In recent years, it has become less and
less realistic for any nation to ignore the uses of space, and space-based
technologies. Space technologies are useful to developing, as well as
developed, nations both for their civil and military potential. While
access to space-based technologies and their benefits is becoming far more
affordable and widespread, the realm of outer space remains
technologically and economically demanding and risky. For the government
of an industrializing nation like North Korea to focus many of the
country's precious resources towards becoming a space power is risky at
best. For North Korean leaders bent on demonstrating their technological
capabilities, the prospect of achieving space power may be tempting
indeed, even if it comes at the expense of feeding their own citizenry.
North Korea appears to have made just such a gamble.
INTRODUCTION
A brief examination of North Korea's
national governmental, military, and economic characteristics will allow
for a more accurate assessment of North Korea's achievements in space.
North Korea is perhaps the world's most militarized, isolated, and
strictly controlled Communist nation. North Korea occupies an important
strategic position in Asia, bordering South Korea (the border demarcated
by a demilitarized zone), China and Russia. It is about the size of the US
state of Mississippi with a population of about 23 million people.
North Korea's governmental system is
highly authoritarian. North Korea's Communism, which began as
Confucian-influenced Marxism-Leninism, evolved into the "Juche Idea,"
which is based on the necessity and desirability of self-reliance. "The
[current] constitution stipulates: 'The Democratic People's Republic of
Korea makes the Juche Idea, a revolutionary ideology with a
people-centered view of the world that aims to realize the independence of
the masses, the guiding principle of its actions." 1 North Korea's
Constitution has gone through multiple revisions, the latest of which
occurred in 1998. In many ways, the constitution has little effect on
actual governance. On paper, a legislature (the Supreme People's
Assembly), a cabinet, the head of the government, and the head of state
all share power to govern the nation. However, North Korea effectively is
governed by the head of state. Until his death in 1994, this leader was
Kim Il Sung. Since then, his son, Kim Jong Il, has led the country, though
he was not officially inaugurated as chairman of the National Defense
Commission until 1998. Kim Jong-Il is also the leader of the Central
Committee of the Workers' Party and of the Party Central Military
Committee. While Kim Jong-Il's hold on North Korea is not as strong as his
late father's, around whom a significant personality cult still centers,
he appears to be firmly in control of North Korea. North Korea's most
powerful institutions and constituencies are the military, the Korean
Workers' Party, and the Socialist Youth League. Although most North
Koreans are technically members of these groups, only a very small elite
has a significant role or influence in the political maneuvering, power
struggles, and corruption which define North Korea's high level
governance.
North Korea's current grave
weaknessesfamine and a stagnant economyare fueled in large
part by the tragic inefficiencies of its governmental system and
priorities. There is no doubt that floods, poor growing seasons, and the
naturally inhospitable nature of North Korea's mountainous terrain make
feeding its population extremely difficult. However, many experts believe
that inefficiencies and corruption account for up to 85% of North Korea's
food deficit. 2
Since Kim Jong-Il's ascension to power, North Korea has abandoned its
short-lived economic reforms. "An editorial of [the Party newspaper]
Rodong Shinmun...indicated North Korea will scrap the agriculture-first,
light-industry-first, trade-first policy adopted in the three-year
economic plan (1994-1996) and instead will give top priority to heavy
industry." 3
Despite these measures, growing numbers of joint projects with South
Korean firms shows a certain degree of North Korean ideological
flexibility in economic matters. The deteriorating humanitarian conditions
in North Korea affect a large proportion of its population but appear to
have little or no effect upon the Pyongyang leadership's economic
priorities. North Korea is a contradiction-a nation where the vast
majority of people live in poverty, but also a nation with substantial
military power and potential space power. Experts believe that North Korea
is essentially dominated by the top 9 to 13% of the population. 4 These 2 million-plus
people constitute a formidable military and technical force.
CURRENT POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
The 1990s have not been kind to North
Korea. As the most centrally planned economy in the world, 5 the DPRK has long
been burdened by the inefficiencies inherent in a highly collectivized and
monitored economy. North Korea lost many of its significant communist
trading partners, and sources of economic assistance, to the
democratizations elsewhere in the world. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union, North Korea lost favorable trade opportunities and several forms of
economic aid. 6
North Korea's ability to feed its own people, always precarious because of
to the difficulties of successfully pursuing collectivized agriculture,
the overwhelming emphasis on military industry, and the low proportion of
arable land, was disastrously compromised by serious floods in the
mid-1990s, which precipitated widespread and persistent famine and
disease. Malnourishment is sufficiently widespread that North Korea, long
proud of its self-sufficiency, appealed to the international community for
help. 7
North Korea also suffers from severe
energy shortages and a crumbling and inadequate civilian infrastructure
(which hinders the distribution of internationally donated food aid).
North Korea's GNP has dropped steadily throughout the 1990s - from $22.9
billion in 1991 to $20.5 billion in 1993. 8 Living conditions have been worsening over
the past few years as food, medicines, and other necessities are in short
supply. The death rate among young children is reportedly very high. 9
North Korea's isolated and often
belligerent international stance, its internal regimentation, and its
military and space programs are closely related. North Korea is one of the
several likely flashpoints for conflict in the Pacific Rim. Because of its
strongly isolationist nature, North Korea's international relations have
traditionally been highly limited in nature and scope.
Although North Korea's international
outlook is dominated by its relationship with South Korea (see the
discussion in the chapter on South Korea), it has significant interactions
with other nations in the region, as well as with the United States, which
maintains a significant military presence in South Korea. The following
paragraphs summarize these relationships.
UNITED STATES- Between the United
States and North Korea lie fifty years of military skirmishes, harsh
words, and veiled threats. North Korea's ire and military posturing has
often been directed as much toward the United States as toward South
Korea. While the United States dwarfs North Korea in power, influence, and
military capability, it has never had the luxury of being able to ignore
the Communist nation. During the Cold War, North Korea's proximity to US
allies in Asia, as well as to the USSR and China, made it a more
significant threat to US interests than most third-world communist
nations. The United States and North Korea first clashed during the Korean
War, where US troops dominated the UN "police action." Since the end of
the Korean War, and the posting of large numbers of US troops in South
Korea, American and South Korean troops have had numerous tense, and
several violent, contacts with North Korean forces. Early main incidents
of high tensions and/or violence include the 1968 seizure of the USS
Pueblo by North Korea, the "Hatchet Incident" of 1976, 10 incursions from the
North, and events surrounding the succession to the South Korean
leadership in 1979.
While the end of the Cold War marked an
improvement in US relations with many of the remaining Communist states,
United States-North Korean relations have only worsened. "North Korea,
independent and unstable, looked even more frightening than when thought
to be a puppet of the communist bloc. Pyongyang had little to lose, having
been virtually abandoned militarily, politically, and economically by
Moscow and Beijing, as well as facing recurrent natural disasters." 11 In 1993, tensions
on the Korean peninsula rose to a dangerously high level as a result of
North Korean attempts to develop nuclear weapons. While much of North
Korea's focus on nuclear technology and build-up conventional of weapons
is officially directed against South Korea, as one of the regions chief
power brokers, the United States is often the main target of North Korea's
aggressive behavior. 12
North Korea remains a high priority
foreign policy and military concern for the United States, not only
because of US concern for the safety of its forces in South Korea, as well
as its regional allies, but also because of certain key strategic factors
affected by North Korea's behavior. North Korea's military capability has
long motivated significant US deployments in South Korea. North Korea's
development of advanced military capabilities, from chemical and
biological weapons, to nuclear capabilities, to missile technology, has
raised US concerns, and has led to fears that North Korea would develop
the ability to threaten US territory directly. As noted in the chart
below, North Korea's newer missiles have the capability to threaten, not
just South Korea, but Japan, much of the Asia-Pacific region, and
eventually, potentially even the United States. The North Korean ability
to access space, even to a limited extent, threatens the balance of power
in the Asia-Pacific, and could, in time, affect the perceived US control
over outer space. North Korea's 1998 launch of a Taepo-Dong missile over
Japan, and its concomitant developments in missile technology, as well as
its role in missile proliferation, have helped to prompt military
enhancements in China, Japan, and South Korea.
It is in the interests of both the United
States and North Korea to strive toward a lessening of tensions in the
region through an improved relationship. "Despite the belligerence that
earned it the label of 'rogue state,' North Korea has long sought to
achieve greater recognition from Washington." 13 North Korea has rather skillfully used its
missile capabilities and the threat of a renewed nuclear program to coax
significant humanitarian aid from the United States. A more peaceful North
Korea, and an improvement in relations between the United States, North
Korea and South Korea, could help lower tensions in the volatile Pacific
Rim. The United States has made clear its willingness to pursue relations
with North Korea so long as "North Korea publicly renounce[s] terrorism
and expel[s] all terrorism suspects." 14 The two nations held talks on terrorism in
summer 2000, though little concrete progress was made. In response to the
constructive character of the inter-Korean summit and North Korea's recent
overtures to both South Korea and the United States, the United States
partially lifted its long-standing economic sanctions against North Korea.
Despite more liberal trade policies, "US counter-terrorism and
weapons-proliferation sanctions against North Korea remain in effect..."15
United States-North Korean relations
remain shaky at best. The United States, one of the main parties in the
Korean War and one of the main parties in the maintenance of the fragile
fifty-year peace on the Korean peninsula, has almost obsessively monitored
North Korean's advancements in military technology, and is particularly
concerned about its missile development. Recently, an improbable, but
potentially useful opportunity to encourage North Korean compliance with
nonproliferation regimes has emerged. The July 2000 meeting between
Russian President Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il yielded a
tantalizing, if somewhat dubious, offer. Putin later reported that North
Korea had offered to cease its development of long-range missiles if other
countries would agree to assist its space efforts by launching at least
two North Korean space satellites a year. 16 US military and government officials
responded to the North Korean missile offer with "controlled exuberance
but said [these events] do not justify a reduction of US troops in South
Korea or cancel the requirement for a National Missile Defense system to
protect the United states from missile attacks." 17 Even without long-range missiles, North
Korea's large military force makes it a major regional power. 18
Later reports suggest that Kim Jong II was
not serious in his offer. 19 In a meeting with South Korean media
executives, Kim "acknowledged that 'we are selling rockets to Syria and
Iran' and would continue rocket development. 'How could we not do it when
a couple of hundred million dollars come out of rocket research?'" 20 Kim's comments were
sufficiently vague that some believe he was sincere in his earlier
comments to Putin and merely wants to make clear that, even as North Korea
pursues peace, it still maintains the ability to wage war. In keeping with
the Juche idea, Kim noted that, "the smaller a nation is, one should
strongly keep its pride and confront powerful big nations." 21
CHINA- As two of Asia's remaining
Communist states, China and North Korea have never been hostile to each
other, but they are not close allies. However, this year saw a warming of
their relationship. On May 29, 2000, the North Korean leader made a secret
visit to China to meet with Chinese premier Jiang Zemin in Beijing. The
two leaders focused on North Korean preparations for the June 2000
inter-Korean summit and on possible Chinese economic assistance to North
Korea, indicating the renewal of more intensive contacts between the two
states. 22 China
was highly supportive of the North-South Korean summit and facilitated
secret talks between North and South Korea prior to the summit. 23 Chinese officials
have stated several times their belief that North Korea's adversarial and
militaristic stance is based, at least in part, on the US military
presence in South Korea, and will be worsened by any US deployment of
theater missile defense (TMD) in South Korea. Improving relations between
North Korea and China could have political and practical benefits for both
nations. Efforts by China and Russia to reduce North Korea's threatening
image could undercut the perceived need for a US TMD. 24
RUSSIA/USSR-During the Korean War,
the USSR and the DPRK were, to some extent, allies. The USSR was one of
North Korea's major trading partners, and supplied the nation with
significant amounts of military and economic aid. The USSR was one of the
main sponsors of the Korean War, and primarily responsible for arming the
North Korea state. Certain aspects of Soviet military and communist
doctrine remain dominant in North Korea to this day. Nevertheless, despite
their technical ideological similarities, the USSR and the DPRK were never
close allies. North Korea's highly isolationist attitude distanced it from
both China and the Soviet Union.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union
brought about an abrupt end of Soviet aid to North Korea, leading, in
large part, to North Korea's economic decline. Since the end of the Cold
War, Russia and North Korea have grown apart. However, Russia's desire to
maintain its regional influence and its ability to play North Korea
against the United States, has led to a continuing relationship with North
Korea. Russian scientists have (against the Russian government's
publicly-stated wishes) continued to be employed as military consultants
in North Korea.
There have also been significant recent
developments in North Korea's relations with Russia. As noted above, on
July 20, 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to Pyongyang to
meet with Kim Jong-Il. Putin's visit to North Korea was the first visit of
a Russian- or Soviet- leader to that state. "The American antiballistic
missile plan [was] very much on the agenda, according to the
Russians...Russians and North Koreans would have a general discussion on
'how we can act together in the world situation, including in connection
with US plans for ABM.'" 25 Putin's meeting with Kim Jong-Il confirmed
Russia's renewed commitment to North Korea, and spurred debate over the
possible emergence of an informal Chinese-Russian-North Korean alliance in
Asia. As well, in April 2001, Russia and North Korea signed an agreement
wherein Russia will upgrade North Korea's Soviet era weapons. 26 The Russian-North
Korean meeting demonstrates quite clearly that not only is North Korea
ready to move at least a bit from its isolationist stance, but also that
other nations are ready to meet North Korea halfway.
North Korea's Relations with Other
Nations- While North Korea has long been highly isolationist, it has
also maintained contacts with other nations. Many of these have been
adversarial, as with the United States, South Korea, Japan, but it also
has long standing unofficial and friendlier relations with nations such as
Iran, Syria, Libya and Pakistan, which are interested in purchasing North
Korean missiles, missile technology, and other weapons.
In recent years, North Korea has been
forced to adjust its prior stance of almost total isolation. North Korea
received humanitarian aid from a number of nationsincluding the
United States, Japan and South Koreaduring the 1990s. This is an
unwelcome choice for North Korea, for it directly counters the Juche idea.
As well, while "North Korea desperately needs economic help...it fears
political instability if its repressed citizens see the prosperity outside
its borders." 27 In
addition to seeking humanitarian aid, North Korea has also moved
cautiously towards normalizing relations with other nations, including
Italy, Australia, and the Philippines, which will facilitate the delivery
of economic aid from these and other countries. 28 Normalization of relations allows North
Korea greater access to humanitarian assistance and improves its world
standing. Western nations who have normalized their relations with North
Korea have done so in hope that this will give them more influence over
the reclusive state. For Japan and South Korea, granting humanitarian aid
to North Korea has also been done, at least in part, to mitigate the
threat of possible North Korean aggression.
The year 2000 has brought significant
developments in North Korea's foreign relations, both with South Korea,
and with other nations. North Korea's slow emergence from total isolation
accelerated in 2000, "creating a new political and security environment in
East Asia, setting off a scramble for influence by Asian powers and the
United States." 29
North Korean representativesincluding foreign minister Paek Nam
Sunattended the regional summit at the G-8 meeting at Okinawa. North
Korean diplomats were greeted with enthusiasm, as representatives of North
Korea's new willingness to practice conventional diplomacy. While many
nations still doubt the sincerity of North Korea's overtures, these
overtures may lead to a less dangerous Southeast Asia.
MILITARY- STRUCTURE, DOCTRINE AND TECHNOLOGIES
As the world's most militarized nation,
there is often very little distinction between the goals of the North
Korean military and those of the nation. North Korean military doctrine
and the actions of the North Korean regime appear enigmatic to the Western
eye. "Although North Korea's strategies and tactics can be (sometimes
purposefully) baffling, the country is being run by extremely intelligent
and very rational people, with a strongly developed sense of
self-preservation. The North Korean acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction stems not from an indifference to deterrence, but rather a
keenly developed understanding of the uses of deterrence." 30 North Korean
military doctrine depends closely on the Juche idea, which stresses the
importance of self-reliance and independence from outside parties... 31 As well, "DPRK
military policy focuses on maintaining and sustaining a military force
capable of conducting an offensive operation into the ROK to attain the
national goal of reunifying the peninsula..." 32 While North Korean military doctrine
stresses the necessity of a strong offense in case of a conflict, it does
not necessarily require the initiation of conflicts. North Korean military
doctrine has evolved steadily since 1948. Between 1951 and December 1962,
North Korea followed a conventional doctrine derived from Soviet doctrine
and operations, modified according to its experience with the Korean War.
In 1962, a revised military doctrine emphasized the modernization of the
Korean army, the fortification of the entire nation, self-reliance, and
the preparation for a war of attrition. 33 During the 1960s, military planners paid
significant attention to the ideological aspects of war.
From the mid-1970s on, North Korean
military strategy focused on a continual modernization of weapons, and an
increase in force mobility. It also focuses on offensive operations, in
the belief that its forces can achieve decisive results only by a strong
offense with three objectives: "the destruction of enemy forces, the
seizure and control of territory, and the destruction of the enemy's will
to fight." 34
Despite the offensive orientation of North Korean military doctrine and
the somewhat inflammatory nature of North Korean rhetoric, North Korean
actions have rarely been explicitly aggressive. North Korean military
doctrine stresses the use of both conventional weapons, and chemical and
biological weapons in such an offensive. Western analysts know very little
about North Korea's nuclear strategy except that the country's
collaboration with the Soviet and Chinese militaries has probably
influenced its approach to the development and deployment of such weapons.
35
It is widely estimated that "Pyongyang
commits roughly 25 to 30 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to
military spending." 36 The North Korean military is broken down
into the North Korean People's Army (which includes the Army, Navy and Air
Force) and the Civil Security Forces. North Korea's standing Army, which
makes up the major arm of the military, is more than a million strong. 37 One distinctive
characteristic of the DPRK's Army is the Special Purpose Forces Command,
which focuses on reconnaissance and preparation for guerilla activity. 38
North Korean Ground Forces Order of Battle |
1992 Number |
1999 Number |
Strength |
+1,100,000 |
996,000 |
Divisions/Brigades |
|
153 |
Infantry Divisions |
26-30 |
60 |
Mechanized and mobile brigades |
23-30 |
25 |
Armor brigades |
14-15 |
13 |
Artillery brigades |
20-30 |
30 |
Special operations forces brigades |
22 |
25 |
Total medium and light tanks |
3,600 |
2,800 |
Artillery |
|
11,200 |
Chart courtesy of FAS, accessed at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/agency/army.htm
North Korea's air force is of medium
strength and capabilities, with over 500 combat aircraft, including
several hundred fairly new MiG-21s and MiG-29s. The North Korean Air Force
" became a separate service in 1948. The air force adapted Soviet and
Chinese tactics and doctrine to reflect North Korea's situation,
requirements, and available resources. Its primary mission is air defense
of the homeland." 39 The North Korean Air Force has significant
resources for, and focus upon, air defense. It has placed many of its
military industrial production, and aircraft supporting, including
hangers, ammunition, fuel, and repair facility either underground or in
hardened shelters. It also has an extremely dense air defense network. 40
North Korean Air Force Order of Battle, 1992 |
Number |
Strength |
70,000 |
Organization> |
|
Air combat commands |
3 |
Air division |
1 |
Interceptor regiments |
12 |
Total aircraft |
|
Jet fighters |
760 |
bombers |
82 |
Transports |
280 |
Helicopters |
300 |
Chart courtesy of FAS, accessed at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/agency/af.htm
The North Korean People's Army also
includes a separate naval force, which is headquartered in Pyongyang and
focuses on coastal defense. "Most North Korean combat vessels, such as
light destroyers, patrol ships, guided missile boats, torpedo boats, and
fire support boats are small. Some 40 guided missile boats pose a
substantial threat; they have the capability of launching missile attacks
against [US] large vessels and are equipped with two to four 46-km-range
Styx anti-ship missiles." 41 The North Korean Navy appears to have
reduced its earlier habit of mounting seaborne infiltration attempts into
South Korea, though the possibility of renewed actions of this sort
remains.
North Korean Navy Order of Battle, 1992 |
Number |
Strength |
40,000-60,000 |
Fleets |
2 |
Squadrons- East Sea |
10 |
Squadrons- Yellow Sea |
6 |
Equipment |
|
Submarines |
25 |
Missile attack boats (PTG) |
39 |
Coastal partol boats |
400 |
Amphibious craft |
198 |
Marine warfare craft |
23 |
Chart Courtesy of FAS, accessed at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/agency/navy.htm
Although the North Korean military suffers
from outdated weapons and infrastructure, and certain deficiencies within
its structure and technology (such as a relatively weak Air Force), it
remains a potentially formidable adversary. The North Korean army does
not, in general, reflect the impoverished nature of the DPRK, but rather
the strong image North Korea strives to project.
Certain sectors of the North Korean's
military are technologically well advanced. It also maintains at least
some limited nuclear capability. Some experts believe that North Korea has
sufficient plutonium to arm one or two nuclear weapons. 42 While North Korea
signed the 1994 Agreed Framework with the US (and South Korea), which
committed the DPRK to a cessation of military-oriented nuclear activities,
it is unlikely that this agreement has (or will) substantially alter North
Korea's intentions, merely its methods. Experts worry that continued
undeclared development of nuclear weapons continues, leading to the
possibility that North Korea could produce nuclear weapons despite the
1994 Agreed Framework. 43,44
North Korea is also suspected of producing
both biological and chemical weapons. North Korea is not a signatory to
the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) or to international agreements
governing biological weapons, and, may, in keeping with Soviet doctrine,
regard chemical weapons as integral to any future military action. 45 North Korea also
appears to be continuing its development and stockpiling of toxic and
biological substances, including malignant anthrax, cholera, bubonic
plague and smallpox. It is also apparently testing biological weapons on
its nearby island territories. 46
North Korea's probable chemical and
biological weapons capability (and likely nuclear weapon capability) are
made a more serious threat by the DPRK's fairly robust missile base (which
could serve as a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction, as well
as for conventional weapons.)
North Korea has been actively pursuing a ballistic missile development
programme since the mid 1970s, when it became involved in a Chinese
programme...Despite severe shortages of resources, North Korea continues
to press forward with its ballistic missile programmes. The reported 1997
deployment of the No-Dong Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), during a
period of widespread famine in the country, highlights Pyongyang's
determination to bolster its missile capabilities at any cost. This
deployment and the ongoing work on the longer-range Taepo-Dong 1 and 2
systems underscores North Korea's interest in using its ballistic missile
forces to hold more distant targets at risk, including those in Japan and
ultimately the United States. 47
The DPRK's missile programs have become
steadily more advanced over the last decade. North Korea's missiles have
not only provided North Korea with a significant source of income, but
also serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States,
Japan and South Korea. North Korea began its ballistic missile program by
obtaining a few Scud-Bs from Egypt in the early 1980s. North Korea
modified the Scuds for greater range and payload capacity, which improved
the missile enough to make it attractive enough for export. It was at this
time that North Korea obtained financial support from Iran to support the
Mod-B's development. 48 North Korea is a leading arms exporter,
exporting 500 to 600 million dollars worth of weapons per year. 49,50 This makes North
Korea's military technologies one of the nation's major sources of hard
currency. 51 North
Korean engineers have proved extremely capable in reverse engineering and
improving Russian and Chinese missile systems. Indeed, Syria has
reportedly paid North Korea to reverse-engineer and produce Russian SS-21
missiles. 52 In the
last several years, North Korea has reportedly exported missiles to Iran,
to Pakistan, and possibly to Libya. North Korea may also export its future
longer-range missiles to these countries. 53
Nevertheless, North Korea's current
ballistic missiles are nowhere near as advanced as US, Russian or Chinese
systems. North Korea continues, therefore, to work on advancing its
ballistic missile capability both through internal development and by
seeking "to obtain advanced conventional weapons and related technologies
such as aircraft electronics and spare parts from several countries,
including Kazakhstan." 54 While both China and Russia have
downgraded their relationship with North Korea, substantial and often
unofficial contact between military and technical communities have
continued to bolster North Korea's advancing missile program.
Since the mid-1990s, North Korea has
focused upon the development of a longer range ballistic missile, the
Taepo Dong series. North Korea continues to perfect its Taepo Dong
missiles, launching a three-stage missile with a range of up to 3,500
miles, in August 1998. 55 The Taepo Dong missiles are far more
sophisticated than the SCUDs with which North Korea started. Three-stage
missiles could also be used for launching satellites (see further
discussion in next section).
North Korean Missile Technology56
Designation |
Stages |
Propellant |
Range |
IOC |
Inventory |
Comment |
Scud-B |
1 |
liquid |
300 km |
1981 |
? 100 |
|
Hwasong-5 |
1 |
liquid |
330 km |
1984 |
? 150 |
Scud-B derivative |
Hwasong-6/td>
| 1 |
liquid |
500 km |
1989 |
? 250 |
Scud-C |
No-dong-1, 257 |
1 |
liquid |
1300 km |
1999 |
100 (approx) |
|
Taepo Dong-1 |
2 |
liquid |
1500 - 2000 km |
2000 |
0 |
|
Taepo Dong-2 |
2 |
liquid |
3750 - 6000 km |
2000 |
0 |
|
NKSL-1* |
3 |
liquid + solid |
orbital |
1998 ILC |
0 |
|
NKSL-X-2** |
3 |
liquid + solid |
orbital |
1999 ILC? |
0 |
|
*NKSL-1 is an unofficial designation created by Charles Vick.
The NKSL-1 is a Taepo Dong-1 missile with a third stage and satellite
added.
**NKSL-X-2 is an unofficial designation created by Charles
Vick. NKSL-X-2 is a Taepo Dong-2 missile with a third stage and satellite
added.
SPACE TECHNOLOGIES AND APPLICATIONS
North Korea has, at least implicitly,
identified outer space as an area of national interest. The development of
space technologies is a priority for North Korea because of the special
characteristics of space as the high ground of offense and defense. For
North Korea, outer space is of military interest, first and foremost. For
the DPRK, an impoverished nation with a highly regimented society, and an
inward looking worldview dominated by military concerns, space power,
while not easily achieved, is a potentially invaluable goal.
The North Korean government cannot
realistically deny or ignore the threats that external space based
technologies potentially pose to North Korea and its governing regime.
These threats are great indeed, for they are cultural, political and
military in nature. Transparency, both military and cultural, poses a
grave danger to North Korea's leadership. Although the isolated general
population seems not to be dissatisfied with its rulers, access to global
communications and media- through space-based technologies could
de-stabilize the domestic situation and seriously hinder North Korean
leaders' ability to stay in power. The growing utility and hazards of
outer space have led the DPRK's leaders to attempt to mold North Korea
into a power in space, one of the arenas in which it is also most
vulnerable. North Korea's primary approach to space has been via the
quasi-space military technologies, including ballistic missiles. North
Korea's ballistic missile program, while not technically a space program,
demonstrates a moderately advanced technical capability. North Korea
could, potentially, apply the lessons of its ballistic missile program to
a true space program.
There is some evidence that North Korea's
interest in space transcends the quasi-space military technologies. The
August 1998 attempted satellite launch using the Taepo-Dong missile was
intended to "greatly encourage the Korean people in the efforts to build a
powerful socialist state under the wise leadership of General Secretary
Kim Jong Il." 58
Any North Korean satellite launched at the present level of technological
ability would not have any substantial military utility. However, it would
be a significant feat in terms of image enhancement, and in terms of the
military utility of future satellites.
The ballistic missiles that have raised
such Western concerns about North Korea are not launch systems, and are
not necessarily part of a space program. However, ballistic missiles and
launch systems have many systems and technologies in common. As the North
Korean attempt to launch a satellite using a Taepo-Dong demonstrates,
three-stage missiles can be fairly easily modified for use as launch
vehicles. In the earlier eras of their space programs, the United States,
Russia, and China all launched satellites on barely-modified ballistic
missiles. 59 Thus
far, North Korea's focus has been primarily upon the development of
missile technology, not space technology, but gaining expertise in one may
enables future expertise in, and exploitation of, the other.
The DPRK's space capabilities are limited
by the abysmal condition of the North Korean economy, as well as by the
technically challenging nature of space operations. However, North Korean
leaders appear aware of space's utility, and motivated to develop their
nation's space capabilities. The DPRK has proved adept at using military
space power as a bargaining chip. On a more concrete level, North Korea is
believed to be using commercially available space systems and technologies
to maximize its military use of space. "It is believed that North Korea
has obtained commercial Global Positioning System satellite navigation
packages which it will attempt to integrate into the No Dong's guidance
system. If successful, this would give the missile substantially greater
accuracy and bring about a corresponding increase in operational
effectiveness." 60
While integration of GPS technology (and corresponding gains in accuracy)
would have only limited impact on ballistic missiles, this type of
technological expertise could enable the development of guided missiles.
It is difficult to obtain information on
North Korean policies regarding other space capabilities and technologies,
such as GPS, remote sensing, and satellite communications. However, it is
possible to speculate as to North Korea's most likely policy standpoint on
such issues. Such hypotheses are based largely upon the thesis that the
DPRK's space program may be following a similar course as China's, not
only technologically, but also politically. The technical parallels
between the development of the Chinese and North Korean space programs
stem largely from the fact that much of North Korea's missile know-how
originated in China. That China and the DPRK's motives for seeking space
power may be similar is also a reasonable conjecture. North Korea is, in
many ways, a more extreme version of today's China: more rigid in its
totalitarianism, more pronounced in its poverty, and more entrenched in
its isolation. China has sought space power in part to be able to deal
with conditions of asymmetry, to be able to fight wars in which it is the
weaker power. 61
North Korea, aware that it is likely to be the weaker power in a conflict,
may attempt to deal with its weakness by equalizing the playing field and
depriving its adversary of advanced capabilities.
The relevant question is not how long it
will take North Korea to "catch-up" with China, or the West, but rather,
how long it will be before the DPRK is able routinely to use its advanced
weapons systems as a bargaining chip and deterrent. North Korea's
development of space capabilities has been aided by transfers of
space-oriented technology from China (and Russia.) These transfers appear
to have continued even in recent years. Despite years of Western
predictions of North Korea's imminent demise, unless food supplies for the
military are depleted enough to provoke military unrest, the North Korean
regime is unlikely to collapse in the immediate future. 62 Despite, or perhaps
because of, its extreme poverty and the humiliation this has caused, North
Korea appears determined to strengthen its military capabilities. To the
degree that space power and military strength are perceived as synonymous
or mutually reinforcing, North Korea has also pursued space power.