

ORIGIN/ACTION

G-1

SS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

DEF 10-8 file

FOR/IRM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	R	IO
L*	FBO	AID
3		12
3C1	S/S	S/P
4	27	1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	10	3
OSD*	USIA	NSA
19		3
REC	ACD	NSC
7	10	6

A-1043

SECRET

TO : Department of State WASHINGTON PM 2 05

INFO: Department of Defense WASHINGTON

COPY NO. 1 SERIES A

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : American Embassy LONDON

DATE: November 2, 1964

SUBJECT: Informal U.K. Draft Agreement

REF : Embtel 1980

The Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department of the Foreign Office has provided the Embassy informally with the attached text of its version of a proposed agreement to provide for cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in monitoring the nuclear test ban treaty. As noted in the referenced message, this draft has not been approved at the ministerial level by the new Government. In providing the Embassy with the draft, Bryan Shepherd of the Foreign Office suggested that an official of the U.K. Defense Department, Dr. R. Press, might raise it informally with AFTAC on a forthcoming trip to Washington.

Declassified
 Authority: 24716
 By: Pam Jahnske
 Date: 06-22-2011

For the Ambassador:
 Richard V. Hennes
 Richard V. Hennes
 First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: As Stated
 4 copies to State
 3 copies to Defense

GP-3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 Retain class'n Change/Classify to _____
 With concurrence of _____
 Declassify In part and exclude as shown
 EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (1)
 RPO/HDR by [Signature] 31.16.198
 SECRET DEF 39-35

SECRET

FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR/DEPT. USE ONLY
 In Out

Drafted by: PM:RVHennes:bjr 11/2/64

Contents and Classification Approved by: PM - George S. Newman

Clearances:

file per C.A. [Signature] 11/10/64

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure to H 1043

London copy 1

G

(Draft of October 6, 1964)

Letter to the
U.S. State
Department

I have the honour to refer to the discussions which took place in Washington in September between technical representatives of the United States Government and Her Majesty's Government on the subject of co-operation and collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom in the field of monitoring the Treaty banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and under Water, signed at Moscow on the 5th of August, 1963.

2. I have the honour to enclose a memorandum, together with its annexes, setting out the understanding of Her Majesty's Government as to the arrangements which are to be put into effect. I should make it clear that the statement of preferred locations at Annex A is based on technical considerations only and is subject to the possibility of successful negotiations with the Governments of the countries concerned. I should be grateful if you would confirm that this letter and the memorandum and its annexes represent also the understanding of the United States Government in this matter.

3. I have the honour further to record the understanding of Her Majesty's Government that, if the United States or the United Kingdom determines that there has been a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, there will be consultation /through...

~~SECRET~~

through political channels before a decision is taken
by the United States or United Kingdom Authorities to
make a public disclosure of the violation. I should be
grateful if you would confirm that this is also the
understanding of the United States Government.

3 rev. 1
Memorandum of Understanding regarding
Test Ban Monitoring Requirements

The United Kingdom proposes to make an independent contribution to monitoring the nuclear test ban treaty by installing and operating United Kingdom stations in collaboration with the United States network. To this end:-

1. The United Kingdom stations will be located on a basis of full complementarity with the United States network.
2. The precise number of United Kingdom stations will be subject to United Kingdom budgetary limitations.
3. To facilitate full exchange and common evaluation of data, the United Kingdom will install and operate United States equipment provided by the United States. This paragraph does not preclude the incorporation of British equipment in due course.
4. The locations preferred on technical grounds for United Kingdom stations are set out in Annex A to this memorandum.
5. Whenever United States equipment is installed and operated at United Kingdom stations, it will be on the basis described in Annex B to this memorandum.
6. The United Kingdom stations will be located and operated to provide the United Kingdom with a reasonably independent assessment of possible violations of the Test Ban Treaty by the Soviet Union.
7. All data from United Kingdom stations will be promptly transmitted to the United States (AFTAC) through a single communications link. The United States will similarly provide to the United Kingdom data recorded at United States detection facilities.

/8.

8. The United Kingdom will establish a data analysis centre. The United Kingdom and United States data analysis centres will effect the maximum exchange of data and analysis techniques. To this end a technical representative from each operational organisation may be stationed at the headquarters of the other.
9. Operation of the United States/United Kingdom monitoring systems will be supported by continuing research and development programmes on which there will be a full exchange of information. These programmes will be directed towards improving the effectiveness of the monitoring systems.
10. The arrangements described in this Memorandum will operate for a period of ten years, and will continue to operate thereafter subject to termination at one year's notice by either Government. This in no way precludes the introduction of changes in techniques or equipment during the period in which the arrangements are in operation.
11. Operation in overseas territories will impose varying degrees of disclosure of information concerning the purpose and results of monitoring operations. The extent of such disclosure will be negotiated between the station operator and the host country.
12. The fact of United States/United Kingdom monitoring collaboration will be unclassified, but the identification of USAF Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) with monitoring activities will be classified SECRET. Additional security provisions are set out in Annex C to this Memorandum.

ANNEX A

Preferred Locations for U.K. Stations and
Deployment of Techniques

The proposed United Kingdom stations are given below
in two groups:-

- | <u>(A) FIRST PRIORITY</u> | | <u>Techniques Incorporated</u> |
|-------------------------------------|------------|---------------------------------------|
| (1) United Kingdom | Orfordness | Backscatter Radar |
| | Feltwell | Acoustic |
| | | Tellurgic)
Geomagnetic) Magnetic |
| | | Fluorescent |
| | | VLF Phase |
| (2) Pakistan | Peshawar | Broadband EMP |
| | | Cosmic Noise |
| | | Seismic |
| | | Acoustic |
| (3) Mauritius (a new station) | | Electromagnetic |
| | | Telluric)
Geomagnetic) Magnetic |
| | | VLF Phase |
| | | Atmospheric
Fluorescence |
| | | Cosmic Noise |
| (4) South Africa
(a new station) | Capetown | Electromagnetic |
| | | VLF Phase |
| | | Telluric)
Geomagnetic) Magnetic |
| | | Air Sampling |
| | | Cosmic Noise |
| | | Atmospheric
Fluorescence |
| (5)
(a new station) | Pretoria | Acoustic |
| <u>(B) SECOND PRIORITY</u> | | <u>Techniques Incorporated</u> |
| (6) Fiji (a new station) | | Electromagnetic |
| | | Cosmic Noise |
| | | Atmospheric
Fluorescence |

/7

Annex A (Contd.)

Techniques Incorporated

(7) Australia Perth W.A.
(an existing U.S. station.
The U.S. regards it as
highly desirable that this
station should be absorbed
into the U.K. network).

Electromagnetic
Atmospheric Fluorescence
VLF Phase
Cosmic Noise

(8) Brisbane
(a new station)

VLF Phase



FOIA(b)1 AF

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX C

Security

The fact that United Kingdom stations are operating in co-operation with APTAG will be SECRET.

The details of United States techniques used at United Kingdom stations will be SECRET.

All recorded data and derived evaluation will be SECRET.

The fact that technical equipment from the United States is installed at a particular United Kingdom station will be unclassified.

The fact that a particular United Kingdom station is monitoring the Nuclear Test Ban will be unclassified.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX B

Equipment Supply

The United States will provide equipment at United States expense for operation in United Kingdom stations. The equipment will be on loan to the United Kingdom for the period of the Agreement. Necessary supplies of spare parts peculiar to the equipment, together with consumable supplies and parts not available in the United Kingdom will be supplied to the United Kingdom as necessary at United States expense.

For the operation of United States equipment in United Kingdom stations the United States will at United States expense train United Kingdom personnel.

The United States will provide at United States expense specialised equipment and technical assistance as required for site surveys at proposed United Kingdom station locations.

The cost of site acquisition, installation and day-to-day running costs at the United Kingdom stations will be borne by the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom will operate United States equipment in accordance with Standard Operating Procedures to be provided by the United States.

~~SECRET~~