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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000


17 MAR 1992

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LIBBY

*K9/17* *ek* \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Comments Received on Draft DPG -- Potential Issues



OSD 1.4 (6)

(U) I would note that this draft's Strategic Deterrence section could use strengthening, particularly re: defenses. *Dir Adv. Sub Plans*  
*Crash reports*  
*st. 11 chg.*

(U) We may wish to review the concurrency references (p. 29, 51, and perhaps implied, p. 57) for specificity/consistency.

(U) We received several comments on the Total Force text in the Crisis Response section. The reference to combat forces for "initial" contingency response would both describe the force most accurately and remain consistent with the current NSSR if we did not insert the descriptor "most" (p. 29). Yet no one commented on the total force text now at p. 50 (perhaps because of the qualifier "primarily" in the RC sentence, which actually could also be dropped).

(U) The Reconstitution bullet at p. 21 drops SecDef's focus on a "renewed global" threat, which USD/P repeatedly affirmed when asked.

Dale A. Vesser  
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary  
(Resources & Plans)

Attachment: a/s

Prepared by: Rod Fabrycky, x79478

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*Doc #19 R-4*  
*07-11-1920-A1*

**Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999**

This Defense Planning Guidance implements the President's new defense strategy. This strategy guides U.S. security policy and military strategy in a dramatically changed global security environment, one marked by a significant reduction in the resources we will devote for defense and a focus on regional security challenges of concern to us, rather than on the global challenge we faced in the Cold War.

Our strategic position and choices today are very different from those we faced in the past. A fundamentally new situation has been created by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the internal as well as the external Soviet empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The United States has responded decisively to reduce its conventional and strategic forces to levels consistent with the promise and uncertainties of the changing environment. The passing global threat challenges U.S. leadership to preserve and strengthen the wide-ranging security relations we have developed over the last forty years with friendly nations and allies, including leading industrial democracies, and to include new democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in a prosperous and democratic "zone of peace." The new international environment also reflects the victory of the United States and its Coalition allies over Iraqi aggression -- the first major post-Cold War conflict.

Our regionally-oriented defense strategy and this Defense Planning Guidance seek to achieve our national security objectives while facilitating the reduction and restructuring of our defense establishment. As a Nation we have never before succeeded in reducing the defense establishment while retaining necessary capabilities. Our planning should preserve our ability, albeit at

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lower levels of forces, to shape the future strategic environment -- to foster positive trends and preclude the renewal of major challenges and thereby to avoid having to return to the more costly defenses requirements of the past. The choices we make in this more benign international environment will set the Nation's direction into the next century.

### I. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE 1990S

In the August, 1991 *National Security Strategy Report*, the President identified four basic national security interests as a framework for a number of national security objectives in the decade ahead:

- " The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies, to:

- deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and, should deterrence fail, repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies;
  - effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism;
  - improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems capable of defending against limited ballistic-missile strikes, and enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities;
  - promote democratic change in the Soviet Union, while maintaining firm policies that discourage any temptation to new quests for military advantage;
  - foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military adventurism;
  - prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile countries or groups, especially the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and associated high-technology means of delivery; and
  - reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combatting international traffickers and reducing demand at home.
- A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

National security and economic strength are indivisible. We seek to:

- promote a strong, prosperous and competitive U.S. economy;
- ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space;

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- promote an open and expanding international economic system, based on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes; and
  - achieve cooperative international solutions to key environmental challenges, assuring the sustainability and environmental security of the planet as well as growth and opportunity for all.
- *Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.*

To build and sustain such relationships, we seek to:

- strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights;
  - establish a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities;
  - strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic and social progress;
  - support Western Europe's historic march toward greater economic and political unity, including a European security identity within the Atlantic Alliance, and nurture a closer relationship between the United States and the European Community; and
  - work with our North Atlantic allies to help develop the processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to bring about reconciliation, security and democracy in a Europe whole and free.
- *A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.*

Our interests are best served in a world in which democracy and its ideals are widespread and secure. We seek to:

- maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance;
- promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes;
- promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions as the surest guarantors of both human rights and economic and social progress;
- aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking; and
- support aid, trade and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress."

In consonance with those broad interests and objectives, the President has approved the new regional defense strategy. This edition of the Defense Planning Guidance articulates the regional defense strategy -- from which the National Military Strategy is also derived -- and develops from it defense policy guidance for the next several years and the attendant guidance to the military

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services and defense agencies for their preparation of program proposals for the FY 1994-99 planning period implementing the Base Force.

## II. THE REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

### A. Regional Focus

The collapse of a global military threat to the United States presents an unprecedented opportunity to achieve our enduring national objectives with fewer forces and lesser resources for defense than was required during the Cold War. We can take advantage of the more benign environment now developing to shift our planning from a focus on global conflict to one on regional threats and challenges, and in this way work to preclude the emergence of new, non-democratic threats that could challenge our interests more broadly. As we reduce the resources we spend on defense, we must not squander our position of relative strength and security achieved at great sacrifice through the Cold War, nor eliminate our ability to shape the environment in ways favorable to us and those who share our democratic and free market values.

### B. Underlying Strategic Concepts

The Department does not decide when our Nation will commit force, but our recommendations on the design of defense forces and programs for the next six years may not only determine a future President's options when a crisis occurs, but actually shape the course of events, preclude potential challengers, and make such crises less likely. As we design our defense program, it is important to appreciate four concepts that underlay the potential roles that U.S. forces can play in furthering our security in this new environment.

1. Defense Planning Horizon and Uncertainty. An unavoidable challenge for defense planners is that we must start

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development today of forces to counter threats still so distant into the future that they cannot be confidently predicted. Events of the last few years demonstrate concretely how quickly and unexpectedly political trends can reverse themselves. Our ability to predict becomes even worse as the time frame becomes longer.

Given the magnitude of recent changes in the security environment, we build defense forces today for a future that is particularly uncertain. Fundamentally, we are striving to provide a future president with the capabilities 5, 10 or 15 years from now to counter threats or pursue interests that cannot be defined with precision today.

2. Shaping the Future Security Environment. Our strategy seeks to anticipate and to shape trends to advance U.S. security objectives in the future. This is both within our means and critical to our future security. America cannot base its future security on just a shaky record of prediction or a prudent recognition of uncertainty. Sound defense planning seeks to help shape the future. That is what the President's regional defense strategy seeks to do.

The containment strategy we pursued for the past forty years successfully shaped the world we see today. There are many causes for the favorable changes in the world that we have enjoyed in the last three years, including the fundamental flaws of Communism. But a necessary foundation for the liberation of Eastern Europe or the phenomenal changes under way in the former Soviet Union was the commitment of the United States and our allies through forty years of Cold War. Our refusal to be intimidated by the enormous build-up in Soviet military power during the Cold War, our willingness to match that buildup, our joint efforts with our friends and allies to build a democratic security community, and our deployment of forces forward in Europe and the Pacific that allowed democracy to develop and flourish in so many parts of the

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world, all these contributed to the very substantial peaceful changes that we see occurring today in the world.

We can now reduce the overall size of our forces and defense budget in light of those changes. But it's important for us to remember that our future security will continue to depend in large measure upon our willingness to build strong alliances, deploy forces overseas in Europe, Southwest Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and to retain high-quality forces here at home. These forces are critical to allow us to defend our national interests and to come to the aid of our friends as right and our interests should demand. The future may also come to depend on others' perceptions of our will and capability to reconstitute forces and to deter or defend against strategic attack, should that prove necessary. Among other elements that will help shape our future are continued efforts to prevent proliferation of advanced military-related technologies to irresponsible states; a robust military-technical lead of our own; verifiable arms reductions, not just to make war less destructive, but to make war less likely; and a highly effective, world-wide network of military intelligence capabilities. A defense posture based on these capabilities will be crucial for strengthening a democratic security community, heading off future crises or arms races, and precluding future aggressors from challenging our vital interests. These are main purposes of the regional defense strategy.

The regional strategy has already shaped our future for the better in the first major conflict of the post-Cold War era. Our success in organizing an international coalition in the Persian Gulf against Saddam Hussein kept a critical region from the control of a ruthless dictator bent on developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and harming Western interests. Instead of a more radical Middle East under Saddam's influence, Saddam and Iraq's dangerous military have been weakened, our ties with moderate states are stronger, and Arabs and Israelis have for the first time in many years met to discuss peace.

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One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying old alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into close security relationships. If other leading democracies and we continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely. If we part, many other problems can result. If we can assist former Warsaw Pact countries, including republics of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia and Ukraine, into a steady course of democratic progress and reduced military forces subject to responsible civilian control, we will have successfully secured the fruits of forty-years effort. Our fundamental belief in democracy and human rights gives other nations confidence in our tradition of civil-military relations and in our commitment to use our significant military power only as a force for peaceful democratic progress.

We must plan to help shape our future environment and hedge against both anticipated threats and uncertainty. This can be done at the reduced resource levels provided in the current fiscal guidance. We stood by freedom through forty painful years of the Cold War, and we stood by it again in the first crisis of the post-Cold War world. The defense programs for 1994-1999 should build upon our strengths to preserve our ability to shape the future.

3. Strategic Depth. With the end of the Cold War and the passing of the Soviet threat, America's strategic position is stronger than it has been for decades. Today we face no global challenger. No ideology challenges the primacy of democratic values. There are no significant alliances hostile to our interests. No region of the world critical to our interests is under hostile, non-democratic domination. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world are our friends. Near-term threats in regions critical to our interests are small relative to our capabilities and those of our allies. In Europe,

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a threat once poised at the inner-German borders was first pushed hundreds of miles eastward and has since transformed into the promise of a new era of strategic cooperation. Except with respect to strategic nuclear forces, no country is our match in military technology or the ability to apply it. A challenger to our security would have to overcome our formidable alliances and the qualitative advantages that we displayed so impressively in Desert Storm. We have in fact won great depth for our strategic position.

The events of the last three years have provided America with strategic depth in which to defend our national interests. Because we now face neither a global threat nor a hostile, non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs. We can seek to preclude hostile, non-democratic domination of a critical region, and hence the reemergence of a global threat, through political and economic means, as well as through our security efforts. Through forward presence, sustained crisis response capabilities, and a continued technological edge, we can help to preclude potential aggressors from beginning regional arms races, raising regional tensions, or gaining a dangerous foothold toward hostile, regional domination. We can maintain the military capabilities and strengthen the alliances necessary to our regional strategy. Together with our allies, we can provide more security at a reduced cost.

As a nation, we have paid dearly in the past for letting our capabilities fall and our will be questioned. There is a moment in time when a smaller, ready force can preclude an arms race, a hostile move or a conflict that, once lost, cannot be recaptured by many thousands of soldiers poised on the edge of combat. Our efforts to rearm and to understand our danger before World War II came too late to spare us and others a global conflagration. Four short years after our resounding global victory in World War II, we were nearly pushed off the Korean peninsula by a third rate

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power. We paid dearly in the past for our rush to disarm and our failure to accept a leadership role befitting our role in the world.

Our defense program for FY 94-99 must provide the ready forces, the mobility, the forward presence and strength to preserve our alliances, the means to fight proliferation of advanced weapons and the many other elements that will help to preserve at lower cost the hard-won depth to our strategic position.

#### 4. Selectivity

The Cold War required the United States and its allies to be prepared to contain the spread of Soviet power on a global basis. The former Soviet Union supported challenges in various regions as part of a global challenge to us and our allies. This meant that developments even in some relatively remote parts of the globe could affect the balance of power between us. The United States remains a nation with global interests, but the demise of the Soviet Union and the increasing strength of our allies permit us to define our interests more selectively and to safeguard those interests in separate regional contexts and at lower resource levels. The end of the Cold War has given us substantial flexibility in determining which regional challenges engage our vital national interests and therefore merit a U.S. military role.

Our new defense strategy therefore allows us to be more selective in deciding where and to what extent our military will be involved. Deterring or defending against a direct attack upon the United States remains our foremost objective. We must also be prepared should the United States deem it necessary to respond militarily to a hostile, non-democratic threat to dominate a region critical to our interests. Such regions include Europe, East Asia, and Southwest Asia, whose hostile, non-democratic domination could come to pose a threat to U.S. security. We also

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need to be prepared to respond selectively to other areas of historic or alliance commitment.

We should plan to remain capable to protect American citizens in pursuit of their legitimate interests abroad. This includes the capabilities to evacuate U.S. citizens from areas of crisis, and to protect them from terrorist attack. We should also plan to assist as a high priority national security mission in the interdiction of narcotics into the United States.

U.S. preference and steady policy is to address international security issues wherever possible in a collective context. The increasing strength of our allies and friends and our common interests in many areas present widening opportunities for common efforts in the context of the United Nations, existing alliances, or ad hoc coalitions, such as that involved in the Persian Gulf. We should plan forces and programs to operate in conjunction with others and to take advantage of the strength of our allies and friends where possible. We should press others to share more fully the burden of responsibility within the framework of collective defense arrangements.

Nevertheless, there may be instances where only firm U.S. leadership backed by significant U.S. capabilities can bring a coalition together and there are likely to be instances where we cannot count in advance on the international community to provide the preponderance of forces necessary to protect our vital interests. Therefore, for potential crises engaging our interests in regions critical to our national well-being, we must plan sufficient forces and programs to provide a future President the options he will need to provide such leadership and protect our interests. Having such capabilities will enhance deterrence, make the need for the use of military force less likely, and will increase the likelihood of effective international cooperation. Failing to have such capabilities for leadership would endanger our critical interests.

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In some areas we may be called upon by friends and by states seeking to strengthen their own security through democratic and economic reforms to help them address sources of regional instability in ways that promote adherence to international law and limit international violence. Where critical U.S. interests are not threatened, the countries involved will have to play the leading role and our support will consist primarily of non-military programs; but DoD can play a supporting role through security assistance, military-to-military contacts, and humanitarian assistance. We should look for innovative, low cost ways of providing such assistance. If such preventive measures fail, U.S. involvement will generally take the form of participation in collective responses. In such instances, American commitments will have to balance our concern for a just international order with due regard for our lesser interests in this case and limited resources. We should plan forces to participate in such missions; but we must not assume that we will carry the sole, or even preeminent, international burden in these areas.

### C. Enduring Requirements

The new defense strategy with its regional focus continues the need to pay special attention to four enduring requirements of our national security posture. Each requires careful, long-term attention, the investment of defense resources, and supportive operating practices; each represent key strengths that cannot be readily restored should they be lost.

1. Alliances and Coalitions. Maintaining our alliances continues to be an essential part of our strategy. In many respects, our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since World War II. It represents yet another victory, a "Silent Victory" of building longstanding

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alliances and friendships with nations that constitute a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented "zone of peace" that encompasses more than two-thirds of the world's economy. The U.S. will maintain and nurture its alliance commitments in Europe, the Far East, Latin America and elsewhere.

The growing strength of our friends and allies will make it possible for them to assume greater responsibilities for our mutual security interests. We will work with them towards this end. More reciprocal, more mature security relationships will be more sustainable over time and will advance our interests. As alliance partners and other friendly nations acquire more responsibility for their own defense, the U.S. will be able to reduce its military forces overseas without incurring significant risks. These changes, however, must be managed carefully to ensure that they are not mistakenly perceived as a withdrawal of U.S. commitment. We will in any case wish to continue to have a significant forward presence, as discussed below.

Certain situations, like the crisis leading to the Gulf War, are likely to engender ad hoc coalitions, that may include allies, nations with whom we have longstanding defense relations, and perhaps some with whom we have not previously cooperated. Some coalitions may entail only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished. We should plan to maximize the value of such coalitions. This may include specialized roles for our forces as well as developing cooperative practices with others and techniques for rapidly coordinating efforts with forces of nations with whom we have less prior dealings.

We should recognize that it will not always be incumbent upon us to assume a leadership role. In some cases, we will encourage that leadership be taken by others, perhaps through mechanisms such as international or regional organizations. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the United States will remain postured to act independently in defense of our interests where necessary. This

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may happen when collective action cannot be orchestrated or when an immediate response is a necessary presage to a larger or more formal collective response. This requirement will affect the type and level of forces and forward presence we maintain.

Events in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union over the last year or more have greatly advanced the prospects for dramatically expanding our cooperative defense efforts with others. Some of the strongest advocates for strong trans-Atlantic bonds and a continued U.S. presence in Europe are the newly emerging democracies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. We have begun international cooperative training programs with these nations and started military-to-military exchanges and a regular defense dialogue. Liaison relations exist between them and NATO. We should plan to encourage and continue such efforts. Each of these nations faces economic, ethnic or regional security challenges; but there is progress being made.

If democracy matures in Russia, Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union, there is every possibility that they will be a force for peace not only in Europe, but in other critical regions. Such democratic states will have more in common with us than in conflict. We could well imagine that in a crisis like Operations Desert Shield/Storm years from now, we will have not merely political, but military support from Russia, Ukraine, or other states of the former Soviet Union. We have begun security discussions with states of the former Soviet Union, as well as cooperative efforts to stem proliferation of weapons and technology and to lessen future risks by destroying nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of the former Soviet Union. We must plan to build on and expand these and other early efforts at cooperation with these nations.

Recent events have affected our critical security relations in Asia, as well. For decades, the very real security threat from the Soviet Union had served as the primary rationale for the U.S.-

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Japan security relationship. Even as the Soviet threat passes, however, the need for strong U.S.-Japan ties persists; and the U.S. remains committed to Japan's security. This strong relationship helps to counter remaining security threats, to further enhance regional peace and stability, and to protect the wide-ranging U.S. interests in East Asia and beyond. Japan contributed to the Persian Gulf defense cooperation fund and subsequently dispatched mine sweepers to the Gulf. Our forces stationed in Japan and generously supported by it played an important role in the Gulf War. In addition to Japan, we have active mutual security agreements with the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and have established non-treaty security relationships with several other countries. These ties will be important as the demise of Soviet Communism begins to affect China, Vietnam, and North Korea. North Korea's disturbing nuclear program, coupled with its record of support for international terrorism, and the tremendous military establishment it continues to support make it the most serious single threat to peace in Asia. But the seven largest armies in the world are in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Given our historic commitment to the region and its growing importance to us, continued security ties will be vital.

Finally, the Gulf War has greatly enhanced the nature of our security relations in that region and underscored their continued importance. Taken together, many facets of this experience -- combat forces, logistical support and financial participation -- and our subsequent cooperation on forward presence of U.S. forces promise continued close ties with nations of the region on which we can build.

2. Quality Personnel. Our victory in the Gulf War reminded us again of the importance of high-quality personnel and effective leaders. The highly-trained, highly-motivated All-Volunteer Force we have worked so hard to create is the key to maintaining our future military competence. We also require quality career

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- (U) Section II, E.1., Page 29, Para 2: The directive that U.S. forces must continue to be "at least a generation ahead ..." is much too opaque to provide useful program guidance. In particular, the concept of a technology "generation" has no commonly understood meaning and is, therefore, not useful. The general call for technological superiority is adequate without trying to quantify superiority.

Recommendation: Delete this paragraph.

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civilians in the managerial, scientific and technical fields, to maintain the pace of innovation and perform many of the challenging tasks of the Department.

Many aspects of the Gulf War tested the training, discipline, and morale of our military forces and they performed superbly. To continue to attract the highest quality people, we must provide challenging and rewarding career opportunities. This includes realistic training and the benefits of advanced training techniques such as interactive simulation. We must also provide the personnel tempo and quality of life they and their families deserve.

Quality personnel also require quality leadership. Our success in the Gulf reflected outstanding military leadership. We must continue to train our military leaders in joint operations and, as noted above, in cooperative efforts with the forces of many different nations. They must also be given the opportunity and encouragement to pursue innovative doctrine for operations and new approaches to problems arising under the regional defense strategy, as discussed below.

3. Technological Superiority. The onset of a new military-technical regime presents continued challenges not only in the realm of technological superiority but also in the way we organize, train, and employ our military forces. The Gulf War made clear the early promise of this new regime, emphasizing the importance of recent breakthroughs in low-observable, information, and other key technologies.

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continue to be at least a generation ahead

Future generations

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Comment: Add at end of paragraph: "Finally, while advanced technologies should be furthered and exploited, the absolute levels of capability to be fielded must take into account tradeoffs among capability, quantities, and costs. As demonstrated in the initiation of our new acquisition policy in the President's Budget, some of the most capable systems are now not needed in the absence of specific threats warranting their development." N.B. p. 58 has more this tone.

Rationale: While some previous policy statements have endorsed advanced technology very broadly, the recent decision to terminate programs such as the Seawolf submarine and recast programs such as the RAH-66 Comanche shows that increased capability no longer can be justified for its own sake.

See also opening statement of this paragraph, i.e., "without necessarily mandating absolute superiority in all areas."

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
- (U) Section II.E.1., Page 29, Para 3: Change paragraph to read: "Robust research and development is needed to maintain our qualitative advantage. New technologies must be integrated and evaluated in simulations and exercises and used to develop doctrine and tactics. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the acquisition process. ~~X~~ We need the ability to experiment with continuous, virtual and real technology demonstrations on future electronic battlefields, linked to key training ranges, including competing, integrated design and manufacturing teams, if we are to optimize our allocation of resources and reduce the time to get technology from the lab into the field. We must create incentives for the defense industry to develop technologies that will improve our production processes, facilities and equipment. ~~X~~ This will be increasingly important as procurement declines."

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- (U) Section II.E.1., Page 29, Para 3: The notion of "reducing the time to get technology from the lab into the field" is no longer a major goal of U.S. defense acquisition policy.

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must have at least the same qualitative advantages over their opponents as our forces did in the Gulf War.




Our investment in innovation must reach and be sustained at levels necessary to assure that U.S.-fielded forces dominate the military-technological revolution.

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Robust research and development alone will not maintain our qualitative advantage. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems produced in numbers sufficient for doctrine and tactics to be developed. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the acquisition process. We need to be able to fight future forces through simulation before we buy them. We need the ability to experiment with continuous, virtual and real R&D prototyping on future electronic battlefields, linked to key training ranges and competing, integrated design and manufacturing teams, if we are to reduce the time to get technology from the lab into the field, and if we are to concurrently develop the joint doctrine necessary to employ our combined forces. We must encourage defense industry to invest in new manufacturing processes, facilities, and equipment as well as in R&D. This will be increasingly important as procurement declines.

To make certain the best technology is available



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4. Core Competencies. Core competencies are the leadership, doctrine, and skills needed to retain mastery of critical warfare capabilities. Examples include armored warfare, maritime and aerospace superiority, and forcible entry operations.

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Identifying the key core military competencies of the future and retaining the lead in them will be among our highest priorities.

Future challenges may require different capabilities, perhaps replacing or possibly supplementing those core competencies that are critical to today's military requirements. A critical task will be to begin preparing for tomorrow's competencies, while gaining an appreciation of those we need no longer emphasize.

Maintaining and refining our core competencies is a responsibility that resides primarily within the Service organizations. But the Service leaders must search broadly for inputs and understanding; static approaches to warfare will not serve our longer-term interests. It is not enough to simply buy new equipment or develop new prototypes. Our understanding of warfare and the way we intend to defend our interests as a Nation must continually develop and evolve in the military-technical revolution that lies ahead.

#### **D. Goals and Elements of the Regional Defense Strategy**

The core goals of the regional defense strategy are to protect American interests and to promote a more stable and democratic world. We want to preclude hostile, non-democratic powers from dominating regions of the world critical to us and thereby coming to pose a serious global challenge. Threats to our critical interests could arise with little notice in various parts of the world, including Europe, Asia, Southwest Asia and Latin America. To accomplish these goals, we must preserve U.S. leadership, maintain leading-edge military capabilities, and enhance collective security among democratic nations.

The regional defense strategy rests on four essential elements:

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ASD/RA

(U) Add a new paragraph after the 3rd paragraph, bottom of page 8, to read:

The new strategy provides a basis for re-sizing active and Reserve forces within the objectives of the Total Force Policy. These basic objectives remain: 1) to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy, and overseas commitments permit; and 2) to integrate the capabilities and strengths of active and reserve forces in a cost-effective manner.

(U) Reason for change: Since the Department has made a strong case that overall reductions in active and reserve forces are based on requirements, it is important to reemphasize the Total Force Policy early-on in the Guidance. It is very important to describe how the Department's highly successful Total Force Policy--the effectiveness of which was clearly demonstrated in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM--relates to the new "Base Force" and the new military strategy. Also, this is consistent with the discussion of active and reserve roles in the Total Force at the bottom of page 32.

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- Strategic Deterrence and Defense -- a survivable strategic nuclear deterrent capability, and strategic defenses against limited strikes.
- Forward Presence -- forward deployed or stationed forces (albeit at reduced levels) to strengthen alliances, show our resolve, and dissuade challenges in regions critical to us.
- Crisis Response -- forces and mobility to respond quickly and decisively with a range of options to regional crises of concern to us.
- Reconstitution -- the capability to generate wholly new forces to hedge against future threats emerging.

### 1. Strategic Deterrence and Defense

Even though the threat of strategic attack has decreased significantly with the rise of democratic forces and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, deterring nuclear attack will remain the highest defense priority of the Nation. It is one area where our survival could be at risk in a matter of moments. Strategic nuclear forces are still essential to deter use of the large and modern nuclear forces that will exist even under a modified START regime. Our strategic nuclear forces also provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of an unforeseen global threat. U.S. nuclear targeting policy and plans have changed, and will continue to change, to account for the welcome developments in states of the former Soviet Union.

Fundamental changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have all but eliminated the danger of large-scale war in Europe that could escalate to a strategic exchange. We have entered a new era in our thinking about nuclear forces. This was evidenced in the President's recent nuclear initiatives, which made major unilateral changes in our tactical nuclear posture and strategic nuclear deterrent forces.

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If the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union agree to the President's bilateral proposals, both sides will make even more dramatic changes to their nuclear deterrent forces. For us these include earlier reductions to START levels; fewer ICBMs, with only one warhead apiece; and fewer warheads on our ballistic missile submarines. In addition, a substantial number of bombers would be oriented primarily toward conventional missions. In the end, the actual number of warheads would be roughly half of what we planned to have under START. The military departments should undertake measures now to prepare for this outcome. We must also examine more innovative ways of providing strategic deterrent forces.

[REDACTED]

We must also find ways of ensuring that strategic forces are increasingly capable of conventional missions.

[REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 (A)

The reform leaders of the newly independent states have clearly voiced their interest in reducing strategic forces inherited from the Soviet Union. They recognize we are not a threat and rightly view these forces as diverting scarce resources from rebuilding their troubled economies and complicating the improvement of relations with the West. We hope to give the new Commonwealth leaders impetus to make substantial reductions in these strategic forces to a level consistent with the absence of any threat from the West.

We can foresee the possibility of a time when Russian nuclear weapons no longer pose a threat to the United States and its Allies, and we no longer need to hold at risk on a day to day basis what future Russian leaders hold dear. A transformation of Russia along these lines should clearly be our goal. But we are not there yet. Our pursuit of this goal must recognize the as yet robust strategic nuclear force facing us, the fragility of

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democracy in the new states of the former Soviet Union, and the possibility that they might revert to closed, authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Our movement toward this goal must, therefore, leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in our relations and a survivable deterrent capability.

The threat posed by the global proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles has grown considerably and the threat of an accidental or unauthorized missile launch remains. The new technology embodied in the SDI program has made missile defense capability a realistic, achievable, and affordable concept. We need to deploy missile defenses not only to protect ourselves and our forward deployed forces but also to have the ability to extend protection to all nations that are part of the broader community of democratic values. Like "extended deterrence" provided by our nuclear forces, defenses can contribute to a regime of "extended protection" for friends and allies. This is why, with the support of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, we are seeking to move beyond the ABM Treaty toward the day when defenses will protect the community of nations embracing liberal democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic missiles.


Limited deployment of defenses will also be an integral element of our efforts to curtail ballistic missile proliferation. Defenses undermine the military utility of such systems and should serve to dampen the incentive to acquire ballistic missiles.

Collective defense allows countries to rely on the contributions of others for elements toward protecting their mutual interests in ways that lessen the risks and the costs for all. The nuclear umbrella that the U.S. has extended over our allies has defended the nuclear peace and lessened the risks of war without requiring our allies themselves to match the threat posed by the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. This has been a risk-reducing and cost-saving measure for us all; it is one we can

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
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3  
Air Force (Staff)



Army

OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)


See also p. 31, last line

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afford fiscally to continue and one that our interests cannot afford to let lapse.

Strategic nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role with respect to countries other than the Soviet Union.

 Strategic forces will also continue to support our global role and international commitments, including our trans-Atlantic links to NATO.

OSD 1.4 (a)

With the major reductions we have made and are prepared to make in our Base Force, it is critical that we ensure the effectiveness of our remaining systems. This entails completing procurement of 20 B-2 bombers -- a limited force for specialized missions, particularly in conventional operations--and continued upgrades to our B-1B fleet, to ensure safety of operations, to design effective countermeasures, and to increase its conventional capabilities. It entails extending the service life of our Minuteman III force and planning for future upgrades as it transitions to a single-warhead system. And it entails outfitting the last Trident submarines while planning how best to sustain the 18-boat force well into the next century. In addition to these important investments, we must adequately support the operation and training of these forces, the airmen and sailors who operate them, and a readiness posture which is appropriate to the reduced threat, but does not put our deterrent at risk in a tumultuous world.

## 2. Forward Presence

Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving security environment. We will continue to rely on forward presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. commitment and lend credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability,


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promote U.S. influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis response capability. Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the U.S. has been able to work with our friends and allies to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending and of unnecessary arms competition.

We should plan to continue a wide range of forward presence activities, including not only overseas basing of forces, but periodic deployments, exercises, exchanges and visits. Important too are host nation arrangements to provide the infrastructure and logistical support to allow for the forward deployment of forces when necessary. Our maritime and long-range aviation forces enable us to exert a presence in areas where we have no land-based forces. Special operations forces can help resolve conflict peacefully or deal effectively with selected low-intensity and terrorist threats. Presence forces also provide the mainstay of our counter-drug operations.

Our forward forces should increasingly be prepared to fulfill multiple regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional ones, rather than being prepared only for operations in the locale where they are based. Moreover, as in the Gulf war, our forward presence forces must be ready to provide support for military operations in other theaters.



**PA+E**

**Reference:** Page 12, end of 1st partial para.

**Comment:** Add following sentence:

"The timing of implementing reductions beyond those currently planned will need to be carefully considered and should be phased, taking into account future regional stability."


**Rationale:** Clarity.

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
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OSD 1.4 (A)

The changing security environment suggests significant adjustments to our forward presence in four critical regions discussed below.

The changes in Europe allow us to scale back our presence significantly to a smaller, but still militarily meaningful contribution to NATO's overall force levels. In this new environment, a substantial American presence in Europe will provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of Eastern Europe and possibly some states of the former Soviet Union seek to be integrated into a larger and evolving security architecture. It provides options for selected action should future American leaders decide it to be in our interest. Notably both our new friends in Eastern Europe and the leaders of the states of the former Soviet Union consider a continued U.S. presence in Europe and a strong NATO to be essential to overall European stability. American presence will also allay Western European concerns as those countries seek a new identity through integration and possibly the emergence of a common foreign and security policy.




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
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OSD 1.4 (a)



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## OSD 1.4 (a)

In East Asia and the Pacific, the peace we have helped to secure has facilitated long-term economic growth and

These contributions have allowed us to initiate a plan for carefully reducing our level of forces in the region, and to work successfully with our allies to increase their own role in providing for regional security and stability -- provided we avoid a disengagement or abrupt drawdown that would weaken that stability. We anticipate that more than 25,000 U.S. troops will be pulled out of bases in East Asia by December 1992. This includes the withdrawal from the Philippines. However, plans to remove additional forces from South Korea have been suspended while we address the problem posed by the North Korean nuclear program. U.S. forces have a unique role to play in this region. The changes in our defense posture in the Pacific will be far less extensive than in Europe, because the threat has changed much less here. The US does not intend to withdraw from Asia and will keep substantial air and naval forces forward deployed in Asia for the foreseeable future.

In the Persian Gulf region, we are striving with friends and allies to build a more stable security structure than the one that failed on August 2, 1990. We have major interests in that part of the world and, consistent with the wishes of our local friends, we must remain engaged to protect those interests.

OSD 1.4 (a)

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OSD 1.4 (a)

We will face new difficulties maintaining a ground presence in Latin America. In accordance with the provisions of the Panama Canal treaty, we would retain no major bases in Latin America beyond the turn of the century. Despite the general trend toward democratization and peace in Latin America, dramatic reductions of former Soviet and East European aid to Cuba, drug cartels, and prospects for continuing instability in Haiti and elsewhere will continue to demand a forward role for our peacetime forces.

Precipitous reductions in forward presence may unsettle security relations. Planned reductions should be undertaken slowly and deliberately, with careful attention to making in-course adjustments as necessary.

### 3. Crisis Response

The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of the regional defense strategy and also a principal determinant of how we size our active and reserve forces. The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including effective forcible entry capabilities, remain key elements of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges and achieving decisive results once there has been a decision to commit U.S. forces.

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Reference: Page 14, 1st partial para., lines 2-3.

*PA+E*  
Comment: Insert "single" between "initially to any" and "regional contingency" and insert to  
", to the extent possible," between "with combat and" and "most support forces".  
*(still primarily for support)*


*PA+E*  
Rationale: Clarity. Guidance later in the same paragraph and elsewhere indicates that a  
second, concurrent regional conflict would have to draw extensively upon  
Reserve Component personnel. Additionally, although the guidance is moderated,  
the instruction to increase the relative share of active component support for crisis  
response would demand a significant increase in resources for that purpose over  
the FY 1993 President's Budget. It is not clear in the draft DPG that such a goal  
has overriding priority. Given that the military departments' force structure is  
being mandated in DPG programming guidance and manpower capped at the  
same time, the shift of resources implied here may not even be feasible.  
Moreover, this passage seems to contradict the Total Force statement on p.32,  
directing that forces be kept in the component "in which they can maintain  
required readiness to effectively accomplish required missions at the least cost."  
A question that needs resolution is as follows: How should the military  
departments handle crisis response units that are far enough back in the  
deployment sequence that they could be maintained in the Reserve Components?  
A possible alternative approach is as follows:

*constrain  
believe  
the draft  
shift is  
now fully  
funded,  
checking*

"We must have the capability to respond initially to any single regional  
contingency with combat forces drawn wholly from the active component and  
support forces--active or reserve--that can meet the demanding timelines inherent  
in the planning scenarios."

*Air Force (Staff)*

AF-20. *(S)* Page 14, Para 1, Line 1. Delete remainder of  
paragraph following "over time. . ." and replace with: Initial  
response to a regional contingency will be with combat and  
support forces drawn from the active component, and a limited  
number of combat, support, and mobility assets from Reserve  
forces. Reserve forces will be responsible for augmentation of  
active combat forces and for providing combat forces in  
especially large or protracted contingencies. Mobilizing Reserve  
combat forces will provide the force expansion needed to enhance  
the US capability to respond to another sizeable regional or  
local contingency.



OSD 1.4 (A)

*Jr. Staff*



*See 2-MRC reference. top of p. 51*

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(2) Our response to regional crises must be decisive, requiring the quality personnel and technological edge organized to win quickly and with minimum casualties. In regional conflicts our stake will be less immediate than we faced against a Soviet threat, and political and strategic considerations will require a decisive outcome, which in certain instances will mean the overwhelming use of force. When we choose to act, we must be capable of acting quickly and with the appropriate level of force. We must be confident of the outcome before an operation begins. We must be prepared to make regional aggressors fight on our terms. This requires maintaining a broad range of capabilities and a continuing emphasis on technological superiority and doctrinal innovation.

(3) The short notice that may characterize many regional crises require highly responsive military forces. Most combat and most support forces for the initial response to such contingencies will be drawn from the Active Component, with exceptions to include notably support and mobility assets. Reserve Component forces will be responsible primarily for supporting and sustaining active combat forces and for providing combat forces in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve Component combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the U.S. capability to respond to another contingency.

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
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Air Force



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
Air Force



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
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


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
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
There are an array of other potential challenges to peace that require our forces to respond, including the challenge of halting the drug trafficking that fuels instability abroad and drains our own domestic vitality. We must continue humanitarian assistance efforts, and security assistance to aid positive developments abroad. We cannot ignore the reality of terrorist organizations targeting American citizens and interests around the globe. We have to anticipate instability and resulting threats to American citizens. We need the capability to respond quickly anywhere in the world to rescue American citizens endangered by political instability. The threat of regional challengers introducing nuclear weapons could greatly further complicate future regional crises. U.S. nuclear forces may have to play a role to help deter third party use of weapons of mass destruction.

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(U) Finally, the Gulf War provides a host of lessons that should guide future crisis response planning. Our crisis response forces must incorporate the relevant lessons of the Gulf War as identified in the Conduct of the War Study and other subsequent reports. Our understanding of the war and its implications for forces will continue to evolve for some time to come.

#### 4. Reconstitution (U)

(U) With the demise of the Cold War global threat, we have gained sufficient strategic depth that potential global-scale threats to our security are now very distant--so much so that they are hard to identify or define with precision. The new strategy therefore prudently accepts risk in this lower probability area of threat, in order to refocus resources both on the more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in the long-term foundations of our strategic posture.




OSD 1.4 (a)

~~(S, NT)~~ Nevertheless, we could still face in the more distant future a new antagonistic single threat or some emergent alliance of hostile regional hegemony. For the longer term, then, our reconstitution strategy must refocus on supporting our national security policy to preclude the development of any potentially

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


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
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hostile entity that could pursue regional or global domination in competition with the U.S. and our allies.



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
E. Regional Goals and Challenges (U)

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OSD 1.4 (a)

(U) Overall, we face a significantly more benign environment, with greater prospect that our vital interests will not get entangled in local conflicts. There are many reasons for this. The USSR is no longer fueling conflicts, either through the provision of either an alternative world view, or, more concretely, money and arms, and similarly the support of Cuba and Vietnam to foreign insurgencies largely has dried up. Thus local conflicts are less likely to originate or persist, and even if they do, they are less likely to engage the interests of the United States, because their outcome is less likely to affect the larger regional balance. The potential for local conflicts is increased overall probably only in the territories of the former Soviet Union itself. The demise of the Soviet Union has resulted in increasingly desperate conditions for former Soviet client states, which may lead to dramatic, unexpected shifts in their policy. However, these states will no longer be able to count on the possibility of support from their former Soviet allies, and

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(U) Recommend the following information be inserted as a separate category immediately prior to Section II A 4, page 5.

4. Counterdrug Activities (U)

(U) The Department has a crucial role in defending the United States from the scourge of illegal drugs. In order to accomplish that, the Department will employ the resources at its command to accomplish that mission effectively. Further, the detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs continues to be a high-priority national security mission. The plans and programs of the Department constitute an important and integral part of the President's multi-national and multi-agency approach to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the United States and fulfills a key and essential role in our nation's fight against illegal drugs. The Department's strategy is a multi-pronged approach supporting the accomplishment of the national objectives. It depends upon action at every phase of the flow: in the countries that are the sources of drugs, in transit from the source countries to the United States, and in the distribution and use within the United States. The Department will work to advance substantially the national objective of reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States through the effective application of available resources consistent with our national values and legal framework. This is a long-term commitment and will remain a high-priority objective within the Department for future planning and programming.


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therefore no longer have the capability to precipitate crises that could turn into global conflict.



OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)

1. Europe (U)

(U) We confront a Europe in the midst of historic transformation, no longer starkly divided into East and West. We are hopeful but not yet certain of achieving a Europe "whole and free."

We must strive to aid the efforts in the former Eastern bloc to build free societies. Over the long term, the most effective guarantee that the Soviet Union's successor state does not threaten U.S. and Western interests is successful democratization and economic reform. In doing this, we must recognize what we are so often told by the leaders of these new democracies -- that continued U.S. presence in Europe is an essential part of the West's overall efforts to maintain stability even in the midst of

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
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
such dramatic change. NATO remains the essential means by which the U.S. remains involved in Europe's security future.

(S) The breakup of the former Soviet Union presents an historic opportunity to transform the adversarial relationship of the Cold War into a relationship characterized by significantly greater cooperation. It already has reduced significantly our defense requirements. The U.S. has a significant stake in promoting democratic consolidation and peaceful relations between Russia, Ukraine and other republics of the former Soviet Union. A democratic partnership with Russia, Ukraine, and the other republics would be the best possible outcome.

(U) If democracy matures in Russia there is every possibility that it will be a force for peace not only in Europe, but in other critical regions where previously Soviet policy aggravated local conditions and encouraged unrest and conflict. A democratic Russia will have more in common with us in the pursuit of peace and democratic order than in conflict. It may even open the door to future military cooperation. Our military-to-military contacts with Russia, Ukraine and the other republics should help in fostering democratic philosophies of civil-military relations, transparency, and defensive military doctrines and postures.



OSD 1.4 (a)



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
OSD 1.4 (a)

04SD/A

- (U) Section II.C.1., Page 17, Para 3, Line 5: Add the words "chemical and biological" after "nuclear".

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
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OSD 1.4 (a)

(S) For the immediate future, key U.S. concerns will be the progress in Russia and the other republics toward demilitarizing their societies, converting their military industries to civilian production, eliminating or, in the case of Russia, radically reducing their nuclear weapons inventory, maintaining firm command and control over nuclear weapons, and preventing leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries. Military budget cuts in Russia and other republics will significantly improve the chances of democratic consolidation by reducing the influence of forces and institutions with vested interests in aggressive policies abroad and authoritarianism at home, and freeing up resources for more productive investments and thus improving the chance of economic success.

OSD 1.4 (a)



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
OSD 1.4 (a)



*Air Force*

AF-2. (S) Page 3, Para 1, Line 15. General Comment: Text uses terms "East, Central, and Western Europe" here and through following passages. Definition of East & Central Europe is unclear and should be made explicit to avoid confusion here and in other passages. ?


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OSD 1.4 (a)

(5) The end of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have eliminated the large-scale military threat to Europe. The ascendancy of democratic reformers in Russia is creating a more benign policy toward Eastern Europe. However, the U.S. must keep in mind the long history of conflict in Eastern Europe, as well as the potential for conflict between the states of Eastern Europe and those of the former Soviet Union.


(5) The emergence of democratic, increasingly Western-oriented states in Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance. The liberation of Eastern Europe significantly reduces our most urgent defense requirements in this region. It is, therefore, critical to U.S. interests in Europe that we assist the new democracies in East/Central Europe to consolidate their democratic institutions and national independence.



OSD 1.4 (a)

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OSD 1.4 (a)



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
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
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
OSD 1.4 (a)

2. East Asia/Pacific (U)

(S) East Asia, long an area of great interest to the U.S., is growing in its strategic and economic importance to us. It has as much potential to seriously engage U.S. security interests as any in the world. We have a long history of involvement in the region because of key economic, commercial and political interests. Fundamentally, East Asia is of vital importance because its economic resources, if controlled by a hostile power, could generate a global challenge, and because it is an area of potential competition among great powers. Japan and Korea alone represent almost 12 percent of the world economy. In addition, East Asia remains an area of enormous concentration of military power, actual and latent, including some of the largest armies in the world: those of China, India, the two Koreas, and Vietnam, as well as deployed U.S. and Russian forces.




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ASD/C<sup>3</sup>I

OSD 1.4 (a)



does the missing p. 43  
address PRC?


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
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
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OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)




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
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should pursue our cooperation with friendly regional states, including assistance to combat insurgency, terrorism and drug trafficking.

3. Middle East and Southwest Asia (U)



OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)



We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military sales without jeopardizing power balances in the region. We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate




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standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable them to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.



OSD 1.4 (a)

(S) The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the risk of future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons, slow the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.



OSD 1.4 (a)

(S) The presence of drug production and trafficking and instances of international terrorism in the Middle East and Southwest Asia complicates our relations with regional countries. We will contribute to U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives and support the efforts of U.S. counter-narcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade.

4. Latin America and the Caribbean (U)

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*ISA/IA (replace with)*

(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the US seeks a stable security environment. The focus of US security policy is strengthening and preserving fledgling democracies, supporting economic development as a foundation of national and regional security via the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, by sustaining the capability of nations to resolve narco-trafficking and internal security issues, and by preventing the spread of ballistic missile technology by encouraging nations to observe the Missile Technology Control Regime for exports, and by preventing the introduction of nuclear weapons into the hemisphere by encouraging full adherence to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

*(N.B. is highlights of Sec Def 4/10)*

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ASD/RA - Replace paragraph with:

(U) A major component of the National Drug Control Strategy is to work with the host source country governments to disrupt and destroy the growing, processing and transportation of coca and coca products and their associated precursor chemicals, with the long-term goal of effecting a major reduction in the supply of cocaine from these countries to the United States. Pursuant to


the National Drug Control Strategy, near-term efforts of the Department of Defense will focus primarily on the Andean nations from which most cocaine entering the United States originates. Effective implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy requires that the Department of Defense provide counterdrug operational support to the forces of cooperating countries. This support and assistance can be provided in the form of training; reconnaissance; command and control systems and equipment; intelligence; planning, logistics, and medical support; and civic action. In addition to this support of the foreign forces, the U.S. military will undertake ship and aircraft counterdrug detection and monitoring activities and authorized intelligence sharing in concert with cooperating nations. As pressure is brought to bear on the cartels that operate within these countries, drug production, processing, and trafficking are likely to continue expanding to other countries in the region.

(U) As a second line of defense against the transit of illegal drugs, the U.S. Armed Forces' support for interdiction efforts focuses on detection and monitoring, and the eventual interception by law enforcement agencies, of drug smugglers and their shipments, so that their trafficking operations can be consistently disrupted. Air interdiction efforts center principally on small, privately owned aircraft. The main goal of air interdiction is to deter general aviation aircraft pilots from transporting illicit drugs towards or into the United States. The detection and monitoring of airborne smugglers will be accomplished primarily by both airborne and surface based radars. In order to deny drug smugglers the use of transfer points and to prevent the undetected aerial penetration of U.S. borders and coasts, the radar system and associated communications system must be integrated and capable of rapid target acquisition, correlation, and information transfer. The primary air smuggling routes to the United States from the source and transshipment countries are over the Caribbean Sea, over the Gulf of Mexico, over the Central American isthmus and Mexico, as well as over the adjacent Eastern Pacific. The maritime interdiction remains focused on deterring drug smugglers, denying seaborne smuggling routes, and assisting law enforcement agencies in detecting and seizing drug-smuggling vessels and arresting their crews. Most drugs that are smuggled by sea to the United States pass through the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, or the Pacific Ocean.

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(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the U.S. seeks a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of U.S. security policy is assisting nations in the region against the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists, while fostering the development of democratic institutions. In addition, the U.S. must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit drugs, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.



OSD 1.4 (a)

(S) The situation in Central America will remain a concern. In El Salvador, we seek the successful implementation of the agreement reached by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. We also seek peaceful resolution of the conflict in Guatemala. In Panama, we seek to foster stability. Our programs there must also provide the capabilities to meet U.S. responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties, including defense of the Canal after 1999.

OSD 1.4 (a)



Reference: Pages 23-24 (Latin America and the Caribbean).

PA+E

Comment: Recommend rewording last paragraph on page 24 as follows:

1) Move third sentence (on Peru) to become last sentence of first full paragraph on page 24.


2) Substitute language below for last paragraph page 24.

"Countering drug trafficking remains a major problem in this region. As the lead agency of the U.S. government for detection and monitoring, DoD's activities in Latin America must be geared toward attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and in transit to the United States. In support of the National Drug Control Strategy, the Department of Defense will focus its counterdrug activities on the Andean nations which are the initial source of cocaine entering the United States. The Department's counterdrug activities will provide support to cooperating countries as well as to U.S. law enforcement agencies engaged in interdiction activities."

Rationale: (1) While many of Peru's problems may stem from the drug trade, the objective of stabilizing the government fits better in the earlier paragraph, furthermore the National Drug Strategy focuses on the entire Andean Ridge, not just Peru.

(2) Completeness.

PA+E (general)



OSD 1.4 (a)

Sec AF (general)

(U) Overall, my impression is that our fiscal guidance probably cannot be stretched to cover all that the programming and force structure guidance requires us to do.

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
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OSD 1.4 (A)

(U) Countering drug trafficking remains a high priority. Our programs will focus on attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the U.S. In particular, we should assist Peru in its efforts to overcome a serious and growing drug-linked insurgency. Our programs must provide the capability to detect the flow of drugs from source countries to the U.S., and for providing that information via secure communications to enforcement agencies.

5. Sub-Saharan Africa (U)



III. Programming for the Base Force (U) OSD 1.4 (A)

A. Introduction (U)

1. (U) Guidance. Formulation of the FY 1994-99 Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs) will use the guidance of the Secretary of Defense on policy and strategy in the preceding sections and on programs in this section, and in the Illustrative Planning Scenario annex, and the Fiscal Guidance published on 14 February 1992.

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Army

OSD 1.4 (a)

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2. (S) Overall Program Priorities. We will profoundly reduce our defense establishment, yet think beyond mere equal across the board cuts to restructure our forces and programs to support our regionally oriented defense strategy for shaping the future environment. Under current plans, force structure reaches minimum acceptable "base force" levels (for strategic deterrence, crisis response forces, and forward presence levels alike) by around FY 1995 for most of the force, so retaining adequate levels of force structure is a strategic imperative. Programming and managing this base force at levels of readiness (training, manning, equipping and maintenance) adequate for deterrence and timely regional crisis response is similarly imperative. Sustainability sufficient for the intensity and duration of regional crisis response operations is also of great importance. We must give high priority to selected research and development to keep our qualitative edge in systems and in doctrine. However, a profound slowing in the former Soviet modernization that long drove our programs enables greatly reduced emphasis on production; hence our new approach to defense acquisition. Finally, we will vigorously pursue reductions and management efficiencies in defense infrastructure and overhead to reduce the Department's cost of doing business.

**B. Strategic Nuclear Deterrence and Defense (U)**

1. (S) Nuclear Deterrent Forces. Program for base force levels as follows, pursuant to the President's Nuclear Initiatives of September 1991 and January 1992. This force would provide sufficient capability to support US deterrent strategy, assuming CIS forces are reduced to START levels, the strategic environment continues to improve, and our modernization goals are attained. With partial downloading of the Minuteman ICBMs, this force will conform with the START treaty.


*vice "Offensive Forces" per IT Staff, May, also st comment...*






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Dic. SBIO




OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)

2. ~~(S)~~ Defenses. Within a refocussed SDI program, develop for deployment defensive systems able to provide the U.S., our forces overseas, and our friends and allies global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.



OSD 1.4 (a)


~~(S)~~ Ensure that strategic and theater defense systems, as well as offensive and defensive systems, are integrated.

*ADI program moved to modernization; no force structure in it.*

C. Conventional Forces for Forward Presence and Crisis Response (U)

~~(S)~~ Program for overall base force levels as follows while meeting readiness and sustainability guidance and remaining compliant with arms control agreements.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Program forward presence forces to retain the flexibility to adapt rapidly to changes within regions, and to provide joint support and reinforcement among regions. CJCS commission a study in consultation with USD(P) to review forward presence policy and guidance, to be completed by 1 Nov 92.



OSD 1.4 (A)

1. Army. Within total end strength of 536,000 AC, 550,800 RC:

- ~~(S)~~ Program for 12 active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre divisions; sufficient AC combat support and combat service support forces

ARMY

AR-4 (2) CRITICAL Page 33. para 1. Army. Change as follows:

"Commit to Retain in Europe a corps comprising 2 heavy divisions and an ACR, with CS capability and a base for reception and onward movement."

Rationale. Presents a more realistic and flexible way of meeting NATO commitments.

USMC:

k. (S) The programming for 2.5 MEBs of amphibious lift has previously been accepted because it is a credible measure of the footprint required to execute forcible entry. The requirement is to provide credible forward presence, not simply a lift profile. Preliminary analysis shows the number of ships required to meet the lift footprint does not equate to the number needed to meet optempo/forward presence requirements. A J-3 brief dated 1 Aug 91 identified 52 amphibious ships as the current requirement for forward presence averaging. The current SCN profile does not meet this criteria. Therefore, revise the text on page 33, Section III, discussion of amphibious shipping requirements to read:

Program for 2.5 MEBs of amphibious lift tailored to support the National Military Strategy and current operational and optempo guidance)

*N.B. Base Force says "2.5 MEBs"; presence paragraph says don't exceed OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. —*

OSD 1.4 (a)

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
for a fully deployed corps (3 divisions) for 30 days, and sufficient support forces (AC and RC) for two concurrent major regional contingencies that develop sequentially.

-- (c) Retain in Europe a corps comprising 2 heavy divisions and an ACR, with combat support capability and a base for reception and onward movement.

-- (s) Retain one heavy division (-) in Korea, including associated support.


2. Navy/Marine Corps. Within total end strength of 501,000 AC, 118,200 RC (Navy) and 159,000 AC, 34,900 RC (Marine Corps):


- (s) Program for 12 carrier battle groups based on a force of 12 aircraft carriers (plus one training carrier) and 13 airwings (11 AC/2 RC). Program for about 150 major surface combatants.



- (c) Program for 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces. Program for amphibious lift for 2.5 MEBs. Y

OSD 1.4 (a)






OSD 1.4 (a)

3. Air Force. Within total end strength of 430,000 AC, 200,500 RC:


- (C) Program for 26.5 FWEs (15.25 AC/11.25 RC, including recce/SEAD).



OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)

4. Special Operations Forces.




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D. Mobility and Prepositioning (U)


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


(U) Implement the Secretary of Defense-approved mobility and repositioning recommendations of the Mobility Requirements Study as follows.



OSD 1.4 (a)

2. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Sealift (Navy). Acquire through new construction or conversion in U.S. shipyards additional large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships with a capacity of 3 million square feet of cargo space (which, plus the current SL-7 fast sealift ships, will provide the capability to surge 2 heavy divisions from CONUS).




Support implementation of the Merchant Mariner Reserve program to provide for availability of manning.

3. Prepositioning. OSD 1.4 (a)


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*Air Force*



*Don*  
Donald B. Rice

OSD 1.4 (d)

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OSD 1.4 (a)

- ~~(S/NF)~~ Navy/Marine Corps: acquire through new construction or conversion in US shipyards additional ships for afloat prepositioning providing at least 2 million square feet of capacity for Army combat equipment (at least a heavy brigade equivalent) and support. Support the current 3 Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons.

4. (U) CONUS Infrastructure (Army). Program CONUS infrastructure improvements per the approved Mobility Requirements Study recommendations, including a West Coast containerized ammunition facility and capabilities to move units "from fort to port."

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
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**E. Readiness (U)**

(C) Forward Presence and Crisis Response generally require high levels of readiness for most forces, given short warning times for regional threats; but readiness must be higher for certain missions and forces than for others, as reflected below. Readiness programming will reflect the "first to fight" principle. Specifically, priority for resources to maintain manning, training and equipment readiness will be accorded to units, regardless of component, according to each unit's peacetime deployment roles and the most demanding of its deployment or employment time(s) for the regional conflicts depicted in the Illustrative Planning Scenarios at Annex A.


1. ~~(S)~~ Readiness Levels. Program resources necessary to maintain unit readiness levels as follows:

AIR FORCE STAFFS




OSD 1.4 (a)


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OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)



- Other RC combat forces, and their associated support forces, will maintain readiness levels commensurate with their contingency missions.

2. (U) Personnel Quality. Structure and resource robust recruitment, retention and quality of life programs at levels expected to maintain roughly current high levels for the major aggregate personnel quality indicators across the force. Provide adequate resources for military institutions of higher education.

3. (e) Training. Place increased emphasis on joint and combined exercises that stress interoperability, joint warfighting

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doctrine, and rapid deployment (including use of prepositioned materiel). Provide programs of realistic instrument-evaluated joint training such as "Red Flag" and the National Training Center. Increase emphasis on use of simulators in training to most efficiently provide a well-trained force. Maintain requisite proficiencies for selected forces necessary to deliver limited theater nuclear strikes, and for forces that could have to operate in a nuclear/biological/chemical environment.


4. (U) Maintenance. Do not permit Intermediate and Depot maintenance unfunded requirements (as adjusted for programmed force reductions) to exceed levels in the FY 93-97 defense program. Retain sufficient core maintenance infrastructure to sustain future programmed forces after initial deployment.

F. Sustainability (U)

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1. War Reserve Inventories.

(C) For the near term, particularly in light of the need to restore our sustainability posture following Operation Desert Shield/Storm, war reserve material objectives are to (1) repair critical assets that would be needed for a near-term contingency, (2) reposition returned assets to maximize contingency responsiveness at minimal cost, and (3) procure only those assets demonstrably required in addition to existing assets to meet sustainability requirements below.



OSD 1.4 (a)

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[REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 (a)

[REDACTED]

*SVCS, may be able to do more than*

*reworded for clarity & appropriateness*

OSD 1.4 (a)

[REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 (a)

[REDACTED]

2. Industrial Surge

OSD 1.4 (a)

(b) Program for industrial preparedness measures to permit surge production of munitions, critical troop support items and spares where this is a cost-effective alternative to full war reserve

~~SECRET/NOFORN/CLOSE HOLD~~ -- DRAFT

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
*Air Force*



OSD 1.4 (A)



inventories for a portion of the above guidance. Program for support and spares surge and mobilization requirements for each major defense acquisition program achieving Milestone III during the program period.



OSD 1.4 (a)

G. Modernization and Investment (U)

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1. New Approach to Defense Acquisition.

a. (g) Threat/Requirements. The end of the Soviet threat and the expected pronounced slowdown or even halt in Russian modernization programs profoundly alter US modernization requirements. For our new strategy, investment requirements must reflect the different nature and sophistication of regional threats, and resulting changes in priority among defense missions and means of executing them, as well as the enduring strategic requirement for technological superiority.



*refocused "spm"  
per comments on  
industrial base's  
importance, but  
kept "gap" as  
a new emphasis*

The USD(P) description of "new" Acquisition Strategy in the Modernization and Investment Section is seriously at odds with that of the official representation for defining and executing the strategy. In particular, the draft DPG allegation that the acquisition process "must be fundamentally altered" is incorrect. Additionally, the DPG notion that a high-low mix of systems should be an explicit planning goal has no basis in current acquisition policy or procedures. What the Department is doing is building on its currently sound acquisition process to increase the emphasis on the early stages of the process including additional technology demonstrations. We have rewritten this section (Attachment 1) which we call "A Shift in Acquisition Emphasis" and recommend that it replace your section.

1. "A Shift in Acquisition Emphasis" *UWYR*

(U) In response to the dramatic changes in the national security environment, the Department is embarking on a major shift in emphasis in the way it develops and produces weapons systems within the existing defense acquisition system.

(U) The disintegration of the Soviet Union has reduced both the size and the rate of technical improvement of the military threat to U.S. interests, making the need to produce advanced weapon systems less urgent. DoD can afford to take more time in developing and evaluating new technologies before making decisions on weapons production. Regional instabilities now pose the most significant threat to U.S. interests and largely determine future equipment inventory requirements. While the Gulf War increased concerns about the ability of regional powers to acquire and employ some advanced weapons, the broad advances of hostile weapons technology previously driven by Soviet military R&D investments is radically slowing. With proper investment in our own research and development efforts, the Department can preserve the U.S. technological capability to counter the full range of likely threats to U.S. interests.

(U) While DoD will put fewer new advanced weapon systems into production in the future, the aggressive pursuit of new technologies will still be essential to maintaining the advantages U.S. armed forces need to prevail in future conflicts. A new weapons program will move to production only after DoD has verified the need for and cost-effectiveness of producing the system and after technical, manufacturing, and operational risks have been reduced to acceptable levels. In addition, DoD will emphasize upgrades of existing weapon systems using proven technologies whenever operational needs can be met in this manner. The principal objective of the defense acquisition system remains, ensuring that we have the best-equipped armed force in the world. The important difference is that the new security environment lessens the urgency to rush systems into production.

(U) The management keys to meeting this new environment will be: (1) disciplining the weapon systems development process so that first rate options are constantly available to force planners in the form of both upgrades and potential new starts; and (2) a vigorous science and technology (S&T) program that emphasizes ongoing experiments and technology demonstrations in accordance with a comprehensive S&T strategy that is tied to projected user requirements; and, (3) a disciplined mechanism for overseeing the interface between technology base efforts and the systems development process. DoD will adapt its fundamentally sound acquisition process to maintain a technically and operationally superior defense capability, while keeping the overall defense program flexible and affordable. DoD will fund the demonstration of a broad and robust range of technology options in a way that will be less costly than full engineering and manufacturing development. DoD will remain alert, through this dynamic science and technology effort, to the emergence of "leap-ahead" technologies. At the same time, oversight overhead is being reduced to the greatest extent possible.


(U) The revised defense acquisition approach will incorporate a range of different technology-level efforts, including experiments and basic research, advanced technology demonstrations, and advanced technology transition demonstrators. These efforts shall support subsequent technology insertions through systems upgrades as well as serve as hedges against the need to respond to currently unforeseen challenges to U.S. national security. Moreover, when a valid operational need results in a DoD commitment to pursue a systems acquisition program (i.e., demonstration/validation and full development/production), system and subsystem prototyping shall be an integral component of the acquisition strategy."

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(U) Recommend the following changes to Section II B 3, Crisis Response, pp 13-14: (Bold sections added.)

*ASD/RA*  
(e) The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of ~~our~~ the regional defense strategy and also a principal determinant of how we size our active and reserve forces. The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. One trait most share, however, is that they have the potential to develop on very short notice. These conditions require highly responsive military forces available with little or ~~no notice, a role best suited to the active component.~~ *✓ Dropped* Over time, we must have the capability to respond initially to any regional contingency



*Proposed insert*

OSD 1.4 (a)

*From NSSR 8/91 FYI:*

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Over time we will move to a Total Force that permits us to respond initially to any regional contingency with units — combat and support — drawn wholly from the active component, except for a limited number of support and mobility assets. Since many support functions can be more economically maintained in the reserve component, we will still rely on reserve support units in any extended confrontation. The primary focus of reserve combat units will be to supplement active units in any especially large or protracted deployment. To hedge against a future need for expanded forces to deal with a renewed global confrontation, which — though possible — is less likely and clearly less immediate than previously calculated, some reserve combat units will be retained in cadre status.


This approach will allow us to maintain a Total Force appropriate for the strategic and fiscal demands of a new era: a smaller, more self-contained and very ready active force able to respond quickly to emerging threats; and a reduced but still essential reserve component with emphasis on supporting and sustaining active combat forces, and — in particularly large or prolonged regional contingencies — providing latent combat capability that can be made ready when needed.



OSD 1.4 (a)

b. (U) R&D Emphases. Aggressively pursue advanced technologies for application in future weapon systems, to preserve our science and technology base and our forces' technological advantage, and to reduce system life cycle costs and lengthen service lives. Increase development and evaluation of prototypes and technology demonstrators, to demonstrate and validate advanced technologies and, where warranted, producibility, operational performance and associated doctrine. Incorporate advanced technology into existing or new systems only when the technology and subsystems are thoroughly proven; technical, production and operational risks are minimized; the production program is cost-effective; and the system is absolutely needed. Greatly reduce concurrency among the acquisition stages. Emphasize government-supported R&D as necessary to support our technology base. More effectively and efficiently evaluate systems and subsystems using such tools as modeling and simulation to augment system field testing.

*reworded w/*  
*DDR+E*  
*language (a*  
*T+E "thrust")*



OSD 1.4 (a)

ASD/SO/LIC

4. p. 39, 2a., 2nd para. Add new entry. "- long-range, high-speed, infiltration/exfiltration capability."

Rejected

RATIONALE: This unsatisfied requirement remains the top priority on USCINCSOC's Integrated Priority List. Due to the V-22 cancellation, an alternative solution must be developed to provide an essential capability for counterterrorism, special operations, and contingency response.

PA+E

Reference: Page 39, section 2.a., second paragraph.

Comment: [Deletions are indicated by strike outs and additions by italics.]

"...the following specific thrusts which contribute directly to high priority defense needs:

- All weather air superiority and defense against very low observable cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles and aircraft. Done

- Sea control and undersea superiority against ~~open ocean, coastal and regional~~ threats posed by advanced, stealthy nuclear and *Shallow water ASW against* non-nuclear submarines and stealthy cruise missiles, and by undersea mine warfare. *instead dropped "open ocean, coastal"*

- Rapid and high confidence neutralization of undersea mine threats, both shallow and deep water. *Not done, included in original...*

- Global surveillance and communications, focused on a theater of operations with sufficient fusion and planning assets.
- All-weather day/night precision strike against 21 century critical mobile and fixed targets.
- Air superiority and ~~all-weather~~ defense against very low observable cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and aircraft.
- Sea control and undersea superiority against open ocean, coastal and regional threats posed by advanced, stealthy nuclear and non-nuclear submarines and by undersea mine warfare.
- All-weather, day/night, survivable, mobile, and lethal ground combat capability.
- *ok* Technology for Training and Readiness, including embedded training, distributed simulation, and virtual environment depiction.
- Application of advanced technology for improving design, test and manufacturing processes to improve performance and reduce life cycle cost and schedule thruput time.

~~Shallow water ASW~~

~~Mobile~~

Replacement *ok*

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2. Defense-Wide Investment Programs.

a. (U) Science and Technology:

(U) Fund the science and technology program (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a, exclusive of SDI funding) at not less than 0% real growth per year, with a goal of 2% real growth per year, from the FY 1993 President's Budget. In devising the S&T program, take into account the potential European and Japanese contributions.

*Reserves increase made in FY93 Budget per new acquisition approval per OUSD data*

(C) Balance the S&T program between (1) a core of broad sustaining programs, and (2) the following specific thrusts which contribute directly to high priority defense needs:

- Global warning, navigation, surveillance and communications, focused on a theater of operations with sufficient fusion and planning assets.



OSD 1.4 (a)

- All-weather air superiority and defense against very low observable cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.
- Sea control and undersea superiority against potential regional threats posed by advanced, stealthy nuclear and non-nuclear submarines and stealthy cruise missiles, and by undersea mine warfare.
- Rapidly deployable, all-weather, day/night, survivable, mobile and lethal ground combat capability.
- Technology for Training and Readiness, including embedded training, distributed simulation and virtual environment depiction.
- Application of advanced technology for improving design, test and manufacturing processes to improve performance and reduce life cycle cost and schedule throughput time.

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*OUSDA - (kept portions not lined out)*

"(U) Test and Evaluation: In the FY 94-99 program:

*OUSDA*

~~1) (U) Invest in T&E resources to:~~

- Fund test capability investment needs (6.5 and related 6.4 and 7.8 funding) at not less than 0% real growth per year, with a goal of 2% real growth per year, from the FY 1992 President's Budget.
- Reduce operating and maintenance costs for new T&E capabilities by 15% when compared to similar existing facilities.
- Optimize investment strategy to support high priority defense ~~S&T~~ and T&E thrusts.
- Enhance susceptibility, vulnerability, and lethality assessment programs for combat systems and munitions.

~~2) (U) Manage T&E processes to:~~

- Harmonize weapon system requirements documents, the COEA, and test documents.
- Evaluate more effectively through the use of modeling and simulation to augment system field testing.
- ~~Develop early evaluation plans with emphasis on result-driven decisions, measurable operational and technical issues, explicit definition of the operational environment, and operational suitability.~~

*picked up @ p. 59*

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
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b. (U) Manufacturing Technology Program. Program not less than zero percent real growth per year from a baseline predicated upon the FY 1992 funding level. ManTech technical priorities should be based upon thrust areas identified in the National Defense Manufacturing Technology Plan.

c. (U) Test & Evaluation Assets: In the FY 94-99 program:

- Fund test capability investment needs and optimize investment strategy to support R&D emphases, including the high priority defense S&T thrusts, identified above, recognizing the increasing complexity of weapons systems to be tested.
- Reduce operating and maintenance costs for new T&E capabilities significantly when compared to similar existing facilities. Reduce or eliminate duplication or overlap in test capabilities and efforts.
- Enhance susceptibility, vulnerability and lethality assessment programs for combat systems and munitions.

*Removed paragraphs; retains some DDRE language*



d.

OSD 1.4 (A)

e. (U) Facilities and Infrastructure. Installations not required to support the reduced force levels will be closed in accordance



ARMY

~~"Installations not required to support reduced force levels, training, and reconstitution will not be retained. Facilities will be resourced according to Service priorities. We must not make resourcing decisions in anticipation of future BRAC closures. Fund investment for environmental stewardship to attain and sustain full compliance with federal and state environmental laws. Accordingly, plan to resource new facility investment and backlog reduction only at those...guidance above."~~

Rationale. Expands list of factors to consider when closing bases. It also removes language that contradicts Congressional language that precludes reducing resources for installations in anticipation of BRAC closing. *P+L + GC Staffs interpret otherwise*

*(So de I) - RF*

NAVY

(U) Page 40, Section III.G.2.d., delete direction referring to core and non-core installations.

Reason: Making a list of core and non-core bases is contrary to the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

AIR FORCE

AF-47. (U) Page 40, Para 2, Line 2. Delete sentence which reads: "Accordingly, plan to resource new facility. . .and environmental conditions."

RATIONALE: As written, could be viewed as potentially prejudging the base closure process, which is illegal.

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with Title XXIX of PL 101-510. Accordingly, plan to resource facility investment only at those "core" installations which have a very high probability of retention, as documented by the 1991 Base Closure and Realignment process. Confine facility investment at non-core installations to that required to address life/safety and environmental conditions. Fund environmental compliance, restoration and pollution prevention sufficient to achieve sustainable compliance with federal and state environmental laws and governing standards overseas; and to minimize negative mission impacts and future costs and to provide federal leadership in environmental protection. To maintain access to space and enable spaced-based support to terrestrial forces, provide necessary space launch capabilities and infrastructure.

reward  
per P&L  
+60  
consultation

3. Force Modernization Programs

(U) Fully fund all acquisition programs continued or initiated in the POMs, in accordance with the baseline approved by the DAB. In particular, fully reflect any agreements between the Defense Acquisition Executive and a Military Department Secretary that resulted from the Under Secretary for Acquisition's and the Deputy Secretary's affordability initiative.

a. Strategic Deterrence and Defense

(C) Program resources to maintain the adequacy of strategic deterrent forces consistent with postulated threats and arms control constraints, and to develop the capability to defend against accidental launches and third world ballistic missile threats. Also program for expected implementation costs of arms control agreements and initiatives.

(1) Nuclear Deterrent Forces.


(S) Bombers: Ensure the viability of the B-1B as a key component of our future bomber force. [REDACTED]

vice offensive  
forces per  
J+Staff, May  
+ 1/2 reward


OSD 1.4 (a)




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OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)




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*OSD 1.4  
- language  
per Libby  
mention.*



*move  
AD language  
here from  
former section*



OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)

b. Conventional Forces.

(1) ~~(S)~~ Priority Mission Areas. Selectively focus investment on and within the following high-priority areas, which derive from assessment of programmed regional contingency capabilities (including evaluation of Persian Gulf War experience):

- Deployable anti-armor: air-deployable ground force mobility and anti-armor capabilities for enhanced immediate tactical flexibility




OSD 1.4 (a)

- Combat Identification Friend or Foe (IFF): enhanced capability to identify friend, foe, allied and neutral ground combat vehicles, aircraft and ships, particularly in support of air/land battle doctrine, with joint exercises to refine interoperability procedures.


- Mine Warfare: improved naval and land mine clearance ability (including rapid minefield location and improved killing mechanisms, including against scatterable mines), with emphasis on support of amphibious operations, particularly in shallow water and beach areas; also, assault obstacle-breaching

capabilities, and advanced force-multiplying offensive land and naval mine capabilities.

- Chemical/biological: improved chemical and biological detection and warning systems (ground vehicles and air recon), protection systems (individual and collective) and medical support and decontamination systems; and consideration of CB effects in development of equipment that may be used in a CB environment; also necessary are implementation of expected CW agreements and destruction of chemical munitions.
  - Anti-tactical ballistic missile: improved timely intelligence and operational capabilities to track, identify, target and strike mobile ballistic missiles/launchers. (See also the related guidance in the strategic sections.)
  - Precision Air Strike: improved all-service joint air operations planning systems and procedures, including timely selective target assignment; increased ability, particularly munitions stocks, for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft to use precision guided munitions against ground targets, during day or night and in all weather,  

- OSD 1.4 (a)
- Tactical C3I: improved integration of national, theater and tactical intelligence and C3 systems; better and more survivable all-weather day/night reconnaissance and target identification capabilities (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles); improved sensor-to-shooter integration and near-real-time weapon targeting; forward deployable C3I assets minimizing lift requirements; modernized secure, interoperable and jam-resistant tactical communications (including for SOF); improved C2/management of combat service support operations.



OSD 1.4 (a)



OSD 1.4 (a)

**H. Reconstitution Capability (U)**

**1. General Principles.**

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(C) Reconstitution should be an "economy of resources" area of the defense program; higher priority should go to base force capabilities and to preserving our enduring strategic requirements of alliances, technology, quality personnel and core competencies. Programs for the base force will also provide considerable latent reconstitution potential. Still, modest but high-leverage reconstitution-specific investments can provide a valuable low-cost hedge, particularly as our Cold War investments become opportunities for selective "smart lay-away" of long-lead elements of forces or production capability.


(U) Active and reserve units would take part in deterring or responding to any threat that might require reconstitution. Such

J-8 (not in Jt Staff official pkg.)

44. (U) Page 43, paras 2 & 3. Recommend "reconstitution" be substituted for the word "regeneration."

REASON: Regeneration is currently defined as the capability to generate additional military power within the base force and differs from reconstitution in that it does not involve the creation of new units.


ARMY




OSD 1.4 (a)

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units (particularly the RC) would require "generation" to reach combat readiness; additional new forces beyond these could be reconstituted from the following types of assets:



OSD 1.4 (α)



c. (c) Manpower Assets. From the outset of any reconstitution effort, plan to use reassigned active component personnel and Ready Reserve training or volunteers, and place maximum reliance on increased recruiting and retention (including civil service support, and retention of personnel in recallable statuses). Plan

OSD 1.4 (α)

*precision clarity*



"Update projections of IRR...guidance below, plan program  
for measures to increase the size of the IRR."


**Rationale.** The word "program" implies direction to commit  
funding to an initiative which still requires additional  
analysis.

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for maximum recall and use of retired military personnel for reconstitution. Plan for necessary use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Use annual IRR screening and training authority to ensure members' availability. Update projections of IRR size and of requirements for IRR members to fill AC, SelRes, and cadre-type units and, if necessary to support reconstitution guidance below, program for measures to support an enlarged IRR. Maintain plans for use of conscription to meet an extreme and imminent threat.

2. ~~(S)~~ Force Reconstitution Programs. Reconstitution choices must reflect both "smart lay-away" opportunities and long-term reconstitution needs, and must reflect the relative likelihood of various reconstitution threats, focussed on long-term threats that may not now be precisely definable. "Regeneration" assets offer relatively short response times and availability in the immediate future, yet would also be useful for projected long-response reconstitution requirements at generally low cost. Production restart capability likely could prove a timely and longer-term reconstitution approach given expected warning times, and could offer enhanced capabilities, but likely at greater investment costs. Reconstitution investment must reflect these tradeoffs.



OSD 1.4 (C)

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a. (S) Land Forces: [REDACTED]

using the most cost-effective combination of:

OSD 1.4 (a)

- The 2 reserve component heavy cadre divisions, each with mission essential equipment for training and minimal SelRes O&M and manning (including minimal necessary full-time support);
- Equipment exiting active or reserve units and placed in long-term storage; and/or
- Industrial restart, surge and/or new production capability including, if appropriate, lay-away of production facilities and perhaps component stockpiling or other industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for M1A1).

Include in the POM a study/evaluation of, and as warranted resources for, the ability for reconstituted units to use equipment left by units deploying to POMCUS sets previously identified in the prepositioning section. (These units would contribute to meeting the above guidance.) Include exploration of innovative training measures to prepare reconstituted units in advance of POMCUS units' vacating their equipment sets.

avoid repeating list...

b. (S) Naval Forces: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] using the most cost-effective combination of:

OSD 1.4 (a)

- An Innovative Naval Reserve including up to 32 frigates and up to 8 training frigates with minimal necessary full-time support/training crews and augmentation/nucleus crews and O&M;
- The training carrier, backfilled in the training role by a deactivated but recallable carrier within an acceptable time; and/or
- Other ships in inactive but recallable status.

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c. (S) Air Forces: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] using the most cost-effective combination of:

OSD 1.4 (a)

- Airplanes exiting active or reserve units and placed in inviolate storage;
- Industrial restart, surge and/or new production capability including, if appropriate, lay-away of production facilities and perhaps industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for F-16, F-117); and/or
- Particularly for airlift/tanker squadrons, innovative measures involving, as appropriate, dual-use and/or refittable airframes, and possibly civil reserve status.

d. (S) Support and Training: If necessary for timely training and support for reconstituting units, program for selected training assets and cadre-type support units or stored support equipment; however, wherever possible identify and plan to draw such assets from the civil sector, defense production base, or government holdings or otherwise use resources made available after strategic warning.

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