



Department of State

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POSITION ON THIS OFFER. THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO CONTRIBUTE A FEW CONSIDERATIONS SEEN FROM THIS EMBASSY'S PERSPECTIVE. //

3. GIVEN THE ROC'S STRATEGIC/POLITICAL VULNERABILITY, THE TEMPTATIONS TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPACITY HAVE TO BE ASSUMED. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, MANY FACTORS WHICH WOULD ARGUE AGAINST SUCH AN EFFORT IN COLLECTIVE GROC THINKING, E.G., RELATIVE INEFFECTIVENESS VIS-A-VIS THE PRC, HEIGHTENED DANGER OF A PRC PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE IF THE ROC SEEMED TO HAVE SUCH A CAPACITY OR THREATENED TO USE ACHIEVED WEAPONRY, JEOPARDIZING POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AND AN IMMEDIATE, ECONOMICALLY DISASTROUS CUT-OFF OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR SUPPLIES, FROM THE U.S. WE DO NOT KNOW DEFINITELY THAT ANY FUNDAMENTAL DECISION HAS IN FACT BEEN TAKEN. CCK HAS ASSURED US EMPHATICALLY AND CATEGORICALLY IN THE NEGATIVE. ADMITTEDLY, HE COULD BE EXPECTED TO DO THIS, IF HE SAW HIS COUNTRY'S ESSENTIAL INTERESTS AS REQUIRING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPACITY. CLEARLY, IF THE ROC WERE TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION, THEY WOULD HAVE TO CONCEAL THEIR EFFORT FROM US AT ALL COSTS. IN ANY EVENT CCK IS NOW EVEN MORE PAINFULLY AWARE OF OUR CONCERNS AND OF THE NECESSITY OF CONVINCING US OF THE CREDIBILITY OF HIS ASSURANCES. EVIDENCE IS BEGINNING TO APPEAR THAT HE IS ISSUING FOLLOW-UP ORDERS.

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BEYOND THESE CONSIDERATIONS, THE INDIVIDUAL WOULD NEED THE PROPER ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS (DOCTORATE LEVEL) AND, APPROPRIATE WORK EXPERIENCE TO BE ACCEPTED BY THEIR CHINESE HOSTS BUT ALSO TO MEET THE EXACTING PROFESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE ASSIGNMENT. ON BALANCE, AND THIS IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER DISCUSSION, WE BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THE SCIENTISTS SHOULD HAVE A BACKGROUND IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS R&D, WHILE A SECOND SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND HEAVY WATER R&D AND PRODUCTION. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF ONE OF THE SCIENTISTS HAD SOME BACKGROUND IN REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGIES.

9. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT A PROGRAM SUCH AS THIS COULD BEGIN WITH ONLY TWO SCIENTISTS, WHOSE ASSIGNMENT TO TAIWAN WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE SIMULTANEOUS. INDEED, IT MIGHT BE WISE TO PLACE ONE SCIENTIST ON TAIWAN FOR A TRIAL PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS BEFORE DECIDING ON THE ADVISABILITY OF ASSIGNING A SECOND. DEPENDING ON THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SCIENTISTS CHOSEN FOR THESE ASSIGNMENTS, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE ASSIGNMENTS BE PROGRAMMED FOR TWO-YEAR PERIODS.

10. THIS MESSAGE IS TO ALERT THE DEPARTMENT TO THE TREND OF OUR THINKING. AMBASSADOR UNGER WILL BE IN WASHINGTON ON CONSULTATION SEPTEMBER 18-30 AND WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE THIS SUBJECT FURTHER. BROWN

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