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EYES ONLY FOR U/S KIMMITT FROM A/S SOLOMON TOPOL 2141

E. O. 12356: DECL: ·OADR TAGS: PREL, CH, US, AG

SUBJECT: SINO-ALGERIAN COOPERATION: NEW DEVELOPMENTS

BEIJING 12377

ALGIERS Ø716 B.

- 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. FOLLOWING AT PARA FIVE IS THE BACKGROUND PAPER YOU REQUESTED ON CHINA AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION.
- REFIELS REFLECT LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ISSUE OF SINO-ALGERIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION, INCLUDING A PUBLIC

REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A JOHNSTON SECRET UNCLASSIFIED



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SINCE 1984, CHINA'S PUBLIC POLICY WITH RESPECT TO

NUCLEAR EXPORTS HAS BEEN FOUNDED ON THREE PRINCIPLES: GUARANTEE FOR PEACEFUL USE, (2) SUBMISSION TO TAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL ITS EXPORTS (WHICH MEANS PROVISION OF TECHNICAL DATA TO THE IAEA AND AGREEMENT TO IAEA INSPECTION OF FACILITIES), AND (3) NON-TRANSFER TO THIRD COUNTRIES. THE CHINESE REITERATED THESE THREE PRINCIPLES IN THEIR APRIL 30 STATEMENT AND SAID THAT THE ALGERIANS WOULD "BRIEF THE IAEA ON THE NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND ALGERIA AND DISCUSS WITH IT THE ISSUE OF SUBMITTING THE REACTOR TO LAEA SAFEGUARDS AND SUPERVISION. " APART. FROM SINO-ALGERIAN COOPERATION, CHINA'S CONTINUING ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM HAS BEEN THE SCLE BREACH OF THESE PRINCIPLES OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE.

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CHINA HAS STATED PUBLICLY THAT IT IS WILLING TO PARTICIP IN GLOBAL DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS. BEIJING HAS STATED THAT PRC WOULD AT NO TIME AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE BE THE FIRST USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; IT SUPPORTS A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON NUCL TESTING; AND IT SUPPORTS THE THOROUGH DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CHINA CONTINUES TO CONDUCT UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING. CHINA HAS PLEDGED PUBLICLY THAT IT DOES NOT ENGAGE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION NOR DOES IT HELP OTHER COUNTRIES DEVEL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CHINA JOINED THE IAEA IN 1984; SUCH MEMBERSHIP DOES NOT IN ITSELF ENTAIL AN OBLIGATION TO APPLY IAEA SAFEGUARDS, EITHER TO A COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS OR TO

ITS OWN NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

THE NPT: WHAT MEMBERSHIP WOULD MEAN FOR CHINA

NPT MEMBERS THAT ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES PLEDGE NOT T TRANSFER TO ANY RECIPIENT WHATSOEVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NUCL EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. ALL COUNTRIES PARTY TO THE NPT UNDERTAKE REQUIRE IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON THEIR SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR EXPORTS THEY ALSO AGREE TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO CEASE THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND ON A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. CHINA'S DECISION TO JOIN T NPT WOULD BE A HIGH PROFILE COMMITMENT TO BECOME PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND WOUL

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PAGE Ø5 OF Ø6 STATE 143946 Ø22133Z CØ7/12 Ø11698 NODØ6Ø THEREFORE BE AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD. OUR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES ARE TO ELICIT A PRC DECISION TO JOIN THE NPT AND CONDUCT NUCLEAR COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH TH NPT AND THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GUIDELINES.

NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GUIDELINES (NSG)

THE MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENT KNOWN AS THE NSG CONSISTS O TWENTY-SEVEN NATIONS, INCLUDING ALL PERM FIVE MEMBERS BUT CH AND A MIX OF WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND SOUT AFRICA. THE GUIDELINES COVER SOME OF THE SAME GROUND AS THE NPT EXPORTERS COMMITTEE GUIDELINES IN REQUIRING SAFEGUARDS F THE SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR ITEMS ON A "TRIGGER LIST," BUT GO BEYOTHE NPT GUIDELINES TO INCLUDE COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER COUNTRIE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT ON THE TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES.

THE U.S. CONDITIONS ITS OWN SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES ON AGREEMENT BY THE RECIPIENT STATO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS ON ALL OF ITS NUCLEAR

ACTIVITIES (SO, FOR EXAMPLE, NO NUCLEAR EXPORTS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO PAKISTAN, INDIA, OR ISRAEL BECAUSE THEY HAVE SO

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NUCLEAR PROGRAMS NOT OPEN TO IAEA INSPECTION). IN 199Ø GERM
AND IN 1989 JAPAN ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD REQUIRE FULL SCO
SAFEGUARDS AS A CONDITION OF NUCLEAR SUPPLY. CANADA, SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS, AUSTRALIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, BULGARI
AND POLAND IMPLEMENT SIMILAR POLICIES. HOWEVER, OTHER MAJOR
SUPPLIERS, INCLUDING THE USSR, THE UK, AND FRANCE HAVE NOT Y
AGREED TO CONDITION THEIR NUCLEAR EXPORTS ON A POTENTIAL
RECIPIENT COUNTRY'S ACCEPTANCE OF FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. IT
U.S. POLICY TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE ALL OTHER NUCLEAR SUPPLIE
THAT FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS SHOULD BE MADE A CONDITION OF
SIGNIFICANT NEW NUCLEAR SUPPLY.

END TEXT BACKGROUND PAPER ON CHINA AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERAT BAKER