PROF. MICHAEL BARNHART: It is my privilege to introduce and invite remarks from the Honorable Minoru Kusuda, a graduate of Waseda University, and most recently Executive Vice Director of the Japan Foundation and Executive Director of the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, but his experience that is of most interest to us this morning is as Chief Secretary to Prime Minister Eisaku Sato from 1967 to 1972. Mr. Kusuda.
MR. KUSUDA. (Remarks made through an interpreter.) Thank you very much for your kind introduction. I would like to use my assistant as interpreter. Thank you.
I would like to tell you about what happened, based upon my memories as Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Sato. It was on Friday, July 16, 1971, Japan time, on a day when the regular cabinet meeting was being held. Usually these cabinet meetings start at 9:00 a.m. Just before the end of the meeting, a message came from the Foreign Ministry to the official residence of the Prime Minister. The contents of the message said National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger went to Beijing from July 6th to July 7th, whereupon Kissinger told Chou En-lai that President Nixon wanted to visit China.
This message had been relayed from the Secretary of State Rogers to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Ushiba, and then to Vice Foreign Minister Yasakawa in Tokyo. It had not been communicated through the U.S.-Japan hot line, one that had been installed upon an agreement at the Sato-Nixon meeting in November 1969.
As soon as I received the news, I rushed to the Cabinet meeting room, but the meeting for the day had been adjourned, so I went to the Prime Minister's office and reported the news to Prime Minister Sato. The Prime Minister's instantaneous expression was very hard to describe. It seemed as if he were fighting a thousand emotions in one frozen minute in time. His verbal reaction was only one word of acknowledgment, "Soka?" or literally translated, "Is that so?" He fell silent afterwards.
As you all know, post-World War II Japanese diplomacy had placed first priority on cooperating with the United States, so much so that the opposition party in Japan was always making sarcastic remarks about the complete reliance on following the U.S. lead. As for relations with the People's Republic of China, Japan continued to observe the division of politics and economics.
There is no denying that there was a joke circulating among Japanese diplomats that one of them had had a nightmare that one morning he would wake up and find U.S. and China had established relations and failed to tell Japan. This nightmare had become a reality, and so I hope you can understand the sense of astonishment and consternation among the government, the business world, the academia, and the media.
It was against this background that the chief of the Japanese cabinet released a restrained comment on the situation, saying, "We welcome the dialogue that has begun between the U.S. and Japan in the interest of world peace."
Following this, Sato received a confidential telegram from President Nixon. The gist of it were as follows: "I would like you to know how much the comment made by your spokesman concerning the start of a new initiative between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China means to us, and how grateful we were for your response. Both our governments recognize the significance of improving the relationships between the People's Republic of China in order to eliminate dangerous conflicts in Asia, and so the platform for closer dialogue between great countries of the world can be constructed. Because of the extreme delicacy and urgency of Dr. Kissinger's mission to Beijing at this time, I deeply regret the fact that I was unable to discuss last night's news with you beforehand, but I assure you that we recognize the importance of discussing any common interests, including the China issue, with you, and would like to proceed by working closely with you on all matters of Chinese policy."
Prime Minister Sato did not criticize nor complain about the Nixon shock. Instead, he expressed his support for America's action as one in the interest for world peace, which in turn invoked President Nixon to express his gratitude and deep regret to the Prime Minister. Afterwards, President Nixon told the American Ambassador to Japan that U.S.-Japan relations will become more and more important in the future; there must never be another Nixon shock again.
I think the Prime Minister's calm and reserved manner consequently deterred a vicious cycle of accusation and supported friendly relations between the United States and Japan.
But why did the Nixon shocks occur? There seems to be a number of explanations. First, Dr. Kissinger is said to have implied that if they told the Japanese, they would not be able to keep the secret. I think this is just an excuse.
The President had some options, like dispatching a special emissary to Japan and ask for Prime Minister Sato's personal cooperation. I think that was possible to arrange. I think it was possible for the Prime Minister's comments in Tokyo to be released in support of President Nixon immediately after the speech in Washington. I think that was feasible and desirable.
Another interpretation for Nixon's actions is that it was revenge against Prime Minister Sato for a broken secret promise concerning textiles. Both (inaudible), Kissinger and Wakaisume, have looked back and stated that the linkage between Okinawa and textiles was an assignment that they were not enthusiastic about. Dr. Kissinger felt he had to fulfill the President's domestic political agenda. Professor Wakaisume, in his recent work, confessed that he did his job for the sake of realizing Japan's domestic demand, that is, a nuclear-free Okinawa reversion.
It is understandable that the Prime Minister's failure to deliver on the secret promise naturally angered President Nixon. In Japan these developments were considered to be Nixon's betrayal, but from President Nixon's perspective Sato's betrayal had come first.
Even if these were the circumstances, would the President, the supreme chief of state, decide extremely important strategic issues based on feelings of vengeance. Assuming that it could have affected the decision-making process, I doubt that it was a primary factor. I consider the White House to be a place where decisions are basically made with realistic vision of the Nation's interests.
It is my opinion that the primary reason for these developments was that the Nixon Administration was wary of any potential obstacle that might occur by informing Japan beforehand of this new strategic paradigm. I think that the excuse in Nixon's letter to the Prime Minister, that the situation was extremely delicate and urgent, is plain and descriptive. I think that the President did not want to address Japanese opposition and claims, and wanted to avoid getting caught up in the debate.
Of course, I am aware of the fact that Japan was unable to follow through on the secret promise concerning textiles, but I cannot help questioning whether the policy that the U.S. took in responding to a nation who had upheld its position as a sincere American ally was the right one. It is my understanding that Prime Minister Sato took pains to restrain his feelings of dismay and address the issue in a calm and composed manner, so that U.S.-Japan relations would not be complicated any further and that constructive relations could be resumed.
In addition, I would like to reflect upon the impact of the Nixon shocks. Nixon's initiative had a dramatic impact on creating a new paradigm of global politics. He freed China from the clutches of the long Cold War and summoned it to the circle of international politics.
As a result, an era of detente began. International relationships were initiated on a global scale, opening up the trilateral relationship between the U.S., the Soviet Union and China, and the dynamic exchanges between countries in the Far East, including Japan and Vietnam. I think it demonstrated President Nixon's eminence as a great leader in foreign policy.
And what were the impacts of the Nixon shocks on Japan? As demonstrated by the succeeding Tanaka administration that resumed diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China by September 1972, the impact was in favor of liberating Japanese diplomacy. Nixon's initiative constructed the framework in which both the U.S.-Japan alliance and diplomatic relations with China became possible. In this sense Nixon shock did not have a negative effect for Japanese diplomacy.
In comparison, the impact on Japanese domestic politics was serious. Public opinion surveys taken in 1970, for those who liked the U.S., showed 33 percent in favor but plummeted to 18 percent in 1973. In the same survey, numbers for those who disliked the U.S. rose from 8 percent in 1970 to 13 percent in 1973. There were even murmurs of dissent toward U.S. credibility among the ruling party, the LDP members. They were concerned as to whether or not Japan could really rely on the U.S.
It goes without saying that these criticisms about U.S. policy were in fact criticisms toward the pro-American Sato administration. The Sato administration was branded the "fading cabinet" by the media. Not only did the Sato administration begin its journey towards the end, Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda, the man designated to succeed Sato, was considered material of the Sato brand. Consequently, the prime ministership was preempted by Tanaka, and it opened the turbulent era of the seventies in Japanese political history.
Finally, I would like to also mention that as former and founding Executive Director of the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, I am extremely pleased to be here with you today and to share my experience. As one who worked during the era of the shocks, it makes me feel humble to be sitting among such good company, to be able to participate like this a quarter of a century later, and sit among preeminent scholars and distinguished guests of the United States and Japan gathered here, and observe the vigorous discussions about history. I would like to express my deep respect and gratitude to you all, and look forward to learning more from the fruits of your research.
Thank you very much.