ATTACHMENT 1 SM-2077-52 3 September 1952 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Chief of Naval Operations Chief Staff, U.S. Air Force Subject: Security Measures on Chemical Warfare and Biological Warfare 1. The Joint of Chiefs of Staff have considered the recommendation by the Secretary of the Air Force that action be taken to "tighten security measures on Chemical Warfare (CW) and Biological Warfare (BW) but not to extent of over-classification with the resultant damage to our accelerated program". In connection with CW, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that only part of the field of CW pertaining to nerve gases is of such sensitivity as to require a special guide for its security classification and therefore the term CW as used herein applies only to the nerve gases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that information concerning BW and CW is being more widely disseminated than is necessary or is desirable from a security point of view. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after examining the current over-all policy on security classification of military information and the security classification policies concerning BW and CW, agree that the policies furnish adequate guidance for safeguarding these areas of information and consider that within the framework of the existing policies action can be taken to curtail unnecessary dissemination of BW and CW information. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, in the interest of increased security, responsible agencies should re-examine their procedures for implementing the current policies and keep under continuing review the following: a. Measures to insure adequate classification under the presently effective over-all security classification policy and the specific security policies governing classification of matter concerning BW and CW. b. Measures to insure that classified BW and CE documents and information are made available to authorized 1 personnel only on a "need-to-know" basis with determination in each case reserved to the highest practicable level of command in each Service concerned. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further consider that responsible agencies should: a. Impose stringent controls over visitors to activities involved in the BW and CW programs. Visits by individuals or groups for indoctrination purposes should not normally be authorized. Rather, consideration should be given to devising a means to conduct essential indoctrination programs at places other than where BW or CW research and development work is begin performed and possibly by personnel not directly concerned in this work. Conversely, this should not be construed to exclude personnel who are actually engaged in the furtherance of the BW and CW programs. b. Maintain under continual surveillance positive measures to insure thorough security indoctrination of all personnel, and in particular, civilian scientists assigned to the BW or CW programs. And further insure that all such personnel are debriefed prior to assignment to other duties outside these fields or upon termination of employment in connection therewith. c. Impose a time-lag on publication, sufficient to provide security for current research, when reviewing BW and CW material prepared for unclassified publication by personnel connected with the BW or CW programs. d. Insure, insofar as practicable, that all published articles stemming from the BW or CW research and development programs are disassociated from anything which might connect them with U.S. military endeavor. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: W. G. LALOR, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Secretary Copies to: Asst C/S, G-3 Secy to CNO (JCS) Director/Plans, AF Commandant Marine Corps Director, J/S (Further implementation of JCD 893/18)