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## Department of State

## INCOMING TELEGRAM

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SUBJECT: PROPOSED ASS: TO ROC	IGNMENT OF U.S.	NUCLEAR SCIEN	TISTS

REFS: A. TAIPEI 6065, B. STATE 231333

AS THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, SOMETIME AGO PRESIDENT CHIANG MADE A FORMAL OFFER TO ACCEPT A NUMBER OF U.S. NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS ON ASSIGNMENT TO TAIWAN TO PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY IN NUCLEAR R&D PROGRAMS CONDUCTED BY THE GROC. THIS OFFER HAS BEEN REITERATED TO US ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, BY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF, MOST RECENTLY ON SEPTEMBER 8, AND ON HIS BEHALF BY THE PREMIER, FOREIGN INISTER, TWO VICE FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND OTHERS. OINT OF THIS REPEATED OFFER IS TO ALLAY U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE NATURE AND THRUST OF GROC NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, SPECIALLY U.S. CONCERN THAT THE GROC MIGHT VIOLATE EXIST-ING BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS GOVERNING PEACE. UL NUCLEAR COOPERATION. WE HAVE REPORTED THESE REITERA TIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER AND HAVE DISCUSSED THEM WITH VISITING NUCLEAR TEAMS AND OTHER INTERESTED WASHINGTON OFFICIALS.

2. REF B INDICATES THAT WASHINGTON IS RE-THINKING THE USG SECRET



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POSITION ON THIS OFFER. THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO CONTRIBUTE A FEW CONSIDERATIONS SEEN FROM THIS EMBASSY'S PERSPECTIVE.

GIVEN THE ROC'S STRATEGIC/POLITICAL VULNERABILITY, THE TEMPTATIONS TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPACITY HAVE TO BE ASSUMED. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, MANY FACTORS WHICH WOULD ARGUE AGAINST SUCH AN EFFORT IN COLLECTIVE GROC THINKING, E.G., RELATIVE IN-EFFECTIVENESS VIS-A-VIS THE PRC, HEIGHTENED DANGER OF A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE IF THE ROC SEEMED TO HAVE SUCH A CAPACITY OR THREATENED TO USE ACHIEVED WEAPONRY, JEOPARDIZ-POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AND AN IMMEDIATE, ECONOMICALLY DISASTROUS CUT-OFF OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR SUPPLIES, FROM THE U.S. WE DO NOT KNOW DEFINITIVELY THAT ANY FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONHAS IN FACT BEEN TAKEN. CCK HAS ASSURED US EMPHATICALLY AND CATE-GORICALLY IN THE NEGATIVE. ADMITTEDLY, HE COULD BE EX-PECTED TO DO THIS, IF HE SAW HIS COUNTRY'S ESSENTIAL IN-TERESTS AS REGUIRING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CLEARLY, IF THE ROC WERE TO MOVE IN THIS DI-RECTION, THEY WOULD HAVE TO CONCEAL THEIR EFFORT FROM US AT ALL COSTS. IN ANY EVENT CCK IS NOW EVEN MORE PAINFULLY AWARE OF OUR CONCERNS AND OF THE NECESSITY OF CONVINCING OF THE CREDIBILITY OF HIS ASSURANCES. EVIDENCE IS BEGINNING TO APPEAR THAT HE IS ISSUING FOLLOW-UP ORDERS.

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8. REGARDING THE KIND OF PERSON TO BE CHOSEN FOR SUCH AN ASSIGNMENT, WE WOULD RECOMMEND, AS A MATTER OF PRIMARY CONSIDERATION, THAT HE/SHE POSSESS HIGH PERSONAL QUALITIES OF MATURITY, GOOD JUDGMENT, RELIABILITY, TOUGH-NESS, PERSISTENCE AND PATIENCE TO DEAL WITH AN EXACTING AND TRYING TASK. SECOND, THE PERSON SHOULD BE A U.S. CITIZEN OF UNQUESTIONED LOYALTY, PREFERABLY WITH A WORKING KNOWL-EDGE OF MANDARIN AND EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH CHINESE.

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BEYOND THESE CONSIDERATIONS, THE INDIVIDUAL WOULD NEED THE PROPER ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS (DOCTORATE LEVEL) AND, APPROPRIATE WORK EXPERIENCE TO BE ACCEPTED BY THEIR CHINESE HOSTS BUT ALSO TO MEET THE EXACTING PROFESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF TH ASSIGNMENT. ON BALANCE, AND THIS IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER DISCUSSION, WE BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THE SCIENTISTS SHOULD HAVE A BACKGROUND IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS R&D, WHILE A SECOND SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND HEAVY WATER R&D AND PRODUCTION. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF ONE OF THE SCIENTISTS HAD SOME BACKGROUND IN REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGIES.

9. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT A PROGRAM SUCH AS THIS COULD BEGIN WITH ONLY TWO SCIENTISTS, WHOSE ASSIGNMENT TO TAIWAN WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE SIMULTANEOUS. INDEED, IT MIGHT BE WISE TO PLACE ONE SCIENTIST ON TAIWAN FOR A TRIAL PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS BEFORE DECIDING ON THE ADVISABILITY OF ASSIGNING A SECOND. DEPENDING ON THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SCIENTISTS CHOSEN FOR THESE ASSIGNMENTS, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE ASSIGNMENTS BE PROGRAMMED FOR TWO-YEAR PERIODS.

10. THIS MESSAGE IS TO ALERT THE DEPARTMENT TO THE TREND OF OUR THINKING. AMBASSADOR UNGER WILL BE IN WASHINGTON ON CONSULTATION SEPTEMBER 18-30 AND WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE THIS SUBJECT FURTHER. BROWN

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