting the vibrant trade industry.
AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
BASES AND FACILITIES
MARINE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
BASES AND FACILITIES
Ground Self-Defense Force
Bases and Facilities
Japanese Space Systems
Center, Launch Sites, and Installations
NOTE- As noted in the text of this paper, Japan's space programs
are not military in nature. The display of this graphic in this appendix
is for convenience only, and should not be taken to imply a military
purpose for Japan's space program.
Return to Table of Contents.