This chapter examines some of the policy
issues the United States must consider regarding international use of, and
involvement with, RNSS. This chapters explores the use of RNSS in the five
Pacific Rim countries of Japan, China, Taiwan, North Korea, and South
Korea, a region that represents both a mix of traditional US allies and
adversaries, and a range of RNSS-related capabilities and uses. An
evaluation of US policies regarding GPS necessitates both an overview of
GPS, and an examination of each country's current and likely near-future
involvement with RNSS. Such involvement could include GPS applications,
indigenous commercial GPS-based services and equipment, development of GPS
augmentation systems or independent space-based navigation systems, and
the use of other nations' space-based navigation systems. The United
States confronts diverse policy issues in the Asia-Pacific, both in
dealing with allies and with adversaries. While some of the issues raised
have long been concerns for the United States, other issues are newer,
arising from the implications of widespread GPS availability.
AN OVERVIEW OF GPS
The GPS system, which was built by
the US DoD, cost more than $10 billion to construct. It consists of three
primary components: the space, control, and user segments. The space
segment consists of 24 satellites in six inclined, low earth orbits,
20,200 kilometers above Earth. The control segment consists of ground
monitoring stations around the globe operated by DoD. The user segment is
any receiver that can acquire GPS signals from the satellites. GPS
satellites carry atomic clocks that continuously transmit precise time
signals. The system can determine a receiver's position anywhere on Earth
and low Earth orbit by recording the length of time taken by the
satellites' coded radio signals to reach the receiver, which itself
generates a set of codes identical to those of the satellites. The travel
time is multiplied by the speed of light to determine the receiver's
distance from the satellites. At least four satellites, whose positions
are always known, must be overhead in order for GPS to determine the
three-dimensional position of a receiver relatively accurately.
GPS satellites transmit two types
of signals. The first is the precision (P)-code, which provides the
Precise Positioning Service (PPS), and requires a decryption key to
access. Primarily confined to US military use, this signal will allow a
receiver to determine position with an accuracy of about 21 meters. The
second signal GPS produces is the coarse acquisition (CA)-code. First
available for civilian use in 1984, this signal provides what is known as
the Standard Positioning Service (SPS) for worldwide access via a
standard, commercial GPS receiver. Historically, DoD deliberately degraded
this signal by a technique called selective availability (SA). When SA is
operating, DoD deliberately introduces random errors into the signal,
resulting in positioning errors, and a CA-code accuracy of 50 to 100
meters. The military employed SA for fear that adversaries could use a
more accurate signal to the detriment of the United States. Clinton's 1996
GPS policy called for SA to be shut off permanently by 2006 at the latest.
On May 1, 2000 President Clinton announced that the government would stop
degrading the civilian signal with SA in order to enhance the signal's
everyday usefulness. 2 Thus, at
midnight on May 1, 2000, SA was turned off, and GPS's accuracy
dramatically increased. With SA off, the accuracy of a commercial GPS
receiver is now between 6 and 15 meters. 3 The military retains the ability to deny
GPS signals regionally if deemed critical to national security. The United
States plans to add two additional signals to future GPS satellites to
enhance the system for civilian aviation and maritime navigation and
scientific use, although Congress did not approve GPS civilian signal
upgrades for 2000. 4 Despite
difficulties in obtaining Congressional funding for GPS, some funds have
been allocated to GPS improvements through FAA and Department of
Transportation appropriations. 5
Augmentation systems can improve the
real-time accuracy and availability provided by SPS. One method, known as
differential GPS, or DGPS, can provide augmentation of the basic GPS
signal on both local and regional scales. DGPS improves positioning
accuracy of a user's receiver by using additional receivers in precisely
known locations that receive GPS signals and transmit a correction signal
to the user's receiver at a different frequency. DGPS thus corrects for
the effects of SA and other system errors, making GPS more accurate and
reliable. Many countries and private companies operate DGPS correction
networks. In areas in which differential GPS systems operate, commercial
GPS receivers are now accurate to 1 meter or better. 6 Private service providers operate their
own, fee-based DGPS networks to serve high-precision applications such as
mining, forestry, transportation, and surveying. The government, via the
Coast Guard and the National Geodetic Survey, maintains two DGPS networks
for maritime and geodetic purposes. The FAA is also developing a Wide-Area
Augmentation System (WAAS) and Local-Area Augmentation Systems (LAAS) to
support air traffic management. 7
While the existing networks are based on the ground, WAAS will be a
space-borne system providing DGPS corrections over large areas of North
American airspace.
GPS has multiple beneficiaries.
The US military, its creator and primary intended user, has integrated GPS
into almost every facet of its operations, ranging from the positioning of
troops to navigation over air, sea, and land to precision timing and
targeting of guided weapons. The civil sector worldwide is increasingly
using GPS for public services including emergency response, search and
rescue, weather forecasting, highway construction, land management, and
air navigation. GPS is also useful to surveyors, motorists, farmers,
hikers, and geology and environmental researchers. GPS is not only a
powerful technology, but also a profitable one: in 1998, the sale of
GPS-based goods and services grossed $4 billion in worldwide revenues, and
this market is projected to grow annually by 25 percent through 2003. The
United States is a world leader in the GPS equipment and service industry,
and currently holds one-third of the market. US companies are projected to
maintain this dominance for the next several years. 8 Now part of the emerging Global
Information Infrastructure, GPS use reduces the costs of a variety of
civilian and military navigation and positioning activities by improving
efficiency and accuracy for no more than the cost of a receiver.
GPS is not the only existing RNSS.
The Russians operate a counterpart system known as GLONASS, which stands
for the Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System. While 24 satellites
are required to provide precise navigation information worldwide, only ten
GLONASS satellites are currently functioning. These ten satellites provide
good coverage in Russia, and parts of Europe and Asia, but not worldwide.
GLONASS's deterioration is a result of Russia's poor financial situation.
When fully functional, GLONASS provides better positioning accuracy than
GPS's CA-code with SA turned on. GLONASS, which possesses no SA feature,
operates at different frequencies and uses different position algorithms
than GPS. Thus, the two systems require different operating equipment.
GLONASS, like GPS, is owned and operated by the Russian military, and has
its own version of GPS's P code. Because GLONASS supports the Russian
military, the nation has a strong incentive to keep the system operating.
In order to attract funding for GLONASS, Russia has offered to let the
system be the basis of an international navigation system and has also
negotiated funding and use arrangements with various countries. 9 Russia launched two GLONASS satellites
in October 2000. At least 15 more satellites need to be launched in the
next few years to keep the system operational.
Europe is in the process of
developing an independent, global satellite navigation system, which will,
if completed, be called Galileo. 10
The European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Union (EU) are working
together to build this system. Europe's increasing dependence on
foreign-owned RNSS systems led to the desire to develop Galileo, "an
independent system under civilian control which will be guaranteed to
operate at all times." 11 The
Galileo system will be made up of 30 satellites (27 active satellites, and
three spares), and will be interoperable with GPS and WAAS in Europe,
Japan, and the United States, as well as with Russia's GLONASS. Unlike GPS
and GLONASS, Galileo will be civilian owned and operated. Galileo will
ensure European access to RNSS, enable improved aircraft guidance and
positioning, provide better coverage in northern Europe, bolster Europe's
RNSS-related industries and create new jobs in the aerospace and
information industries. 12
Currently in development, European officials expect Galileo to be fully
operational by 2008, with some limited operability by 2006. In April 2001
Galileo moved closer to becoming an operational reality when EU transport
ministers agreed to "an initial 100 million euros ($87 million) in funding
for the 30-satellite Galileo constellation." 13 The EU and ESA are providing initial
funding for Galileo but are trying to attract private investment in the
system. The system's basic service will be available worldwide free of
charge, although the EU may impose a tax on GPS receivers, or provide
enhanced, fee-based services in order to earn revenue.
RNSS AVAILABILITY IN THE PACIFIC RIM
The use of RNSS varies widely
within the countries under examination in this paper. The following
sections summarize the uses of RNSS in each country. Table 1 provides an
additional overview.
- JAPAN
Of the five Pacific Rim nations
examined here, Japan is most involved in RNSS commerce, applications, and
infrastructure. Although Japan uses GLONASS to some extent, the majority
of the nation's RNSS activity centers on GPS. GPS commerce is big business
in Japan: the country is Asia's leading GPS equipment manufacturer and had
the highest world market share in 1998 with 47 percent. 14 Japan is particularly renowned for
having the world's largest portable and automobile GPS receiver industry.
15 These products are widely used
domestically and abroad, both within and beyond Asia. Thus, the Japanese
economy reaps large benefits from commercial enterprise based on GPS. The
Japan GPS Council, the counterpart of the US GPS Industry Council, helps
promote the Japanese GPS industry, with both government and private
support.
Japan relies heavily on GPS
applications for military and civilian applications. The nation is one of
the world's largest users of GPS military equipment; military-grade GPS
receivers and encryption devices are extensively used by Japan's Maritime
Defense Forces. 16 In addition, the
Japanese Defense Agency has an agreement with DoD to access military-level
GPS signals. 17 GPS receivers are
also used in Japan for maritime navigation in coastal areas, aircraft
navigation, surveying, and monitoring crustal motion and volcanic
activity. 18,19,X20
Japan also makes extensive use of
DGPS correction networks. The Japanese Maritime Safety Agency operates a
maritime beacon DGPS network for safety in coastal navigation. A private
DGPS service provider uses a network of 34 ground stations to cover nearly
the entire island nation. 21 Two
civilian agencies in the Japanese government are also making efforts to
build a wide-area DGPS network for international aviation safety. 22 Called the Multifunctional Transport
Satellite (MTSAT), this space-based augmentation system is intended to
supply DGPS correction data to improve the accuracy of GPS-based
navigation data for Japan's flight information region. The system will
also have some meteorological applications, but will not have any signal
encryption for military uses. Japan attempted to launch an MTSAT in
November 1999, but the H-2 rocket carrying it was destroyed when it
deviated from its flight path. As safe air traffic management is critical
over the increasingly crowded skies of the Asia-Pacific region, Japan is
likely to persist in its attempt to orbit an MTSAT.
While Japan has undertaken
significant efforts to create national DGPS networks, and possesses a
strong GPS-based industry, and myriad GPS applications, the nation has no
independent RNSS and is unlikely to develop one in the near future. In
March 1997, Japan's Science and Technology Agency looked at five ways the
nation could proceed in satellite navigation, ranging from developing an
independent RNSS for the region, to continuing to rely on GPS and GLONASS,
to cooperating with Europe on an RNSS. The agency decided to continue
research into satellite navigation technologies that could, if desired in
the distant future, lead to the development of a Japanese RNSS. The
Japanese decision not to pursue an independent RNSS project resulted from
the high costs of such an endeavor, a focus on capturing the
ground-equipment markets, and to US concerns that such an undertaking
would undermine GPS. 23 Thus, Japan
has focused its primary efforts on creating GPS augmentation systems, and
cooperating on the development and funding of an RNSS with Europe. Japan
has also considered paying for part of upgrades to GPS or a
next-generation system led by the United States as long as Japan could
contribute hardware. 24 In 1998,
the Japanese government signed a cooperative statement with the United
States declaring its commitment to work with the United States to promote
GPS as a worldwide standard for navigation, positioning, and timing.
25
- CHINA
China has been increasingly
involved with, and interested in, RNSS. GPS and GLONASS are both used for
a variety of applications. Civilian uses of the systems include dam
construction, coastal navigation, police dispatch, cargo monitoring,
surveying of oil and gas reserves, and air traffic management. 26 China also uses GPS and GLONASS for
military applications. 27 The
Chinese aerospace industry is currently integrating GPS into its new
fighter aircraft, while the military has used GPS technologies to support
unmanned aerial vehicle programs and field training exercises. 28 China has also expressed interest in
using GPS and GLONASS to increase the accuracy of ballistic missiles
through mid-course guidance corrections. 29 Currently, China has some domestic GPS
and GLONASS receiver production capabilities, but is not a major developer
or manufacturer of RNSS user technology. There are reports, however, that
the Chinese military-industrial complex has entered into joint ventures
with foreign firms to produce GPS receivers for possible incorporation
into weapons. Such weapons could be used by China or sold to third
parties- including "nations of concern." 30 China's military uses of GPS are a
concern for the United States and its allies. Nevertheless, the Chinese
are unlikely to rely heavily on RNSS and RNSS applications for military
purposes until they have their own RNSS system and/or guaranteed access to
RNSS.
China currently has limited
indigenous RNSS capabilities, and operates several DGPS ground stations
for activities such as air traffic management. China has stated an
interest in developing a space-based navigation capability, and has
engaged in navigation satellite research for at least 20 years. It
recently launched a two-satellite regional positioning satellite system
called Beidou ("Northern Dipper"). The two geostationary satellites,
launched in October and December 2001, are less capable than GPS or
GLONASS, but give China its first autonomous satellite navigation
capability. 31,32 Chinese officials have stated that China
is working on a more complex, global navigation system using a larger
number of satellites in various orbital planes. 33,34 Most
recently, the Chinese have expressed interest in helping Russia fund
GLONASS. 35 China can be expected
to seek to depend on RNSS systems other than GPS, although the Chinese are
also likely to continue using the US system. China finds RNSS an
increasingly useful and necessary tool, but is reluctant to increase its
dependence on foreign owned systems, especially if such systems are owned
and operated by non-Chinese military services.
- TAIWAN
Taiwan has only recently become
involved in space activities. In 1990, Taiwan established a National Space
Program Office to develop basic space technologies and satellites for
purposes such as communications, environmental monitoring, and scientific
research. Taiwan also hopes to create an indigenous space industry for
national security and economic growth; however, its use of RNSS is
currently minimal, especially compared to Japan and China. Taiwan has
begun limited use of GPS technologies to support missile, fighter
aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicle programs. 36 On the civilian side, research
institutes and universities use GPS technology for mapping, surveying, and
geodesy. In 1989, Taiwan established a GPS receiver network to monitor
ground movement, which, in this earthquake prone island, remains the chief
GPS application. Taiwanese commercial investors have begun to finance the
development of autonomous vehicle navigation systems as well as computer
software based on GPS. In the near future Taiwan's main involvement with
RNSS will be in GPS augmentation, civilian and military GPS applications,
and development of commercial GPS products. Taiwan does not have the
resources to develop its own satellite navigation system.
- NORTH KOREA
North Korea's most widely known
and worrisome use of RNSS is for military applications. The DPRK has
reportedly used GPS receivers imported from Japan on its submarines.
Reports have also indicated that North Korea leased a Thai communications
satellite equipped with GPS to plot the path of a missile it planned to
test in August 1999. 37 Some
analysts worry that North Korea may soon integrate GPS receivers into its
indigenous or imported medium- or long-range ballistic missiles to improve
their accuracy. 38 North Korea has
declared its intentions to use space capabilities for peaceful purposes,
but has also stated that it would use these assets for military ends if
confronted with foreign hostility. Despite its intention to be an
independent space-faring nation, without dependence on China or any other
nation for access to space, the primitiveness of North Korea's space
technology and the poor condition of its economy make it highly unlikely
that North Korea will develop its own RNSS. 39 The US policy considerations regarding
North Korea and RNSS should include possible North Korean hostile use of
GPS and other available RNSS, including procurement of RNSS receivers and
RNSS-responsive weapons from other countries, incorporation of GPS
technology into its own missiles, and development of GPS spoofing or
jamming capabilities for use in regional conflicts involving North Korea.
- SOUTH KOREA
South Korea makes fairly extensive
use of GPS for a variety of civilian applications, including maritime and
aviation navigation, land surveying, bridge construction, precise
synchronization of telecommunications networks, and intelligent
transportation. 40 The size of the
domestic market for GPS equipment and services is unknown; however,
private firms in South Korea manufacture GPS receivers for handheld and
automobile navigation uses and also offer GPS-based services. 41 As of 1997, the nation planned to build
a DGPS correction network. 42 While
various government ministries and agencies oversee the use of GPS, the
Korea Astronomy Observatory monitors the local quality of, and any
interference in, GPS signals. South Korea is seeking to develop both an
indigenous space launch capability and a satellite-manufacturing industry.
43 Given its alliance with the
United States, and the expense and difficulty of building an indigenous
RNSS system, South Korea is likely to forgo developing its own system, and
continue to use GPS. South Korea may develop a regional DGPS network to
augment the GPS signal, sustain GPS-based applications and commercial
activity, and possibly use other countries' RNSS. 44
US POLICY ISSUES - GPS AND THE PACIFIC RIM
GPS-related policy issues and
dilemmas add complexity to the many foreign policy issues the United
States faces in dealing with the Pacific Rim countries. The diverse and
growing utility of RNSS in Japan, China, Taiwan, North Korea, and South
Korea indicates that all of these countries have stakes in RNSS and in the
US GPS in particular. Current national policy on GPS states that the
United States will seek to protect US national security, civil, and
economic interests relating to GPS, while making the system available for
international use, promoting cooperation with foreign governments, and
addressing the civil, commercial, and security interests of other nations.
45 Balancing US interests and needs
with international interests, however, can prove formidable. The 1996 GPS
policy states the US intention to achieve this national-international
balance, but does not address the specific regional challenges that face
the United States throughout the world. The United States must balance
military-civil tensions, both domestically and abroad. The proliferation
of GPS technologies adds new complexities to US interactions in the
Asia-Pacific.
Clinton's 1996 GPS policy
specifically calls for cooperation with foreign governments and
international organizations in order to balance international and domestic
interests in GPS. The question is, how will the United States cooperate
with Pacific Rim nations when both US security and US economic
competitiveness are potentially at stake? Yielding to some interests of US
allies in the region could weaken US control of, and benefits from, GPS.
The United States must consider the needs and interests of nations who
rely upon GPS, and work with these nations to develop policies and
agreements that satisfy their needs, along with the needs of the United
States. The United States is working to establish GPS, rather than Galileo
or GLONASS, as the world's standard RNSS system. Ignoring international
concerns about GPS will impede US attempts to promote GPS as such a
standard.
Just as the United States has
built up civilian and military applications and commercial enterprises
around the availability of GPS, so have many of the United States' Pacific
Rim allies. US policy does not clarify to what extent, or how, the US
government and US firms should work with foreign organizations to promote
GPS civilian applications throughout their countries. Agreements like that
made between Japan and the United States on cooperation using GPS, and
international relationships between GPS-specific business councils can
provide an institutional framework to facilitate GPS use and commerce in
the Pacific Rim. This, in turn, will encourage these countries to support
GPS as a global navigation standard. 46 Another US priority is to maintain the
market share of its GPS equipment and services in the Pacific Rim
countries. Continued GPS dominance depends on friendly trade relations
between the United States and its Asian allies, low import tariffs on GPS
goods, and simplified international sales clearances and equipment
certifications.
Export control, however, must
still be a major policy concern of the United States, as well as its
Pacific Rim allies. Reports that traditionally hostile nations like North
Korea and China may be integrating GPS receivers into guided weapons
increase the importance of export controls. While the United States
maintains export controls on military-grade GPS equipment, the nation has
few controls on civilian GPS receivers. If it becomes clear that "hostile"
nations are using GPS to the detriment of the United States, the United
States may want to consider working with its allies to develop stricter
export controls on civilian GPS technologies. Ultimately, however the US
ability to restrict the flow of technology to North Korea, China, and
other potentially aggressive nations depends on the willingness of other
nations to coordinate their efforts with those of the United States. The
United States thus needs to reach agreements with allied nations regarding
what GPS technologies should be exportable to potential regional
adversaries. Overly stringent export controls should be avoided, however,
as they may limit the economic potential of GPS equipment and service
sales. A balance between commercial interests and national security is
essential- and difficult to achieve.
In addition, the United States
must determine its stance on those Pacific Rim allies who use GPS for
military purposes. By sharing military assets or information with any
other nation, the United States risks lessening its military advantage
connected with GPS. On the other hand, US allies benefit from such
interactions, and as a result, are likely to remain committed to the use
of GPS. The US government should consider the military needs of its
Pacific Rim allies, and craft policies regarding allied access to P-code
signals and trade of military-grade GPS equipment for specific uses that
fit with US interests in the Pacific Rim. 47
One of the central US policy goals
regarding GPS is maintaining the system as a global standard. As noted in
the 1996 GPS policy, GPS allows the United States to reap significant
civil, military, economic, and political benefits. Today, the preservation
of GPS spectrum is uncertain, the development of a new European RNSS is
imminent, GLONASS renewal is possible, and international hesitance to rely
on a system controlled by the US DoD is growing. It is now more than ever
in the US interest to formulate policies that rally foreign countries
around GPS. Perhaps agreements like the US-Japan joint statement on GPS
cooperation, serve as the clearest means by which the United States can
assure the dedication of foreign nations to GPS. The Japanese agreement
has been valuable because Japan is a world leader in GPS use and commerce.
Such agreements with other Pacific Rim nations may not have quite the same
impact and may or may not be feasible- but should still be explored. US
promotion of GPS as a global standard will be facilitated by official
assurances of the extreme unlikelihood of a US denial of GPS access.
Confidence in GPS will also be increased by a US commitment to stable
funding for GPS. Cooperation between the United States and its Pacific Rim
allies to develop applications and civilian augmentation signal that
maximize GPS's benefits will also help increase loyalty to GPS.
The United States must consider
the implications of global GPS availability as it pertains to US military
superiority. This is especially relevant in the case of a conflict in the
Pacific Rim because GPS is essential to several US military systems. If
foreign militaries are also making extensive use of the system, does this
dilute US military strength? Commercial GPS receivers are accurate enough
to allow hostile militaries to improve their navigation and positioning
activities. Even if SA was turned back on, militaries can still use the
CA-code to position military units and improve weapons delivery accuracy,
especially given the broad availability of DGPS systems which improve
GPS's accuracy. For example, it is estimated that North Korea could
improve the accuracy of its No Dong 1 missile by 25 percent through use of
GPS, even with SA on. 48
Considering the reported intentions of nations like North Korea and China
to develop GPS-enhanced weapons, the United States and allies must work to
minimize this threat by agreeing upon appropriate uses of GPS and
deterring and combating the "misuse" of GPS.
Assuring US (and allied) access to
the GPS signal is another defense-relevant policy concern. On a technical
level, the United States must determine how to overcome attempts by
hostile nations to interfere with US military use of the GPS signal, as
well as unintentional interference. Protection of the GPS signal is
essential, given US DoD estimates that China may be able to completely
interdict the GPS signal in ten years. 49 The United States must undertake
research on overcoming selective jamming and spoofing of GPS and DGPS to
preserve its military advantage in a conflict.50 At the same time, the United States must
determine how to deny GPS to adversaries in the case of conflict. Not only
is the United States faced with deciding which nations should have access
to the P-code, but also with the possibility of denying access to the
CA-code during a conflict. This is both a technical and political issue.
If the United States interferes with the GPS signal in a regional
conflict, this may harm US allies, many of whom are dependent on GPS for
both military and civilian functions - including public safety. The United
States may also be faced with situations where denying GPS to an adversary
could endanger civilians within that nation.
Although the United States
recently turned off SA, the military can still decide through 2006 to
employ SA to degrade GPS signals in a region if US national security is
threatened. Before the May 1, 2000 decision to turn off SA, those who
advocated keeping SA on argued that SA provided a defensive edge for the
United States, and deterred foreign military investment in GPS
technologies.51 Such assumptions
are key arguments for turning SA on again in the case of a conflict in the
Pacific Rim. Other experts maintain that SA offers minimal advantage to
the US military, as foreign militaries have a local ability to improve
signal accuracy using DGPS networks. Future enhancements, including
development of independent RNSS, would further undermine the military
advantage represented by GPS's SA.52 SA opponents also note that a foreign
military's ability to benefit from the absence of SA depends on that
military's technical sophistication, and pre-supposes its investment in
GPS-based technologies in the first place. Civil and commercial users also
advocate keeping SA off, in order to enhance GPS's utility for civil uses
and commercial applications, reduce costs and complexity associated with
using GPS with SA on, increase global confidence in GPS's capabilities,
and spur growth of commercial GPS industries. A DoD evaluation of what
circumstances would necessitate a return to the use of SA must include an
evaluation of the effects of such a switch on civilian and commercial
users of GPS. US decision-making vis-à-vis SA is additionally constrained
by the fact that frequent policy changes could undermine international
confidence in GPS.
Essentially, the United States
must determine how to balance its national security interests with those
of US and foreign commercial interests in GPS in the event of a Pacific
Rim conflict. The 1996 GPS policy states that the government can interfere
with domestic GPS commerce for national security reasons. The policy does
not specify what criteria will be uses in limiting sales to foreign
nations, with which nations the United States would restrict GPS-related
trade, or how the United States will respond to sales of GPS equipment and
services to hostile nations. US export control policy for GPS technologies
must consider the likely efficacy of restrictions, that is, will US
"adversaries" be able to purchase GPS technology from third parties even
with US export controls? US export control policies must, at once, advance
national security and avoid stunting US industrial growth.
CONCLUSION
Pacific Rim involvement in GPS has
the potential both to advance and undermine US national security,
economic, and diplomatic benefits from GPS. As a result, the United States
must work to develop policies independently, as well as with nations in
the region, to promote positive uses and growth of GPS while deterring
potential misuses of the system by aggressors. As well, the success of US
GPS polices in the Pacific Rim will be affected by US actions and policies
elsewhere. US GPS policies that affect European nations may also
indirectly influence the attitudes toward GPS held by the Pacific Rim
nations- both US allies, and potential adversaries. Only by crafting
policies that appeal to international interests will the United States
succeed in maintaining GPS as a global navigation and positioning system
standard and continue to reap national security, financial, and political
benefits from its brainchild.
Table 1. RNSS Capabilities and Uses in the Pacific Rim, Current and
Near-Future
|
RNSS used now |
RNSS used in 5-10 years |
Indigenous RSS now? |
RNSS in 5-10 years? |
Indigenous RNSS Augmentations |
RNSS use for national security? |
RNSS use for civillian functions? |
Indigenous RNSS industry? |
JAPAN |
GPS; GLONASS |
GPS; GLONASS; maybe Galileo |
No |
No, but capable |
DGPS; MTSAT |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes, high |
CHINA |
GPS; GLONASS |
GPS; GLONASS; maybe Galileo |
No |
Maybe |
DGPS |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes, some |
TAIWAN |
GPS |
GPS; GLONASS; maybe Galileo |
No |
No, incapable |
Some |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes, some |
NORTH KOREA |
GPS |
GPS; GLONASS; maybe Galileo |
No |
No, incapable |
? |
Yes |
Maybe |
? |
SOUTH KOREA |
GPS |
GPS; GLONASS; maybe Galileo |
No |
No, incapable |
Some DGPS |
Maybe |
Yes |
Yes, some |
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