Script

Interviews:
Aronson, Alfred

Beria, Sergo

Elsey, George

Gordeyev, Alexander

Kane, Jim

Kennan, George

Khaldei, Yevgeni

Kozinchenko, Luibov

Legchilin, Ivan

Lunghi, Hugh

Ortenberg, David

Roberts, Frank

Yerofeyev, Vladimir

Zarubina, Zoya



   


JEREMY ISAACS

TAPE 12 CR 10025 CONT.

I/V GEORGE ELSEY, 4/12/95

Q: The start of your career when you were in the map room ... how did President Roosevelt react in terms of decision making? Did he have lots of people around him? ... How did he function, especially around the period of Yalta?

A: FDR had a very different way of dealing with State Department than President Truman whom I, with whom I worked very closely also. Er, FDR really functioned as his own State Department. He had his cronies in the department. Er he paid relatively little attention to Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, in Hull's er last year in office. Harry Hopkins, his personal adviser, who lived in the White House er functioned more as a diplomatic adviser than any one of the State Department officers. - To the great consternation of course of career foreign service officers who realised there were many, many things that President Roosevelt should know and should be taking into account that he was ignoring and overlooking.

Q: Did he take people into his confidence? For example the Yalta discussions and things like that, were people briefed by him as to what the situation was?

A: He briefed very little. Well with respect to what Yalta had happened because he was so, already in such failing health when he returned from Yalta that he spent very few days in Washington. He went to Hyde Park and the weather was lousy, so he went south er, to Warm Springs, Georgia. He was in Washington, just a matter, almost of you could of hours after his address to the Congress. So there was no opportunity for a detailed er thoughtful review of what had happened at Yalta with either his military or his political advisers.

(cut)

Q: President Truman, virtually everyone says he was unprepared for office, ... and yet very, very swiftly he was having to make a decision about whether or not to drop the bomb. ... Was Truman unprepared, and how did he begin to deal with these massive decision he had to make?

A: President Truman was unprepared for the Presidency in the sense of being fully briefed and up to the minute on all that was going on. But as a Senator for the past ten years er as Chairman of one of the most important er Congressional Committees of the war, the Truman War Investigating Committee, he was well a- well aware of the major problems that a President had to face. He wasn't briefed on Yalta, he wasn't briefed on the Manhattan project which was the name for the atom bomb project, he didn't know the details of those things, but that doesn't mean he was unprepared to assume responsibilities of the Presidency.

Q: You went to Potsdam. What did you see, and what did you feel about this event?

(discussion)

A: Potsdam was exhilarating and exciting in a number of ways. First of all the fact that the Nazis had been defeated and thoroughly, completely. Secondly er that Truman wanted to get, and did get, Stalin's affirmation that he would enter the war within three months after the defeat of Germany. That was a major aim of why President Truman wanted to go to Potsdam: he wanted to get first hand acquaintance with Churchill whom he had not met, er but he wanted most of all to get that assurance that the Soviets would enter the war against Japan. When left for Potsdam we did not know whether or not the Manhattan project was going to be a success. Er the first test of the bomb er was - did not take place until July 16th after arrival in Potsdam. Er that of course changed er a number of factors: it made it conceivable that the war in the Far East could be brought to a conclusion earlier than had been anticipated. So there were many optimistic aspects. At the same time there were some troubling undercurrents: er the refusal of Stalin to deal fortright- forthrightly with respect to er issues of, of Poland; er, er the fact that President Truman wanted internationalisation of waterways, a number of things that would have led to a more open er post-war economic and political circumstance, Stalin was: "Nyet, nyet, nyet." So we were balancing both the er the good and the bad and were trying to sort our way through er: where are we going to be with the Soviets er in the coming years?

Q: How did Stalin look to you? Was he an impressive man?

A: Stalin surprised me by his er stature. He was much smaller than I had anticipated. For that matter so was Churchill, although I'd been seeing Churchill for several years. These er world leaders had grown to rather mythical proportions in the public eye, so when you came face to face I was six feet two and Stalin was a head shorter, it was something of a surprise in that sense.

Q: Did he exude power? How did people react around him from what you saw?

A: The most impressive thing to me about Stalin was this enormous security guard that accompanied him wherever he went. True, President Truman had secret service agents, but none of the whole phalanx of er guards that accompanied Stalin wherever he went. The conference was in Sicilianhof(?) which had been the summer home of the former crown prince of Imperial Germany. Er that was in Soviet, the Soviet zone, and access to that was absolutely impossible unless you had passes signed by er the British, the Americans and, most of all, the Soviets. Er the Soviets would not allow anyone into the conference room unless you were going to be a participant. You couldn't even look into the conference room, you couldn't even see where the conference was going to take place, unless you were one of the major participants. Security was tighter than anything I had ever seen before, or since for that matter.

Q: Now it was at Potsdam that President Truman informed Stalin that he had a new weapon, and it was shortly afterwards that he gave you instructions for a cable which actually gave the okay for the despatch... Can you tell me something about then?

A: President Truman, after consulting with er the British, and with his own military advisers, decided that he would tell Stalin that we had a powerful new weapon, without identifying it as a, a nuclear weapon. Stalin took the er news er very casually, said he hoped er the weapon would be put to good use against the Japanese, and walked away. There is some question amongst the Americans as to whether Stalin had really understood what Truman was saying. As we now know, er they knew all about the Manhattan project through er espionage and their own agents. Of course we were unaware of that at the time. The - there was no problem in deciding whether or not to use er the bomb. Anything that would bring the war to a, a quick and speedy conclusion was uppermost in President Truman's mind. He was appalled at the estimates of American casualties. He was appalled at the er continuing er casualties in Japan from the air raids that were going on, and so loss of life on both sides could be saved if er the war could be brought to a quick end, and the bomb seemed one way to do it - the only way to do it.

Q: You were given by him the actual cable message which authorised the dispatch of the bomb. Do you remember that? Did it seem to be something historic to you?

A: President Truman received a message from Washington that came through us in the map room, we were his communication officers there, er saying that the timing for the, the weather circumstances and all, everything was very propitious for an, a early dropping, use of the bomb, and his permission was requested er to release information about the bomb, a long statement that had been prepared in advance. And Truman reading this very hastily one morning misunderstood, thought he was being asked whether or not to drop the bomb itself. So he wrote out in long hand, and handed me for dispatch, "Okay, release, but not before August two." Why August two? That was the day we were set to leave Potsdam to return to the 'States. Truman wanted to be away from Stalin before the bomb was dropped, or before there was any announcement because he didn't want to have to answer any questions from the Soviets as to what is this all about.

Q: Were you aware yourself that this was a real big turning point in history? Or did it just seea gradual of the war as a process?

A: At that particular time everything seemed a turning point in history. No, it er, I was well aware, we in the map room had been aware of the Manhattan project for about three years, we knew what it was, we'd followed the progress reports, er so it was not all that special. Er, we hoped, as did everybody else who knew what it was all about, that this would bring a speedy end. This - the Japanese had ignored the Potsdam declaration of July 26th in which er, er they were threatened with er heavy devastation, er loss of life, and damage if they did not surrender. They ignored the Potsdam declaration. It seemed that this, this was the next step, this had to be done.

Q: The war comes to an end, there's victory, but the climate seems to change. Can you remember yourself when you first felt that, yes, the President's really starting to get very worried about the Soviet Union. ...? Can you pin point that or did that also evolve slowly?

A: The mood, the attitude er in Washington toward the Soviet Union had begun to change er well before er Potsdam. Storm signals were already er flying. Er within er days after er Roosevelt's death and Truman's taking office, our Ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, flew back to Washington to meet, make sure the new administration knew of the, his concerns, er and the concerns of his staff about post-war intentions of the Soviets, particularly to be sure that we understood the problems that er, er were evol- were arising with respect to Poland. Er throughout - er and then while we were in Potsdam er there were many, many arguments on, amongst the British, er Soviets and Americans about reparations. reaching out to grasp everything The Soviets seemed to be that they possibly could. We could see that ourselves in Sicilianhof: lorries were drawn up er just looting, taking absolutely everything out of the palace with the, except the rooms where the conference was being held, er light fixtures, plumbing fixtures, books, furniture, just sweeping it clean, and they were doing that all over the place er in their zone. Anything that could possibly be of value they were taking. And this was er again an, an indication of a frame of mind and an attitude that was going to be very, very difficult to live with. And we had no sooner returned to Washington than we began to receive cables from American representatives in the, what we were all later to call the satellite countries, on the behaviour of Soviet troops with respect to er, er the people of Poland, er of Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and so on. So er, trouble was in the air.

(discussion)

Q: Can you tell me about the receipt of the Kennan 'long telegram'? Did that end up on Harry Truman's desk pretty early on? Did that have any effect?

A: Kennan's telegram of February '46 er created quite a, a splash throughout Washington, er yes, copies er came to the White House, er Admiral Lahey(?) who was Chief of Staff, had been Chief of Staff to FDR and continued as Chief of Staff to President Truman er saw it, read it, discussed with those of us in the map room. It reinforced ideas he had long held. I can't personally say that I know that President Truman er saw it and read it, but it's inconceivable to me that he didn't, given the interest er in the White House. So, I can, ninety-nine and point ninety-nine percent certain - that he studied it with care.

Q: The Middle East was troubling everyone, and particular Soviet actions in Iran ... in Turkey. Do you remember any of the to-ing and fro-ing that went on about Turkey and Iran?

A: Yes indeed. Er in the early, er in the winter of '45, '46 er word began to get back to us that er Soviets were taking no steps to pull their troops out of Iran as they had pledged to do by the first of March of '46. Er that date came, Soviet troops were still in Iran and er Truman er with Secretary of State Burns began to er, er let Stalin know that they were very, very displeased with this, er and our Ambassador in Moscow, Walter Bedell Smith, er was instructed by Truman to take it up personally with Stalin, that er Truman's message to Smith was er, "I'd always thought the Marshall kep- was a man of his word. He hasn't kept his word here and this upsets me very much." - words to that effect. There was no public protest, although Secretary of State Burns did make a radio address on the matter, but er it was sort of a low-key diplomacy er and it, it worked. The Soviets did begin to withdraw er from Iran. With respect to Turkey it was perhaps a little bit blunter. Er it was apparent that the Soviets had er designs on Turkey, er and er, er the So- Turkish Ambassador in Washington died suddenly and er on the advice of State and the military President Truman er took the rather bold step of sending the body of the Turkish Ambassador back to Turkey on the battleship Missouri, the biggest, strongest battleship in the American Navy at that time. Er the Missouri had the additional distinction of having been the ship on which the Japanese surrender had been signed, so it had a symbolic value as well, and er that, that was the first presence of the United States Navy in the, in the eastern Mediterranean and it has maintained a task force there ever since. But this was symbol to the, to Stalin er, "Don't push us, er and don't push Turkey, because if you push Turkey we'll be there."

Q: About this time Churchill is over here, the speech at Fulton. Were you aware of any talks between Churchill and Roosevelt on this whole question... thinking particularly about Turkey and the response to Turkey?

A: President Truman and er Prime Minister - former Prime Minister Churchill had long talks at the time of er Churchill's visit in March of 1946. They er travelled by train together out to the mid-West, to Fulton, Missouri and er, er the Pri- er President was well aware of the content of er what became known as 'the Iron Curtain speech'. They, between them they did, they - they did a tour d'horizon, they did - surveyed the whole world situation er and Ch- Churchill of course was obsessed with the problems of the Soviet Union; er Truman was becoming increasingly concerned about them. There was a thorough review of the world by the two of them.

Q: Clark Clifford and yourself are asked to compile a report to the President of overall thought and dealings with the Soviet Union. ... Can you tell me how you went about gathering that information yourself, and what was the response of the people that you were speaking to about the Soviet Union? ...

A: In July of '46 the - President Truman increasingly irritated by er, er the failure of the Soviets to live up to the promises made in the declaration of liberator to Europe, at Yalta and the subsequent discussions at Potsdam, asked his special counsel, Clark Clifford, er to compile a list of the agreements that the Soviets had made that they had broken, or were not living up to. And I was then Mr Clifford's assistant and he turned the task over to me. Er we talked about it a bit, and I said, "Well, it seems to me that - er that's only scratching the surface, a list of agreements broken. There's, this is a much more fund- there are much more fundamental problems er in our relationship with the USSR than that. So let's go at it in a somewhat broader way." Er we er requested replies from the Secretaries of, of the Army and the Navy, Secretary of State, the Director of the FBI, the Attorney General, all the agencies the United States Government, the executive branch, that had er, would have significant information on American relations with the USSR. Er the replies came in, quite extensively, er and detailed and I con- consolidated, compiled them in a report for Mr Clifford to submit to the President. The gratifying, if you will, er aspect was that there was absolute unanimity in all of the agencies concerned as to the nature of the problems we had, and the kind of response we were going to have to make. President Truman For the first time realised he had, he didn't have a divided administration, he had strong support. Just a few weeks earlier, or matter of fact days earlier er before we submthat report, er he'd had a falling out and he'd had to fire the Secretary of Commerce, Henry Wallace who'd been a very much pro-Soviet voice and Wallace had given the impression that he was speaking for a large number of people throughout the government and the public. Er this report on Truman's desk made it apparent that Wallace was not at all speaking, was very much a, an isolated voice. Er Truman would have the backing of his administration, a very solid backing in any er tough stand, er stance against the Soviet Union.

Q: In retrospect, some historians have complained that it was a case for the prosecution, and there was no case for the defence, that maybe the Soviet Union's had some legitimate security interests ... Would that be, in retrospect, a fair criticism, or was that nor your brief?

A: It would have been very difficult for any one of us to have made a brief for the Soviet behaviour er in, in er Poland or in any of the er Eastern European countries. Er their absolute er disregard for, for human rights; er their ina- unwillingness to have any political opposition er in any of the countries they were occupying - I don't see how any one of us could have defended that.

Q: Was the -

A: Then or now.

Q: Was there really a fear that parts of Western Europe would fall to Communism? How strong were those fears and how did they show themselves?

A: There was concern that er some of the Western countries could fall under Soviet domination. Italy was a matter of very great concern er and er there was huge sigh of relief in April '48 when very narrowly the anti-Communist (sic) forces were defeated in, in Italian elections. Er it was, it was nip and tuck er given the er prostrate nation, er nature of er the economies er of many of the Western European countries. Er they could easily have er, er the balance could have been tipped in the Communist direction.

 

Q: In February 1947 Britain sends a telegram to the State Department: "Forget it. In six weeks time we can't pay any more. We're quitting from Greece, we're quitting from Turkey." What was the effect of that telegram and how did it affect both the Presidency and your own work?

A: This, er the British er announcement that they no longer could er remain in Greece, support Greece and Turkey, er came as no real surprise. It was a shock that it happened quite as abruptly and quite as quickly as it did, er but er the car- all the straws in the wind had pointed in that direction for some time. Er this simply crystallised er the opinions er in the executive branch that er the United States had to move and move very, very quickly er to reassure er Greece and Turkey, the British and all of Western Europe for that matter that er we were not going to stand idly by and let er Communist subversive eff- efforts, particularly in Greece er succeed; we weren't going to allow, any more than we had a year earlier when the Battleship Missouri had been sent to, to Turkish waters, er to allow Turkey to be pressured into er making er any kind of er submission to Soviet advances. Er the, this led President Truman to go to the Hill, to the Congress, on March 12th and make his speech which later became known as the Truman Doctrine address: that we would help countries er and our help would be primarily through economic means er to resist er aggression from foreign sources.

end of CR 10025

CR 10026

I/V GEORGE ELSEY CONT.

Q: Delivery of the Truman Doctrine speech. Was Truman aware of just how important it was, and was the House aware of how important a moment it was?

A: President Truman took the er Truman Doc- the Truman Doctrine speech - he didn't call it that, of course - er he took that speech very, very seriously, knew it was a momentous step in American er foreign policy, in American relations with the rest of the world. He delivered it er in a joint session of Congress, I was there in the balcony er listening, and I was struck by the absolute concentrated attention of the Congress. Usually a President is interrupted er many times by applause ordinarily by the people of his Party er on whatever the occasion is there is unnecessary applause and commotion and so on and so forth. On this occasion everyone in the hall realised that this was a major historical event. He was interrupted very rarely by applause. By the end he got a polite applause, but mostly it was, it was the, the riveted attention on here is a great change er in the direction of the country, a commitment er that's of major importance. Congress took it very seriously, as did the President. He was fortunate in that Republican er leader of the er Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate was Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a very broad-gauged internationalist - he'd been an isolationist in earlier year, but he had swung around, and Vandenberg led the Republicans in support of er this er, er approach of the President's.

Q: Was the President surprised at the bi-partisan approach, the fact that there really did seem unanimity which carried on of course for fifty years, was he surprised at that?

A: I think he was highly gratified er by the er bi-partisan support, but not really surprised. After all it seemed so self-evident to him that this is what the United States had to do. He would have been more surprised if he hadn't been able to persuade the Congress, er "Gentle- Ladies and Gentlemen, this is a major step for - that the country absolutely must take."

 

Q: The Marshall Plan. Why the Marshall plan came out of the Truman administration, and how important was Marshall in getting this whole plan ... going?

A: Er the Marshall Plan was logical next step from the Truman Doctrine speech. Er in March of '47 the President had said that our assistance to other countries must be primarily economic. Well how do you do economic assistance to other countries, particularly when they are so er beaten down that their infrastructure is in shambles, er when Western Europe had just gone through one of the worst winters in history? Everything was in chaos. Er General Marshall in June of that year proposed a, a mechanism, a way by which the United States and Western European countries could er jointly co-operate to rebuild the economy of, of Europe. It was er again a major, another step forward in the direction that we'd been pursuing for sometime. Why was it called the Marshall Plan? Very simple: er President Truman had been mildly concerned about the labelling 'Truman Doctrine', er he thought, 'After all, there's a risk er I can bring the Republicans only so far, if we start calling everything after Truman I'm going to lose some, some troops.' and er he had great veneration for George Marshall as a man, as a soldier, as a statesman, and he thought this should be called the Marshall Plan: 'If it's called General - for General Marshall, named for General Marshall everyone will support it; if it's called the Truman Plan, right away I'll begin to lose some Congressional and political support. It's going to be the Marshall Plan.' - and it was.

Q: Was it ever seriously believed that the Soviet Union would come on board as part and parcel of the Marshall Plan?

A: There never was any thought that the Soviets would actually er join the Marshall Plan. It would have been impossible for them. Er they would have had to open up their society, they would have had to come clean with all sorts of detailed statistics on their er industry, their whole social structure, which was inconceivable. But it was a desirable step to persuade the world that we really were being altruistic here, this was not basically an anti-Communist, anti-Soviet measure, and er should by some miracle the Soviets themselves join, or some their satellite countries, we would have welcomed them in it. But we didn't think that was a realistic possibility.

Q: Was there perhaps a hope that it might lure some of the Eastern European countries more in towards the Western sphere of influence? ...

A: Oh there was sort of wistful thinking that maybe one of two of the Eastern countries, but er you only thought that for a few moments realising that they were so firmly under Soviet control that it was im- they mighwant to, but it would be impossiblefor them to do so.

(interruption)

Q: At the same time a climate of fear going on, fear of subversion, of worries about secrets that are slipping away. How important did Truman believe the danger was of spies and internal subversion? How much did that concern him?

A: Well, President Truman was naturally concerned at any er, er indication that there had been spying in the Manhattan project of anywhere else in our military establishment, but er he thought it was minimal er the danger to United States w- was minimal. Worrisome, troublesome, to be eradicated, tracked down wherever possible, but as a major matter, no. Er and he thought it was er the, the propaganda from some of the journalists and er political opponents which was vastly exaggerated, over done, over blown.

Q: In retrospect to someone like myself it seems amazing that even someone like General Marshall or Secretary of State Acheson should be labelled and branded in this way as crypto-Communists or fellow travellers. Did the President ever take anything of this seriously? Did he ever offer any comments?

A: Oh, he took none of these exaggerated claims about Acheson, Marshall or others seriously. No, not at all. He took, he took them seriously only in the sense they indicated a pathological er frame of mind of the political opponents who were er uttering such nonsense. But as to any, ever any basis, no. Absolutely not.

Q: What effect did the Hiss trial have on the climate of that time, and the activities of Richard Nixon?

A: Alger Hiss had been a, a middle level er officer in the Department of State. He had retired from State, was working for a private foundation in New York when he was accused of having passed documents, er to Soviet handlers back in the 1930s. There was a lot of er confusion, er confused evidence, confused testimony. Er I think President Truman personally thought that there probably was some er, Hiss had done some things he should not have done, but Hiss was no great threat to American security. He was long since out of the government, and whatever his transgressions were they'd been in the 1930s; they were not affecting any, anything of the current nature. Er Truman regarded this as simply er politics as usual, or rather gutter politics as usual on the part of er Nixon and other persons who were using them to belabour the administration.

Q: The loss of China. To what extent were people like Nixon able to use this as an attack on the administration, and how did Truman and the administration respond to that?

A: There was a lot of er, commotion about the so-called 'loss of China'. Er Dean Acheson answered that er directly er: 'We didn't lose China; China was never ours to lose.' But it was, it became an increasingly er troublesome er question for the administration. There was a great sentiment for pro- pro-China sentiment in the United States. The United States had er long had missionaries in China, trade with China, great sympathy for the Chinese people and the Chinese culture; we had er sympathised with them er through the brutal attacks of the Japanese beginning in the late 'thirties: er so there was much pro-Chinese sentiment and it was very disturbing er to the American public at large to see China falling into the hands of Communists. And at that time there was the attitude everywhere that er Moscow and er the Chinese Communists were tightly linked, hand in hand. This was perceived by many to be part of a world-wide conspiracy and hence was, was somewhat frightening. Er and the opponents on the Hill made good use of, of this er malaise to er create some political points.

Q: What about things like the loyalty oath, and things like that that were taking place? Do you think there was a justification for them? ... Difference between Truman's approach to the situation and FBI and Hoover's approach...

A: I don't really think I can respond very easily to that one.

Q: Okay. Now...

A: It's not that I don't want to, it's just that I'm not sure that I, I'd have to think about that a while before I could give you a concise, clear answer.

Q: Were you personally yourself aware of any casualties, or people were really adversely perhaps unfairly affected by the whole 'McCarthy era' ... Could you see this in action?

A: The er McCarthy attacks er on State Department and other government officers were totally unfounded. Er he was preposterous in the magnitude of his lies, er and he lambasted individuals by name er completely unfairly and unjustly. I knew two people er who figured at one time or another in er McCarthy's wild charges, both er had to undergo long ordeals of exams and reviews by boards. Both were cleared. Er they had nothing in their record. The, the ludicrousness of it was that er one man was accused er by McCarthy er in, in two different er, in two different senses, he didn't, he realised he was talking about the same man: he made two cases out of one person. Er it was - one of the most despicable eras in our political life.

 

Q: It's difficult for us now looking back. What was the actual climate? How did it affect things? Can you give me any example?

A: It certainly had this, the McCarthy charges on er spying, espionage, disloyalty, certainly contributed to the problems of the Truman administration, and er coupled with the general er concern over the Korean War, the lack of our ability to bring that to a successful and early conclusion, all of this contributed to the plummeting of er Truman's er public er opinion, in his public opinion polls where he was down to the, in the twenty percents by the time of the, er he left office.

Q: It was a successful campaign.

A: It was a s- Unfortunately it was successful campaign.

Q: Was the Cold War necessary?

A: Was the Cold War necessary? Well first of all we have to define what the Cold War was. What is the Cold War? When did it start? You might say it started with Karl Marx, Das Kapital. Er we could, you could say it started er at the end of World War One when the United States and other er countries put troops into er former Russia to suppress the Bolshevik revolution. Er, when did the Cold War start? The Cold War's in the sense of er some resistance to Russian or Soviet expansion and the carrying out of the Communist ideals has been underway for over a century. Now was it necessary? Yes. If by the Cold War we mean the events since World War Two, it was necessary, otherwise we definitely would have had er Soviet continued expansion er taking over most, if not all, of Western Europe; moving into the Middle East; er causing problems not only with India but other countries in South East Asia; er Africa is a basket case in itself in many ways, and tragically, and er there would have been fertile grounds for er Communist er subversion and take-over there. All of these things were er prevented, er sometimes er prevented with great cost to blood and treasure, but nevertheless were prevented by the resistance of the United States and other Western countries to Soviet Communist expansionism.

Q: ...Was it really so that the United States was willing to go to an atomic war, bacteriological war, simply because of arguments with a Communist regime which was in the end nothing. How would you answer that question?

A: Well you're - that question assumes that the United States would have been ready to go to an atomic war. I don't accept that assumption. Er President Truman made it clear after the dropping of the two bombs that ended the Japanese war, after we became, everybody became, scientists world-wide, became aware of the damage done by nuclear weaponry, he was determined never to use the bomb again. No other American President ever has seriously considered er using the bomb. I don't - so I can't accept your premise that we were prepared to use bombs to stop Communism. We would use conventional weapons, yes; the bomb, no.

Q: But the whole of the American defence policy, millions of dollars, leading up to Star Wars, all predicated on perhaps the need sometime or other to press the button. No?

A: You have to be prepared to press the button if your opponent also has the same weapon.

(i)

 

Q: Wasn't the whole of America's defence detpolicy ... on the basis that under circumstances, yes, the nuclear weapon would have to be used? Is this not so?

A: If your opponent has a weapon, you have to be prepared to counter with the same or a comparable or a stronger weapon. The Soviet Union had nuclear energy, had er atomic weapons: we had to be prepared with nuclear weapons to ensure that nobody used them. Nuclear deterrence.

Q: What was the worst moment of the Cold War?

A: One of, certainly one of the dangerous, most dangerous moments er was faced by President Kennedy er in the question of, of Cuba and the Soviets er moving missiles into Cuba. That I suppose was as closer time as we ever came to er, a real, a real - the, the threshold of a possible er war with the Soviets.

Q: As a man who was quite close to things, certainly in the early years of the Cold War, did you ever have sleepless nights? Were you ever really worried about the situation?

A: No. No, how can you make anything of that unless I repeat your question.

A: I was never worried er in the time that I was with, worked with President Truman or in subsequent years that we were ever on the brink of a hol- of a major catastrophe. Worried? Yes. Er scared? No.

Q: What did the Cold War achieve?

(instruction)

A: The Cold War, if by that phrase we mean the resistance of the United States and its colleagues in the West against the Soviet er Union, the Cold War achieved a, er an uneasy er balance for a half century with no major outbreak of wars - troubles here, there and elsewhere, but no major struggle comparable to Worlds War One or Two. And by the continued strength and er the continued economic as well as military strength of the West er forced the Soviets to realise the failure of their system, with the result that Communism and the Soviet system as we knew it collapsed and the former Soviet Union broke up. We don't yet know how that's going to work out. It'll take us another perhaps half century to see how that works, but at least we have a totally different world now er than we had when the Soviet Union was throwing its weight around, er flexing its muscles and thumbing its nose at er, at the rest of us.(End)