US Policy Considerations – China, Taiwan, and the
Pacific Rim
Rebecca Jimerson
Lawrence Cooper
Corinne Contant
The current US debate over
the appropriate US relationship with China demonstrates the lack of unanimity
within the United States about how to approach China. One school of thought
holds that Communist China is an outright threat to US goals, especially in
Asia, and believes that Chinese and US interests are fundamentally
incompatible. Those in this camp believe that China wants hegemony, not only in
Asia, but also throughout the world. For strategists in this camp, China has
replaced the Soviet Union as a major adversary that the United States needs to
contain. According to this view, the United States must, therefore, make every
effort to thwart China’s global aspirations and prevent any expansion of
Chinese influence.[2] Therefore,
China should be prevented from reunifying with Taiwan, from joining the World
Trade Organization, and from acquiring additional modern military and space
technologies.
An opposing camp maintains
that China is not now, and need not become, a serious international threat.
These experts brush off concerns over China’s modernization attempts, noting
that their economy cannot sustain its current high growth rates. Thus, China is
unlikely to maintain its present military growth, and if it were to do so, 30
years from now it would still be a regional, rather than a major world, power.
They steadfastly maintain that China is not, and does not intend to be, a major
threat to the United States, despite the fact that China opposes many US
polices in East Asia. This condition would change only if the United States
proves itself to be a direct threat to China. This camp seeks to maintain and
enhance relations with China, despite China’s human rights violations and its
aggression towards Taiwan and the Spratly Islands. According to this point of
view, engagement facilitates the democratization of China, by increasing
contact and interaction with the outside world.[3]
Further, a more democratic China is less likely to cause conflict and more
likely to work out disputes within international structures.
The single most contentious
issue between the United States and China is that of Taiwan’s status. In 1996,
high levels of China-Taiwan tensions brought US forces to the Taiwan Strait.
The situation was was dangerously close to a military confrontation. Chinese
feelings about reunification with Taiwan rise quickly to the boiling point on
this issue, and have produced anger and hostility towards the US. “Since the
opening of Sino-US relations three decades ago, Taiwan has been ‘the crucial
question obstructing the normalization of relations between the US and China.’”[4]
While the US’s official recognition of the PRC, and the Clinton
administration’s stated goal of forging a “strategic partnership” with China
have facilitated relations between the two nations, Taiwan’s ambiguous status,
and the ambiguous US relationship with Taiwan dominates US-Chinese relations.
The United States is faced
with an exceedingly complex dilemma. Taiwan is a democratic nation with a
freely elected government while China is still authoritarian and Communist.
Although the United States does not officially recognize Taiwan, in many ways,
it extends de facto recognition and support to the island. The United States
has important economic ties to, and interests in, both the PRC and Taiwan. As
well, many Members of Congress remain hawkish and tend to antagonize China
through their embrace of Taiwan. The US position toward Taiwan remains
multifaceted. While the United States agreed to a one China principle, it did
not affirm the PRC contention that Taiwan belongs to the PRC.[5]
Thus, “the US carefully “acknowledges,” but does not necessarily affirm, ‘the
Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan belongs to China.’”[6]
The United States has worked to maximize its relationship with China and with
Taiwan through a policy of ambiguity. This policy attempts to grant each
governmental entity what it most needs from the United States and allow the
United States to benefit from each in turn. The United States values its
increasing economic ties to China’s potentially massive economy. As well, the
United States has a profound interest in China’s becoming an influential and
peaceful regional power. The United States has “praised China’s leadership in
the aftermath of India’s and Pakistan’s tit-for-tat 1998 nuclear tests, and its
“’behind the scenes’” role in encouraging North Korea to toe the line with
regards to its nuclear ambitions.”[7]
If, as seems likely, China will evolve into a major power, it is in the US
interest for China to remain friendly to the United States.
US-China relations are further complicated by Taiwanese purchases
of weapons and military technology. The fact that, even after the termination
of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the United States has continued to
arm Taiwan worries Beijing, and reinforces the contradictions in the US
relationship with the two Chinas. The United States “reserves for itself the
ability to sell defense arms to Taiwan and ‘to resist any resort to force or
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or
economic system, of the people of Taiwan.’”[8]
The US willingness to sell weapons to Taiwan is both political and economic,
for Taiwan’s pursuit of more modern weaponry simultaneously feeds the profits
of the US defense industry, and reinforces those who believe that the United
States must support Taiwan given its grave risk from China. It is not yet clear
which point of view, profound wariness or engagement, will dominate US policy
toward China. It is also not clear whose view of China more accurately reflects
China’s future position in world affairs.
US-Chinese tensions have been exacerbated by US military strategies
in recent years. China is strongly opposed to the US development and possible
deployment of a new antiballistic missile system.[9]
While the United States asserts that if adopted, this system would not be
directed against China, but rather against “nations of concern,” China views it
with suspicion. The Chinese nuclear arsenal is at present small enough that a
US missile defense system could negate almost all of China’s nuclear deterrent.
Both China and Russia have urged the United States not to proceed with building
the system, and have warned of a new military build-up in the Asia-Pacific
should the United States go ahead with it. China is not only concerned about
the proposed US national missile defense system, but also about the potential
regional deployment of Theatre Missile Defense. The possible deployment of
Theatre Missile Defense in the Pacific Rim is a key element in US-China
relations. Japan and South Korea would both welcome the deployment of TMD in
the region, but have expressed concerns that the inclusion of Taiwan under US
TMD could be a serious provocation to China.[10]
As noted in the previous section, Taiwan would welcome the deployment of
regional TMD in order to mitigate the threat posed by China’s shore-based
missiles. According to current US planning, regional TMD would primarily be
deployed in order to protect South Korea and Japan from North Korea missiles.
However, “Washington has not ruled out giving Taiwan advanced capabilities to
defend itself from Chinese missile attacks.”[11]
China is vehemently opposed
to both Theatre Missile Defense and National Missile Defense, but for slightly
different reasons. The proposed US national missile defense system will
essentially negate Beijing’s limited nuclear deterrence, and diminish its claim
to great power status. China views the US system as a US attempt to solidify
its status as the world’s only superpower at the expense of other nations and
extant treaties. The similarity of the Chinese and Russian stances against US
Missile Defense underscores the strength of their opposition to the US National
Missile Defense system. China feels directly threatened by US Theater Missile
Defense system, for such a system would directly impede China’s ability to
threaten Taiwan with its missiles. The PRC’s ability to pose a credible threat
to Taiwan has been a major component of its strategy towards Taiwan over recent
years. Thus, TMD would constitute a significant disturbance of the current
cross-strait dynamic, through the intervention of US technology and military
might. In sum, the United States and China both benefit from maintaining an
ambiguity about US relations with Taiwan. Both countries are granted additional
freedom to maneuver in the region because of carefully maintained ambiguities.
Recent events have
highlighted the difficulty of maintaining the US strategy of “strategic
ambiguity” (see US Policy Options section below). In April 2001 the collision
of a US EP-3 electronic intelligence gathering plane with a Chinese F-8 plane
over international waters in the South China Sea resulted in the loss of the
Chinese plane and the emergency landing of the US plane on the Chinese Island
of Hainan. The plane’s landing led to a
stand-off between the US and China over both the crew of the plane and the fate
of the plane itself. After eleven days
of rising tensions and diplomatic maneuvers, the 24-person crew was returned
unharmed and the aircraft only returned in July 2001. This incident highlighted the increasing level of tensions
between the United States and China. Experts believe that “as a result of the
detention of Americans…, Bush is more likely to approve sales of advanced
missile destroyers equipped with Aegis battle management system diesel
submarines, Patriot PAC-3 missile systems” to Taiwan.[12] Spring 2001 statements by President Bush to
the effect that the United States reserves the right to defend and arm Taiwan
have revealed the fragility of the policy of strategic ambiguity linking the
US, Taiwan and China. As well, the centrality of the surveillance airplane to
the latest US-China crisis highlights the increasing importance of advanced
technology for all nations involved in the Pacific Rim.
China and the Asia-Pacific- A consideration of China’s
behavior within the Pacific Rim must be based on the understanding that China
believes its “Red” star is ascendant. China believes its influence in the
region is increasing, and should, and must, continue to do so. The Spratly
Islands and the South China Sea are one potential site of conflict in the Asia-Pacific.
The Spratly Islands are highly contested and potentially volatile, with both
economic and status-boosting value. The Spratly tension is distinctly
multilateral, while most regional tensions involve only two or three nations.
The slightly lower level of interests in, and importance of, the Spratly
Islands means these islands are not likely to be the primary cause or site of a
conflict. However, continued monitoring of the level of tensions in the South
China is essential. Satellite remote sensing could potentially play a role in
reducing tensions in the area by making the actions of all parties more
transparent.[13]
Japan adds another level of
complexity to the regional balance of power in East Asia. This complexity stems
largely from the fact that US-Chinese-Japanese relations depend, to a large
extent, on the course of events in the Koreas, and between Taiwan, China and
the US. Any increase in Japanese defense spending and/or any addition of
offensive capabilities to its Self-Defense Force, could easily antagonize
Beijing. Further North Korean missile testing, or any confirmation of nuclear
weapon development, would be a threat to all the nations in the area, and could
easily increase Japanese and Taiwanese requests for US military aid, including
TMD. This would threaten China, since any TMD in the area reduces the influence
of Chinas nuclear and conventional missiles.
A
US-centered missile defense network in East Asia, and national missile defense
in the United States could lead China to either acquiesce to US hegemony or to
devise strategies and capabilities to counteract it. It could prematurely cast
an adversarial shadow across US-China relations and render ephemeral any hope
of harmonious relations between China and the United States and Japan. Underlying
Beijing’s vociferous objection to the specter of US-Japan missile defense
cooperation is the fear that its modest nuclear arsenal may be neutralized and
that the reinvigoration of the US-Japan alliance and the adoption of new
defense guidelines which expand Japan’s defense cooperation may be applied to a
Taiwan contingency.[14]
China
has multiple interests in the resolution of the status of North and South
Korea. China is not necessarily opposed to a Korean reunification, as long as a
reunified Korea takes a shape that does not threaten China. China has no need
to see a reunification occur in the near future. It continues to monitor events
on the peninsula closely, and seeks to minimize United States influence.
Beijing’s relationship with the DPRK, while far from warm, provides China with
some leverage regarding Korea. China blames the United States for North Korea’s
continued ballistic missile development efforts. Rightly or wrongly, Beijing
links North Korea’s continued development of nuclear weapons to the US’s
testing of anti-missile systems.[15]
Thus, China has used its limited leverage with North Korea to remind the United
States that it may have some ability to nudge North Korea in a direction that
the United States favors; or, conversely, in a direction the United States
fears.
China sees its future role
as that of a military and economic superpower, and believes that it will be
able to achieve military parity with the United States in the mid-term future. China
bases this belief on its commitment to the revolution in military affairs,
which it can develop and implement quicker than the United States could do with
similar modernizations. In its analysis of US performance during the Gulf War,
China believes United States was fortunate that Iraq allowed it time to
transport and assemble its forces. China perceives US slowness, substantial US
reliance on allies, and heavy US reliance on large amounts of high-tech
equipment, especially satellite navigation and communication, as weaknesses to
be exploited. China believes that Iraq, in the Gulf War, and the Serbs, in the
Kosovo War, failed to exploit critical US weaknesses. In a conflict with the
US, China does not intend to make the same mistake. By pressing ahead with its
development of RMA technologies and tactics, China believes it can surpass the
United States, relying on US arrogance, its over-reliance on complex
technology, and the cumbersome and change-resistant nature of the US military
industrial complex.
China is attempting to
perform this RMA “miracle” through continuous upgrades of its military
technology, and timely development of its space capabilities. To make RMA work,
the PLA must internalize the technical skills and education required to fight
with modern weaponry and tactics- especially space forces. China must learn to
project its forces far into the South China Sea and to protect them. Without
that capability, it cannot seize Taiwan, enforce its claims on the Spratly
Islands, and or engage US forces on the high seas. China’s ability to field new
equipment and doctrine tends to progress in fits and starts since it normally
buys training only for the initial cadre of personnel (assuming they will train
additional troops) and also pays for only minimal training, maintenance, and
support personnel.[16]
Compounding these growing
pains is China’s relative ignorance of the technological principles underlying
the equipment. The Chinese have bought or adapted much of the technology and,
because the country lost many skilled technicians during the Cultural
Revolution, it does not have sufficient trained scientists and engineers with
the background to understand the many nuances and challenges of high-technology
equipment. The ability to use high-technology systems in battle requires
systems integration, which means not only the ability to operate technology,
but also the ability to adapt components to varying environmental, operational,
and tactical requirements—an even more challenging task. Further, in its attempt
to achieve parity with other major powers, Beijing must hit a moving target,
because other regional powers and the United States are also engaged in force
modernizations.
The reunification of Taiwan
into the PRC is a high priority for China. However, a forcible military
reunification would destroy much of the island's infrastructure, thus negating
many of the potential economic benefits to be gained from reunification. If
China must attack Taiwan it will not do so until it can attack rapidly, and with
overwhelming force. “The military balance will likely continue to favor Taiwan
until the latter part of this decade…[however] militarily, time is on Beijing’s
side.”[17]
Despite its current strategic disadvantage, if China is provoked or feels
threatened, a Chinese attack on Taiwan in the near future remains a distinct
possibility.
The US, Taiwan, and the
Asia-Pacific- US-Taiwanese relations are
defined, in large part, by US-Chinese relations. The US choice to remove
diplomatic recognition from Taiwan means that the United States and Taiwan
cannot have a “normal” relationship. The United States values its relationship
with Taiwan because of the strong economic ties between the two parties and
because of the symbolic value of the link. While Taiwan values its economic
relations with the US, the most valuable role the United States can play is
that of a protector of Taiwan. Taiwan also has other sources for advanced
weapons. It has, for example, bought weapons from western European nations, and
pursued its own military modernizations. Taiwan has also sought to tie itself
more closely to other Asian nations, such as South Korea and Japan, and to
participate within regional forums. Taiwan has also made several overtures to
the PRC, expressing its willingness to engage in talks, and its desire to find
a lasting peace. Even as it pursues these other measures to guarantee its
security, Taiwan has continued to push the United States to authorize the sale
of advanced military systems and technologies. While Taiwan would certainly
prefer a return to pre-1970’s relations with the US, since diplomatic
recognition is not returning to Taiwan any time soon, Taiwan has worked to
maximize the benefits of its situation, and has attempted to reframe the
US-China relationship as less important in the post-Cold War. Taiwanese
officials have pointed out that the conditions under which “China is
geo-politically important while Taiwan is but a nuisance” no longer exist.[18]
Taiwan’s attempts to ensure its security, and its relationship with the United
States, have been based on the understanding that the United States will
neither abandon Taiwan, nor support Taiwan if it seeks official independence.
Taiwan’s focus on its
economic growth is based, not only on the natural desire for a strong economy,
but also on the realization that: (1) a strong economy ties Taiwan closer to
the United States and other Western countries; and (2) China would lose more if
it attacked and ruined that economy than if it remained weak. Taiwan wants to
enhance its relations with China and, in doing so, make dealing with Taiwan so
valuable that China is loath to risk those benefits through violent
reunification.
Subtlety
is an essential characteristic of Taiwanese international politics and security
posturing. Rather than stress its own desire for US Theatre Missile Defense as
protection against China, Taiwan has stressed the general volatility of the
region, and the risk that Japan and South Korea face from adversaries. Taiwan
is a strong supporter of the deployment of US TMD to the region, for TMD
intended to protect Japan would also protect Taiwan. Taiwan’s claims on the
Spratly Islands are just vigorous enough make it a participant in the dispute,
but not so vigorous as to add significantly to China-Taiwanese tensions, raise
overall regional tensions, or to antagonize the United States and other western
powers, who would prefer to see tensions in the South China Sea dissipate
peacefully. In recent years, Taiwan has increasingly attempted to move beyond
its global isolation and create its own legitimate political space. Taiwan is
seeking membership in several international organizations, including the United
Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and IAEA. Taiwanese
officials are quick to note that granting Taiwan such memberships would not
imply a recognition of Taiwan, for “there are legal precedents such as Ukraine
and Belorussian UN membership while they were part of the Soviet Union.”[19]
Taiwan’s pursuit of membership (or at least observer status) in various
multilateral organizations is part of its ongoing attempt to achieve de facto
global recognition of its right to exist.
Taiwan’s
transformation from an authoritarian and economically depressed island state
into a vibrant democracy with a robust economy has been impressive indeed.
Taiwan has developed into a highly advanced nation, whose advanced military and
civilian technologies and integration into the world economy make it more
powerful than its small size would suggest. Despite all this, Taiwan inhabits a
very unsettled international space and must adapt its domestic politics,
international affairs, and policies toward outer space around this uncertainty.
US Policy Options and Considerations
The current US policy
towards China and Taiwan is characterized as “strategic ambiguity.”
Effectively, this means that “if Taiwan declares independence, don’t count on
us; if the PRC invades Taiwan, don‘t count us out.”[20]
Strategic ambiguity is the US attempt to mute cross-strait tensions without
being put in the middle, or drawn into a conflict. It is a strategy of dual
deterrence, and depends on the fact that neither Taiwan nor China can predict
the US reaction to a disruption of the unstable status quo. US policymakers
hope that “the uncertainty brought about by the United States will...preempt
either the PRC or the ROC from making a move that would upset the status quo.”[21]
The United States “has for decades sought to balance competing US interests in
both China and Taiwan, and, at the same time, maintain credibility, peace and
stability in the region.”[22]
The current US policy has generally been effective, but has rarely been
comfortable to US policymakers who prefer greater clarity in international
affairs. The end of the Cold War, and thus, the potential fading of China’s
geopolitical significance as a counterweight to the USSR, Taiwan’s
democratization, the economic value presented by China’s emerging market, the
importance of Taiwan as a trading partner, and increasing tensions in the
Asia-Pacific have all led many US scholars and officials to wonder if it is not
time to craft a new policy for dealing with China and Taiwan. The newly
emergent geopolitical realities, coupled with rapid technological advances in
space, information, and electronics, make it likely that the US policy is due
for a careful re-examination. As became clear in the April 2001 loss of a
Chinese fighter aircraft off the coast of China, and damage to a US
surveillance aircraft, US policy of balancing Taiwan and China is volatile and increasingly
difficult to continue. US policymakers and defense planners must develop plans
and strategies to deal with any new developments in US-Chinese,
Taiwanese-Chinese, or Taiwanese-US relations, or other developments in the
Pacific Rim. Given the importance of space technologies to US security plans,
US plans must take into account not only US posture toward outer space and
dependence on space assets, but also the space policies and capabilities of the
other nations in the region.
While new US policies in the
Asia-Pacific must address both China and Taiwan, the current realities of power
continue to mean that minimizing the threat posed by China takes precedence
over maximizing the benefits gained from Taiwan. The US adoption of a policy of
either pure containment, or pure engagement toward China would be inadvisable.
Containment would imply the creation of a new Cold War, with China put in the
position of the Soviet Union. Given China’s perceptions of a malevolent United
States, selfishly trying to keep resources and prestige from China, such a
containment policy would probably further alienate China, and act as a
self-fulfilling prophecy. As well, effective containment would necessitate a
unified effort among the US allies. This is unlikely to occur, since Europe
does not perceive any Chinese threat to their interests.[23]
The European states and other nations have gladly filled the gaps left by US
reluctance to trade with China, and have worked to establish economic ties with
China.
Engagement alone is not a
viable policy either. Engagement provides no punishment for violating norms of
conduct and human rights. There can be no negative consequences, only more
engagement. Engagement ignores very real conflicts between US and Chinese
interests, and does not provide the United States with leverage to bargain with
China. As well, if engagement fails, the United States faces a China that will
have gained considerable economic and military benefits. Thus, the failure of
engagement would create a China that poses a greater threat to US interests.
The United States has
focused considerable efforts on preventing China from achieving hegemony. China
has a military that, at the minimum, has the capability to act as a spoiler. If
necessary, China can, either alone, or in concert with Russia or other nations,
field forces to threaten and offset US interests. It is actively upgrading its
forces, and plans on fielding space weapons and developing advanced tactics to
counter the massive technological edge of the United States.
China is actively promoting
economic growth and military modernization at a rapid pace. These advances
potentially threaten US influence in Southeast Asia, and possibly even on a
global scale. US policy makers must attempt to understand whether China seeks
regional hegemony, or a more global power. While these developments give United
States cause for caution, excessive caution is itself a grave risk. The United
States could, through an overly aggressive stance, cause a new Cold War, for,
as Joseph Nye once pointed out: “If we define China as an enemy, it will become
an enemy.”
China is in the process of
solidifying its space power. It already has mastered space launch technology
and provides commercial services from low to high earth orbits. It has some
satellite communications and reconnaissance capability, and is actively
developing more sophisticated satellites. Through development or exploitation
of space technology, China will attempt to facilitate its own Revolution in
Military Affairs. China may be able to use these developments to increase its
influence in the Pacific Rim area through increased ability to apply military
force, and through increased prestige and leadership.
The most effective strategy
for the United States to follow likely falls between containment and
engagement. Under this strategy, the United States would engage in trade, but
would also attempt to impose sanctions that exact costs for Chinese companies
that violate export control laws, proliferation regimes, and other treaties. At
the same time, the United States must strengthen its ties to the countries of
Southeast Asia and ASEAN, in order to influence the direction and extent of
Chinese influence. A strong, but explicitly non-aggressive and non-expansionist
US presence in the region could help entice China to explore some measures of
democratization. Chinese liberalizations would, in turn, alleviate both US and
Taiwanese reservations regarding a possible reunification.[24]
A more democratic China might be able to attract Taiwan’s interest in
reunification.
The policy challenge for the
United States is to find effective ways to engage China while also containing
China’s more aggressive tendencies in order to strengthen and stabilize other
nations in the region, and support future liberalizations in China. The most
effective approach would be to pursue a policy of constructive engagement,
that, for the near future maintains elements of strategic ambiguity, but also
encourages China to continue on a course of liberalization. Such a policy will
only be successful if the United States does not appear to be trying to dictate
to China. Optimal US policy toward the Asia Pacific requires careful
consideration of the effects of US actions such as the deployment of missile
defense. The United States has a window of opportunity in which to redefine its
role in the region in keeping with new risks and new opportunities in the
Asia-Pacific.
Any new US policy towards
China and Taiwan must certainly take into account the changing role of space
technologies in the region. The Asia-Pacific is an unusual region because
several of the latent conflicts there would involve nations with considerable
access to advanced space-based technologies, either through indigenous
development or from commercial sources. Advancements in space and other key
technologies change the security situation in the Pacific Rim in two ways.
First, more and more nations have access to advanced military technologies,
from guided missiles, to military radar, to advanced command and control
capabilities. The proliferation of military technologies even in impoverished
Asian nations makes the region inherently volatile. Second, new satellite
technologies have dramatically increased the level of transparency in the
Asia-Pacific. Access to commercial remote sensing, development of indigenous
satellite technology, and improvements in the gathering and distribution of
information have made it far easier for nations to monitor each others’
behavior and status.
While transparency may,
indeed, prove beneficial to the overall security environment in the
Asia-Pacific, it may also pose certain risks, both to regional stability and to
the continued utility of the US policy of strategic ambiguity towards China and
Taiwan. Strategic ambiguity has allowed the United States simultaneously to
deter aggression or rash actions by either the Chinese or the Taiwanese, in
large part because neither party knew exactly what the US response to PRC
action would be. As well, a measure of uncertainty as to the other party’s
force structure, deployment, and military capability tended to inhibit hasty
actions. Now, both China and Taiwan have a greatly enhanced ability to monitor
each others’ behavior and capabilities. Given the already high level of
cross-strait distrust, rapid confirmation of military advancements might
increase tensions. This new transparency has the capacity to increase trust,
but where trust does not exist transparency poses at least as many risks as
uncertainty.
Conclusion- A
new US policy towards China, Taiwan, and the balance of the Asia-Pacific, is,
indeed, necessary. The United States must remain engaged in the South China
Sea. It is becoming clear that, for good or ill, China intends to maintain or
expand its presence in the region. The United States does not necessarily need
to counter or oppose Chinese influence, but must maintain a strong and peaceful
influence of its own. The United States should work to maintain freedom of
navigation, and to prevent any of the disputants from resorting to the use of
force. The United States must develop a comprehensive policy towards China
that, simultaneously, acknowledges China’s interests in the region and
encourages China to see its ideal role as a strong, but non-aggressive and
non-expansionist regional power. China has expressed its interest in peaceful
resolution of the tensions it is involved in, and should be encouraged to work
within the context of ASEAN, an organization with the authority to settle
disputes in the region. The US policy must address China’s growing space and
military power, and must mitigate the regional risks posed by advances in
Chinese technology.
At the same time, US policy must acknowledge and address new
changes in Taiwan, from Taiwanese democratization to Taiwan’s significant
military capabilities, to Taiwan’s global economic power. While Taiwan’s
democratization is, in many ways, a positive development, it may actually
introduce some additional risks. Under the former Nationalist government, the
population was strictly controlled, and was not permitted to make statements
advocating Taiwanese independence. With free speech comes the ability to
advocate numerous views – a freedom that could increase Chinese fears about
Taiwanese goals, and possibly provoke aggression. US policy must also address
the fact that continued Taiwanese defense enhancements could feed cross-strait
tensions. At the same time, the United States should encourage the creation of
some sort of international, quasi-independent status for Taiwan. The United
States must make it clear to Taiwan that countering China’s military buildup or
posturing in the Spratlies on a tit-for-tat basis is not the best way to gain
US support. The United States must solidify its commitment to Taiwan’s defense
and freedom, for a failure to do so will lead to Taiwanese attempts to do so
without US aid or approval.
While the United States does not have the ability or responsibility
to resolve the China-Taiwan issue, the United States does have the ability to
act as a stabilizing- or destabilizing- force in the Pacific Rim. The United
States must find a way to adapt the stabilizing influences of strategic
ambiguity to the new, post-Cold War, technologically advanced era, an era where
ambiguity is being transformed by transparency. New technologies- space-based
technologies, information technologies, and dual-use systems- are acting as
catalysts for the rapid and unpredictable shifts in Asian geopolitics. The
United States must, therefore, strive for international policies that allow new
technological developments to enhance, not damage, security, in Asia and
worldwide.
[1] Jaime A. Floecruz
[2] Khalilzad, pg. 69.
[3] Khalilzad, pp. 64-69.
[4] Manning, p. 2
[5] Benson and Niou, p. 14
[6] Benson and Niou, p. 14
[7] Agence France Presse, June 8, 2000
[8] Benson and Niou, p. 15, quote from Taiwan Relations Act
[9] This system underwent and failed its third major test in the summer
of 2000.
[10] Anderson, pp. 20-23.
[11] “US Agrees Sale Of Arms…” FAS
[12] “Congress More Likely to Support Taiwan Weapons Sales.” US
Defense News
[13] Baker, John C. and David G. Wiencek
[14] Manning, p. 9
[15] “China Blames US for North Korea Missile Threat,”
[16] Khalilzad, pg. 52.
[17] Manning, p. 6
[18] Lin, Chong-Pin
[19] Manning, p. 12
[20] Benson and Niou, p. 16
[21] Benson and Niou, p. 3
[22] Benson and Niuo, p. 2
[23] Ibid., pg. 71.
[24] Ibid., pp. 72-74.