Kirsten L. Armstrong
Taiwan, a relatively small,
densely inhabited island, scarcely 200 km from Mainland China, is at the heart
of one of the world's most volatile current geopolitical dilemmas. Separated
both physically and politically from the PRC since Chiang Kai-Shek retreated
there in 1949, Taiwan has evolved into a wealthy and democratic political and
economic entity.[1] Yet Taiwan's
status remains ambiguous and precarious. Although Taiwan functions in many ways
as an independent nation, China continues to consider Taiwan a renegade
province, and is eager to bring the island back under Chinese control-by force,
if necessary. Taiwan, on the other hand, prefers the status quo, and its de
facto independence, to reunification. For the moment, there exists a peculiar
balance, as neither side of the Taiwan Strait sees a clear benefit in acting
against the other. Both China and Taiwan are actively modernizing their
military, and taking other steps to ensure that, if a conflict does occur, its
side will emerge victorious. Years of slowly escalating tensions have eroded
what minimal stability there once was, making it dangerously easy to reach the
flash-point for confrontation.
Taiwan's current situation is exceedingly
complex. To understand the Taiwanese situation, it is essential to consider
Taiwan's peculiar international status, its trade and diplomatic relations with
other nations, its relationship with China, and its relationship with the
United States. Understanding Taiwan's position vis-à-vis China also
necessitates an examination of the size, structure, and capability of the
island's military forces. An essential part of Taiwan's military modernization
and economic development has been the development and procurement of high
technology space-based systems. Since many space assets are dual-use in nature,
and have significant military utility, Taiwan's use of, or access to, such
assets can play an important part in the area's strategic balance of power.
Taiwan's fate will have a key role in the resolution of political and economic
tensions in East Asia.
The
island of Taiwan is 13,900 square miles in size, and currently supports a
population of about 21 million people. Taiwan has long been the site of international
disputes. During the 1600s Taiwan was occupied by both the Spanish and the
Dutch. From the late 1600s until 1895 Taiwan was under Chinese control. From
1895 until the end of World War II, Taiwan was a Japanese possession. The
modern entity of Taiwan came into existence in 1949, after the forces of
Chiang-Kai Shek, leader of the nationalist Goumindang Party, were defeated by
Mao's army. They retreated to the island of Taiwan, establishing the Republic
of China there. From 1949 until 1991 the Taiwanese government maintained that
their island, not the People's Republic of China, was the legitimate seat of
the Chinese government.
Since 1949, China and Taiwan
have effectively been two separate nations, governed by two distinct
governments: the former, communist, and the latter, non-communist. As time
passed, the two entities grew farther apart in terms of their economic systems,
political systems, culture, and acceptance of each other. Originally a highly
authoritarian state, Taiwan increasingly liberalized and is now democratically
governed. Taiwan's economy has developed and flourished in recent years. The
island enjoys great prosperity, and trades heavily with the United States,
Japan, and other nations. Taiwan's pursuit of support and recognition worldwide
are based on the highly international nature of its economy, as well as on
security concerns vis-à-vis the PRC. Many Taiwanese fear reunification with
China, fearing that would bring a reversal of its economic success and
democracy. China, on the other hand, wants to resolve what it calls the "Taiwan
issue," and bring Taiwan under its control. This desire has intensified since
China has regained control over Hong Kong and Macao, and since Taiwan has
solidified its status as a democracy.
Current Political and Strategic Considerations
Taiwan has two unique relationships: one
with China, and one with the United States. With regard to China, Taiwan
prefers to maintain and stabilize the status quo, but China insists on
reunification. The United States recognizes China and Taiwan as one unit
diplomatically, but sells arms to, and is an unofficially ally of, Taiwan.
Taiwan
takes a broad view of its national security. Not only does it wish to protect
its physical security, but its political and economic security as well. It has
a four-pronged approach to national security:
• Under the stipulation of
the ROC constitution, to safeguard all rights and interests to reach the
goal of national unification,
• To ensure territorial
integrity and sovereignty,
• To protect people's rights
of security from invasion, and
• To maintain economic
prosperity and social stability.[2]
Taiwan's national security doctrine responds to a variety of
potential threats, but most experts believe the most relevant and proximate
threat to be the PRC. Thus, the PRC remains at the center of Taiwan's foreign
policy and defense strategies. Taiwanese military and national security experts
believe China is likely to attack if and when:
•
The ROC on Taiwan declares itself independent o internal upheaval occurs on the
island
• The ROC's armed forces on Taiwan become
comparatively weak
• Any foreign power interferes in the ROC's
internal affairs
• The ROC on
Taiwan protractedly refuses to talk with the PRC about the issue of unification
• The ROC on Taiwan develops nuclear weapons[3]
In
addition to these factors, most knowledgeable observers believe that a
Taiwanese declaration of independence would motivate PRC action.
A secondary motive for Chinese aggression has recently emerged.
Recent PRC military doctrine states that Taiwan's excessive delay of
reunification talks would also be a cause for Chinese action. A February 2000
policy paper threatening "to use force against Taiwan unless island leaders
agree to negotiate a peaceful reunification" shocked US policy makers.[4]
Chinese officials have stated that, when it comes to safeguarding of China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity, or to the reunification of the China and
Taiwan, "the Chinese government has the right to resort to any necessary
means."[5]
The high tensions in the
area have led analysts to predict how a conflict could unfold. China has
propagandized six particular tactics to instill "fear" in the Taiwanese.
"First, fear of missile attack; second, fear of maritime blockade; third, fear
of combined-arms landing operations; fourth, fear of people's war; fifth, fear
of the undependability of 'western weapons;' and sixth, fear of 'foreigners'
backing off."[6] Invasion is
considered unlikely, as there are much less cumbersome ways to launch an
offensive. "Analysts generally agree that the PRC is more likely to stage some
'unorthodox tactics' to harass Taiwan rather than launch an all-out assault at
the island. These tactics may include testing armed or unarmed missiles in and
around Taiwan's land and maritime territories, cruising submarines near or in
Taiwanese waters, or flying fighters to skirt Taiwan's airspace."[7]
The latest tactic has been cyber-warfare. "Instead of aircraft carriers and
bombers, China is investing heavily in electronic jamming and intercept
techniques to thwart the Pentagon's satellite-based combat communication, just
in case the U.S. gets in Beijing's way."[8]
The most probable offensive
tactic would be a missile attack on Taiwan. Taiwan's proximity to the mainland
makes missile attack an attractive offensive option to China. "China is
building a missile base in Fujian province, directly opposite Taiwan...From
Xianyou, most of Taiwan would be within the missiles' range of 300 kilometers
(186 miles)...The report also said that China had built a dummy base at
Zhangzhou, also in Fujian province, but Taiwan's military authorities had not
been fooled."[9] Missile
attack is also appealing because Taiwan lacks missile defenses. The Chinese
army has a store of short-range conventional missiles that could reach Taiwan.[10]
Further, the Pentagon "estimates that China could have 800 missiles by 2005,
all aimed at Taiwan."[11]
The jury is still out on
which side would prevail should conflict occur. The PLA has clear quantitative
advantages over Taiwan in sheer military strength, yet it could not commit all
its forces to an attack at one time.[12]
As well, Taiwan is further along in its military modernization than China.
Nevertheless, although Taiwan has an impressive military, it is still at
serious risk. One missile attack scenario envisioned by an American analyst
could transpire in less than an hour. "[A] massive, coordinated air strike
employing hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles could cripple Taiwan's air
defenses and early warning systems, destroy its command, control and
communications center and demolish Taiwan's eight primary airfields, thereby
neutralizing the Taiwanese air force as well as its naval ports. Beijing's
military analysts write that China could achieve air superiority over a
paralyzed Taiwan within 45 minutes, suffering few casualties."[13]
The winter and early spring
of 2000, the time leading up to Taiwan's 2000 presidential election, was an
extremely tense period in Chinese- Taiwanese relations. PRC officials stepped
up their warnings and rhetoric toward Taiwan. Beijing's opposition was largely
based on the fact that the presidential front-runner- and eventual winner of
the presidency, Chen Shui-bian, is a strong supporter of Taiwanese sovereignty.
Chinese saber-rattling included releasing a white paper on the "One China
Principle and the Taiwan Issue" in February. This white paper warned that
either a Taiwanese declaration of independence or the indefinite delay of talks
for reunification would prompt a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Chinese also
sent several of their destroyers through the Taiwan straits. Since the election
tensions have subsided somewhat. President Chen Shui-bian, has made several
overtures towards China. Recently, referring to the historic summit meeting
between North and South Korea, he suggested that "leaders on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait could 'rewrite and create history.'"[14]
United
States- US-Taiwanese
relations are friendly, but guarded. During the initial Cold War era, the
United States supported Taiwan, the Republic of China, instead of the People's
Republic of China, because Taiwan, while not a democracy, was not communist in
nature. The United States treats Taiwan as an unofficial ally and has protected
Taiwan on many occasions over the last 50 years. A mutual defense treaty was
signed in 1954, in which the United States pledged to defend Taiwan. The United
States maintained diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China (not the
People's Republic of China) as the legitimate Chinese state until 1979. US
support for the Taiwanese state faded, however, as the United States began to
realize the vast potential benefits of recognizing the PRC. However, the United
States did not give up a close relationship with Taiwan after recognizing the
PRC. Taiwan was increasingly democratic, and an increasingly valuable trading
partner, two factors that encouraged further US involvement with and support of
the island. Thus, the US Congress in 1979 passed the Taiwan Relations Act,
which allowed the United States to continue to sell arms to Taiwan. Although
the United States no longer technically recognizes Taiwan as a nation, de facto
US recognition and support have continued.
The Taiwan Relations Act is
the core of current U.S. foreign policy with Taiwan.
In general, the
purpose of US arms sales policy toward Taiwan is to assist the people of the
island to defend themselves from China's coercion by military and economic
means. By providing sufficient defensive weapons to Taiwan, the United States hopes
to maintain the military balance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait,
thus lessening the chances of military action by China against the island, and,
in turn, allowing the United States 'to respond in a flexible manner to any
effort to resolve the Taiwan issue by other than peaceful means.[15]
The TRA allows the United States to accommodate the
interests of both China and Taiwan. Although the United States wishes to
support a democratic Taiwan, it has strong motives to avoid confrontations with
China over the island's political status.[16]
Further, the TRA did not violate prior agreements with either party.[17]
US
Agreements Affecting Relations with Taiwan and China[18]
Agreement |
Year |
Mutual
Security Treaty with Taiwan |
1954 |
Communiqué agreeing to one China |
1972 |
Carter
administration switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing |
1978 |
Taiwan
Relations Act passed by Congress |
1979 |
Communiqué between Reagan administration and Beijing to limit arms
sales to Taiwan |
1982 |
Six Assurances proposed by Taiwan |
1982 |
New legislation is currently being
debated to shift the balance of US foreign policy back in the direction of
Taiwan. The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act would
Require the Pentagon
to cooperate with Taiwan in defense planning, threat analysis and training
programmes, including staff training and personnel exchanges at the general
officer level. It also would require the U.S. executive branch to offer Taiwan
specific weapons systems-including missile-defense equipment, air-to-air
missiles and diesel-powered submarines-which Taiwan has previously been denied,
partly on grounds that they could be offensive.[19]
The House overwhelmingly passed the legislation on
February 1, 2000, and was referred to the Senate.[20]
House Resolution 1838, "To Assist in the Enhancement of the Security of Taiwan,
and for Other Purposes," was read twice in the Senate, but no further action
occurred before Congress's 2000 adjournment. While this act, and similar
Congressional actions designed to support Taiwan is intended to ensure
Taiwanese safety, overly hasty US actions could spark conflict between China
and Taiwan, and actually decrease the island's security."[21]
The Koreas- Taiwan is not directly involved in the events on the Korean peninsula.
However, like other Pacific Rim nations, Taiwan pays careful attention to
relations among the two Koreas, the United States and the PRC. Taiwan sees
certain parallels between the Korean situation and its own relationship with
China because both involve divided nations, with one democratic and one
communist half. Taiwan has significant economic ties with South Korea that it
does not wish to see disrupted. Taiwan does not have an immediate stake in the
reunification of the Koreas, and hopes that if such a reunification occurred it
would result in a democratic, capitalist Korea, with a US orientation.
The Spratly Islands- Taiwan, like the PRC, is involved in another of the
Asia-Pacific's most volatile tensions, the dispute over the control of the
Spratly Islands. The Spratly Islands, some 200 small islands, reefs and rocks,
are scattered throughout the South China Sea, which is the world's second
busiest sea lane. The Spratly Islands are valuable because control over them
may allow nations to reap both economic benefits- from the oil and gas deposits
thought to lie deep beneath the sea- and political benefits. The nations
directly involved (as claimants of some or all of the Spratly Islands and/or
surrounding sea) are: Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Taiwan and Vietnam. As both Taiwan and the PRC consider themselves to be the
effective legitimate government of China, both entities have similar claims on
the Spratly Islands. Taiwan, thus, "claims all of the islands and most of the
South China Sea for historical reasons."[22]
Taiwan's actions and rhetoric concerning the Spratly Islands have largely
focused on countering China's right to claim the islands, not on the claims of
other nations. There were reports in early 2000 that Taiwan had stepped up
missile deployment on several of its claims in the South China Sea.[23]
Japan- Taiwan and Japan have a
contentious mutual history. The island of Taiwan was under Japanese control during the first half of the 20th
Century, and throughout World War II. Japanese control of Taiwan included a compulsory
"Japanization" of the island. Since the founding of the modern nation of
Taiwan, however, Japan and Taiwan have developed a better relationship with
each other. Both nations are close allies with the United States, and have
faced many of the same regional security issues, factors that nudged them into
a closer relationship. As both nations' economies developed, Japan became one
of Taiwan's most important trading partners. In 1997, 25.4% of Taiwan's imports
came from Japan, and 10% of its exports went to that nation.[24]
While Japan has been careful not to provoke the PRC in its dealings with
Taiwan, Japan has indicated an understanding of Taiwan's security dilemma
vis-à-vis China, and a certain sympathy for the fate of one of the few other
stable Asian democracies. At the same time, Japan's first priority is to
safeguard its own security. Thus, any Taiwanese declarations of independence,
or other actions that would provoke China, would not be welcomed by Japan.
Japan has stressed the necessity of a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan
situation.
Taiwan is a small state,
both in size and population. Taiwan's military is reflective of these
characteristics. The island has ground, navel, air, and other forces composing
its military capability. Taiwan has been actively modernizing and upgrading the
capability of its armed forces. Even with recent improvements, Taiwan still has
vulnerabilities it wishes to minimize.
Since the retreat to Taiwan and the Republic of China's
establishment on the island in 1949, the island's defense strategy has
experienced a curious reversal. In the 1950s the ROC maintained a relatively
large army to support its ultimate goal of retaking the Communist mainland by
force.[25]
With the diminishing likelihood of, and desire to, recover the mainland, Taiwan
focused on a more defensive strategy. Taiwan's relationship with the PRC
worsened as the island began to prosper economically and the government began
to move towards democracy. The exacerbation of tensions led Taiwan to begin
today's focus on defensive military strategies. "Taipei's force development
plan focuses on three specific areas: maintaining air superiority over the
Taiwan Strait and the waters contiguous to Taiwan; conducting effective
counter-blockade operations; and, defeating an amphibious and aerial assault on
the island."[26] The ROC
maintains active duty forces of 425,000 and 3,000,000 reservists in order to
deter attacks. The implementation of this strategy is currently reflected in
the armed forces of Taiwan.
The main strength of
Taiwan's military lies in its two ground forces: the ROC army and the Armed
forces police, which, in 1997, numbered, respectively, 268,000 and 21,000 men.[27]
A 1999 estimate is that the army is made up of 220,000 troops.[28]
The mission of the army is to defend the territory of the ROC, which includes
the main island of Taiwan and smaller offshore islands.[29]
Table 1-Organization of the ROC Army
¨ Three armies ¨ Quemoy, Matsu, Penghu, and
Hualien-Taitung headquarters, and Airborne and Special Operations Command ¨ Tungyin Island Command and
Chukuang Island Command ¨ Two mechanized infantry
divisions ¨ Thirteen heavy infantry
divisions ¨ Seven light infantry
divisions ¨ Six armored brigades ¨ Two tank groups ¨ Two airborne brigades ¨ Two aviation commands ¨
One air defense missile group[30] Source: Hickey, 16 and U.S. Department of Defense, 211 |
|
Taiwan's ground forces
utilize an assortment of weapons and equipment, including: tanks,
self-propelled artillery, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, rocket
systems, antitank missiles, and surface-to-air missiles.[31]
More specifically, the Taiwanese army maintains some 450 M-48H and 300 M-48A5
medium tanks and over 1,000 much older M-41 and M-24 light tanks, plus 42 AH-1W
Cobra attack and 26 OH-58D Kiowa scout helicopters.[32]
Since Taiwan is an island,
particular emphasis is placed on its naval capabilities. Taiwan's navy totals
about 68,000 men, including some 30,000 marines, whose mission is to exert
control over Taiwan's territorial waters and keep open vital sea lanes.[33]
"The navy also provides aid to Taiwanese fishing boats requiring assistance,
and patrols the waters in the Taiwan Strait and, more recently, the South China
Sea."[34]
Taiwan's naval forces (Table 2) are roughly equivalent to 40 major surface
combatants, 4 submarines, 100 patrol boats, 30 mine warfare ships, and 25
amphibious vessels.[35]
Taiwan also has a small naval air force utilizing some 20 helicopters and 30
aircraft.[36]
Table 2-Taiwan's Naval Forces
¨
Destroyers (two destroyer fleets and one frigate fleet) ¨
Amphibious forces (one landing fleet and one landing vessel fleet) ¨
Submarines (one submarine group) ¨
Mine forces (one mine vessel fleet and one mine-sweeper/layer fleet) ¨
Logistic forces (one service fleet and one rescue fleet) ¨
Speedboats (one Hai-chiao group) ¨
Aviation forces (one antisubmarine helicopter group) ¨
Shore-based missiles (one Hai-feng group) ¨
Marine corps (two marine divisions, one landing tank regiments and
one operations service regiment) Source: Hickey, 17 and U.S. Department of Defense, 211 |
Taiwan's air
force (Table 3) is approximately the same size as its navy, at about 70,000
men. With over 400 combat aircraft, "the current inventory includes
approximately 180 older F-5E/F fighter and over 100 more modern Indigenous
Defense Fighters (IDFs)."[37]
"Taiwan has established an air defense early warning network which, when used
in conjunction with its ground-based SAMs and fourth-generation tactical
aircraft, appears to pose a credible deterrent against an air attack from the
mainland."[38]
Table 3-Taiwan's Air Force ¨
Six tactical combat aircraft wings ¨
One transport/antisubmarine wing ¨
One tactical control wing ¨
One communication and air traffic control (ATC) wing ¨
One weather wing ¨
Five separate teams ¨
One air-defense artillery guards command, which contains four
commands, fourteen air-defense battalions, and eleven guards battalions[39] Source: Hickey, 19 |
In addition to ground,
navel, and air forces, Taiwan also maintains a coast guard and a large
contingent of reserves. The coast guard , which numbers around 26,000 men,
patrols the coast to protect against intrusion and smuggling. As a deterrent to
attack, Taiwan supports a military reserve force of nearly 4 million.
While Taiwan maintains a
comprehensive array of military assets, it needs to modernize its entire
military force, to streamline the structure, update its weapons, and maximize
its effectiveness. The ground and naval forces are receiving particular
attention. The army goal is to reduce the number of troops to 200,000, while
making them more effective. Much of the navy's fleet is comprised of World War
II ships, which have outlived their life expectancy. Taiwan is replacing these
and adding antiblockade and antisubmarine capabilities.[40]
In addition to upgrading existing weapons systems, Taiwan is working to acquire
new systems.
Taiwan faces a choice in its
military modernization. Taiwan can procure its weapons domestically, and build
up its internal capacity for production. However, in doing so Taiwan risks
fielding systems that are not as technologically advanced as weapons it can
purchase from the United States or Europe. On the other hand, external
purchases increase Taiwan's dependence on the willingness of foreign
governments to continue supplying parts. Through external purchases Taiwan may
access top-of-the-line technology but may also "increase its dependencies on
foreign weaponry, with all the insecurities and vulnerabilities that attend."[41]
Taiwan has resolved the make-or-buy decision by producing a few items, like the
Indigenous Defense Fighter, small arms, and artillery systems, and purchasing
the majority of its military technologies abroad (Table 4).[42]
Taiwan's main weapons suppliers are the United States and western European
nations. As one writer noted, "Taiwan...is armed to the teeth with billions of
dollars worth of U.S. and French warplanes, frigates, submarines and missiles."[43]
Table 4-Selected Recent Weapons Purchases by Taiwan
¨
150 F-16 Warplanes from the United States ¨
Sixty Mirage 2000-5 Warplanes from France ¨
Modified Air Defense System based on the U.S. Patriot missile ¨
Four Air-Warning Aircraft (AWACS) from the United States ¨
Twelve Helicopters from the U.S. ¨
Sixteen Lafayette-Class Frigates from France ¨
Six Knox-Class Frigates from the U.S. ¨
200 M60-A3 Tanks from the U.S. Source:
Hickey, 77-83. |
Even as its pursues
modernization of its armed forces and acquisition of cutting-edge weapons
systems, Taiwan's biggest vulnerability remains its dependence on other nations
for these very systems. "Taiwan lacks-and will likely continue to lack-the
infrastructure, financial resources, and technical capabilities to keep up with
the state-of-the-art in armaments production. Consequently, Taiwan has found it
both necessary and expedient to expand its acquisition of foreign military
equipment, and this dependency has subsequently increased."[44]
This dependence is further compounded when purchases are made from a number of
countries, which leads to a wide variety of weapons types, many of which are
not compatible with others.[45]
Lack of compatibility and interoperability is a serious obstacle for Taiwan, as
integration is key to military efficiency.
Even with its impressive
recent acquisitions, Taiwan still has a modernization wish list depending
largely on future foreign purchases (Table 5). Current Taiwanese desires for
new or improved weapons include submarines, warships, combat vehicles,
missiles, electronic operations systems, fighters, smart weapons, and theater
missile defense.[46] Taiwan has
recently been focusing on acquiring three particular systems from the United
States. In the spring of 2000, Taiwan lobbied heavily to be allowed to buy four
Aegis destroyers, equipped with anti-missile systems, and advanced combat
monitoring capabilities, for about $6 billion. However, the United States
delayed this sale because of concern about the Chinese reaction. Taiwan would
also like to purchase additional Patriot anti-missile systems and sophisticated
long-range early warning radar.[47]
The most controversial of Taiwan's recent defense pushes is its desire for
Theater Missile Defense, which it would like to bring into service by 2005.[48]
Realistically, Taiwan is interested in whatever military capabilities would
give the island a defensive edge over mainland China.
Table 5-Taiwan's Modernization Goals for Its Armed
Services
(1)
A centralized, automated command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I) structure for national air defense, integrating
air-, sea-, and land-based early warning, surveillance, and reconnaissance; (2)
Across-the-board improvements in national air defense capabilities
(e.g., fourth-generation combat fighters, beyond-visual-range air-to-air
missiles, and advanced surface-to-air missiles-and possibly including theater
missile defenses);\ (3)
Improved three-dimensional ASW capabilities (including airborne
assets); (4)
Next-generation sea-and shore-based antiship defenses; (5)
Improved tanks and anti-tank weapons; and (6)
Advanced electronic and information warfare capabilities. SOURCE: Bitzinger, pp. 77-78. |
Taiwan's space capability
and utilization remains quite limited. While Taiwan has established a civil
space agency and is working to develop a reliable launch capability, it
continues to rely on commercial services and products to supplement its
indigenous space assets. These have included remote sensing imagery and
satellite telecommunications. At this time, Taiwan does not own any military
space systems. However, some of Taiwan's civil space systems could have utility
in a military conflict. As well, several of the defense systems Taiwan is
seeking to acquire are, at least in part, dependent on space-based
capabilities.
Taiwan began its civil space
program in October 1991, with the establishment of the National Space Program
Office. The mission of the agency is to implement the country's Fifteen-Year
Space Program, with the goal of creating the infrastructure and systems
engineering capability sufficient to necessary for the ROC to develop its own
space technology.[49]
Taiwan initially plans to build three satellites and then to develop the
associated tracking, telemetry and command structure to operate them. It is
also building remote sensing receiving stations and processing capabilities.[50]
Taiwan's three satellite
programs are ROCSAT-1, -2, and -3, which are in varying stages of development
and operation. ROCSAT-1 carries several instruments: an ocean color imager,
experiments on ionospheric plasma and electrodynamics, and a Ka-band
communication test payload.[51]
This is Taiwan's first satellite and was successfully launched January 26,
1999, on an Athena I rocket from Spaceport Florida.[52]
ROCSAT-2 will be a remote sensing satellite designed to sense oceans and
landmass of the island and its environs. Taiwan hopes to utilize the imagery
data in land use, agriculture and forestry, natural disaster evaluation,
environmental monitoring, education, and international scientific cooperation
applications. ROCSAT-2 is currently being manufactured and is scheduled for
launch in June 2002. ROCSAT-3 is in the planning and design phase. The project
is a collaborative effort with the University Corporation for Atmospheric
Research for a "constellation of eight low-earth orbiting satellites for
operational weather prediction, space weather monitoring, and climate
research."[53] ROCSAT-3 is
expected to be launched late in 2002.
Table 6- Taiwanese Satellite Programs[54]
Satellite |
Purpose |
Status |
Rocsat-1 |
Technology Testbed |
Operating On Orbit |
Rocsat-2 |
2m Resolution Remote
Sensing |
Launch mid-2002 |
Rocsat-3 |
Weather/Climate
Constellation |
Launch late 2002 |
China has made it difficult
for Taiwan to carry out its space activities. China put pressure on the Germany
not to issue an export permit to Dornier Satellite Systems, the planned
manufacturer of Taiwan's Rocsat-2 Although Taiwanese officials insist that the
satellite is for scientific research, it would be capable of resolving objects
as small as two meters in size, giving it modest military capabilities. Indeed,
as a result in part of Chinese pressure, the German government postponed
granting an export permit three times.[55]
On December 9, 1999, the chairman of Taiwan's science council announced that
Matra Marconi Space will supply Rocsat-2. Though the losing bidder in the
original selection, the firm was able to secure an export license from the
French government.[56]
Taiwan has not extensively
employed satellite technologies for either civil or military use, except to
connect Taiwan with its offshore islands. INTELSAT has provided this service,
and also the international connections to the outside world. When the
commercial application of very small aperture terminals (VSATs) started in
1989, satellites began to assume a larger role. New satellite systems for both
domestic and international use are likely in the near future. [57]
Satellite communications have not been utilized for military purposes to this
point. Thus, "Taiwan has no satellite-communication link to give early warning
information in case of an attack."[58]
Taiwan has begun preliminary
use of remote sensing imagery through commercial purchases from SPOT Image and
other sources. This has begun to allow Taiwan to conduct observe activities on
the Chinese mainland. Reports surfaced in May 2000 that Taiwan might be
purchasing high resolution Ikonos imagery of mainland China, specifically of
several PRC airfields.[59]
Taiwan neither confirmed nor denied the purchases of Ikonos imagery; however,
experts noted that Taiwan's military has likely been using commercial satellite
imagery for some time.[60]
Although Taiwan has no indigenous military space program, its military is well aware of the utility of space-based systems. Taiwan's military modernization has included a significant focus on procuring high-technology weapons systems, systems that very often depend, at least in part, on space-based capabilities. One of the weapons systems the United States has recently sold to Taiwan is the PAVE PAWS long-range radar system. This radar system can "detect missile launches within a distance of 3,000 miles and can link up with anti-missile systems under development by the United States." [61] (The United States will not, however, sell Taiwan the Aegis destroyers it had sought to buy, destroyers that would have been integral to TMD.) Some US officials have discussed including Taiwan in Theater Missile Defense. "The proposed TMD, if successfully deployed, would cover the entire island. Most important, the project may benefit Taipei politically since entrance into the TMD would form an implicit military alliance with both the United States and Japan. This would increase the military costs that China would bear in mounting an attack on the island and would be of tremendous security assistance to Taiwan."[62] Although officials in both Taiwan and the United States think this is a worthy idea, it would seriously anger the PRC. "TMD in Japan is delicate enough, but what really has the Chinese steaming is the possibility that the U.S. would help Taiwan install the system, too. Missiles are a key part of Beijing's strategy to get Taiwan's leaders to the bargaining table."[63] Considerable caution on the part of the United States and Taiwan is necessary as this action might provoke a clash in the Taiwan straits.
[1] Chen, p. 27
[2] Hickey, p. 8
[3] Hickey, p. 11
[4] Pomper and Nitschke
[5] "China's Statement: 'The Right to Resort to Any Necessary
Means,'" The New York Times 22 Feb 2000:
[6] "Chinese Military Researcher Says 'Western Weapons' Cannot
Help Taiwan."
[7] Wang
[8] Crock, Barnathan, and Magnusson,
[9] "China Building Missile Base Opposite Taiwan."
[10] Crock.
[11] Robert Kagan
[12] U.S. Department of Defense, 197.
[13] Kagan.
[14] "President Chen..." June 20, 2000
[15] Wang, 119.
[16] "Be Clear on Ties with China, US Urged,"
[17] Wang, 127-128.
[18] Wang, 115-116 and Kerry Dumbaugh,
[19] Julian Baum, "Silent Running,"
[20] Miles A. Pomper, "Administration Says House Vote to Shore
Up Taiwan Relations Endangers U.S. China Strategy,"
[21] Julian Baum, "Silent Running."
[22] Spratly, FAS
[23] DoD News Briefing, 1/13/00
[24] Taiwan, CIA World Factbook
[25] Hickey, 15.
[26] U.S. Department of Defense, "The Security Situation in the
Taiwan Strait February 26, 1999,"
[27] Hickey, 16.
[28] U.S. Department of Defense, 211.
[29] Hickey, 16 and U.S. Department of Defense, 211.
[30] Hickey, 16.
[31] Hickey, 16.
[32] U.S. Department of Defense, 211-212.
[33] Hickey, 17.
[34] Hickey, 17.
[35] U.S. Department of Defense, 208.
[36] U.S. Department of Defense, 210.
[37] U.S. Department of Defense, 203.
[38] U.S. Department of Defense, 204.
[39] Hickey, 19.
[40] U.S. Department of Defense, 208.
[41] Richard A. Bitzinger, p 96.
[42] Bitzinger, 86.
[43] Jeremy Page
[44] Bitzinger, 79.
[45] "Chinese Military Researcher Says 'Western Weapons' Cannot
Help Taiwan,"
[46] Hickey, 88.
[47] Lawrence Chung, "China Defence Fuels Arms Race-Taiwan
Analysts," R
[48] "Taiwan to Test Anti-Missile System," SpaceDaily 02
Jan 2000
[49] National Space Program Office Website,
[50] National Space Program Office Website.
[51] National Space Program Office Website.
[52] Craig Covault, "Athena Fires Taiwan's Satellite Into
Space,"
[53] National Space Program Office Website.
[54] National Space Program Office Website.
[55] "Chinese Pressure Delays Satellite Launch," Satellite
News 11 Oct 1999
[56] "MMS to Build Taiwanese Sat," Aviation Week & Space
Technology
[57] U.S. Department of Defense, 218.
[58] Baum, 28 May 1998
[59] Loeb
[60] Loeb
[61] "US Agrees Sale of Arms...", FAS
[62] Wang, 134.
[63] Landers, Lawrence, and Baum, "Hard Target,"