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Norma Heary	21 Jun63		
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JCS 2304/85

31 October 1962

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS IF BUILD-UP IN CUBA CONTINUES DESPITE RUSSIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE QUARANTINE (U)

- 1. At their meeting on 28 October 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to forward the attached memorandum, together with its Appendices A and B, to the Secretary of Defense.
- 2. The memorandum was forwarded as JCSM-831-62, dated 28 October 1962.
- 3. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

M. J. INGELIDO


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TOP SECILET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JCSM-831-62 28 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Alternative Actions if Build-up in Cuba Continues
Despite Russian Acceptance of the Quarantine (U)

- 1. As the President indicated in his speech, the quarantine of Cuba is the initial step in obtaining the withdrawal or removal of offensive missiles. He further stated that additional action would be forthcoming if the situation indicated such to be appropriate to accomplish these objectives.
- 2. Experience has shown that positive action pulls our Allies with us, whereas inaction results in doubt as to our resolve. Announcement of additional steps to increase the pressure is urgently required to demonstrate not only to the USSR and Cuba, but also to our Allies, that the United States is moving forward, as the President emphasized, to accomplish all the steps outlined in his message of 22 October 1962. The United States has the advantage now as the result of our forceful action, but the momentum of that advantage must be maintained by application of additional force at timely intervals.
- 3. A series of direct and indirect actions against Cuba in the event that the President's objectives are not achieved in a timely manner and Soviet offensive weapons are not eliminated are discussed below. Also, disclosed below is a series of provocative actions that could cause Castro to make a mistake thereby gaining increased political acceptability and justifying an increased level of US retaliatory actions.
- 4. Indirect Actions. The following actions should be considered for adoption in order to maintain the initiative and put increasing pressure on Cuba to remove voluntarily their existing offensive weapons capability:

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a. Intensify efforts to extend denial of landing and overflight rights to planes en route to Cuba.

Pros .

- Denies USSR air transport to Cuba
- Involves no serious risk of shooting incidents

Cons .

- Fails to force removal of offensive weapons
- Fails to remove Castro government
- b. OAS continue to demand that Castro destroy or remove from the hemisphere all offensive nuclear weapon capability and submit to inspection and verification by OAS.

Pros -

- No further heightening of tensions
- Achieves US objective if accepted

Cons 4

- Fails to remove Castro government and so does not eliminate possibility of reintroduction of weapons
- c. OAS request United States, as an agent of the OAS, to continue surveillance of Cuba to help OAS evaluate the threat. Pilots of other members of OAS to participate as practicable and planes to be clearly marked and identified as being OAS planes.

Pros .

- Maintains essential flow of intelligence on Cuban progress at missile sites under auspices of international body
- Provides intelligence required for execution of all contingency plans
- Maintains pressure on Cuba through continuing show of force

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d. Intensify psychological warfare efforts.

Pros -

- Enhance anti-Castro sentiment in Cuba
- Does not provide basis for retaliation by Cuba/USSR

Cons -

- Fails to remove offensive weapons or Castro government

5. Provocative Actions

The purpose of these actions is to induce the Cubans to fire on US elements, or make some mistake which would make politically acceptable and justify subsequent US air strikes or invasion. In order to prepare the best foundation for certain of the actions, it would be particularly desirable to have the OAS appoint the United States as executive agent for the OAS in maintaining surveillance of Cuba. In addition, we should ask OAS nations to furnish reconnaissance planes or pilots for US reconnaissance planes. OAS ships should be used for some of the close-in patrols described below.

Preliminary to any air strike or invasion, certain tasks must be performed for operational reasons. These include photo missions, air reconnaissance, beach reconnaissance, and electronic countermeasures, among others. The very nature of these operations can make them provocative, and they serve a dual purpose. It should be noted that all of the direct or indirect actions listed in paragraphs 4 and 6 herein result in one degree of provocation or another.

Examples of provocative actions are listed below, generally in descending order of semblance of legality:

- a. Constant, round-the-clock air photo missions at high, medium, and low altitude, accompanied at night with many flares.
- b. Destroyer patrols constantly around the islands. Cruiser patrols directly off Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and other selected cities. These patrols would operate initially at the three-mile limit; later they might "inadvertently" get inside the three-mile limit for increasing periods of time.

- c. Harass Cuban shipping off ports or along coasts. Board and inspect. Direct Cuban ships to US ports for inspection.
- d. Off-shore patrol ships conduct gun-firing exercises firing parallel to the shoreline. At night, conduct exercises using illuminating projectiles with illumination to be concentrated off cities and harbors.
- e. If KOMAR or PT approach off-shore patrol ships day or night, take provocative action to confuse crews.
- f. "Carelessly" extend the landing patterns of our aircraft at Guantanamo to include much of the surrounding Cuban countryside, dropping anti-Castro/Communist leaflets while over Cuban territory.
- g. From time-to-time bring a major carrier task group within easy view of large coastal cities. Conduct flight operations.
- h. Conduct flight operations (carrier or shore-based fighters) to confuse Cuban radar sites and create command uncertainty. Conduct mixed high-level to low-level, low-level to high-level flights in direct run in with legal limit turnaway. Create sonic booms over Havana and other Cuban centers.
 - i. Conduct active ECM to jam all Cuban electronic emissions.
- j. Conduct simulated amphibious assault using electronic devices to confuse radars and loud speaker systems to create noise to unsettle Castro's militia.
 - k. Intense Psychological Warfare:
 - (1) Leaflets and electronic communications offering rewards for Cuban MIG defections.
 - (2) Leaflets and electronic communications requesting Cubans to maintain a list of all informers, party members, and block wardens. Also drop lists of local communists, informers, and block wardens, compiled with assistance of Cuban refugees, over all sizable Cuban towns and cities, promising justice to all these individuals upon Castro's downfall.
 - (3) Drop copies of photos showing missile sites.

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- 1. Aerial release of small parachutes with a side arm and few rounds of ammunition at various locations.
- m. Drop "Snake" fire-fighter simulators outside military installation and cites.
- n. Make intercepts on Cuban military aircraft outside Cuban territorial air space.
- o. Conduct continuous fighter sweeps over the island, combined with buzzing of trains, motor vehicles, and public buildings.
 - p. Put agents ashore to start uprisings against the Castro regime.
- q. Publicly announce concern over pollution of the Guantanamo water supply and send a military force into Cuban territory to check and protect the reservoir.
- r. Incite riots on Cuban side of Guantanamo fence using members of Guantanamo labor force as agents. Riots would justify our providing military assistance to laborers.

6. Direct Actions

a. Aerial Reconnaissance over Cuba

- (1) Day and night flights at irregular hours and at different altitudes.
- (2) Fighter sweeps over Cuba in large numbers to show our determination and to bring home the "facts of life" to Cubans about their insecure position.

Pros -

- Will increase photo coverage necessary to intelligence community and President.
- Fighter sweeps will be a demoralizing factor to the populace.

Cons .

- Could provoke counter sweeps over US territory or sneak attack on US installations or cities. (This, however, has added provocative benefits.)

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b. Conduct Covert Actions to Include Sabotage of Missile Systems

Pros -

- Directly affects the missile that we wish to eliminate.
- Capitalizes on assets available.

Cons -

- Possible compromise of operations.
- c. Add POL to the prohibited list

Pros -

- Will drastically reduce the military effort and bring the economy to a halt and create wide-spread political instability.
- Will put great pressure on Castro to dismantle missile bases.

Cons .

- Missiles will not be immediately eliminated.
- * United States would eventually be subject to criticism for humanitarian reasons.
- d. If total POL blockade is not considered desirable at this time, a blockade against jet fuel could be imposed

Pros -

- Will eventually bring military effort to a halt.
- Does not expose the United States to criticism on humanitarian grounds.

Cons .

- Missiles will not be eliminated for a long time.

e. Total Sea Blockade

Pros -

- Further build-up prevented.
- Will bring economy to a halt and exert great pressure on Castro to dismantle missile bases.
- Much easier to enforce than partial blockade.

Cons -

- Missiles will not be immediately eliminated.
- United States would be subject to criticism because of humanitarian aspects.

f. Air Blockade

- (1) Administrative harassment
- (2) Air defense harassment
- (3) Denial of Bloc aircraft within 50 miles of US territorial waters and air space
- (4) Seizure and destruction of Bloc aircraft within 50 miles of the United States and Cuba

Pros -


- Steps up the blockade effort to maintain initiative.

Cons .

- The Berlin air corridors will be vulnerable for retaliation.
- g. Offensive Strikes. Selective strike on 11 MRBM missile sites and jet fields (Reference Appendix B).

Pros -

- If completely successful, will eliminate known MRBM missile threat.



- Could result in Cuban uprising and possible overthrow of Castro government.
- Demonstrates that the United States is withholding all out action against Cuba in favor of elimination of immediate nuclear threat only.

Cons -

- Heightens tensions and could result in escalation.
- Subjects the United States to criticism for humanitarian reasons as well as for aggression.
- Will not immediately solve the problem or immediately eliminate communism from Cuba.

h. Full Invasion

Pros .

- Definitely removes the offensive threat.
- Eliminates the Castro government.
- Removes Soviet influence in Cuba.
- Indicates to OAS and to NATO the will of the United States to protect the Free World from Communist aggression.

Cons .

- Heightens risk of general war.
- Castro may launch any offensive weapons not neutralized in initial air strikes.
- Opens the United States to charges of aggression in world opinion. However, opportunity for the United States to set up a model government and a viable economy should counter this in the long run.

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7. Although direct and indirect provocative actions are provided giving a wide range of choice, direct action to eliminate the offensive weapons threat provides the greatest promise of achieving the US objective for Cuba. Paragraph 2. Annex A of SNIE 11-18-62, dated 19 October 1962, "Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba," fully supports this view. It indicates that the USSR reaction would be approximately the same regardless of the scale of direct military action. All things considered, it appears at this time that the only direct action which will surely eliminate the offensive weapons threat is air attack followed by invasion and is, in the long run, the best course of action.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

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Sec. 3.3

APPENDIX A

EXPANDED EVALUATION OF COURSES OF ACTION PROPOSED IN THE BASIC PAPER TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL ALTERNATIVES FOR CONSIDERATION

1. Indirect Actions	1
a. Intensify Efforts to Extend Denial of Landing and	2
Overflight Rights to Planes Enroute to Cuba	3
Advantages	4
- With a minimum of effort this will deny entry of air-	5
craft into Cuba except from bases within aircraft range and	i 6
in countries friendly to Cuba.	7
- Avoids necessity of halting aircraft by force with the	e 8
attendant risks.	9
Disadvantages	ĵò
- Fails to provide for removal of existing threat or	11
hostile Castro government.	12
- Dependent upon cooperation of many Allies.	13
b. OAS or US Demand Castro Destroy or Remove From the	14
Hemisphere all Offensive Weapons and Submit to Inspection	15
and Verification by OAS	16
Advantages	17
- Avoids further heightening of tensions and dangers of	18
escalation.	19
- If successful, achieves objective of obtaining removal	1 20
of offensive weapons.	21
Disadvantages	22
- Fails to remove hostile Castro government.	23
- Enforcement in sufficient degree to prevent clandesting	ne 24
reintroduction of offensive weapons would be difficult.	25
c. As a Follow-on to a Above, OAS to Request US as an	26
Agent of the OAS, to Continue Surveillance of Cuba to Help	27
OAS Evaluate the Threat	28
Advantages	29

- Provides a basis for expanded US intelligence on Cuba.

- Continuous ppresence of US aircraft over Cuba would demonstrate US power and so discourage Cuban efforts at rearming.

Disadvantages

- Same as in b above.

d. Intensify Psychological Warfare Efforts.

Conduct a campaign to convince the Cuban people that the United States: supports the general objectives for which the Cuban people fought their revolution; deplores the betrayal of the revolution by some of its leaders, making the Cuban people a pawn of the Soviet conspiracy; proposes to help the Cuban poeple regain control of their country and, when accomplished, pledges to support the Cuban people in their efforts to attain their objectives. Publish the policy world-wide and inform the Cuban people of it continuously by radio and leaflet.

Advantages

- Would encourage dissident elements in Cuba to take some action against the regime.
 - Would put Cuban leadership on the defensive internally.
- Would be favorably received by progressive and liberal elements in Latin America.
- Would tend to help in our relations with Afro-Asians and to undercut Soviet line as friend of aspiring peoples.


Disadvantages

- May cause new difficulties in relations with some of our NATO partners over the anti-colonial issue.

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
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2. <u>Direct Actions</u>	1
a. INCREASE OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER	2
CUBA TO INCLUDE DAY AND NIGHT FLIGHTS AT IRREGULAR	3
HOURS, VARYING ATTITUDES, AND FLUCTUATING NUMBERS.	4
Advantages	5
- Provide best possible information on activities in	6
Cuba concerning any increase or decrease in offensive	7
weapons, as well as intelligence in general.	8
- Continuing flights should clearly demonstrate	9
US capability and determination, encourage dissident	10
reaction in Cuba and demoralize the segment of the	11
population loyal to Castro.	12
Disadvantages	13
- Could provoke Cuban or USSR reaction against the	14
aircraft, attacks on US mainland, or increased pressure	15
elsewhere in the world.	16
b. Expansion of current Blockade to Include POL	17
Advantages	18
- Could eventually be effective enough to degrade	19
significantly the offensive military threat in Cuba.	20
- Would prevent the increase in POL supply stocks	21
over that currently available.	22
- Would eventually bring on the economic collapse	23
of Cuba and the attendant fall of the Castro government.	24
- Would generate unrest in general in Cuba through	25
effects on economy and the people.	26
- Could cause Castro to consider removal of the	27
offensive weapons.	28
- Demonstrates US restraint in avoiding direct	29
attack on Cuba	30




Disadvantages	1, 1,
- Fails to remove offensive threat to US expeditiously	2
- Would produce effects sufficiently severe to encourage	3
encourage serious retaliatory measures by USSR and/or	4
Cuba.	5
- Directly affects Cuban people through impact on	6
economy, making US more vulnerable to condemnation.	7
- Fails to insure removal of the hostile communist-	8
controlled government from Cuba.	9
- Requires indefinite continuation of blockade until such	10
time as Castro regime eliminated and Soviet influence	11
removed.	12
c. EXPANDING EXISTING, BLOCKADE TO INCLUDE ONLY FUELS	13
FOR AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES.	14
Advantages	15
- Avoids impact on Cuban economy and people and the .	16
resulting criticism of US.	17
- Prevents increasing stocks of these fuels for Cuba's	18
offensive weapons.	19
- Demonstrates US restraint and effort to avoid outright	50
conflict.	21
Disadvantages	22
- Fails to eliminate current offensive threat	23
- Does not contribute to anti-Castro efforts in Cuba	24

d. Complete Sea Blockade of all Imports	1
Advantages	2
- Would lead to economic collapse of Cuba.	3
- Avoids direct attack on Cuba with its attendant	4
casualties and damage.	5
- Demonstrates US restraint and avoidance of war.	6.
- Provides environment for further negotiations for	7
removal of offensive weapons.	8
Disadvantages	9
- Fails to eliminate existing offensive weapon threat	10
in time available.	11
- Perpetuates tension and promotes incidents which	12
could provide the basis for expanding into war.	13
- Complete blockage affects Cuban people directly	14
rather than being limited principally to the military,	15
making US more vulnerable to condemnation.	16
- Even if blockade should result in successful	17
negotiations it would leave a hostile communist-controlled	. 18
Cuba to continue to threaten Western Hemisphere and	19
would not insure against introduction of offensive	20
weapons into Cuba.	21
- Ties up US forces for an indefinite period.	22
e. Extending Blockade to Prevent Entry into and Departure	23
of Aircraft from Cuba	24
Advantages	25
- Complements sea blockade by preventing introduction	26
of important cargo by air.	27
- Eliminates communication through aerial flights be-	28
tween Cuba and the rest of the world.	29
- Provides further harassment which might encourage	30
Castro to consider removal of offensive weapons.	31




Disadvantages]
- Might provoke similar USSR reaction elsewhere, e.g.,	2
Berlin.	5
- Provides basis for incidents which might escalate	1
to war.	5
- Not a decisive step in the elimination of the Cuban	6
threat or the Castro government.	7
- Would be of indefinite duration.	8
f. Air Strikes Against All Offensive Weapons Systems,	9
Missiles and Combat Aircraft, as well as Related Air Defense	10
Systems as necessary	11
Advantages	12
- Eliminates immediate threat and so accomplishes	13
stated objective.	14
- Minimizes risks of Cuban attacks on the United States	15
or Allies since entire offensive system is destroyed.	16
Disadvantages	17
- Leaves Cuba in the hands of a hostile communist regime	≥18
which will remain a threat to the Western Hemisphere.	19
- Requires a continuing blockade or similar surveil-	20
lance system capable of preventing the reintroduction	21
of offensive weapons into Cuba.	22
- Entails essentially the same risks of escalation	23
as an all-out invasion with less promise of achievement	24
of lasting results.	25

g. All-out invasion of cuba	1
Advantages	2
- Achieves US stated objective (eliminates missiles and	3
sites, combat aircraft and the Castro regime from the	4
Western Hemisphere).	5
- Confidence in US determination to take all necessary	6
actions to remove threats to the Free World will be	7
materially enhanced with beneficial effects on our	8
Allies and nonaligned nations.	9
- The communist threat in Latin America would be	10
considerably weakened.	11
- Re-establishment of Cuba as a free and independent	12
nation with a viable economy will erase in the long	13
run early criticism of US military actions.	14
Disadvantages	15
- Belated recourse to this course of action would	16
reduce its effectiveness.	17
- The United States might be denounced as an aggressor	18
in the United Nations.	19
- Soviets could cause violent reactions in Berlin	20
against US interests throughout the world.	21
- Could lead to general war if the Soviets mis-	22
calculated US intentions and determinations.	23
- World opinion could go against the US instigated by	24
Soviet propaganda media.	25
- Greater likelihood of Cuban attempts to launch offen-	26
sive missiles as an act of desperation. This would	27
probably require: Soviet acquiescence which is doubtful	28
in view of the Presidential warning.	29
	,



3. Additional courses of action are covered below. Any or]
all of these can be taken concurrently with any action directly	. 2
concerned with Cuba. Each is designed to pose the Soviets with	3
a problem of how to proceed, always indicating to the Soviets	4
the choice of removing the offensive weapons from Cuba is the	=
quickest way to remove the irritation.	6
a. Closing US Ports and Airfields to Soviet Ships and	7
Aircraft:	8
Advantages	9
- Restricts Soviet freedom of movement.	10
- Restricts Soviet trade.	11
- Reduces Soviet intelligence opportunities.	12
- Reduces the danger of Soviet covert attack.	13
Disadvantages	14
- Reduces communications and contact between the US	15
and USSR.	16
- Reduces US/USSR trade and forces USSR to trade	17
elsewhere.	18
b. Covert Operations. Accelerate the sabotage campaign	19
against power facilities (with emphasis at missile sites,	20
airfields and ports); to assassinate leading Russians and	21
Cuban communists; to incite small-scale insurrections; to	22
sabotage missile sites, airfields and ports.	23
Advantages	24
- Would weaken Cuban and Soviet ability to maintain	25
and increase military threat to the United States.	26
- Would tend to weaken control of Castro government	27
and Soviet confidence in it.	28
<u>Disadvantages</u>	29
- Would require considerable time to produce desired	30
effect.	31



c. Political Action. Set up Cuban government in exile	1
support representation in United Nations and in Organization	- 2
of American States.	3
Advantages	4
- A focal point for Cuban patriots.	5
- A competitive device to undermine Castro.	6
- An available organization to control Cuba in the	7
advent of invasion or revolution.	8
Disadvantages	9
- May prove to be a liability if a more favorable	10
government is formed.	11
- May prove difficult to manage, or impede some US	12
action.	13
d. Economic Action. Implement a master offensive	14
economic plan with the primary objective of sharply	15
reducing the flow of industrial, agricultural and military	16
material reaching the USSR and its satellites. Concurrently,	17
take action to reduce selected imports from the USSR.	18
Advantages	19
- May reduce the economic stability of the USSR.	20
- Could divert critical USSR resources to undesirable	21
channels.	22
- Would restrict flow of material required to sustain	23
USSR defense effort.	24
Disadvantages	25
- Adverse reaction from Allied nations.	26
- Heavier load on US resources to fill vacuum.	27
- Success depends on Allied cooperation.	28

APPENDIX B


SCENARIO OF LIMITED ATTACK ON MRBM SITES AND JET FIELDS

A. Factual Background	1
The IRBM sites and associated nuclear storage facilities are	2
still under construction and do not constitute a present threat.	3
The present offensive threat appears to be concentrated in the	4
six MRBM areas and the five jet fields available to the IL28's	5
and MIG's	6
An air attack concentrated on these 11 targets, plus defense	7
suppression including the 8 SAM sites immediately protecting	8
these eleven targets should therefore deal with the heart of	9
the present offensive threat.	10
Because of the impossibility of assuring night time surveil-	11
lance, adequate force to assure disabling of all offensive	12
systems in the eleven target areas during the initial attack	13
should be provided.	14
What is under discussion in this paper is, therefore, a one	15
day attack on eleven target areas, accompanied by necessary	16
defense suppression. Such an attack might involve approximately	17
250 sorties.	18
B. The Problem	19
To analyze the actions which should have preceded such an	20
attack.	21
C. <u>Assumptions</u>	22
It is assumed that:	23
a. The Soviet Union has votoed the U.S. resolution in the	24
Security Council.	25
b. We have no evidence that removal or dismantling of existing	26
offensive systems has begun.	27
D. Possible Courses of Action	28
a. To enhance public and Allied understanding and to increase	

political acceptability of program.

0.

1. Publication of progressive series of low level	_
photographs demonstrating continued work or, at minimum,	2
lack of action to remove.	?
2. High level statements reiterating President's pledge	1
that offensive threat must be removed, emphasizing determina-	5
tion to see this done.	.6
3. Warnings to workers to leave areas.	7
4. Intensive explanation to Allies of extent of threat	3
to base of their security that MRBM's pose, and inform them	9
of our intended action at earliest time consistent with	10
security.	11
b. Possible incidents which could be provoked to add to	12
justification of program.	13
It is important to distinguish between incidents involving	14
the Soviets directly and unambiguously and those which the	15
Soviets might assert involved the Cubans alone.	16
Search and seizure of Soviet ships at sea, or forcing a	17
Soviet submarine to surface might create incidents of the	j8
first class.	19
Those in the second class include:	20
1. Extension of surveillance to middle altitude as well,	21
as high and low altitude, increased frequency.	22
2. Provocative action by either drone or manned planes	23
or helicopters.	24
3. Provocative raid on Komar's either for close photography	,25
examination, or disarming.	26
4. Patrol from Guantanamo base to check water supply.	27
c. Expected effectiveness.	28



The attack would damage and destroy virtually all of	1
those MRBM's and jet aircraft located at the target areas.	2
This will include a large proportion and maybe all of these	3
vehicles now operational in Cuba. Some may now be concealed o	r may4
be moved and concealed between today and the time of attack.	5
Extensive surveillance at all altitudes would therefore	6
seem to be indicated for three reasons:	7
1. It will minimize the chance of undiscovered weapons	8
being operational.	9
2. It will contribute a pattern of activity that will	10
act as a cover for the actual attack.	11
3. It might provoke an incident adding justification to	12