

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 21, 1978

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
SUBJECT: Approach to CTB

*3/6/79 -  
My inclination  
is to go ahead  
with a 3-year  
CTB - to be  
concluded simultane-  
ously with SALT II -  
JC*

The advent of the next round in the CTB negotiations (scheduled to begin September 27) has precipitated a sharp debate within your government over how to proceed -- particularly in light of SALT. Everyone agrees with our present strategy of ratifying SALT before concluding a CTB, but there are sharp differences in tactics.

At Tab A is a memorandum from Cy and Paul who propose that we complete our substantive negotiations in the next round (which will conclude before Christmas) but schedule a further round in the late spring or early summer in order to formally initial such an agreement. This, they argue, will help us avoid a confrontation in Congress on CTB while SALT is being ratified. In the meantime, they would propose to consult with other countries to drum up support for the substantively complete CTB agreement.

Harold and Jim Schlesinger believe this tactic will not work and will, in fact, precipitate a confrontation with Congress precisely at the time we are seeking ratification of SALT and that both agreements would be damaged by it. I believe there is an inherent contradiction between consulting other governments with a view toward making changes in the agreement and trying to prevent the Congress from engaging in the same kind of consultations with the Executive Branch.

The arguments and counter-arguments on both sides are set forth at Tab B. The critical question is whether the negotiations can be spun out until after SALT is ratified. To some extent, this will require Soviet cooperation if we are to avoid an international and, to some extent, domestic backlash on the grounds that we are dragging our feet.

I suggest the following approach:

-- You should discuss with Gromyko our priorities for SALT and CTB and seek his acquiescence to them. It is

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 6/16/98 NLC H/RE NLL-95-116  
BY [Signature] NARS DATE 7/8/98

important in this connection that the Soviets not seek to score propaganda points in the interim.

-- Depending on their reaction, we can shape the Delegation's instructions so as to control the pace of the negotiations. Because of the intensity of feelings on the issues, I would recommend an NSC meeting for this purpose following the Gromyko visit.

-- In the interim, we would simply give the CTB Delegation holding instructions to spend the first few weeks reviewing our position on the outstanding issues -- of which there are some half-dozen mostly related to duration and verification.

RECOMMENDATION

That I be instructed to inform the principals that you will be raising the question of timing and priorities with Gromyko and that we will then consider our appropriate response in the light of his reply.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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September 2, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Cyrus R. Vance *crv*  
Paul C. Warnke *PCW*  
SUBJECT: Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations

With the CTB negotiations now in recess, it is appropriate that we review our approach and take decisions which will allow us to move ahead when the negotiations reconvene. We believe that our review should be guided by these three objectives:

- We should seek to preserve the momentum of the negotiations and to capitalize on the Soviet leadership's current readiness to work out an agreement along the basic lines we have proposed.
- We should strengthen the chances of wide adherence by non-nuclear states by providing for their involvement in the negotiating process, but we should choose a form of involvement that does not run the risk of unraveling the results of the trilateral negotiations.
- We should avoid submitting a CTB treaty to the Congress at a time when that might complicate ratification of either SALT or CTB.

We have devised a strategy which we believe satisfactorily reconciles these objectives.

- First, we would proceed expeditiously in the trilateral talks to resolve the remaining substantive issues. The Soviets have seemed eager to complete the talks and have continued to move toward our positions on all major issues, including our approaches on national seismic stations, on-site inspection procedures, and

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PER 6/28/96 SLK RE MLL-45-117  
BY Q NARS. DATE 11/13/97

peaceful nuclear explosions. Prospects are good for settling outstanding issues during the next round. But rather than terminate the trilaterals at that time, we would plan to hold a final round at a later time, aiming perhaps for late spring or early summer 1979.

- Second, before this final round, we would undertake an extensive series of consultations with other states. We would begin with key Allies (France, FRG, Japan) and then proceed to other Allies and pivotal non-aligned countries (for example, India, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Sweden, Mexico, Nigeria). The purpose would be to explain and build support for the trilaterally negotiated text. We would expect to receive a number of suggestions for changes, and we, the Soviets, and British would decide whether any of these were acceptable when we got back together for the final round.
- A final decision on whether the treaty would go to the Geneva Disarmament Committee would be taken during the last trilateral round. From the preceding consultative phase, we would gain a better understanding of how strongly others felt about taking the treaty to this multilateral body and how much difficulty we might have in protecting our interests there. We would make our decision based on gaining maximum international support, consistent with our own requirement for a realistic CTB.

The principal advantage of this approach is that it would enable us to nail down agreement with the Soviets soon without having either to proceed directly with ratification or to delay the process artificially. We would have the flexibility to decide how best to maximize other nations' support, and to adjust CTB timing to the SALT schedule.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

19 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

I have the memorandum to the President from Secretary Vance and Paul Warnke on the CTB negotiations, dated September 2nd. It raises serious concerns in my mind about the potential negative impact on SALT ratification which the proposed strategy may have.

As a procedure to consult with other nations to involve them in non-proliferation efforts, and as a way to control the timing of a presentation of a CTB treaty to Congress, the proposed strategy makes sense. However, I do not believe the strategy would work to prevent an early confrontation with Congress. As soon as a policy is enunciated on 3 vs 5 years, permitted experiments, and particularly on our intention on resumption of testing after the 3 or 5 years, there would be a response from the JCS and from at least the working levels of DOE. Opponents in Congress will then hold hearings, claiming that they have as much of a right to be consulted and to influence the text of the agreement as do the non-nuclear states. There will be testimony from the JCS and the laboratory directors that in their judgment such a treaty is not in the best interest of national security. Though others of us will be able to point out the stockpile reliability will not be degraded unacceptably in 3 or even in 5 years, the whole process will in my view make severe trouble not only for CTB but also for SALT ratification.

My own judgment is therefore that we should hold off on these decisions, instead pressing the Soviets further at the resumed CTB negotiations on the issue of verification and its relation to a duration clause. Moreover, I believe that we should further explore the idea of combining a comprehensive test ban of limited-duration with an unlimited-duration threshold test ban treaty at a substantially reduced yield.

If the President nevertheless decides to proceed as Cy and Paul recommend, I suggest that he make a decision only to go to a 3 (or 4) year duration, reserving until after SALT ratification any decisions on permitted experiments and on any softening of a resumption commitment.

*Harold Brown*

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BY [Signature] NARS. DATE 2/8/99



The Secretary

September 20, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Recommendation Regarding the Vance-Warnke Memorandum on  
CTB Procedures

On balance I come down in favor of deferring resolution of substantive CTB issues with the Soviets until after the issue of SALT ratification has been dealt with.

First, that is the strategically logical way to proceed -- and that logic is widely understood on the Hill. Testing requirements -- and therefore testing limitations -- are derivative from strategic weapons requirements; it would be far easier to persuade Members of Congress that testing requirements are reduced as a consequence of a SALT Agreement.

Second, the constituency for CTB is quite limited compared to the constituency for SALT. CTB will meet strong objection on technical grounds, while objection to SALT will primarily be on policy grounds. The issue in a CTB debate will be: what technical risks to American security are being incurred for a generalized objective of arms control? Concern will be expressed within the official family (the Chiefs, the Lab Directors). In contrast to strategic arms limitations, in no way can it be suggested that CTB will improve our security relative to the Soviets.

In summary, the opposition to CTB is stronger, the constituency far weaker, the technical case harder to defend, and the arguments in favor revolve around the attitudes of third parties rather than the Soviets. I would consequently conclude that the issue of CTB should await stabilization of our arms relationship with the Soviets.

In a political sense I think it is clear that CTB can create troubles, perhaps insuperable troubles, for SALT. The reverse is not true. Therefore, if one is prepared to delay Treaty submission until SALT issues are resolved, one might as well avoid the costs inherent in the earlier attempt to achieve final resolution of CTB issues.

  
James R. Schlesinger~~SECRET~~

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