As increasingly high-resolution
satellite-derived imagery has entered the commercial market, remote
sensing has become the subject of considerable attention in the United
States and abroad. Although most East Asian remote sensing abilities are
relatively primitive compared to those of the United States and Europe,
the use of commercial imagery by regional powers in this region is
growing. Satellite remote sensing has considerable dual-purpose utility.
This chapter examines current remote sensing capabilities in five East
Asian countries (China, Taiwan, Japan, North and South Korea), as well as
key commercial developments. The shape of the nascent commercial remote
sensing industry, US policies toward remote sensing, and the security
environment in East Asia, will all be affected by remote sensing
developments in the Pacific Rim.
REMOTE SENSING- INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS
Remote sensing has its origins in spy
satellites, such as the US Corona and Soviet Zenit satellites, which took
high resolution pictures of targets and dropped the film to earth for
processing. Technological advances, such as the development of digital
electronic sensors, allow satellites to gather images, and download that
information directly to receiving stations on earth. This dramatically
reduces the time between imaging and analysis, allowing faster response
times with any remotely sensed information.
Remote sensing satellites can be divided
into two broad categories, based on the resolution and scale of their
imagery. Environmental observation satellites, such as Japan's Marine
Observation Satellite (now defunct), have low resolution and produce
broad-scale images. They usually monitor ocean temperature, changes in
vegetation, or other large-scale environmental phenomena. With the
exception of meteorological satellites, most environmental observation
satellites have limited dual-use applications.
Other remote sensing satellites collect
highly detailed, small-scale imagery, and have clear dual-purpose utility.
Military and intelligence satellites are the ultimate example of this
second category of remote sensing satellites. Today, satellite
reconnaissance is an increasingly important intelligence gathering
mechanism, with sensor resolutions on some military and intelligence
satellites estimated to be better than 10 cm. While most imagery is in the
visible spectrum, other parts of the spectrum are useful as well. For
example, synthetic aperture radar sensors can penetrate cloud cover and
the dark of night. Currently, visible light sensors with a resolution
between 0.5 meters and 2 meters are considered high resolution.
REMOTE SENSING TERMS
- Panchromatic - Black and white imagery based on the visible
light spectrum.
- Multispectral -Color images, can incorporate data from the
visible spectrum, or from many parts of the visible, infrared and
ultraviolet spectrum.
- Hyperspectral - produces a color image containing data from a
very large number of spectral wavelengths.
- Radar - an active scanning procedure that transmits microwave
radiation to image its target. Satellites operating at these wavelengths
can 'see' through cloud cover and darkness.
- Sun-synchronous - a polar orbit timed so the satellite crosses
the equator at the same time each day.
- Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) - A technique where the forward
motion of the radar antenna is used to simulate or synthesize a much
larger antenna, providing greater resolution along the direction of travel
Source: Canada Center for Remote Sensing
SATELLITE REMOTE SENSING CAPABILITIES IN THE PACIFIC RIM NATIONS
CHINA'S REMOTE SENSING CAPABILITIES
China is one of Asia's more advanced
nations in terms of overall space capabilities. As part of its development
of space systems, China has worked to modernize its satellite remote
sensing capabilities. China's remote sensing systems range from
mid-to-high resolution imagery satellites to low-resolution earth resource
and meteorological satellites. China's satellite remote sensing systems
are diverse, but comparatively primitive compared to those in India,
Europe, and the United States.
Table 1 describes current Chinese remote
sensing programs. Future deployments are expected. Some experts have
speculated that China is developing an FSW-3 series, a significant
improvement on the FSW-2. However, there is no evidence in the open
literature that such a system has been developed or deployed. The Feng Yun
series has been hampered by the loss of Feng Yun 2B in April 1998. The
most recent Feng Yun satellite was launched June 25, 2000. 1 The FY-3 series is
scheduled for launch in 2001. Such a system would reportedly be a
second-generation LEO observation satellite with more advanced
multispectral capability. Fanhui Shi Weixing was China's first remote
sensing satellite, and has not only been used for intelligence gathering,
but has also carried scientific experiments to orbit.
TABLE 1- SELECTED CHINESE REMOTE SENSING PROGRAMS
(ALL LEO)
2
SATELLITE FAMILY |
STATED PURPOSE |
BEST RESOLUTION |
INSTRUMENTS |
STATUS |
Fanhui Shi Weixing (FSW)-retrievable sats
-3 series (0-2) -17 launches |
Imagery/Reconnaissance/some scientific missions |
10-15 m |
Photographic and CCD cameras |
Started in 1975
18th flight delayed since late 1998 |
Feng Yun (FY)- "Wind and Cloud"
- 2 series - 5 launches |
Meteorological |
1-4 km |
5 and 10 channel Very High Resolution Scanning Radiometers
(VHSRR) |
Started in 1988 1 active satellite |
China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) |
Environmental Imagery |
20 m (CCD) |
Infrared CCD camera
Infrared multi-spectral scanner |
Started in 1999 1 launch 2nd planned Imagery sale planned3 |
Zi Yuan (ZY)- resource satellite
-2 launches - CBERS-type bus? |
Environmental imagery/ earth resource |
20 m (?) |
Infrared camera, multispectral |
ZY-2 launched 9/1/004 |
Other Chinese earth observation projects
in development include the Haiyang-1 mission (ocean observation), a
constellation of LEO Earth Resources satellites (Zi Yuan 2), and possibly
a radar satellite, which would overcome southern China's frequent cloud
cover. China also purchases remote sensing data from Landsat (a Landsat
ground station is located in China), the Japanese JRS-1 system, SPOT,
ERS-1 and 2, and Radarsat International.
China faces three major goals and
challenges in developing its own remote sensing systems. 5 First, there is an
increasing demand within China, and worldwide, for satellite applications
to assist in reconnaissance, resource monitoring and disaster assessment
and response, among other uses. Second, China would like to decrease its
reliance on data from foreign satellites. A reduced dependence on foreign
sources of data would make it far more difficult for other nations to deny
China access to data. Finally, China is seeking to establish itself as a
world-class space power. A high quality, high-resolution indigenous remote
sensing capability would further this goal. Additional steps would include
a refinement of China's real-time sensing abilities, a constellation of
satellites to expand remote sensing coverage, and development of
indigenous analysis ability. All of these abilities would be prerequisites
not only for economic development but also for any future successful
Chinese military actions in the region. 6
TAIWAN (REPUBLIC OF CHINA) 7
Taiwan is in the midst of an ambitious
15-year plan to develop its space science and technology capability. This
plan started in 1991, and includes a strong focus on satellite
development. Taiwan has three main satellite programs (all called ROCSAT)
in various stages of development. Table 2 outlines the ROCSAT programs.
TABLE 2 - ROCSAT SPECIFICATIONS (ALL LEO
SATELLITES)
PROGRAM |
PURPOSE |
SPECTRAL TYPE and RESOLUTION |
INSTRUMENTS |
STATUS |
ROCSAT 1 |
Environmental Observation |
Visible and Near-Infrared - 800 m |
Ocean Color Scanner |
Launched 1999 |
ROCSAT 2 |
Imagery |
Panchromatic - 5 m Multispectral - 20 m |
Panchromatic CCD Multi-spectral scanner |
Scheduled for 2002 |
ROCSAT 3 (constellation of 8) |
Weather and Environmental Observation |
N/A |
GPS receiver, ionospheric photometer |
Scheduled for 2002 |
ROCSAT 2 and 3 would surpass current
Chinese capabilities. Future Taiwanese efforts are likely to focus on
development of indigenous space capabilities. Taiwan's ROCSAT-2 will focus
on imaging Taiwan for civilian and scientific purposes. However, this
system will also be able to image mainland China and other parts of East
Asia. Thus, it would be advantageous as an early warning system to track
deployments of Chinese military assets. Future Taiwanese remote sensing
systems may also be suitable for commercial sales of imagery.
JAPAN8
Japan has a highly advanced remote sensing
program and has cooperated extensively with both Europe and the United
States in developing instruments and sharing data. However, because of the
tight restrictions on Japan's ability to develop its military services,
the security utility of remote sensing and other space applications have
only recently been explored. Japan's Space Law prohibits Japan from
directly engaging in military space activities. In 1998, Japan explored
developing its own reconnaissance satellite, largely in response to the
1998 Taepo Dong launch by North Korea. The proposal was carefully worded
to emphasize the satellite's multi-use capabilities (it would also be used
for monitoring natural disasters, weather, and smuggling operations), and
its defensive orientation. As currently envisioned, this system will be a
constellation of four satellites, two with 1-m optical resolution and the
other two with radar imaging capabilities. Although the United States and
Japan have a long history of cooperation on environmental observation
satellites, Japan has decided to develop this system independently.
Japanese firms will develop and build this system, despite heavy lobbying
by US firms for a role. 9 The Japanese push for independent
capabilities will likely lessen, but not replace, its dependence on the
United States as a source for imagery intelligence.
As evident from Table 3, Japan has a full
schedule of current and future remote sensing projects. A successor to the
GMS family, the Multi-Functional Transport Satellite, was expected to
launch in late 1999, however, the H-2 vehicle on which it was launched was
destroyed after straying off course. 10 A replacement satellite has been scheduled
for launch during fiscal year 2002. The Multi-Functional Transport
satellite would handle communications traffic, as well as weather
tracking. A second ADEOS mission is scheduled for launch in late 2001. 11
Japan is currently developing the Advanced
Land Observation Satellite (ALOS). 12 Scheduled for launch in 2002, ALOS will
carry numerous sensors, including a SAR sensor, and several visible and
near-infrared sensors, which are more advanced than those used in ADEOS.
SAR resolution will be 8 m, with panchromatic and multispectral resolution
of 2.5 and 10 m, respectively. 13 Negotiations are in progress for sharing
these data with the United States and the Europeans.
TABLE 2 - ROCSAT SPECIFICATIONS (ALL LEO
SATELLITES)
PROGRAM |
PURPOSE |
RESOLUTION |
INSTRUMENTS |
STATUS |
Geostationary Meteorological Satellite (GMS) (GEO) 5 satellites
|
Meteorological |
Visible - 1.25 km Infrared - 5 km |
Visible & Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer (VISSR). search and
rescue transponder |
Started in 1977 Currently 1 active, 1 backup (140° and
120°E) |
Marine Observation Satellite (MOS) 2 satellites |
Ocean Observation |
Visible - 900 m Infrared - 2.7 km Multispectral - 50 m
| Multispectral Electronic Self-Scanning, Visible, and Thermal Infrared
radiometers; Data Collection System Transponders |
Started in 1987 MOS-1 (1987-1995) MOS-2 (1990-1996)
|
Japan Earth Resources Satellite (JERS-1) 1 satellite |
Earth Observation |
Multispectral - 13 m SAR - 18 m |
OPS multispectral sensor
8 segment SAR sensor |
Started in 1992 Outlived useful life in 1998 |
Advanced Earth Observation Satellite (ADEOS) |
Earth Observation |
Visible - 8 m Infrared - 16 m |
Advanced Visible and Near-lit Radiometer Ocean Color and
Temperature Scanner |
Multinational payload Launched in 1996, failed in 199714 |
ADEOS II |
Earth Observation- follow-up to ADEOS |
Visible and near infrared |
infrared, synthetic aperture radar, microwave, electro-optical and
multi-spectral imagers |
Scheduled for launch in late 2001 |
Advanced Land Observing Satellite (ALOS) |
Earth Observation |
Visible and near infrared- visible resolution of 1 m /infrared of 2.5
m |
Exact instrument complement in planning |
Scheduled for launch in 2002 |
Future efforts in Japanese remote sensing
will depend in part on the success of ALOS and ADEOS-2, as well as on the
successful deployment of their reconnaissance satellites in 2002. Japan
plans to develop a system of global earth observation satellites, made up
of high and low resolution satellites, in LEO and geosyncronous orbits.
Problems with the H-2 launch vehicle have delayed the successful
deployment of these systems. Japan also participates in the international
Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM), a joint project with NASA.
Launched in 1997, TRMM is made up of five sensors focused on collecting
data on the distribution and intensity of tropical rainfall. Japan
contributed the Japanese Precipitation Radar, which provides data for
three-dimensional storm system maps. 15
SOUTH KOREA
South Korea, a relative newcomer to the
space applications sector, has pursued remote sensing capabilities as part
of its focus on developing dual-use space technologies, and has built or
acquired three remote sensing satellites. Uribyol 1 was launched in August
1992 with the French Topex/Poseidon mission. This microsat (50 kilograms)
carried two CCD cameras, as did Uribyol 2, launched in September 1993. One
of the CCD cameras in Uribyol 2 was of South Korean design. 16 The third satellite
is the Korea Multipurpose Satellite (KOMPSAT), launched in December 1999.
17 Developed
by Korea with the help of TRW, KOMPSAT's instruments (a 10-m resolution
CCD camera, ocean color imaging camera, an ionosphere measurement sensor,
and a high-energy particle detector) 18 are intended to observe the Korean
peninsula and surrounding ocean. In March 2000, an Israeli firm sold South
Korea a 1-m resolution camera, which South Korea is likely to include in
later generations of KOMPSAT. 19
South Korea is likely to use KOMPSAT in pursuit of national security,
civilian, and commercial aims. South Korea is focused on developing its
own capabilities, and reducing dependence on foreign nations. Thus far,
South Korea has launched its satellites from the United States, but is
working to develop a domestic launch capacity. It expects to launch its
own satellite from a South Korean facility on indigenously developed
launch vehicles by 2005. 20
NORTH KOREA
Because of North Korea's closed society
and autocratic government, there is a dearth of information on North
Korean space capability. North Korean actions, including the 1998 launch
of a Taepo Dong 1 missile, and the failed launch of the Kwangmyongsong
satellite at that time demonstrates a strong interest in developing its
space capability. 21 While the DPRK has no known indigenous
remote sensing systems, it is likely that the government recognizes the
value of high-resolution systems for intelligence gathering or other
purposes. Commercially available remote sensing systems may prove useful
to North Korea. North Korea's awareness of the utility of commercial space
assets is demonstrated by its reported leasing of transponder space on a
Thai communications satellite, in order to assist in tracking its missile
flights. 22
Although US law prohibits sales of data from US satellite to North Korea,
it would be comparatively simple for North Korea to purchase
high-resolution imagery of South Korea through secondary agents. However,
unless North Korea can either pay for imagery analysis, or develops a
cadre of its own analysts, the utility of such data would be seriously
limited.
COMMERCIAL -
Commercial remote sensing is still a very
young industry, and, very often, commercial providers are highly dependent
upon sales to government agencies. Tables 4 and 5 detail selected current
and near-future commercial remote sensing systems.
TABLE 4 - SELECTED CURRENT COMMERCIAL IMAGERY
PROVIDERS
COMMERICAL FIRM/SATELLITE |
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN |
TYPE OF IMAGERY/ BEST RESOLUTION23 |
COST (US $) |
Space Imaging (Ikonos) 24 |
United States |
Panchromatic: 0.8 m Multispectral: 3-4 m [License for 0.5 meter
granted in Dec 2000] |
$12-$17/ft2 in North America $29-$44/ft2
outside North America |
US Geological Survey/NASA (Landsat 7) 25 |
United States |
Panchromatic: 15 m Multispectral: 30 m |
Level Zero R $475/scene Level One $600/scene |
SPOT Image, SA (SPOT-4) 26 |
France |
Panchromatic: 10 m Multispectral: 30 m |
$2510-$2879/scene |
Radarsat International27 (Radarsat-1) |
Canada |
SAR: 8 m |
$4000-$5250/area |
SOVINFORMSPUTNIK/ SPIN-228 (Resurs/SPIN-2) |
Russia |
Panchromatic: 1 m |
$25/km229 |
Antrix (Indian Space Research Organization)
(IRS-1C & D) |
India |
Panchromatic: 5.8 m 23.5 m visible, near-IR 70.5 m shortwave IR
|
Operational |
TABLE 5: EXPECTED FUTURE COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS30
COMMERICAL FIRM/SATELLITE |
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN |
RESOLUTION 23 |
PLANNED LAUNCH |
EarthWatch (Quickbird) |
United States |
Panchromatic: 0.8 m Multispectral: 4 m |
October 2001 |
Orbimage (Orbview 3 and 4) |
United States |
Panchromatic: 0.6 m Multispectral: 2.5 m Hyperspectral: 24 m31 |
Orb 4- 2001 Orb 3- 2001 |
Spot Image, SA (SPOT-5) |
France |
Panchromatic: 2.5 m Multispectral: 10 m |
2002 |
MacDonald Dettwiler (Radarsat-2) |
Canada |
SAR: 3 to 100 m |
2003 |
ImageSat (previously West Indies Space) (EROS-A and B) |
Israel/United States |
Panchromatic: 1.8 m (A) and .8 m (B) |
2001- 2003 |
While initially the United States
dominated the remote sensing industry, it is increasingly faced with
competition from around the world. The companies listed in both Table 4
and Table 5 suggest the growing diversity of this industry. In addition to
the companies listed here, South Korean ventures are both expected to
enter the commercial remote sensing market.
The United States is a very strong player
in commercial remote sensing. US regulations reflect both the desire to
maintain a strong market share in supplying data and an awareness of
remote sensing's critical national security applications. While the United
States is no longer the only country with an important stake in commercial
remote sensing, its companies continue to dominate, and its practices and
polices have wide-ranging effects. Commercial remote sensing systems
licensed in the United States operate under specific restrictions.
Generally speaking, the Licensee is obligated to "operate the system in a
manner that preserves the national security and observes the international
obligations and foreign policies of the United States." 32
Key obligations include the following:
- Maintain and make available to the US government a record of all
satellite tasking operations for the previous year;
- Data collection and/or distribution may be limited by the US
government during periods when "national security or international
obligations and/or foreign policies may be compromised;" 33 This restriction is
commonly known as 'shutter control';
- The government of any country has the right to unenhanced data and
images of territory under their jurisdiction. This is the 'sensed state'
provision;
- The US government has the right to unenhanced data for archival
purposes. These data would be available to the public after a reasonable
period of time;
- Data to be purged by a licensee must be offered to the US government
for archival purposes, and would be immediately available to the public;
- The US government must be notified of any substantial agreements that
the licensee intends to enter with any foreign nation, entity or
consortium. The foreign party must comply with license regulations;
- The government may place operational conditions or limitations on SAR
or hyperspectral systems seeking licensure;
- The US government also limits remote sensing of Israel, because of
special concerns about Israeli security.
Clearly US licensees are subject to
serious restrictions on what data they can sell, and to which entities
they can sell. Several other nations have adopted similar policies. For
example, the Canadians have devised a regime similar to US shutter control
for their Radarsat program. However, not since the Gulf War has the United
States or any other country has exercised shutter control, and the United
States has yet to exercise any of its other controls over commercial
remote sensing.
It is difficult to predict how US
regulations will impact the growth of commercial remote sensing. The US
government has yet to formulate guidelines for implementing these
regulations, 34 and there have been, as yet, no test
cases. The remote sensing industry is cautiously optimistic that US
restrictions will be implemented only in extraordinary circumstances.
However, it is possible that if and when the United States acts on its
regulations, this could have a chilling effect on the commercial remote
sensing market. Industry officials have expressed concern that the
negative impact would be similar to what happened similar to the US
satellite market in 1999 when export control authority was shifted back to
the State Department from the Commerce Department.
The commercial remote sensing industry is
still in its infancy. While many are optimistic about industry growth, it
is hard to say how quick this growth will be, or how much of a commercial
market there is for remote sensing data and images. In any event, East
Asian countries are likely to increase their use and purchase
high-resolution commercial imagery. The price is comparatively low,
especially for security uses, and it seems likely that these governments
will take advantage of commercial sources until they develop their own
capabilities.
The presence of non-US commercial
providers of this type of imagery must be a consideration for US
policy-makers. Stringent imposition of US license requirements may shift
demand away from the US industry and toward foreign companies. Thus,
overly zealous licensing requirements could hinder the growth of US
commercial remote sensing firms.
NEAR-FUTURE POLICY ISSUES
Future remote sensing issues extend beyond
US license restrictions. Given the long-standing tensions inherent in East
Asia, and the recent added stress of North Korean missile development, the
potential for conflict is moderately high. Possible sources of conflict
include missile launches by China over Taiwan, or North Korea over any
country; territorial disputes in the Spratley or Kiril islands; or an
armed conflict between China and Taiwan.
Each potential conflict is problematic
even without the complications added by use of remote sensing imagery.
Remote sensing imagery is an increasingly important source of
intelligence. While increasing transparency can lessen tensions, it might
also escalate tensions and widen the scope of conflicts. Some issues to
consider:
- Countries within the region may place pressure on the United States to
exercise shutter control in times of tension.
- The impact and implications of damage to commercially owned satellites
and/or ground facilities during a conflict.
- Whether nations have indigenous imagery analysts, or whether they are
dependent upon others for imagery analysis.
- The mixed uses of imagery - it could be used either to provoke
conflict, or to help defuse conflicts.
For example, imagery analysts have
suggested the use of remote sensing imagery to help clarify and defuse the
territorial dispute over the Spratley Islands. High-resolution aerial
images can detect and assess the controversial activities there, and
moderate resolution imagery can be useful for ship detection. 35 Cooperative imaging
regimes may allow for monitoring all civilian and military activity in the
area without provoking an armed incident. Remote sensing is preferable to
airplane surveillance, because imaging satellites operate from
international territory in space, and are not at risk of being
misinterpreted as a fighter-bomber. 36
These issues are of interest to any
country with satellite capability and/or a strategic interest in the
region. The United States has long-term alliances with two of the
countries in the region (Japan and South Korea), and has complex relations
with China, Taiwan, and North Korea. Even in the case of a regional
conflict that doesn't directly involve the United States, the United
States may have sufficient regional interests that it will use its
commercial and governmental space systems and/or diplomatic weight to
shape such a conflict. Even in the absence of US government involvement, a
US-based commercial remote sensing firm may become involved through its
sale of imagery to parties in the region.
Shutter Control- Given the
ambiguous nature of US government shutter control regulations, the
potential exists for other countries to try to persuade the United States
to exercise shutter control during a conflict. In a conflict between China
and Taiwan, for example, either nation might attempt to purchase
commercial imagery (likely from a US firm), or ask the United States to
impose shutter control over the area. There are also situations where the
United States may seek to persuade other governments or firms either to
impose shutter control or provide imagery to the United States or a third
party, as a favor to the United States.
The US government has stated it will
impose shutter control only where US national security is threatened.
Thus, unless US forces are involved or US territory is threatened,
imposing shutter control is likely to be difficult and politically
unpopular, but still theoretically possible. Instead of exercising shutter
control, which would set an uncomfortable precedent and possibly damage
the commercial sector, the United States may, instead, work to persuade
commercial firms (or other nations) voluntarily to refrain from imaging
territory in conflict. This might be done via such incentives as
guaranteed US government business. US-led cooperative control of remote
sensing practices is likely to be more effective than a US attempt to
impose a more coercive control regime.
Damage to Commercial Systems - As
the intelligence value of satellite imagery increases, both satellites and
control facilities are becoming possible targets in a conflict. Space
systems may be targeted through direct assault, or through sabotage and
other less overt means. If the satellite or ground station is owned and
operated by one of the governments involved in the conflict, it would be
considered a casualty of war. If the asset is a commercial satellite,
especially one from a business in a country not involved in the conflict,
the situation would be more much complex.
If a commercial satellite system were
destroyed, the home government of the firm's country would likely become
involved. It is difficult to predict the degree of government involvement,
or what the result of such involvement would be. Robust government
response is more likely if the government has partial ownership of the
space asset (such as the SPOT satellites), or if government-owned
instruments were carried on the destroyed satellite. The response may take
the form of diplomatic action, commercial sanctions, or even, possibly,
military retaliation. This is a new area of concern for the international
community. It seems that nations are increasingly seeing commercial space
systems as potentially legitimate targets that, in turn, require
protection. For example, China has made statements that suggest that if
the United States proceeds with missile defense, China would consider US
commercial satellites a legitimate target during a conflict.
Challenge of Imagery Analysis - The
ability to obtain high-quality imagery of territory alone is not enough to
benefit a nation's civil or military sector. Benefiting from remote
sensing data requires the ability to analyze the raw data and turn them
into useful information. This often involves merging remote sensing data
with other geospatial information such as GPS or detailed maps. Faulty
analysis can lessen the utility of satellite imagery, and can lead to
disastrous results. Even the United States, with its long history and vast
experience in remote sensing is not immune to this kind of mistake, as
shown by the accidental destruction of the Chinese Embassy during the
Kosovo conflict. For the East Asian countries, which, except for China and
Japan, have only recently delved into remote sensing, proper imagery
analysis is even more of a challenge.
The Asian nations are attempting to gain
some indigenous analysis capability. There are also commercial firms that
perform imagery analysis, and such firms may provide a valuable resource
to nations who have not yet developed their own analysis capability.
Countries are also seeking transfer of this knowledge and expertise
through cooperation with countries with imagery analytic experience, or by
purchasing firms with such ability. For example, Japanese imagery analysis
ability is far more capable than its neighbors, in part because of
extensive cooperation with the United States. China appears to being
pursuing the latter route, for reports suggest that imagery analysts are
among the Russian specialists China has hired in recent years.
CONCLUSIONS
Today, Taiwan, China, Japan, North and
South Korea are clearly aware of the possible advantages of
high-resolution remote sensing, for commercial, civil, and military
applications. However, none of these nations yet have an indigenous
capability, though Japan and China are fairly close to achieving it. Until
the Asian nations develop their own capabilities, they will continue on
depend on commercial firms to meet some of their imagery needs. Doing
business with US firms implies the necessity of abiding by significant
restrictions. As these restrictions have not been fully tested, there is
still uncertainty about how much the US government will exploit its
control over the commercial sector in order to achieve US foreign policy
objectives. Thus, the degree to which the Pacific Rim nations, especially
China and North Korea, can rely on access to commercial remote sensing
firms to pursue their own foreign policy objectives is still unclear.
Commercial remote sensing firms will face
risks in doing business in the East Asian countries, particularly in times
of conflict. In times of conflict, diplomatic pressures regarding shutter
control could become intense, and firms will be faced with a decision
about where they draw the line between free commerce and government
pressure. Commercial space assets or space assets of a non-participating
government may be casualties of regional conflict. As remote sensing grows
and becomes more commercial in nature, the industry is likely to face
significant challenges. Since satellite remote sensing inherently serves
both civil and national security applications, commercial remote sensing
firms will be faced with issues beyond those that face other international
businesses. Political and security concerns, as well as business plans,
will shape the remote sensing industry. Nowhere is this as clear as in the
Asia-Pacific, a region increasingly prepared to use remote sensing data,
whether both commercially procured or indigenous, as a tool for peace or a
weapon of war.
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