



# *Small Spacecraft*

- The Promise and Potential of Thinking Small

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# ***“Small” is Essential to Success***

- **“Key to strong walls are the smaller stones that fill the spaces and lock together the larger elements”**


**“Irish Stone Walls”**  
by Pat McAfee




- **A decade ago the power of small spacecraft was questioned:**
  - In the mid-80s NASA faced a ‘going out of business’ problem – big, expensive missions = fear of failure and lengthy periods between results
  - Commercial (and some government) pioneers saw great human benefit in a proliferation of small space missions (*“The Logic of Microspace”* by Rick Fleeter)
  - It was slowly realized that a portfolio approach using s/c of various sizes and types was best in terms of return on investment and maintaining pace
- **Small spacecraft don’t eliminate the need for larger ones, but they have proven to be extremely capable**

*How many American’s can name a person on the Space Station?  
How many American’s remember Spirit and Opportunity?*


# Mass is One Dimension of Thinking Small



Here are two more



XSS-11  
~100kg



Cubesat  
Complexity (~100 parts)




GeoLITE  
Cost (~\$100M)



# Risk is a Key and Essential Dimension in the World of Small

- Risk is essential – consider a stock portfolio:
  - The “most effective” portfolio must contain high-risk elements, even at the lowest desired levels of risk
  - The least desirable option contains only low-risk elements
  - The key to optimizing a portfolio is to include high-risk elements and ensure a high return per dollar spent



- Risk comes in many flavors: cost, schedule, technical, programmatic, cultural, etc...
- Complexity  $\neq$  risk
- The goal when designing a small mission is to properly blend cost, benefit, and risk to achieve a great result

*THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: a 100 kg microsub enters the ocean of Europa and is eaten by a 50 ft long silicon fish – small spacecraft/infinite return*

## ***Ten Roles Where Thinking Small Can Pay Off***



- **#1 – Building a Portfolio**
- **#2 – Achieving “First Results”**
- **#3 – Challenging Established Culture**
- **#4 – Acquiring Precursor Scientific and/or Operational Data**
- **#5 – Exploring Risky Markets/Destinations**
- **#6 – Maintaining Programmatic Pace**
- **#7 – Demonstrating Technology**
- **#8 – Training Future Leaders**
- **#9 – Establishing Cooperative Ventures**
- **#10 – Ensuring Full Exploitation of Resources**

# Even NASA Can Think Small... to Great Effect!



- NASA design (JSC), ESA contribution, vendor fabrication
- Prototype vehicle built to Class A specs
- Small focused team (100 CS employees) using modern tools
- Complex OML
- Demonstration of streamlined, fast track development

X-38



- NASA design (ARC airframe, GRC propulsion), Boeing fabrication
- Modified Buffalo (C-8A) (airliner sized)
- Blown wing demonstrator
- 3X lift increase over conventional aircraft
- **Unassisted aircraft carrier (Kittyhawk-class) landing and takeoff!**
- Design database for C-17

Quiet Short-Haul  
Research Aircraft  
(QSRA)



- NASA design (JSC), DARPA/NASA funding, vendor fabrication
- “Buy by the Limb” strategy
- Sophisticated upper body system with 47 DOF
- Mission focused – develop augmenting capability
- 25 person in-house team
- Mobile, dexterous, and teleoperated

RoboNaut




- NASA design (ARC/DFRC), Rockwell detailed design and fabrication
- Fly-by-wire RPV subscale (.44) demonstrator
- Graphite-epoxy structures – 2X g loads of conventional aircraft
- Provided control laws for production systems

Highly Maneuverable  
Aircraft Technology  
(HiMAT)

- ***NASA can run at the bleeding edge through in-house innovation... when allowed to!***

# Small Spacecraft Can Address Many Markets

- Government generally remains focused on large programs that feed institutional need; in the small world:
  - USAF has long been a source of advocacy
  - NASA thinks small (or commercial) with great reluctance
  - OGAs not there yet (though NOAA might become interested in the wake of N-POESS)
- Commercial and academic sectors better matched to thinking small, especially really small:
  - Entrepreneurial ventures focused on high capacity microsats designed to exploit technology (MEMS, high-power solar, IP comm,..)
  - Government should not compete in this market – nurture with modest funding and support (access to SMEs, tools, facilities)
  - A decade ago I predicted modest growth in this sector... not sure it ever materialized



# Access to Space Continues to be a Vexing Problem

- On the cost dimension, transportation can quickly become the dominant factor in the project budget
- Opportunities remain limited:
  - Primary P/L (dedicated or shared LV) – most expensive option, but you own the resource
  - Secondary P/L (custom carrier or multiple carrier) – cheapest ride but sacrifice autonomy, must track to primary P/L schedule, and trajectory is often constrained

*So... why hasn't anyone built a dedicated small launcher?*



Challenge	Opportunity
• Small rockets are notoriously difficult to develop	• Lots of technology available and amateur rocket community getting close to needed capability
• Need \$20-30M to do the job right	• Commercial ventures have raised far more in the past
• Requires a very well structured team with egos in check	• Talent is available
• A flexible launch range is needed	• Wallops has MARS (commercial) and range assets are pre-negotiated with cleared ascent area
• The government has to allow it to happen	• Favorable Administration

*A fresh look at the technology and the market should demonstrate the potential for a profitable company focused on microsat launches*

# What's Possible: a Small Mission Left Unfinished...



- **Imagine exploring the Moon commercially with small spacecraft:**
  - **A MER-sized lunar rover remotely operated from Earth using IP nets and designed to survive repeated lunar nights**
  - **Built by young people in a garage using existing tools – a diverse team operating in close partnership with schools**
  - **Watched by millions via a reality TV venue**
  - **Pre-mission revenue generated by advertising sales, product placement, gaming, product sales, video sales, etc.**
  - **Revenue augmented during launch and ops through web traffic, feed pricing, technology IP, data purchases, mission-related events, etc.**
- **When the Moon is done the team next lands on an asteroid**



*The best way to make “small” work is to think BIG!*



***EXTRA CREDIT***

***[NOTE: the following charts  
present only a NASA perspective***

# Small Spacecraft – Myth Busting

MYTH	REALITY	IMPLICATION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsats are new</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NASA started with smallsats (e.g. Explorer 1) and has had an on-again, off-again love affair ever since</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NASA has had to periodically retool, reinvent, and retrain to incorporate smaller missions in the overall portfolio</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsats are not "main mission" investments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If correctly matched to scientific/technical requirements and sociopolitical needs, a smallsat mission can deliver startling results</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Good mission design is very important when smallsats are concerned - David can slay Goliath IF you choose the right rock and aim very carefully</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsats do what big sats do</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technology enables ever more capable smallsats, but a balance of large, medium, and small missions is still the best bet</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tendency to oversell the role of smallsats and to create programmatic imbalances, much the way "faster, better, cheaper" did in the 90s</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsats are built with off-the-shelf component</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• They can be, but more often they are just as customized as larger satellites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Excess tendency to treat smallsats as an "assembly job" of pieces and parts rather than a complex spacecraft</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technology is driving by the larger missions, not the smallsats</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Often it's easier to incorporate new technologies on a smaller spacecraft if the gain in performance more than offsets the technical risk (it usually does)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NASA has not invested much in spacecraft technologies and will likely have to shop far afield to find the systems needed to build smallsats to meet VSE goals</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsats can be complex because it takes a lot of design to jam things into a small volume</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For the type of missions smallsats will be fairly complex, but this need not be a barrier to meeting cost or reliability targets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Choosing the right level of complexity is critical to meeting cost and performance goals</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsats represent high-risk to the overall mission</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsats PERMIT the incorporation of "appropriate risk" into an overall mission portfolio - these risks should be clearly stated to everyone involved</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A "dumb failure" is unwanted in a mission of any size - all types of risks must be adjudicated when designing a smallsat mission to maximize mission success factors</li> </ul>

# The Pros and Cons of Small Spacecraft

## The programmatic perspective

PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• When all benefits are weighed, a smallsat mission can be designed to yield results that capture the imagination and deliver</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Larger spacecraft have the advantage of delivering more "bang for the buck"</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• There is a great deal of experience in the arena of designing, building, and operating smallsats</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Most of the experience base is no longer within NASA - the Agency will likely have to rely on support from external community to build SOTA spacecraft</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Smallsats provide programmatic flexibility and the ability to respond to changing requirements</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• It's critical to tightly integrate smallsat mission requirements to ensure that each mission provides the right answer at the right time in the overall mission sequence</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• NASA owns a low-cost launch facility at Wallops (with a commercial partnership) with a long history of launching spacecraft at low-cost and high reliability</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Use of WFF requires NASA to cooperate closely with commercial entities for LV and launch complex</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• There has been an explosion of smallsat and related technology over the past decade - you can even buy a satellite kit</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Most of the action in the smallsat arena has not been in the U.S.</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Several smallsat projects can be combined and launched on the same rocket</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• LV providers often shy away from "piggy-backed" payloads and sometimes a failure of one payload can effect all others</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Smallsats programs tend to attract very capable staff and managers</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• It's hard to keep teams small and focused because so many people want to "help"</li></ul>

# The Pros and Cons of Small Spacecraft

## The cost perspective

PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If simplicity is maintained during design and development, smallsat cost can be built at very low cost</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Per kg., smallsats are often carry a premium price - some economy of scale does exist</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complex spacecraft capable of meeting significant science and technology objectives can easily be built for &lt;\$100M</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existing cost models generally are poor predictors of cost in the micro- and nano-sat realm; more work is needed</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opportunity exist to reduce NASA costs by partnering with others, including commercial firms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To make best use of high-reliability, lower cost components developers might be forced to shop off-shore</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opportunity for relatively low-cost launch exists as either secondary/tertiary payloads, or as primary on vehicles like Minotaur</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LV usually is higher proportion of mission cost when compared to larger missions - tends to encourage secondaries and multiple payloads per launch</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existing subsystems/components/parts are available so that modular approaches to design and fabrication are truly feasibility</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Modularity, "serial design," design reuse," and "common bus" are concepts that are difficult to employ in practice unless Agency maintains a "product line" strategy</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsats require small teams, lean development, novelty in testing, and other creative developmental approaches and, as a result, can achieve low cost</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Very difficult to maintain low-cost profile within the NASA environment where the culture is adverse to lean and mean developments</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsats will become even more abundant when launch costs come down</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cost and price are not the same thing, and there's not much pressure to reduce launch prices</li> </ul>

# The Pros and Cons of Small Spacecraft

## The risk perspective

PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The ability of a smallsat to achieve a given mission objective is nearly the same as larger spacecraft - smallsats are getting more reliable</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NASA risk management procedures are poorly matched to the development of smallsats since the Agency's focus has been on much larger investments</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsats can represent the high-risk portion of the overall mission portfolio</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher risk must carry a commensurately higher return and this requires exceptionally thorough mission planning and spacecraft design when planning smallsats missions</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Launchers for smallsats have achieved high-levels of reliability - vehicles like the Minotaur have a great track record because of their heritage</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not all LVs enjoy the track record of vehicles like Minotaur - the history of other rockets show a stepwise evolution to acceptable levels of reliability</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsats can be built using high-reliability methods if lessons-learned are incorporated into design and development practices</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NASA has a tendency to discard streamlined processes used in the past to develop low-cost missions (Spartan, Hitchhiker, SMEX, etc.)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Investment exposure is less with smaller missions - if you lose one it's less noticeable</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If the small mission does what it's suppose to it suddenly becomes precious - does JPL take risks with Spirit and Opportunity, or are they treated more like Cassini despite their much lower cost?</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smallsat teams tend to form highly effective and interactive teams that are nimble in terms of spotting mistakes during development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Because lean oversight is a necessary element of smallsat design it is essential to have especially effective reviews to catch errors that could lead to mission failure</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The importance of testing tends to be elevated in smallsat development programs since fewer up-front inspections are conducted</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NASA must resist "uncosted work" levied on the smallsat program that could divert monies being held for testing late in the development cycle</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A small spacecraft often has a single purpose - this allows the team to focus on the primary payload and it is therefore less likely to fail</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A larger spacecraft often has multiple payloads and can suffer failures without being labled a "mission failure"</li> </ul>