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Authority NNP 35152

By X NARA Date 4-27-10

7/3/73

Al Barr of INR brought around a 40 Committee memo dated today instructing that the French be notified informally of our plans to collect information on their nuclear tests, and adding that the former practice of having the Defense Attache's office in Embassy Paris pass the information to the French military should be followed. This meets our concern and gives the green light to tell the French about the helicopters in Paris.

Barr called back later in the afternoon to say that JCS has already instructed DIA, which is sending in turn an instruction to Gen. Donaldson's office.

WE:cm

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By JL NARA Date 4-27-10

retn to EB

SECRET/SENSITIVE

June 12, 1973

Colonel Bourland told me today that the helicopters will be operated by the Navy to fulfill DNA requirements. DNA is in process of providing required tracks and distances to the Joint Reconnaissance Center, and a joint paper is to be prepared.

Air Force has mentioned the practical problem to Navy and to JRC, and Bourland will inform us further whether steps will be taken to coordinate the helicopter flights so that collisions with French aircraft will be avoided.

CDR
Douglas

WE:EJB

Copies to:3
0
PM
EUR
S/PC
S/S
RFSECRET

June 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR INR - MR. CLINE

I have carefully gone over the documents you submitted in connection with the JCS proposal to use the 1973 French nuclear tests for R&D purposes. I have noted the arguments advanced against this proposal, namely, that R&D collection could be taken as participation in the tests and that we would thereby risk sharing in their condemnation.

I am unable to find that presence in the area of nuclear tests or even their close examination constitutes participation. We have for years been monitoring the French tests with such equipment as has been appropriate for our purposes. We have been doing the same with the Chinese tests. The only difference is distance.

Although the same fears of condemnation were presented last year, there was no evidence to show that they were borne out.

The stated purposes of the proposed R&D collection effort are specific and important. We would be remiss in failing to take advantage of the opportunity.

Should there be criticisms of our presence at the French tests, I think we could continue to deal with them by reasserting our total condemnation of nuclear testing in the environments prohibited by the LTBT. I find no inconsistency between this condemnation and a close monitoring of the French tests.

Therefore, on all these grounds, I support the JCS position.

William J. Porter

Authority NNP 35152
By X NARA Date 4-27-10Secret~~RDV~~
EJB

TO: RDV

Al Barr of INR/DDC (29033) came to see CM and me with this paper. I told him to propose to the JRC that we enlarge our present understanding with the French--under which our 135 aircraft send the French a signal as they approach the test site--to include the sending of a signal to the French when we launch helicopters. The helicopter bit is the only new wrinkle. By sending a signal we would minimize the risk of collision with French fighter aircraft. I told Barr he could report this as an EUR position; I said we would mention this to EUR and I was confident they would endorse this proposal.

The separate question of our violating the LTBT by exploiting the French tests for ABM R&D purposes, which began last year and on which Kissinger overruled State's objection, is something other bureaus will fight about in front of P.

EJB

5-18-73

JRC = Jt Reconnaissance Center

Authority NNP 35152
 By JL NARA Date 4-27-10

 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

 CM-2684-73
 11 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE 40 COMMITTEE

 Subject: Weapon Effects Data Collection from
 1973 French Nuclear Tests (S) (NICE
 DOG/HULA HOOP) (U)

1. A series of four atmospheric nuclear test detonations is expected to be conducted by France during July and August at their Tuamotu Archipelago (Mururoa Atoll) Pacific Test Site.

Latest DIA estimate

2. The United States has been monitoring French atmospheric tests in the South Pacific since the early 1960s. These annual nuclear effects data collection operations have been contained in the Joint Reconnaissance Center monthly reconnaissance forecasts and schedule books since 1966.

3. The primary purpose of this proposed operation, nicknamed NICE DOG/HULA HOOP, is to collect radar and infrared data on low altitude nuclear fireballs. This collected data will permit evaluation of how such bursts affect the operation of missile defense radars. In addition, optical and electromagnetic data will be collected from the visible and infrared radiation of the fireball. These latter data, which have not been available from the analysis of long past US atmospheric tests or by underground tests, are required in the design of future ballistic missile defenses, in planned satellite surveillance systems, and in the design and evaluation of strategic hardsite radar sites.

COPY NO 4

EYES ONLY

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 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5b(2)

 DECLASSIFY ON IMPDET

EYES ONLY

SENSITIVE

4. It is planned to carry out the NICE DOG/HULA HOOP weapon effects data collection operations during the July-August period in the vicinity of the French atmospheric tests in the vicinity of Mururoa Atoll similar to the 1972 NICE DOG/DIAL FLOWER collection operation. The service assets assigned/or required for the operation would consist of: USNS WHEELING (T-AGM-8), one KC-135 aircraft (No. 53120), one NC-135 aircraft (No. 60369) and one helicopter repair ship (ARVH) or an amphibious transport dock (LPD), and two SH-3A or CH-53A helicopters, for the conduct of an in-flight radar transmission experiment to be conducted through the atomic "mushroom" cloud at distances of 20 nm or greater.

5. During the planned NICE DOG/HULA HOOP operation, the ships distance to ground zero (GZ) would not be closer than 20 nm immediately prior, during and immediately after the nuclear detonation. During periods preceding the actual French nuclear test, one of the two ships would be required to approach Mururoa Atoll up to 12 nm, remaining outside the territorial waters, to visually and electronically survey the French test site to determine test readiness conditions, and to visually observe the test balloon and suspended test device gondola. The aircraft and helicopter distance to ground zero will not be closer than 20 nm. Helicopter altitudes will vary from 5,000 feet to 15,000 feet and the KC/NC-135 aircraft altitudes will vary from 10,000 to 20,000 feet. Platforms will be equipped with frequency monitoring equipment to avoid interference with the French.

6. This concept proposal is submitted for review and approval at this time to facilitate requisite planning, to identify and coordinate the allocation of service assets, and to initiate long lead time contracts and inter-agency agreements required to configure ships and aircraft with radar and special electronics systems, relocate assets, train personnel, and resolve any funding problems.

7. Your concurrence with this concept proposal is requested by 1700 hours, Wednesday, 16 May 1973.


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8. Subsequent to approval of this concept proposal, pertinent detailed plans and graphics will be included as appropriate in the Joint Reconnaissance Center Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule Book.



T. H. MOORER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Authority NNP 35152
By X NARA Date 4-27-10SECRET/SENSITIVE

25 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Secretary
FROM: INR - Ray S. Cline
SUBJECT: JCS Proposal to Use 1973 French Nuclear Tests
for R&D Purposes

The JCS proposes a larger effort against the 1973 tests than was carried out last year. In addition to the two C-135 aircraft and the USNS WHEELING which participated last year, JCS proposes to deploy two helicopters and a helicopter support ship. The helicopters would be airborne during the test to conduct radar transmission experiments through the nuclear mushroom cloud. The USNS WHEELING's closest point of approach (CPA) to Mururoa Atoll is to be 12 NM to visually and electronically determine test readiness conditions. Immediately prior to the tests, the WHEELING is to move out and remain at a CPA of 20 NM from ground zero. The aircraft and helicopter CPA is also to be 20 NM from ground zero.

For the past two years, the Department has opposed our use of the French tests for R&D purposes. Last year, in a memorandum to the 40 Committee, Ambassador Johnson outlined the Department's concern that our collection efforts could precipitate considerable political costs (TAB A). Our concern hinged on our vulnerability to charges of violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty should our monitoring of the tests be construed as "participation". Since the Department's consideration of last year's JCS proposal, there have been new developments likely to

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increase the attention focussed on the tests. The U.S. has signed the ABM Treaty, participated in the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, and supported a UNGA resolution which called for a cessation of atmospheric testing. In addition, Australia and New Zealand have asked the International Court of Justice to restrain the French from testing and there has been further questioning from Congress concerning the U.S. relationship to the tests. Given the direction of these events and the increased international attention being paid to this problem, we should expect that it is more likely that we would be accused of a treaty violation this year than last. (We understand that French television has already ^{implied} ~~inferred~~ an American involvement in the tests). Despite these developments, the 1973 JCS proposal is even more ambitious than that of last year. This is reflected in the proposed use of helicopters, which would make our R&D effort more obvious and seriously undermine our use of a legal argument that we were "monitoring" rather than "participating" in the tests.

Barr said
this came
from C. Lloyd

We have reservations about the need for the R&D effort outlined in the proposal. Under the ABM Treaty, future deployment of ABM systems is severely limited. Our present Safeguard system is new, and there is some question regarding the priority which should be assigned for ABM system R&D. In short, we do not feel that DOD has fully reassessed its R&D data collection priorities in light of arms control developments.

INR and PM feel that we are again flirting with a situation that is potentially embarrassing, and that at a minimum we should avoid a collection effort so obviously for R&D purposes that we will be vulnerable

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to charges of treaty violations. ACDA believes that such charges of treaty violations would be difficult to dispose of, and would reflect on our past and future arms control and non-proliferation efforts.

We feel that the Department should again register with the 40 Committee its concern that the JCS proposal for using the French tests for R&D purposes has potential for exposing the US to charges of treaty violations, and that it is our belief that the political costs that could accrue from such charges outweigh the necessity for the R&D effort outlined in the JCS proposal. We recognize the commitment the Executive Branch made during the 1963 LTBT ratification hearings to maintain our knowledge of foreign nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements; and believe that a lesser effort--which would not require a close approach--would be more appropriate to that commitment and to this year's political realities.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the 40 Committee suggesting a modification of the JCS proposal.

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INR/DDC:ARBarr:sp

Ext. 29033

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Authority NNP 35152

By JL NARA Date 4-27-10

SECRET

25 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: The 40 Committee

SUBJECT: JCS Proposal to Use 1973 French Tests
for R&D Purposes

Last year the Department of State opposed the use of the French nuclear tests for R&D purposes because it felt that the possibility of our being accused of violating the Limited Test Ban Treaty by monitoring the tests overrode the anticipated R&D gains. We find the possibility of political costs is greater this year than last, and we feel the necessity for an R&D effort in conjunction with the tests has diminished.

Since we last considered a proposal to monitor the tests the US has signed the ABM treaty and supported a United Nations General Assembly resolution for the cessation of atmospheric testing. In addition, because Australia and New Zealand have brought this matter before the International Court of Justice, and because the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment has sensitized large elements of the world community, international interest in the tests this year will probably be even higher than last year.

The 1973 proposal to use the French tests for R&D purposes is more ambitious than last year; our use of the tests for R&D purposes would therefore be even more obvious. Therefore we run risks of being plausibly accused of participating in the tests. Although it is possible to argue

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that without French cooperation there is no "participation" in the test under the terms of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the purpose of the clause prohibiting participation in such tests was to ensure that the denial of the benefits of atmospheric testing for weapons development purposes would in fact be mutual. Both the United States and the USSR attached great importance to this. Therefore, to give full effect to the treaty and to maintain the implied bilateral commitment to the USSR, the United States should not "participate" in the French test in this fashion.

In sum, the above factors render us more vulnerable to charges of treaty violations this year than last, and we foresee an international and domestic political environment more sensitized and receptive to accusations of non-compliance. For these reasons, the Department feels that the political costs that could accrue from such charges outweigh the necessity for the intensive R&D effort outlined in the JCS proposal. We recognize the commitment the Executive Branch made during the 1963 LTBT ratification hearings to maintain our knowledge of foreign nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements; and believe a lesser effort--which would not require a close approach--would be ^{more} appropriate to that commitment and to this year's political realities. I recommend, therefore, that a more discreet collection effort than the one proposed be prepared for the Committee's consideration.